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Foreword
James Gustave Speth
Dean, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

In 1896 Svante Arrhenius published On the Inﬂuence of Carbonic Acid in the Air
upon the Temperature of the Ground, in which he used models to demonstrate his
theory that emissions from combustion of coal would lead to a warming of the
Earth. With this effort the science of climate change was born, more than 100 years
ago.
The politics of climate change, on the other hand, is much younger. It was not
until June 1988, at a conference in Toronto, Canada—The Changing Atmosphere:
Implications for Global Security—that the idea for an international convention on
climate change was proposed.
I doubt that the proponents of the Convention, myself included, imagined the
magnitude or the full complexity of this proposal. In retrospect, I doubt that any
of us, given our current understanding of the enormity and signiﬁcance of the
issues being negotiated, would have dreamed that just 15 months after the ﬁrst
intergovernmental negotiating session a Convention would have been signed and
ratiﬁed. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change had
been negotiated, drafted, and was open for signature by the time of the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. By June 1993, 166 Parties had signed the
Convention, and it entered into force March of 1994. This series of events was a
stunning demonstration of the political momentum that was gathering behind
the issue of climate change.
The global negotiations that have followed in the wake of the ratiﬁcation of the
Convention have been among the most heated and comprehensive ever. More
than any other issue, climate change and the debate surrounding it have increased
international awareness of global environmental problems. As an issue that is per
tinent to development, quality of life, and human wellbeing, climate change has
been effective in convincing both rich and poor countries of the necessity of inter
national cooperation.
This volume has been compiled in collaboration with United Nations Devel
opment Programme in an effort to contribute to better understanding of the con
nections between climate change and sustainable development. The volume
should serve as a tool for decisionmakers in developing countries, who will have
enormous responsibilities in facing climate challenges in the coming years. At the
same time, it is intended to be a resource for university faculty and students and
others interested in exploring the complexities of the climate change debate. By
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developing a perspective on climate change that is this well-rounded, the volume
should prove valuable both to those concerned about development and those
focusing on the environment.



Foreword
Elena Martinez
Assistant Administrator and Regional Director
Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
United Nations Development Programme

The policies being formulated in developing countries today are those that will
ultimately have the greatest impact on the environment and natural resources at
the regional level, and on climate change at the global level. In recognition of this,
 is focusing on capacity building and institutional strengthening, and in so
doing, is supporting developing countries in their e›orts to acquire the means to
become involved with the global struggle to address climate change, while simul
taneously furthering sustainable development and poverty eradication. At the
core of this approach is the  conviction that the best way to address climate
change is through sustainable development. At the same time, the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change () promises to be a critical tool for sus
tainable development. Yet, unfortunately, it seems that this connection between
sustainable development and the climate change regime is all too often over
looked, both politically and academically.
Because the climate change regime is fairly new, and the system of global envi
ronmental governance has yet to truly test its legs, much of the focus has been
compartmentalized—giving the impression that the issue of climate change is all
about mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. But it is not. It cannot be. First, there
is little incentive for any country, regardless of region or economic status, to
commit to climate change activities solely for the sake of abating emissions. This
is especially so for developing countries, which are unlikely to sacriﬁce domestic
developmental goals and priorities, such as poverty alleviation and installation of
sustainable energy services, solely for the good of the global environment. This is
especially critical because the consensus is that the Convention will be e›ective
only if both developed and developing countries fulﬁll their common but
di›erentiated responsibilities. Second, it has been determined that the conse
quences of climate change are not only very real, but are already being felt
throughout the world, particularly in developing countries, which are less ﬁnan
cially able to manage unexpected extreme weather events. Thus, climate change
adaptation activities must be brought to the forefront.
Despite these realities, the resources dedicated to the speciﬁc link between cli
mate change and sustainable development are limited. This was a driving factor
behind the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean’s () deci
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sion to support this volume. Climate Change and Development not only elaborates
the linkages between climate change and the various components of develop
ment, such as energy, abatement, technology, health, forestry, and agriculture, but
it considers the avenues available to developing countries, and includes discus
sions of demonstrable achievements that may be replicated.
Further impetus for  involvement with this volume is the range of social
and economic extremes to be found in Latin American and the Caribbean. During
the 1990s, the region experienced a modest but uneven growth rate. The decade
was also marked by increased, yet volatile, private capital inﬂows. Consequently,
despite overall regional economic growth, there are still pockets of poverty
throughout the region that lack social and physical infrastructure such as educa
tion, healthcare, water, and energy services. The regional progress on poverty
eradication in the 1990s was not suﬃcient to compensate for the damage done in
the 1980s. In fact, in 1999 the number of absolute poor in Latin America and the
Caribbean reached an all-time high of 220 million, which was further com
pounded by increased inequity between socioeconomic groups.
The cycle of poverty, systemic paucity, and environmental degradation has the
potential to self-perpetuate, particularly with regard to energy services. Without
energy, economic growth is severely limited, as employment, health facilities, and
education services are all reliant to varying degrees on energy. Thus, in tandem
with economic growth, leaders throughout the region have been intensifying their
commitments to improve the quality of life for their populations. The common
underlying theme of the policies being implemented to alleviate poverty is foster
ing growth. For its part,  has been focusing on capacity building and insti
tutional strengthening to facilitate the introduction of policies and systems based
on sustainable energy generation. Further, it has been promoting and supporting
climate change activities throughout the region. The Latin American and
Caribbean region is in the vanguard of activities that integrate climate change and
sustainable development. As elaborated by the Latin American contributors to this
volume, countries throughout the region have taken signiﬁcant steps that demon
strate the region’s commitment to changing the path of development. From
Brazil’s biomass initiative to the adaptation activities in the Caribbean, from
Argentina’s ﬂeet of natural gas vehicles to Costa Rica’s carbon sequestration pro
jects, there is evidence that climate change initiatives are gaining momentum
throughout the region.
Thus, based on the progress that has been made, and work there is yet to do,
 has collaborated the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies to
produce this volume, which successfully integrates not only the broad concepts of
climate change and sustainable development, but also the subtopics of impacts,
ﬁnancing, and ﬂexibility mechanisms. This volume is a fundamental resource for
decisionmakers in developing countries, whose actions to advance development
today are destined to impact the future of climate change, and indeed, of sustain
able human development.

   

Note from the editor
Luis Gómez-Echeverri
United Nations Development Programme

Climate change is one of the most serious environmental problems that human
ity faces today. According to assessments of the , the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, developing countries will be the most seriously aﬀected.
Unfortunately however most of these countries are lacking the basic tools, the
institutions and the capacities needed to cope with and mitigate its eﬀects. Fur
thermore, the dismal condition of poverty and deprivation under which a large
portion of the world’s population lives provides a poor platform on which to
embark on a major attack on climate change.
Many in developing countries will have great diﬃculty addressing an issue that
may cause a problem for the sustenance of life in some distant future when their
principal concern is the preservation of life today. Given that the beneﬁts of miti
gation will not be apparent for years to come, it is understandable that paying the
mitigating costs today is unappealing. This is a great dilemma given that develop
ing countries have a lot to contribute to the solutions. But it is doubtful that they
will do so under the threat of conditionalities or increased burdens. What is more
promising is an agenda that attends to both climate change as well as development
priorities. But the linkages between climate change and development need to be
known and enhanced through positive action. It is often forgotten that projects
that help countries adapt to climate change or to mitigate greenhouse gas emis
sions can also be instrumental in enhancing good governance and in addressing
poverty reduction and sustainable development priorities of developing countries.
In many cases these linkages are not promoted simply because of a lack of
knowledge. The purpose of this book is to emphasize the linkages and to promote
a development agenda that also addresses climate change concerns. As such, it is a
tribute to those who have already decided that better environmental behavior is
good business, that better land use practices, reforestation, improved watershed
management, and better infrastructure are insurance for a better life, a more pro
ductive livelihood, and safer property.
The science of climate change is young and full of uncertainties. The message
of this book is that this is no excuse for promoting good management of resources
and good environmental behavior that in turn results in adaptation to climate
change and mitigation of . The implicit argument is that it will be diﬃcult
to engage most people around the world on the subject of climate change unless
we link it to our daily lives and to our daily economic activities. Furthermore,
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it argues for a strengthened international cooperation system that can help
strengthen these linkages.
While most books concentrate either on the science or on the policy side of cli
mate change, few try to bring issues related to both under one volume as this one.
Thus the decision to present the subject of climate change in a way that brings
together issues of science and the linkages to important aspects of development,
capacity building and technology transfer, as well as policy options.
In the last section, the book focuses on the Latin American region and some of
its challenges and the eﬀorts of the region to cope with the subject of climate
change. This a region with great challenges but also with a great opportunity to do
it right. As it proceeds to make billions of dollars of investments on energy and
technology options in the decades to come, each decision will be a vote either in
favor or against the environment, not only of the region but also of the globe.
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Common questions about climate change
United Nations Environment Programme and
World Meteorological Organization

Abstract
This document answers some of the most commonly asked questions about climate
change, including whether the Earth has warmed, which human activities are con
tributing to climate change, what further climatic changes are expected to occur, and
what effects these changes may have on humans and the environment.
Introduction

Climate is the average weather, including seasonal extremes and variations, either
locally, regionally, or across the globe. In any one location weather can change very
rapidly from day to day and from year to year, even within an unchanging climate.
These changes involve shifts in, for example, temperatures, precipitation, winds,
and clouds. In contrast to weather, climate is generally inﬂuenced by slow changes
in features like the ocean, the land, the orbit of the Earth about the sun, and the
energy output of the sun.
Fundamentally, climate is controlled by the long-term balance of energy of the
Earth and its atmosphere. Incoming radiation from the sun, mainly in the form of
visible light, is absorbed at the Earth’s surface and in the atmosphere above. On
average, absorbed radiation is balanced by the amount of energy returned to space
in the form of infrared “heat” radiation. Greenhouse gases such as water vapor and
carbon dioxide, as well as clouds and small particles (called aerosols), trap some
heat in the lower part of the Earth’s atmosphere. This is called the greenhouse
eﬀect. If there were no natural greenhouse eﬀect, the average surface temperature
would be about 34° (61°) colder than it is today.
Winds and ocean currents redistribute heat over the surface of the Earth. The
evaporation of surface water and its subsequent condensation and precipitation in
the atmosphere redistribute heat between the Earth’s surface and the atmosphere,
and between diﬀerent parts of the atmosphere.
Natural events cause changes in climate. For example, large volcanic eruptions
put tiny particles in the atmosphere that block sunlight, resulting in a surface cool
ing of a few years’ duration. Variations in ocean currents change the distribution
of heat and precipitation. El Niño events (periodic warming of the central and
eastern tropical Paciﬁc Ocean) typically last one to two years and change weather
patterns around the world, causing heavy rains in some places and droughts in
others. Over longer time spans, tens or hundreds of thousands of years, natural
changes in the geographical distribution of energy received from the sun and the

This article is reprinted with
the permission of the United
Nations Environment Programme and the World Mete
orological Organization,
which co-sponsored its origi
nal compilation and publica
tion in 1997.
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amounts of greenhouse gases and dust in the atmosphere have caused the climate
to shift from ice ages to relatively warmer periods, such as the one we are currently
experiencing.
Human activities can also change the climate. The atmospheric amounts of
many greenhouse gases are increasing, especially that of carbon dioxide, which has
increased by 30% over the last 200 years, primarily as a result of changes in land
use (e.g., deforestation) and of burning coal, oil, and natural gas (e.g., in automo
biles, industry, and electricity generation). If current trends in emissions were to
continue, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would double during
the twenty-ﬁrst century, with further increases thereafter. The amounts of several
other greenhouse gases would increase substantially as well.
The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to human activ
ities will change the climate by enhancing the natural greenhouse eﬀect, leading to
Because most greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long period of
time, even if emissions from human activities were to stop immediately, eﬀects of
accumulated past emissions would persist for centuries.
an increase in the Earth’s average surface temperature. This warming may be par
tially oﬀset in certain regions where air pollution leads to high concentrations of
small particles in the atmosphere that block sunlight.
The current best estimate of the expected rise of globally averaged surface tem
perature relative to 1990 is 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°) by the year 2100, with con
tinued increases thereafter. Because most greenhouse gases remain in the atmos
phere for a long period of time, even if emissions from human activities were to
stop immediately, eﬀects of accumulated past emissions would persist for cen
turies.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), co-sponsored by the
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organi
zation and made up of over 2,000 scientiﬁc and technical experts from around the

Schematic view of components
of the global climate system,
some of their processes and
interactions, and some aspects
that can cause climate change.
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world, published its First Assessment Report in 1990 and its Second Assessment
Report in 1995. The second report contains over 10,000 references and is over 2,000
pages in length. Although our understanding of some details of climate change is
still evolving, the  report is the most comprehensive and scientiﬁcally author
itative account of our understanding of climate change, the potential impacts on
humans and the natural environment, the technology currently available to reduce
human inﬂuences on climate, and the socioeconomic implications of possible
measures to mitigate these changes. The document that follows has been written
and reviewed by scientists who participated in the  process, and it attempts to
answer some of the most commonly asked questions about these issues, based
upon information contained in the  reports. A list of the scientists who pre
pared this document is provided at its end.
Has the world warmed?

The globally averaged temperature of the air at the Earth’s surface has warmed
between 0.3° and 0.6° (about 0.5° and 1°) since the late nineteenth century. The
four warmest years on record since 1860 have all occurred since 1990. The warm
ing has been greatest at night over land in the mid to high latitudes of the North
ern Hemisphere. The warming during the northern winter and spring has been
stronger than at other seasons. In some areas, primarily over continents, the warm
ing has been several times greater than the global average. In a few areas tempera
tures have actually cooled, e.g., over the southern Mississippi Valley in North
America.
Other evidence of global temperature
increases since the nineteenth century
includes the observed rise in sea level of 10 to
25 centimeters (about 4 to 10 inches), the
shrinkage of mountain glaciers, a reduction
of Northern Hemisphere snow cover (1973 to
present), and increasing sub-surface ground
temperatures. Data derived from measure
ments of tree rings, shallow ice cores, and
corals, and from other methods of indirectly
determining climate trends, suggest that
global surface temperatures are now as warm
as or warmer than at any time in the past 600
years.
Data from a few locations can be used to
trace temperatures even further into the past. For example, deep ice cores and
North Atlantic deep-sea sediments suggest that the recent warming stands out
against a record of relatively stable temperatures over the past ten thousand years,
with century-to-century variations of temperature seldom approaching the
observed increase of global mean temperatures of about 0.3° to 0.6°  (about 0.5°
to 1°) over the last century.
Satellite-based instruments have recently measured temperatures at higher alti
tudes (2 to 6 kilometers, or about 1 to 4 miles above the Earth’s surface), rather than
at the surface. These observations indicate that this portion of the atmosphere may
have cooled slightly, by above 0.1° (about 0.2°), since 1979 when the measure
ments began. Although apparently at variance with the surface temperature mea-

Measured global surface tem
peratures relative to the aver
age for the 30-year period 1961
to 1990 (the horizontal line).
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Trends in measured surface air
temperature over the past
century. Red circles represent
warming; blue circles repre
sent cooling. No data are avail
able for the large areas with
no circles.

surements – they are not. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in short-term trends are to be
expected between the surface and atmospheric temperatures at higher altitudes,
because of the diﬀerent factors aﬀecting the variability and persistence of climate
patterns at diﬀerent altitudes. Furthermore, questions have recently arisen con
cerning the consistency of calibrations of the satellite-based instruments, suggest
ing that what was believed to be a small cooling may actually be a slight warming.
Are human activities contributing to climate change?

A comprehensive assessment by the  of the scientiﬁc evidence suggests that
human activities are contributing to climate change, and that there has been a dis
cernible human inﬂuence on global climate.
Climate changes caused by human activities, most importantly the burning of
fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) and deforestation, are superimposed on, and
to some extent masked by, natural climate ﬂuctuations. Natural changes in climate
result from interactions such as those between the atmosphere and ocean, referred
to as internal factors, and from external causes, such as variations in the sun’s
energy output and in the amount of material injected into the upper atmosphere
by explosive volcanic eruptions.
Studies that aim to identify human inﬂuences on climate attempt to separate a
human-caused climate-change factor (the signal) from the background noise of
natural climate variability. Such investigations usually consist of two parts: detec
tion of an unusual change, and attribution of all or part of that change to a par
ticular cause or causes.
The concepts of detection and attribution may be understood in terms of a
simple medical analogy. Measurement of a body temperature of 40° (104°)
detects the presence of some abnormal condition or symptom but does not in itself
give the cause of the symptom. To attribute the symptom to an underlying cause
often requires additional and more complex tests, such as chemical analyses of
blood and urine, or even x-rays and  scans.
Early work on climate-change detection examined changes in the globally aver
aged surface temperature of the Earth over the last century. Most studies of this
type concluded that the observed increase of roughly 0.5° (about 1°) was larger
than would be expected as a result of natural climate variability alone. Observed
globally averaged temperature changes have also been analyzed away from the
Earth’s surface. The observations used come from conventional weather observing
instruments (radiosondes) and from satellites. As expected, because of the diﬀer

  
ent factors aﬀecting the variability of and persistence of temperatures at diﬀerent
altitudes, there are noticeable diﬀerences between short-term trends at the surface
and those at higher altitudes. The record of temperatures away from the Earth’s
surface, which spans only the past 40 years compared with the much longer sur
face record, is too short for globally averaged values to provide any deﬁnitive
information about the extent of human inﬂuences.
The further step of attributing some part of observed temperature changes to
human inﬂuences makes use of climate models, which have been employed to esti
mate the climatic eﬀects of a range of human-induced and
natural factors. The human factors include recent changes in
the atmospheric concentrations of both greenhouse gases and
sulfate particles (called “aerosols”). The natural factors con
sidered include solar variability, the eﬀects of volcanic erup
tions, and internal variability of the climate system resulting
from interactions among its individual components.
The changes in globally averaged temperature that have
occurred at the Earth’s surface over the past century are simi
lar in size and timing to those predicted by models that take
into account the combined inﬂuences of human factors and
solar variability.
To probe the question of attribution requires the applica
tion of more powerful and complex methods, beyond the use
of global averages alone. New studies have focused on com
paring maps or patterns of temperature change in observa
tions and in models. Pattern analysis is the climatological
equivalent of the more comprehensive tests in the medical
analogy mentioned previously and makes it possible to
achieve more deﬁnitive attribution of observed climate
changes to a particular cause or causes.
The expected inﬂuence of human activities is thought to be
much more complex than uniform warming over the entire
surface of the Earth and over the whole seasonal cycle. Patterns of change over
space and time therefore provide a more powerful analysis technique. The basic
idea underlying pattern-based approaches is that diﬀerent potential causes of cli
mate change have diﬀerent characteristic patterns of climate response or ﬁnger
prints. Attribution studies seek to obtain a ﬁngerprint match between the patterns
of climate change predicted by models and those actually observed.
Comparisons between observed patterns of temperature change and those pre
dicted by models have now been made at the Earth’s surface and in vertical sec
tions through the atmosphere. Model predictions show increasing agreement with
changes observed over the past 30-50 years. The closest agreement occurs when the
combined eﬀects of greenhouse gases and sulfate aerosol particles are considered.
Statistical analyses have shown that these correspondences are highly unlikely to
have occurred by chance.
The agreements between the patterns of change predicted by models and those
actually observed are due to similarities in large spatial scales, such as contrasts
between the temperature changes in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres or
between diﬀerent levels of the atmosphere. It is at these large scales that we have
most conﬁdence in model performance. More importantly, many of the results of
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Modelled and observed
changes in atmospheric tem
perature, from close to Earth’s
surface to the lower stratos
phere. Model results are from
two sets of experiments: with
“present-day” levels of atmos
pheric CO2 (panel a), and with
present-day CO2, sulfur emis
sions, and stratospheric ozone
depletion (panel b). They are
given as changes relative to a
pre-industrial state of the
atmosphere. Observed changes
(panel c) are temperature
trends over the period 1962 to
1988, as estimated from
weather balloons. All results are
for annually averaged data and
are in units of ˚C (panels a, b)
and ˚C/25 years (panel c). The
patterns of change in panels b
and c are similar.
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these studies agree with our physical understanding of the climate system and do
not depend solely on numerical models or statistical techniques.
There are still uncertainties in these detection and attribution studies. These are
due primarily to our imperfect knowledge of the true climate change signal due to
human activities, to our incomplete understanding of the background noise of
natural climatic variability against which this signal must be detected, and to inad
equacies in the observational record. Such uncertainties make it diﬃcult to deter
mine the exact size of the human contribution to climate change. Nevertheless, the
most recent assessment of the science suggests that human activities have led to a
discernible inﬂuence on global climate, and that these activities will have an
increasing inﬂuence on future climate.
What human activities contribute to climate change?

The burning of coal, oil, and natural gas, as well as deforestation and various agri
cultural and industrial practices, are altering the composition of the atmosphere
and contributing to climate change. These human activities have led to increased
atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases, including carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, chloroﬂurocarbons, and ozone in the lower part
of the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide is produced when coal, oil, and natural gas (fossil fuels) are
burned to produce energy used for transportation, manufacturing, heating, coolThe use of fossil fuels currently accounts for 80 to 85% of the carbon dioxide being
added to the atmosphere.
Relative importance of the vari
ous greenhouse gases and
small particles currently in the
atmosphere. Bars extending to
the right of the horizontal line
indicate a warming effect. The
impacts of tropospheric ozone,
stratospheric ozone, and parti
cles are quite uncertain. The
range of possible effects for
these gases is indicated by the
red bar; i.e., the effect is in the
range of one end of the red bar
to the other.

ing, electricity generation, and other applications. The use of fossil fuels currently
accounts for 80 to 85% of the carbon dioxide being added to the atmosphere.
Land use changes, e.g., clearing land for logging, ranching, and agriculture, also
lead to carbon dioxide emissions. Vegetation contains carbon that is released as
carbon dioxide when the vegetation decays or burns. Normally, lost vegetation
would be replaced by re-growth with little or no net emission of carbon dioxide.
However, over the past several hundred years, deforestation and other land use
changes in many countries have contributed substantially to atmospheric carbon
dioxide increases. Although deforestation is still occurring in some parts of the
Northern Hemisphere, on the whole, re
growth of vegetation in the north appears
to be taking some carbon dioxide out of
the atmosphere. Most of the net carbon
dioxide emissions from deforestation are
currently occurring in tropical regions.
Land use changes are responsible for 15 to
20% of current carbon dioxide emissions.
Methane (natural gas) is the second
most important of the greenhouse gases
resulting from human activities. It is pro
duced by rice cultivation, cattle and sheep
ranching, and by decaying material in
landﬁlls. Methane is also emitted during
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coal mining and oil drilling, and by leaky gas pipelines. Human activities have
increased the concentration of methane in the atmosphere by about 145% above
what would be present naturally.
Human activities have increased the concentration of methane in the atmos
phere by about 145% above what would be present naturally.
Nitrous oxide is produced by various agricultural and industrial practices.
Human activities have increased the concentration of nitrous oxide in the atmos
phere by about 15% above what would be present naturally.
Chloroﬂuorocarbons () have been used in refrigeration, air conditioning,
and as solvents. However, the production of these gases is being eliminated under
existing international agreements because they deplete the stratospheric ozone
layer. Other ﬂuorocarbons that are also greenhouse gases are being used as substi
tutes for  in some applications, for example in
refrigeration and air conditioning. Although cur
rently very small, their contributions to climate
change are expected to rise.
Ozone in the troposphere, that is, in the lower part
of the atmosphere, is another important greenhouse
gas resulting from industrial activities. It is created
naturally and also by reactions in the atmosphere
involving gases resulting from human activities,
including nitrogen oxides from motor vehicles and
power plants. Based on current data, tropospheric
ozone is an important contributor to the enhanced
greenhouse eﬀect. However, in part because ozone is
also produced naturally, and because of its relatively
short atmospheric lifetime, the magnitude of this contribution is uncertain.
Contrary to popular perception, the Antarctic ozone hole does not cause global
warming. Instead, the global depletion of stratospheric ozone caused by  and
other gases has resulted in a small cooling eﬀect.
Human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use,
have increased the abundance of small particles in the atmosphere. These parti
cles can change the amount of energy that is absorbed and reﬂected by the atmos
phere. They are also believed to modify the properties of clouds, changing the
amount of energy that they absorb and reﬂect. Intensive studies of the climatic
eﬀects of these particles began only recently and the overall eﬀect is uncertain. It
is likely that the net eﬀect of these small particles is to cool the climate and to par
tially oﬀset the warming of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases.
How do we know that the atmospheric build-up
of greenhouse gases is due to human activity?

Four lines of evidence prove conclusively that the recent buildup of carbon diox
ide arises largely from human activities.
First, the nuclei of carbon atoms in carbon dioxide emitted by burning coal, oil,
and natural gas (fossil fuels) diﬀer in their characteristics from the nuclei of
carbon atoms in carbon dioxide emitted under natural conditions. Coal, oil, and

Carbon dioxide emissions from
the burning of coal, oil, and nat
ural gas are shown for the
period 1860 to 1992 for three
groups of countries.
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dioxide in the atmosphere.

   
natural gas were formed deep underground tens of millions of years ago, and the
fraction of their nuclei that were once radioactive has long ago changed to non
radioactive carbon. But the carbon dioxide emitted from natural sources on the
Earth’s surface retains a measurable radioactive portion. As carbon dioxide has
been emitted through fossil fuel combustion, the radioactive fraction of carbon in
the atmosphere has decreased. Forty years ago scientists provided the ﬁrst direct
evidence that combustion of fossil fuels was causing a buildup of carbon dioxide
and thereby diluting radioactive carbon in the atmosphere by measuring the
decreasing fraction of radioactive carbon-14 captured in tree rings each year
between 1800 and 1950.
Second, scientists began making precise measurements of the total amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at Mauna Loa, Hawaii, and at the South Pole in
the late 1950s. They have since expanded their observa
tions to many other locations. Their data show convinc
ingly that the levels of carbon dioxide have increased
each year worldwide. Furthermore, these increases are
consistent with other estimates of the rise of carbon
dioxide emissions due to human activity over this
period.
A third line of evidence has been added since 1980.
Ice buried below the surface of the Greenland and
Antarctic ice caps contains bubbles of air trapped when
the ice originally formed. These samples of fossil air,
some of them over 200,000 years old, have been
retrieved by drilling deep into the ice. Measurements
from the youngest and most shallow segments of the
ice cores, which contain air from only a few decades
ago, produce carbon dioxide concentrations nearly identical to those that were
measured directly in the atmosphere at the time the ice formed. But the older parts
of the cores show that carbon dioxide amounts were about 25% lower than today
for the ten thousand years previous to the onset of industrialization – and over
that period changed little.
The ﬁnal line of evidence comes from the geographic pattern of carbon diox
ide measured in air. Observations show that there is slightly more carbon dioxide
in the northern hemisphere than in the southern hemisphere. The diﬀerence arises
because most of the human activities that produce carbon dioxide are in the north
and it takes about a year for northern hemispheric emissions to circulate through
the atmosphere and reach southern latitudes.
Carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere by a variety of sources, and over
95% of these emissions would occur even if human beings were not present on
Earth. For example, the natural decay of organic material in forests and grasslands,
such as dead trees, results in the release of about 220 billion tons of carbon diox
ide every year. But these natural sources are nearly balanced by physical and bio
logical processes, called natural sinks, which remove carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere. For example, some carbon dioxide dissolves in sea water, and some is
removed by plants as they grow.
As a result of this natural balance, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere
would have changed little if human activities had not added an amount every year.
This addition, presently about 3% of annual natural emissions, is suﬃcient to

  
exceed the balancing eﬀect of sinks. As a result, carbon dioxide has gradually accu
mulated in the atmosphere, until, at present, its concentration is 30% above pre
industrial levels.
Direct atmospheric measurements of other human-produced greenhouse
gases have not been made in as many places or for as long a period as they have for
carbon dioxide. However, existing data for these other gases do show increasing
concentrations of methane, nitrous oxide, and  over recent decades. In addi
tion, ice core data available for methane and for nitrous oxide demonstrate that
the atmospheric concentrations of these gases began to increase in the past few
centuries, after having been relatively constant for thousands of years.  are
absent from deep ice cores because they have no natural sources and were not
manufactured before 1930.
What climate changes are projected?

The  has projected further increases in globally averaged surface tempera
tures of 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°) by the year 2100, as compared with 1990. This
projection is based on estimates of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and
sulfate particles in the atmosphere.
The average rate of warming of the Earth’s surface over the next hundred years
will probably be greater than any that has occurred in the last 10,000 years – the
period over which civilization developed. However, speciﬁc temperature changes
will vary considerably from region to region.
As a result of the warming, global sea level is expected to rise by a further 15 to
95 cm (about 6 to 37 inches) by the year 2100, because sea water expands when
heated, and some glacial ice will melt.
Although globally averaged surface temperature increases and sea level rise are
the most certain of the  projections, other eﬀects can be projected with some
conﬁdence. Greater warming is expected to occur over land than over the oceans.
However, there is evidence to suggest that the Earth’s climate has occasionally
changed rather rapidly in the distant past. There may be similarly abrupt tran
sitions due to human-induced climate change. These abrupt transitions raise the
possibility of signiﬁcant surprises as the world warms over the next century, per
haps with rapid and unexpected changes in ocean currents and regional climate.
The maximum warming is expected to occur in the Arctic in winter. Nighttime
temperatures are expected to increase more than daytime temperatures. In gen
eral, there will probably be an increase in the number of very hot days at mid-lat
itude locations in summer, such as in most of North America, Europe, and parts
of South America, with a decrease of very cold days in the same locations in winter.
Extreme events such as heavy rains and droughts are the most destructive
forms of weather, and the frequency and duration of these events are likely to
increase as the climate continues to change. Increases in the global averages of
both evaporation and precipitation are expected. In winter at mid-latitudes,
higher surface temperatures are expected to cause an increased portion of the pre
cipitation to fall in the form of rain rather than snow. This is likely to increase both
wintertime soil moisture and runoﬀ, leaving less runoﬀ for summer. In spring,
faster snow melt is likely to aggravate ﬂooding. In the summer, increased heating
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The possible range of globally
averaged surface temperature
increase is shown for the
period 1990 to 2100. (top)

The possible range of globally
averaged sea level rise is shown
for the period 1990 to 2100.
(bottom)

   
will lead to increased evaporation, which could decrease the availability of soil
moisture needed both for natural vegetation and agriculture in many places, and
increase the probability of severe drought. Droughts and ﬂoods occur naturally
around the world, for example in association with El Niño events, but are likely to
become more severe, causing water management to
become an even more critical problem in the future.
The most uncertain projections of future climate
relate to changes in particular locales, as well as to how
weather events such as tropical storms, including hur
ricanes, typhoons, and cyclones, will be aﬀected. This
uncertainty results from the existence of large natural
regional variations, as well as limitations in computer
models and the understanding of the relationship
between local and global climate at the present time.
The range of estimated warming of 1° to 3.5° (about
2° to 6°) by the year 2100 arises from uncertainties
about the response of climate to the buildup of green
house gases and particles, as well as the total amount of
future emissions of these gases. Factors such as esti
mates of human population growth, land use changes,
life styles, and energy choices yield a range of plausible
greenhouse gas emissions. For example, concerted
eﬀorts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases would
lead to a signiﬁcantly lower projected temperature rise.
All of these predictions are based on the assumption
that the global climate will change gradually. However,
there is evidence to suggest that the Earth’s climate has
occasionally changed rather rapidly in the distant past.
There may be similarly abrupt transitions due to
human-induced climate change. These abrupt transi
tions raise the possibility of signiﬁcant surprises as the world warms over the next
century, perhaps with rapid and unexpected changes in ocean currents and
regional climate. The likelihood that such rapid changes could occur increases
with increasing emissions of greenhouse gases.
How reliable are predictions of future climate?

Predictions of climate change are calculated by means of computer models that
mathematically simulate the interactions of the land, sea, and air, which together
determine the Earth’s climate. Our conﬁdence in these models rests largely on their
basis in accepted physical laws, their ability to describe many aspects of current cli
mate accurately, and their skill at reproducing some of the important features of
past climates.
Climate models are based on a wealth of scientiﬁc observations and well estab
lished laws of physics, including the laws of gravity and ﬂuid motion, and the con
servation of energy, momentum, mass, and water. It is this reliance on basic phys
ical laws that lends high conﬁdence to the prediction that a buildup of greenhouse
gases will eventually lead to a signiﬁcant alteration in the Earth’s climate.
A second important reason for having conﬁdence in climate models is because
of their ability to reproduce many of the observed features of the atmosphere and

  
ocean. For the purposes of predicting the behavior of the atmosphere for only a
few days ahead, an atmosphere-only model, with no simulation of the ocean, can
be used. This is the method employed in making short-term weather forecasts,
whose relative accuracy demonstrates the ability of this sort of model to reproduce
some of the important details of the atmosphere’s behavior.
While reliable weather forecasts can only be made for periods up to ten days,
predictability for greater lengths of time can be obtained for averages of weather,
i.e., the climate. For example, with regard to longer periods (several years or
more), climate models in which both the oceans and the atmosphere are repre
sented are able to simulate the main features of current climate and its variability,
including the seasonal cycle of temperature, the formation and decay of the major
monsoons, the seasonal shift of the major rain belts and storm tracks, the average
daily temperature cycle, and the variations in outgoing radiation at high elevations
in the atmosphere as measured by satellites. Similarly, many of the large-scale fea
tures observed in ocean circulation have been reproduced by climate models.
It is possible for a model to simulate current climate well but still fail in its pre
diction of climate change. So another test of models is to compare their simula
tions of earlier climates to historical data, including the climate of the past cen
tury. These eﬀorts have been hampered by our imprecise knowledge of a variety
of factors, including how humans have changed the amounts of small particles in
the atmosphere and variations in the energy output of the sun.
Nevertheless, using estimates of some of these factors, climate models can
reproduce many changes observed over the last century, including the global mean
surface warming of 0.3° to 0.6° (about 0.5° to 1°), the reduction in temperature
diﬀerences between day and night, the cooling in the atmosphere above 14 km
(about 9 miles), the increases in precipitation at high latitudes, the intensiﬁcation
of precipitation events in some continental areas, and a rise in sea level. Moreover,
a climate model has correctly predicted broad features of the globally averaged
surface cooling and subsequent recovery associated
with the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991.
Climate models can also be used in attempts to
reproduce the main features of prehistoric climates,
but this eﬀort has been limited by the scarcity and the
indirect nature of the evidence available from sedi
ment cores, tree rings, preserved pollen, and ice core
data used to infer earlier climates. Even so, the models
have reproduced some of the general features of recon
structed past climates, such as the enhanced North
African monsoon 6,000 to 9,000 years ago and the
approximate level of cooling during the last ice age.
The major weakness of models is their reliance on
approximations of some aspects of climate. It takes too much computer time, or it is
simply beyond the capacity of even supercomputers, to represent some of the key
smaller-scale processes that aﬀect climate. Even if adequate computers were avail
able, scientists’ understanding of the detailed physics of such processes is limited. So,
some aspects of climate are approximated, based on a combination of physical laws,
laboratory experiments, and direct observations of climate. For example, it is not
possible to represent the details of the formation and dissipation of clouds. The
approximation of cloud behavior is a major source of uncertainty in climate models.
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In summary, the fact that models are based upon the known physical laws of
nature and can reproduce many features of the current climate and some general
aspects of past climates gives us increasing conﬁdence in their reliability for pro
jecting many large-scale features of future climate. However, there remains sub
stantial uncertainty in the exact magnitude of projected globally averaged tem
perature rise caused by human activity, due to shortcomings in the current climate
models, particularly in their representation of clouds. Furthermore, scientists have
little conﬁdence in the climate changes they project at the local level. Other uncer
tainties, not arising from speciﬁc limitations in the climate models, such as esti
mates of the rate of future green house gas emissions, also restrict the ability to pre
dict precisely how the climate will change in the future.
Are recent extreme weather events, like the large number
of Atlantic hurricanes in 1995, due to global warming?

The area (expressed in per
centage) of the United States,
excluding Alaska and Hawaii,
with an unusually large
amount of total annual precip
itation coming from extreme
precipitation events (those
with more than 5.08 cm [2
inches] of rainfall [or equiva
lent if precipitation is snow
fall] in 24 hours) is displayed.
The smooth curve shows the
same data, but averaged over
periods of about 10 years.

As the world warms, some extreme climate events, like the frequency of heat waves
and very heavy precipitation, are expected to increase, but it remains uncertain
whether or not to expect changes in the frequency of some other extremes. More
over, it is important to note that it is not possible to link any particular weather or
climate event deﬁnitively to global warming. The causal linkage, if any, between
the frequency of extreme events and global warming can only be determined
through statistical analyses of long-term data, because the natural climate system
can produce weather and climate events that often
appear to be uncharacteristic of the recent climate.
Data on climate extremes in many regions of the
world are inadequate to draw deﬁnitive conclusions
about possible changes that may have occurred on a
global scale. However, in some regions where good
data are available, there have been some signiﬁcant
increases and decreases in extreme events over time.
For example, there has been a clear trend to fewer
extremely low minimum temperatures in several
widely separated areas in recent decades (e.g., Aus
tralia, the United States, Russia, and China). The
impact of such changes can manifest itself in fewer
freezing days and late season frosts, such as have been documented in Australia and
the United States. Indeed, we expect that the number of days with extremely low
temperatures should continue to decrease as global temperatures rise.
Widespread, extended periods of extremely high temperatures are also expected
to become more frequent with continued global warming, such as the unprece
dented high night time temperatures during the 1995 heat wave in Chicago, Illinois,
and the Midwestern United States that caused an estimated 830 deaths. However,
the global frequency of such heat waves has not been analyzed at this time.
Higher temperatures lead to higher rates of evaporation and precipitation. As the
Earth warms, we expect more precipitation, and it is likely to fall over shorter inter
vals of time, thereby increasing the frequency of very heavy and extreme precipita
tion events. Analyses of observed changes in precipitation intensity have been con
ducted for only a few countries. The best evidence of increases in extreme and very
heavy precipitation events probably comes from data in North America. In Australia,
which is historically prone to heavy precipitation, an increase in rainfall amount

  
from major storms has also been observed. Analyses for South Africa also show
increases in extreme precipitation rates. In another area, China, where data have
been analyzed for the last several decades, no obvious trends are apparent, but high
concentration of air pollution (such as sulfate particles that can cool the climate)
may be counteracting such changes in this region.
There is as yet no evidence for a worldwide rise in
the frequency of droughts. In the future, however, it
is expected that many regions will experience more
frequent, prolonged, or more severe droughts, pri
marily due to the more rapid evaporation of mois
ture from plants, soils, lakes, and reservoirs. This is
expected to occur even as precipitation increases and
heavy precipitation events become more common.
Blizzards and snowstorms may actually increase
in intensity and frequency in some cooler locations as
atmospheric moisture increases. In more temperate
latitudes snowstorms are likely to decrease in fre
quency, but their intensity may actually increase as
the world warms. Observations show that snowfall
has increased in the high latitudes of North America, but snow accumulations
have melted faster because of more frequent and earlier thaws.
There is evidence of an increase in the frequency of intense extra-tropical
storms in the northern North Atlantic and adjacent areas of Europe, such as the
British Isles, but there has been a decrease in such events in the southern North
Atlantic (south of 30°) over the past few decades. It remains uncertain as to
whether these changes are natural ﬂuctuations or relate to global warming,
because there is little consensus about how global warming will aﬀect these non
tropical, yet powerful storms.
There is little evidence to support any signiﬁcant long-term trends in the fre
quency or intensity of tropical storms, or of hurricanes in the North Atlantic during
the past several decades. Although the hurricane frequency was high during 1995
and 1996, an anomalously low number of hurricanes occurred during the 1960s
through the 1980s, including those hitting the United States during that period.
Reliable data from the North Atlantic since the 1940s indicate that the peak strength
of the strongest hurricanes has not changed, and the mean maximum intensity of
all hurricanes has decreased. There is also some evidence for a decrease in the fre
quency of cyclones in the Indian Ocean during the past two decades relative to ear
lier records and an increase in the frequency of typhoons in the western Paciﬁc.
Wide variations in the total number of tropical storms including hurricanes,
typhoons, and cyclones occurring per decade have been observed, with no apparent
long-term trends in most ocean basins. There is little consensus about how global
warming will aﬀect the intensity and frequency of these storms in the future.
Why do human-made greenhouse gases matter
when water vapor is the most potent greenhouse gas?

The Earth’s surface temperature would be about 34° colder than it is now if it were
not for the natural heat trapping eﬀect of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapor. Indeed, water vapor is the most abun
dant and important of these naturally occurring greenhouse gases. In addition to
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its direct eﬀect as a greenhouse gas, clouds formed from atmospheric water vapor
also aﬀect the heat balance of the Earth by reﬂecting sunlight (a cooling eﬀect), and
trapping infrared radiation (a heating eﬀect).
However, just because water vapor is the most important gas in creating the
natural greenhouse eﬀect does not mean that human-made greenhouse gases are
unimportant. Over the past ten thousand years, the amounts of the various green
house gases in the Earth’s atmosphere remained relatively stable until a few cen
turies ago, when the concentrations of many of these gases began to increase due to
industrialization, increasing demand for energy, rising population, and changing
land use and human settlement patterns. Accumulations of most of the humanmade greenhouse gases are expected to continue to increase, so that, over the next
50 to 100 years, without control measures, they will produce a heat-trapping eﬀect
equivalent to more than a doubling of the pre-industrial carbon dioxide level.
Increasing amounts of human-made greenhouse gases would lead to an
increase in the globally averaged surface temperature. However, as the temperature
increases, other aspects of the climate will alter, including the amount of water
vapor in the atmosphere. While human activities do not directly add signiﬁcant
amounts of water vapor to the atmosphere, warmer air contains more water vapor.
Since water vapor is itself a greenhouse gas, global warming will be further
enhanced by the increased amounts of water vapor. This sort of indirect eﬀect is
called a positive feedback.
It has been suggested that as greenhouse gases accumulate, the atmospheric
events that generate cumulus clouds in tropical areas would cause a drying rather
than moistening of the upper layers of the troposphere (the lowest region of the
atmosphere). However, observations of the current atmosphere provide evidence
for the conclusion that on a global scale, a warmed atmosphere will moisten and
this will enhance greenhouse warming.
Clouds are another important factor in determining climate. The increased
levels of water vapor in the atmosphere, as well as changes in temperature and
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winds, will also cause changes in clouds that will alter the amount of energy from
the sun that is absorbed and reﬂected by the Earth, at some locations enhancing
and at others diminishing the warming due to greenhouse gases. The response of
clouds to global warming is a major uncertainty in determining the magnitude
and distribution of climate change.
Why should a few degrees of warming be a cause for concern?

The most recent  scientific assessment of climate change estimated that the
globally averaged surface temperature will increase by 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°)
by the year 2100, with an associated rise in sea level of 15 to 95 cm (about 6 to 37
inches). These changes may lead to a number of potentially serious conse
quences. For example, mid-and high-latitude regions, such as much of the
United States, Europe, and Asia, could experience an increase in the incidence of
heat waves, floods, and droughts as the global climate changes. The impacts of
such extreme events on human welfare as well as natural ecosystems could be
significant.
Climate change is likely to have wide-ranging and mostly adverse impacts on
human health. The projected increase in the duration and frequency of heat
waves is expected to increase mortality rates as a result of heat stress, especially
where air conditioning is not available. To a lesser extent, increases in winter tem
peratures in high latitudes could lead to decreases in mortality rates. Climate
change is also expected to lead to increases in the potential transmission of many
infectious diseases, including malaria, dengue, and yellow fever, extending the
range of organisms, such as insects, that carry these diseases into the temperate
zone, including parts of the United States, Europe, and Asia. For example, pro
jections indicate that the zone of potential malaria transmission, in response to
global surface temperature increases at the top of the projected range, may
enlarge from an area containing about 45% of the world’s population to about
60% by the end of the twenty-ﬁrst century, resulting in 50-80 million additional
cases of malaria per year.
It may be possible for global agricultural production to keep pace with increas
ing demand over the next 50-100 years if adequate adaptations are made, but there
are likely to be diﬃculties in some regions. This conclusion takes into account the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of carbon dioxide fertilization, i.e., given suﬃcient water and
nutrients, plant growth will be enhanced by an increased concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Changes in the spread and abundance of agricultural
pests and the eﬀects of climate variability were not reﬂected in this assessment.
Regional changes in crop yields and productivity are expected to occur in response
to climate change. There is likely to be an increased risk of famine, particularly in
subtropical and tropical semiarid and arid locations.
With 50-70% of the global human population currently living in coastal areas,
future sea level rises, alterations in storm patterns, and higher storm surges could
have signiﬁcant eﬀects. About 46 million people are currently at risk by ﬂooding
in coastal areas as a result of storm surges. In the absence of measures to adapt,
even with current populations, a 50 cm (about 20 inches) sea level rise would
increase the number of people whose land will be at risk from serious ﬂooding or
permanent inundation to about 92 million, while a 100 cm (about 40 inches) rise
would increase this number to 118 million. If expected population growth is incor
porated into the projections these estimates increase substantially.
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Other projected changes include a disappearance of between one-third and
one-half of the existing mountain glacier mass by 2100. Alpine glaciers are already
observed to be in rapid retreat and many cities between 30° and 30° depend on
these natural reservoirs for their water supply. For example, in Lima, Peru, the
entire water supply for 10 million people depends on the summer melt from a
glacier that is now in rapid retreat, for reasons that may or may not be related to
global climate change. In the future, climate change could also lead to shifts in
river ﬂow and water supply, with serious implications for human settlements and
agriculture.
Climate change is also likely to aﬀect human infrastructure, including trans
portation, energy demand, human settlements (especially in developing coun
tries), the property insurance industry, and tourism.
Why can’t ecosystems just adapt?

Climate change has the potential to alter many of the Earth’s natural ecosystems
over the next century. Yet, climate change is not a new inﬂuence on the biosphere,
so why can’t ecosystems just adapt without signiﬁcant eﬀects on their form or pro
ductivity? There are three basic reasons.
First, the rate of global climate change is projected to be more rapid than any to
have occurred in the last 10,000 years. Second, humans have altered the structure
of many of the world’s ecosystems. They have cut down forests, plowed soils, used
range-lands to graze their domesticated animals, introduced non-native species to
many regions, intensively ﬁshed lakes, rivers and oceans, and constructed dams.
These relatively recent changes in the structure of the world’s ecosystems have
made them less resilient to further changes. Third, pollution, as well as other indi
rect eﬀects of the utilization of natural resources, has also increased since the
beginning of the industrial revolution. Consequently, it is likely that many ecosys
tems will not be able to adapt to the additional stress of climate change without
losing some of the species they contain or the service they provide, such as sup
plying suﬃcient clean water to drink, food to eat, suitable soils in which to grow
crops, and wood to use as fuel or in construction.
For millions of years, species have been shifting where they grow and repro
duce in response to changing climate conditions. Over the next century, global
warming could result in approximately one-third of the Earth’s forested area
undergoing major transitions in species composition. From the fossil record we
have an indication of the maximum rate at which various plant species have
migrated to more suitable areas: from 0.04 km/yr (about 0.03 miles/yr) for the
slowest to 2km/yr (about 1.3 miles/yr) for the fastest. However, the projected rate
of surface temperature change in many parts of the world could require plant
species to migrate at faster rates (1.5 to 5.5 km/yr or about 1 to 3.5 miles/yr). Thus,
many species may not be able to move rapidly enough to prosper. These changes
in vegetation and ecosystem structure may in turn give rise to additional releases
of carbon into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change.
Moreover, as the old vegetation dies in areas most aﬀected by climate change,
such as forests in northern latitudes, it is likely to be replaced by fast growing, often
non-native species. These species commonly yield less timber, provide lower qual
ity forage for domesticated animals, supply less food for wild animals, and furnish
poorer habitat for many native animals. The prevalence of pest species such as
weeds, rats, and cockroaches may also increase.

  
Humans actively and productively use and manipulate large portions of the
land surface of the Earth, whether it be for agriculture, housing, energy, or forestry.
These practices have created a mosaic of diﬀerent land uses and ecosystem types,
resulting in fewer remaining large and contiguous areas of a single type of habitat
than existed in the past. Therefore it will often be diﬃcult for plants and animals
to move to a location with a more suitable climate even if a species were able to
migrate quickly enough. This was not the case thousands of years ago, when
ecosystems last experienced rapid climate change. Now, many of the world’s
ecosystems are essentially trapped on small islands, cut oﬀ from one another and
only capable of travel over a limited and shrinking number of bridges. As this
increasingly occurs, more species are likely to be stranded in an environment in
which they cannot survive and/or reproduce.
Further complicating the response of many of the Earth’s terrestrial and
aquatic ecosystems to climate change is the prevalence of stress from other dis
turbances associated with resource use. In the case of trees, for example, many
species are already weakened by air pollution. Increased concentrations of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere will raise the photosynthetic capacity of many plants,
but the net eﬀect on ecosystem productivity is unclear, particularly when com
bined with higher air temperatures or where soil nutrients are limiting.
Among the ecosystems that are most likely to experience the most severe eﬀects
from climate change are those that are at higher latitudes, such as far northern
(boreal) forests or tundra, as well as those where diﬀerent habitat types converge,
such as where grasslands meet forests, or forests give way to alpine vegetation.
Coastal ecosystems are also at risk, particularly saltwater marshes, mangrove
forests, coastal wetlands, coral reefs, and river deltas. Many of these ecosystems,
already under stress from human activities, may be signiﬁcantly altered or dimin
ished in terms of their extent and productivity as a result of future climate change.
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Science and nonscience
concerning human-caused climate warming 1
J. D. Mahlman
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
NOAA, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA

Abstract
The human-caused global warming problem is now the focus of intense interna
tional attention in many sectors of society. As we learn more about the science of the
problem, the sense of controversy about the state of the science has actually
increased, sharply so over the past decade. This essay highlights the fundamental
aspects of the science underlying global warming. The vital roles of climate models
and of climate data in sharpening scientific understanding are featured. Finally, the
roles of controversy in the science and the sociology of this problem are addressed,
and new insights are offered on the inevitability of future major conflicts and con
troversies as society begins to deal with the need to either reduce the use of fossil
fuels considerably or adapt to substantial changes in Earth’s climate.
Why this essay?

I am an atmospheric and climate scientist with a career-long interest in under
standing how the climate system works. I centered my earliest research, in the late
1960s, on direct analysis of available observations to isolate the most important
mechanisms governing atmospheric behavior. It made me very much aware that
the available atmospheric measurements and accompanying atmospheric theory
are not suﬃcient to provide the deep quantitative understanding that is required
to predict changes within the climate system. It was already clear to me that math
ematical models would have to be added to gain deeper understanding and
improved predictive skills.
In 1970, I joined National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s ()
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory () at Princeton University, which
was leading the world in the new eﬀort to use mathematical modeling approaches
to understand the entire climate system and how it changes.  was attempting
to include and understand various parts of the climate system, including such key
aspects as the ocean and land-surface systems. My task was to emphasize the
stratosphere and the climate eﬀects of atmospheric chemistry, including ozone, a
gas that absorbs solar and infrared radiation eﬃciently. I soon learned that recon
ciling theory and observations through the use of mathematical models is essen
tially the only way to achieve a fully quantitative understanding of the climate
system. More importantly, I also learned that the challenges to be overcome

1 Originally published in Annual
Review: Energy Environment,
1998. 23: 83-105. The U.S. Govern
ment has the right to retain a
nonexclusive, royalty-free license
in and to any copyright covering
this paper. Reprinted with the
permission of the author. Visit the
Annual Reviews home page at
http://www. AnnualReviews.org.
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2 In this article, the term
greenhouse warming is used to
describe the general warming
of Earth’s climate in response to
human-produced emissions of
carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases such as
methane, nitrous oxide, and the
chlorofluorocarbons.

   
through the use of mathematical models are daunting, requiring the eﬀorts of
dedicated teams working a decade or more on individual aspects of the climate
system.
It is this high degree of diﬃculty and complexity that provides signiﬁcant con
text for this personal essay on human-caused “greenhouse warming” 2 and some
of its broader implications. The climate system is suﬃciently complex and all
encompassing that there are no “all-knowing” experts on this problem. However,
teams of talented scientists working together can, and do, become close to the
equivalent of an encompassing expertise. I am fortunate to be surrounded at 
by a team of world-renowned scientists who are knowledgeable about almost all
aspects of greenhouse warming. Most of the insights I oﬀer have been gained from
a research lifetime of fruitful encounters with this extraordinary group of col
leagues.
An overview of the science of global warming
Historical setting

3 Arrhenius S. 1896. On the
influence of carbonic acid in the
air upon the temperature of the
ground. London Edinburgh
Dublin Philos. Mag. J. Sci. 41: 237
76.
4 Manabe S, Wetherald RT.
1967. Thermal equilibrium of
the atmosphere with a given
distribution of relative humid
ity. J. Atmos. Sci. 24: 241-59.

Since the famous work of Arrhenius in 1896 3, the possibility of a net warming of
the global climate due to increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) produced
by the burning of fossil-fuel has been recognized. The subject matured with the
publication in 1967 by Manabe and Wetherald 4 of the ﬁrst fully self-consistent
model calculation of this greenhouse warming eﬀect. They used a simple onedimensional (altitude only) model of the global atmosphere. In the three decades
since, a tremendous amount of observational, theoretical, and modeling research
has been directed at the climate system and possible changes in it due to human
activity. This research strongly demonstrates that potential climate changes are
projected to occur that are well worth our collective attention and concern.
This considerably strengthened climate knowledge base has energized pro
posals for aggressive international eﬀorts to mitigate the impact of greenhouse
warming by substantially reducing the use of fossil fuels to supply the world's
growing need for energy. However, that same research eﬀort has shown that, in
projecting future climate changes, remaining scientiﬁc uncertainties are signiﬁ
cant. These uncertainties are regarded by many as good reason to be extremely
cautious in implementing any policies designed to reduce CO2 emissions. Others,
however, argue that the risks of inaction are very large and that the scientiﬁc
uncertainties include the possibility that the greenhouse warming problem could
well be worse than current best estimates. Thus, serious policy disagreements can
be ampliﬁed by diﬀering perspectives on the current state of greenhouse warm
ing science.
Some fundamental aspects of greenhouse warming science
The earth is strongly heated every day by incoming radiation from the sun. This
heating is oﬀset by an equally strong infrared radiation leaving the planet. Inter
estingly, if Earth were without any atmosphere, and if its surface reﬂectivity did not
change, global-mean surface temperature would be roughly 33° colder than it is
today. This large diﬀerence is due to the strong atmospheric absorption of infrared
radiation leaving the earth’s surface. The major atmospheric infrared absorbers
are clouds, water vapor, and CO2. This strong infrared absorption (and strong ree
mission) eﬀect is extremely robust: It is readily measured in the laboratory and is
straightforwardly measured from earth-orbiting satellites. Simply put, adding


CO2 to the atmosphere adds another “blanket” to the planet and, thus, directly
changes the heat balance of the earth’s atmosphere.
Individuals skeptical about the reality of global warming have correctly noted
that, in terms of direct trapping of outgoing infrared radiation, water vapor is by
far the dominant greenhouse gas on earth. Since water vapor dominates the cur
rent radiative balance, how can it be that CO2 is anything other than a minor con
tributor to earth’s absorption of infrared radiation? Part of the answer comes from
the well-known modeling result from infrared spectroscopy that net planetary
radiative forcing changes roughly linearly in response to logarithmic changes in
CO2. 5 Thus, a quadrupling of CO2 gives another roughly 1°C direct warming over
the direct 1°C warming for a CO2 doubling, valid for the extreme assumption that
water vapor mixing ratios 6 and clouds do not change. Interestingly, this approxi
mate relationship also holds for a large extended range as CO2 is decreased 7.
It is thus hard to escape the conclusion that CO2 provides a measurable direct
addition to the atmospheric trapping of infrared radiation leaving the surface of
our planet. However, a simple comparison of the relative greenhouse eﬃciencies
of water vapor and CO2 quickly becomes problematic because water vapor enters
the climate system mostly as a “feedback” gas. All models and observations cur
rently indicate that as climate warms or cools, to a pretty good approximation, the
observed and calculated global-mean relative humidity of water vapor remains
roughly constant as the climate changes, whereas its mixing ratio does not 8. Thus,
as climate warms (cools), the holding capacity of atmospheric water vapor
increases (decreases) exponentially. This is a powerful water vapor positive feed
back mechanism – that is, a process that acts to amplify the original warming
caused by increasing CO2 levels. With this major positive feedback, the modeled
“climate sensitivity” 9 increases by about a factor of three, to roughly 3°.
Lindzen 10 hypothesized that this water vapor feedback eﬀect could actually be
negative in the upper troposphere. If this were the case, then the water vapor pos
itive feedback amplifying eﬀect would be roughly one third to one half less than
that currently projected. A conceptual diﬃculty with making this hypothesis work
is that the relative humidity of the upper troposphere must then get sharply and
progressively lower as the lower troposphere warms up and moistens in response
to the added infrared absorbers. 11 Conversely, the relative humidity of the upper
troposphere must get progressively higher if something were acting to cool the
planet. In eﬀect, this hypothesis states that the dynamical behavior of the atmos
phere would change strongly in response to altered infrared absorbers. Currently,
observational evidence remains generally consistent with the modeling results
that project a strong positive water vapor mixing ratio feedback under approxi
mate constancy of relative humidity as the climate changes. 12 The quality of water
vapor data in the upper troposphere, however, is not particularly good, and none
of the current observational tests can deﬁnitively address the issue at hand – how
the water vapor feedback might work a century from now.
The basic story of human-induced greenhouse warming remains simple.
Increased infrared absorptivity due to increasing CO2 and other trace gases pro
duces a net heating eﬀect on the earth’s surface, due mainly to increased down
ward infrared radiation. The eﬀect is not dissimilar to the suppression of night
time cooling when there is cloud cover or a very humid weather pattern. The
positive feedback eﬀect of water vapor acts to amplify the warming eﬀect, both
locally and globally.
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5 Scientists at GFDL recently
performed simple one-dimen
sional radiative/convective
model calculations of the
effects of reducing CO2. The loglinear relationship has been
found to hold down to CO2 con
centrations as low as one sixtyfourth of preindustrial levels. As
CO2 is decreased, the atmos
phere's ability to hold water
vapor collapses and the global
temperatures drop sharply.
6 Relative humidity is the ratio
(in percentage) of the vapor
pressure of air to its saturation
vapor pressure. The saturation
vapor pressure of air, deter
mined from the Clausius-Clap
eron equation of classical ther
modynamics, is a strong
exponential function of tem
perature, roughly doubling for
each 10°c. Water vapor mixing
ratio is the mass of water vapor
of air divided by the mass of dry
air; it is generally conserved for
a few days following an air
parcel when no condensation is
present.
7 See note 6.
8 Relative humidity (see note
6) is determined in the tropos
phere by the interplay among
evaporation at the earth's sur
face, upward transfer of water
vapor (by small-scale turbu
lence, thunderstorm-scale
moist convection, large-scale
rising motion), and net removal
by precipitation. Equally impor
tant is the local lowering of rel
ative humidity in the tropos
phere due to adiabatic
warming in regions of descend
ing air under approximate con
servation of water vapor mixing
ratio. Any appeal to a sharp
change in mean relative humid
ity thus necessarily hypothe
sizes a substantial change in
the dynamical behavior of the
troposphere, in this case a large
change in the motions of the
troposphere in response to a
comparatively small perturba
tion to the thermodynamics of
the climate system.
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9 The term climate sensitivity
typically refers to the level of
equilibrium global-mean sur
face air temperature increase
that the climate system would
experience in response to a
doubling of CO2. Each model
has its own climate sensitivity,
almost guaranteed to be some
what different from the
unknown value for the real
world.
10 Lindzen RS. 1990. Some cool
ness concerning global warm
ing. Bull. Am. Meteorolog. Soc.
71: 288-99.
11 Relative humidity is the ratio
(in percentage) of the vapor
pressure of air to its saturation
vapor pressure. The saturation
vapor pressure of air, deter
mined from the Clausius-Clap
eron equation of classical ther
modynamics, is a strong
exponential function of tem
perature, roughly doubling for
each 10°c. Water vapor mixing
ratio is the mass of water vapor
of air divided by the mass of dry
air; it is generally conserved for
a few days following an air
parcel when no condensation is
present.
12 Oort AH, Liu H. 1993. Upper
air temperature trends over the
globe. J. Clim. 6: 292-307 and
Sun D-Z, Held IM. 1996. A com
parison of modeled and
observed relationships
between interannual variations
of water vapor and tempera
ture. J. Clim. 9: 665-75.
13 Clouds are effective
absorbers and reflectors of
solar (visible plus ultraviolet)
and infrared radiation. Their net
effect is to cool the planet, but
the effect is very small relative
to the 33°c "atmosphere/ no
atmosphere" difference noted
above. However, for predicting
smaller human-caused climate
changes, the effect of clouds
becomes crucially important.

   
An additional, but smaller, positive feedback is the relationship between ice (or
its absence) at the earth’s surface and its reﬂectivity (albedo) of solar radiation. In
essence, if ice or snow cover melts, the surface left exposed (ground, vegetation, or
water) is generally less reﬂective of incoming solar radiation. This leads to more
absorption of the solar radiation, thus more warming, less ice, and so on.
Inclusion of this “ice-albedo” feedback process in mathematical models of the
climate ampliﬁes further the calculated warming response of the climate to
increased concentrations of CO2 and infrared absorbing gases; it also ampliﬁes any
calculated cooling. Other kinds of feedbacks, both positive and negative, result
from interaction of land surface properties (e.g. changes of vegetation that lead to
albedo and evaporation changes) with climate warming/cooling mechanisms or
from changes in CO2 uptake by the biosphere.
The major source of uncertainty in determining climate feedback concerns the
impact of clouds on the radiative balance of the climate system. 13 A CO2-induced
increase in low clouds mainly acts to reﬂect more solar radiation and thus would
provide a negative feedback to global warming. An increase in high clouds mainly
adds to the absorption of infrared radiation trying to escape the planet and would
thus provide a positive feedback. A change in cloud microphysical and optical
properties could go either way. Which of these would dominate in an increasing
CO2 world? We are not sure. Our inability to answer this question with conﬁdence
is the major source of uncertainty in today’s projections of how the climate would
respond to increasing infrared-absorbing gases. Furthermore, it is not likely this
cloud-radiation uncertainty will be sharply reduced within the next 5 years, no
matter what promises are oﬀered, expectations are stated, or claims are made.
Although clouds dominate the climate modeling uncertainty, other key
processes are also in need of improved understanding and modeling capability. An
example is the eﬀect of human-produced airborne particulates (aerosols) com
posed mostly of sulfate (from oxidation of the sulfur in fossil fuels) and carbon
(from open ﬁres). Sulfate aerosols are mostly reﬂective of solar radiation, produc
ing a cooling eﬀect, whereas carbonaceous aerosols mostly absorb solar radiation,
producing a net heating eﬀect. Eﬀorts to reduce the current uncertainty are lim
ited by inadequate measurements. Even more uncertain are the so-called indirect
eﬀects of atmospheric aerosols. By indirect eﬀect we mean the uncertain role the
presence of these aerosols plays in the determination of cloud amounts and their
optical properties.
Another key uncertainty lies in modeling the response of the ocean to changed
greenhouse gases. This aﬀects the calculated rate of response of the climate over,
say, the next century, as well as the possibility of changed ocean circulation, a
potential major factor in shaping regional climate changes.
A frequently overlooked aspect of the human-caused greenhouse warming
problem is its fundamentally very long timescales. The current rate of adding to
the CO2 concentrations of the atmosphere is a bit more than half a percent per
year. Thus, the time required for CO2 amounts to approach twice preindustrial
levels is roughly a century or so, a process well underway (now about 30% higher).
Also, the climate is not expected to respond quickly to the added CO2 because of
the large thermal inertia of the oceans. This eﬀect can produce delays in the real
ized warming on timescales ranging from decades to centuries. Moreover, the deep
ocean carries over a thousand years of thermal “memory.” Thus, it will take a long
time for this problem to reach its full potential.
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This great inertia in the climate is also a big factor at the other end of the problem. What if we get a climate we do not like and want our “normal” one back? Cur
rently, the apparent net atmospheric lifetime of fossil-fuel-produced CO2 is about
three-quarters of a century. Thus, the natural draw down of the extra CO2 would
take a long time. Also, the gradually warmed ocean would take a long time to give
up its accumulated heat in a climate that had been given a chance to return toward
its essentially undisturbed state.
Why climate models are imperfect and why they are crucial anyway

Over the past three decades, a quiet revolution has fundamentally changed the way
that much of the research in climate science works. Earlier, the controlling science
paradigm was the interchange between theory and observation concerning the
structure and behavior of natural phenomena. Today, much climate research is
driven by the interactions among theory, observation, and modeling. By model
ing, we mean computer-based simulations of various phenomena based on
numerical solutions of the theory-based equations governing the phenomena
under investigation. These combined approaches are now widespread in the phys
ical sciences. It is signiﬁcant that mathematical modeling of weather and climate
literally pioneered this new approach to scientiﬁc research.
Mathematical models of climate can range from simple descriptions of simple
processes to full-blown simulations of the astoundingly complex climate system.
Models of the coupled atmosphere-ocean-ice-land system lie close to the most
complex limit of such models. This very complexity of climate models can lead to
highly divergent human reactions to them, varying from “garbage in, garbage out”
to almost worshipful. The truth is far from either of these unscientiﬁc characteri
zations.
Newcomers to the greenhouse warming problem tend to be unaware of the
long and rich history of mathematical modeling of the atmosphere and the ocean.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, simple mathematical models were created to
attack the weather forecasting problem. More advanced models were built in the
late 1950s and early 1960s 14 because of a strong research interest in understanding
the circulation of the atmosphere. Shortly thereafter, the ﬁrst model bearing a
strong resemblance to today’s atmospheric models was created. 15 That early
model, as well as all of today’s models, solves the equations of classical physics rel
evant for the atmosphere, ice, ocean, and land surface. These equations are con
servation of momentum (Newton’s second law of motion), conservation of heat
(ﬁrst law of thermodynamics), and conservation of matter (air, water, chemicals,
etc., can be blown around by wind or currents, changed in phase, transferred
across boundaries, or converted chemically, but the number of atoms of each kind
remains unchanged).
The modeling approach thus provides high potential for fundamental tests of
applications of these theoretical ﬁrst principles. Such modeling appears decep
tively simple: these equations are taught in high school physics. There are some
daunting challenges, however. When coupled and applied to moving (and
deforming) ﬂuids such as air and water, these equations form continuum systems
that are intrinsically nonlinear and can exhibit surprisingly counterintuitive
behaviors. Moreover, their solution in a climate model requires a reasonably ﬁnescale grid of computational points all over the atmosphere-ice-ocean-land surface
system. In addition, important small-scale processes such as moist convection

14 Phillips NA. 1956. The gen
eral circulation of the atmos
phere: a numerical experiment.
Q. J. R. Meteorolog. Soc. 82: 123
64 and Smagorinsky J. 1963.
General circulation experi
ments with the primitive equa
tions. I. The basic experiment.
Mon. Weather Rev. 41: 99-164.
15 Smagorinsky J, Manabe S,
Holloway JL Jr. 1965. Numerical
results from a nine-level gen
eral circulation model of the
atmosphere. Mon. Weather Rev.
43: 727-68.
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16 Lorenz EM. 1963. Determin
istic non-periodic flow. J. Atmos.
Sci. 20: 130-41.
17 Cane M, Zebiak SE, Dolan SC.
1986. Experimental forecast of
El Niño. Nature 321: 827-32.
18 The pinball machine is a
device designed for recreation
and amusement that allows
the player to shoot steel balls
(of roughly 1-in diameter) into
an obstacle-strewn field of elec
tronic bumpers that, when
struck by the ball, act to
increase the net speed of the
ball (super elastic rebound). The
playing field is slanted so that
the ball enters at the highest
point. When all five balls have
been trapped in the gutter, the
game is over. The object of the
game is to keep the balls in play
as long as possible (through
adroit use of flippers near the
gutter that propel the ball back
uphill and away from the
dreaded gutter). The longer the
ball is in play, the more it is in
contact with bumper collisions
that add to the number of
points earned. A sufficiently
high score wins free replays.
Thus, the object of the game is
for the player's skill to over
come gravity for as long as pos
sible, somewhat analogous to
the efforts of ski jumpers and
pole-vaulters.

   
(e.g. thunderstorms) and turbulent dissipation remain formidably diﬃcult to
incorporate on a ﬁrst-principles basis. Worse, no meaningful steady-state solu
tions solve directly for the average climate. In eﬀect, the average climate in such a
model must be described as a statistical equilibrium state of an unstable system
that exhibits important natural variability on timescales of hours (thunder
storms), days (weather systems), weeks to months (planetary-scale waves/jet
stream meanders), years (El Niño), and decades to centuries (ocean circulation
variations and glacial ice changes). Clearly, models of such a large and complex
system are intrinsically computer intensive. Fortunately, today’s supercomputers
are over a thousand times faster than those of 30 years ago. Because of today’s wide
spread availability of relatively inexpensive computer power, the number of fully
coupled atmosphere-ocean climate models in the world has increased from a few
in the early 1980s to roughly 10 independently conceived models today. Roughly 20
more are essentially based on these 10 models.
Over the last half century, use of these kinds of physically based mathematical
models has resulted in major improvements in the science of weather forecasting.
Sharp skill improvements have been achieved in ﬁnding the useful short-term pre
dictability in a fundamentally chaotic system (by which I mean that the details of
weather variations become essentially unpredictable after a suﬃcient lapse of
time, say a couple of weeks). 16 For example, it has become almost routine to fore
cast the intensity and path of a major winter storm system well before the surface
low-pressure area (so ubiquitously displayed in television weathercasts) has even
formed.
Recently, it has become clear that slower variations of the coupled ocean-ice
atmosphere-land surface system provide potential for ﬁnding useful predictabil
ity on timescales longer than the couple of weeks characteristic of individual
weather systems. The most visible example is the realization that El Niño events,
which produce warming in the tropical eastern Paciﬁc Ocean, may be predictable
a year or so in advance under certain circumstances. 17 The existence of such a “pre
dictable spot” of warm ocean suggests a “second-hand” improvement of predic
tion of seasonal weather anomalies (e.g. a wetter-than-normal California winter).
The existence of such extended-range predictive potential in the climate system
leads to obvious questions about such models’ validity for predicting systematic
changes in the statistical equilibrium climate (say a 20-year running average)
resulting from the inexorably increasing infrared-active gases that are currently
underway. First, we must recognize that these are conceptually quite diﬀerent
things: Weather forecasting attempts to trace and predict speciﬁc disturbances in
an unstable environment; climate projections attempt to calculate the changed
statistical equilibrium climate that results from applying a new heating mecha
nism (e.g. CO2 infrared absorption) to the system. Perhaps surprisingly, predict
ing the latter is in many respects simpler than predicting the former.
As an example of the fundamental diﬀerence between weather forecasting and
climate change, consider the following simple and do-able “lab” thought experi
ment that utilizes the common pinball machine. 18 As the ejected ball in the pin
ball machine careens through its obstacle-laden path toward its inevitable demise
in the gutter, its detailed path, after a couple of collisions with the bumpers,
becomes deterministically unpredictable. Think of this behavior as the “weather”
of the pinball machine. Of course, the odds against success can be changed dra
matically in favor of the player by raising the level of the machine at the gutter end,


in eﬀect changing the “climate” of the pinball machine. By reducing the slope of
the playing ﬁeld, the eﬀective acceleration of gravity has been reduced, increasing
the number of point-scoring collisions before the still inevitable ﬁnal victory of
gravity. Interestingly, in this altered pinball machine “climate,” the individual tra
jectories of the balls are ultimately as unpredictable as they were in the unaltered
version. The diagnostic signal of an altered pinball “climate” is a highly signiﬁcant
increase in the number of free games awarded. A secondary diagnostic signal, of
course, is a noticeable decrease in the received revenues from the machine. It thus
is conceptually easy to change the pinball machine’s “climate.” Detecting changes
in pinball machine “climate” and attributing its causes, however, can be easily
obscured by the largely random statistics of a fundamentally chaotic system, not
unlike in the actual climate.
What do these pinball machine experiments have to do with understanding
models of the real climate? Projections for greenhouse warming scenarios depend
on a number of physical processes (see above) that are subtle, complex, and not
important to weather prediction. However, people outside the climate ﬁeld are
frequently heard to say that climate models are ill posed and irrelevant because
they attempt to forecast climate behavior that is well beyond the limits of deter
ministic predictability and that if one cannot predict weather more than a week in
advance, the climate change problem is impossible. Such statements are scientiﬁ
cally incorrect. The “weather prediction” problem is essentially an initial value
problem in which the predictability of interesting details (i. e. weather) is funda
mentally limited by uncertainty in initial conditions, model errors, and instabili
ties in the atmosphere itself. In contrast, climate change projections are actually
boundary value problems, (e.g. interference with a pinball machine’s acceleration
of gravity), where the objective is to determine the changes in average conditions
(including the average features of the evolution toward the new equilibrium) as
the planet is heated or cooled by newly added processes (e.g. increased CO2).
The diﬀerences between weather and climate models are further instructive
when one considers how their strengths and weaknesses are evaluated. Thanks to
massive amounts of weather and climate data, both kinds of models can be eval
uated by careful comparison with data from the real world. In practice, however,
the approaches to improving these superﬁcially similar models are very diﬀerent.
The weather models are evaluated by comparing model-based forecasts, started
up from real data on a given day, with what happened hours to weeks later. Inter
estingly, one of the key problems with such weather models is that they can easily
reject their initial conditions by drifting toward a model climate that is quite diﬀ
erent from that of the real data that was used to start up the detailed forecast cal
culation. In eﬀect, such a weather forecast model is deﬁcient in the climate that it
would produce if released from the constraints of its starting data.
In sharp contrast, a climate model has the responsibility of simulating the timeaveraged climate for, say, today’s conditions (or for around, say, the year 1800). In
this case, the focus of the scientiﬁc inquiry is quite diﬀerent. Here, attention is
directed toward proper simulation of the statistics of climate, such as the daily and
annual temperature cycles forced by the sun, the number and intensity of extra
tropical cyclones, locations of deserts and rainy areas, strength and location of jet
streams and planetary waves, ﬁdelity of El Niño simulation, location and charac
teristics of clouds and water vapor, strength and location of ocean currents, mag
nitude and location of snow accumulation and snow melt, and, ﬁnally, amplitudes
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19 Out of many such examples,
one of the more interesting is
provided by the Department of
Energy's Atmospheric Radiation
Measurements Program. At a
heavily instrumented site in
Oklahoma (and at some lesser
sites), intensive measurements
are made of horizontal wind,
vertical velocity, temperature,
water vapor, clouds, latent heat
ing, precipitation, short-and
long-wave radiative fluxes, and
surface fluxes of heat, momen
tum, and water vapor. This com
prehensive set of measure
ments is being used to evaluate
our current modeling capabili
ties and deficiencies on cloud
processes, "cloudy" radiative
transfer, convection (thunder
storm scale), and turbulence.
These areas represent some of
the weakest aspects of the
atmospheric parts of climate
models.

   
and patterns of natural variability of all of these on a wide range of timescales (days
to centuries).
Achieving all of this in a climate model is a daunting task because the enormous
wealth of phenomena in the climate system virtually requires the use of judicious
tuning and/or adjustment of various poorly deﬁned processes (such as clouds, or
the ﬂuxes of heat between atmosphere and ocean) to improve the model’s agree
ment with observed climate statistics. Such tunings and adjustments are wide
spread, especially for the global-mean radiative balance, and are often done to
ensure that the model agrees with the global-mean features of the climate. If this
is not done, a coupled model started up with today’s climate will tend to drift
toward a less realistic climate. These practices have been criticized as evidence that
climate models have no credibility for addressing the greenhouse warming prob
lem. Interestingly, such tunings and adjustments (or lack thereof) may have little
to do with the ability of a model to reduce its fundamental uncertainty in predict
ing anthropogenic climate change. Recall that the key uncertainties highlighted
above (water vapor, cloud, and ice albedo feedbacks) revolve around how such
properties might change under added greenhouse gases. This is a set of modeling
problems that cannot be evaded by judicious model tuning or adjustments. Likely
to prove much more fruitful in the long run would be improved fundamental
modeling of the key processes that govern the most important climate feedback
processes as CO2 increases (e.g. clouds, water vapor, ice, ocean circulation).
Thus, the models are imperfect tools with which to make such climate change
predictions. Does this mean we should shift our focus to other tools? Deﬁnitely
not. Statistically-based models that use historical data are possible alternatives, but
they are of marginal validity, mainly because the recent earth has never experi
enced the rate of warming expected to result from the current runup of infraredactive greenhouse gases. In this sense, the large, but very slow, global-mean climate
excursions of the past geological epochs are instructive, but they are far from deﬁn
itive as guidelines or analogs for the next century.
The above considerations make it clear that there is no viable alternative to
coupled climate models for projecting future climate states and how they might
unfold. The physically-based climate models have the huge advantage of being
fundamentally grounded in known theory as evaluated against all available
observations. There are indeed reasons to be skeptical of the ability of such
models to make quantitatively accurate projections of the future climate states
that will result from various added greenhouse gas scenarios. Fortunately, the
weak points of such climate models can be analyzed, evaluated, and improved
with properly focused, process-oriented measurements, complemented by wellposed numerical experiments with various formulations of the climate models. 19
In short, the use of such climate models allows a systematic approach to close the
gap between theory and observations of the climate system. No alternative
approach comes close.
Why climate data are imperfect and why they are crucial anyway

The availability of climate data in many forms is crucial in the quest to understand,
simulate, and predict the climate system and how it might change in the future.
Such data provide the basics for our characterizations of the time-averaged climate
states of various statistics of temperature, pressure, wind, water amounts, cloudi
ness, and precipitation as a function of geographical location, time, and altitude.


Most importantly, such data provide invaluable information on the natural vari
ability of climate, ranging from seasons to decades.
These data sets have empowered important direct insights on how the climate
system works. For example, the observed average daily and seasonal ranges of
mean temperature provide valuable evaluations of our theoretical understanding
of how the climate changes in response to changed radiative circumstances (e.g.
day to night, summer to winter). On longer timescales, indirect inferences (or
proxy measures) provide valuable information on how ice ages and warm epochs
appear to depend sensitively on subtle changes to the heating of Earth due to
seemingly small variations in the precession of Earth’s orientation toward the sun
and in Earth’s elliptical orbit around the sun. Interestingly, the onset of ice ages
and their terminations appear to respond more sensitively to these small solar
heating changes than are calculated by our current climate models. For example,
the ice core records show that atmospheric CO2 lowers as the climate cools, a pos
itive feedback eﬀect that we do not expect to be relevant over the next century.
However, such observations of prehistoric climates are ambiguous enough that
they do not justify any conﬁdent conclusions that our current climate models may
be underestimating the century-scale global temperature increase due to added
greenhouse gases.
For the atmosphere, there are thousands of places on earth that collect infor
mation daily for the primary purpose of weather forecasting. Fortunately, all the
information collected for weather purposes are also central to the needs to char
acterize longer-term climate. Unfortunately, many kinds of key atmospheric
information are not readily available from the weather networks. These include
vertical velocity, radiative heating/cooling, cloud characteristics, evaporation, and
properties of critical trace species such as particles containing sulfate and carbon.
For the land surface, many local sites provide information on snow, water storage,
runoﬀ, and soil moisture. Unfortunately, the spatial coverage is far from adequate,
and most stations provide little information on the state of the vegetative cover and
its role in governing surface water budgets and reﬂectivity of solar radiation.
For the world ocean, the data coverage is spotty and episodic relative to the
need to characterize the state of the ocean and its role in climate variability and
climate change. For example, we are still waiting to see the ﬁrst instantaneous
“weather map” of the internal ocean’s waves, jets, and vortices, a privilege that is
taken for granted by atmospheric scientists. Fortunately, the ocean’s surface is
partly accessible to measurements from earth-orbiting satellites. This allows
remote measurements of ocean surface temperatures, sea state, and ocean height,
a measure of integrated density over a fairly deep layer that allows some inferences
about ocean currents.
For all parts of the climate system, the ability to characterize long-term trends
of key climate variables is minimally adequate at best and nonexistent at worst.
Few climate measurement systems currently in place are conﬁgured to address
what I call the climate monitoring requirement.
Climate monitoring is deﬁned here as the systematic, long-term collection of
key climate measurements, with careful attention paid to maintenance of calibra
tion and continuity of records for very long time intervals, and with a strong focus
on interpretation of the data gathered. Very few current climate measurement sys
tems satisfy these stringent requirements. This mainly is because of the fact that
almost all climate-relevant measurements are gathered for shorter-term purposes
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such as weather forecasting, and for eﬀorts to understand speciﬁc processes such
as clouds or El Niño.
So, why should we care about this climate monitoring deﬁciency? Who actually
has a stake in improved climate monitoring? Climate data scientists do because
their goal is to use the data to learn about how climate and climate change actually
work. Climate theorists and modelers do because the current anthropogenic
greenhouse warming projections are theoretically based, as manifested in the
mathematical climate models (making climate change projections without
attempting to evaluate them against the evolving real world is counter to the ethic
of science). Policymakers do because they are already in the process of making
policy (or nonpolicy) in the face of an imperfectly understood, but potentially very
serious, global environmental threat. Policymakers, like scientists, always need to
evaluate their conclusions against new information.
In spite of the compelling needs for improved climate monitoring, not much is
now being done nationally or internationally about the current monitoring deﬁ
ciencies. Even worse, many critical capabilities are deteriorating in the United
States and elsewhere because of budgetary pressures. Why is this so? This is a ques
tion that continues to baﬄe me. I suspect the answer lies mainly in the unwilling
ness of top oﬃcials to make ﬁrm commitments to a problem that requires sus
tained focus for many decades. 20 Also, the problem suﬀers from its apparent lack
of glamour. “What? No immediate payoﬀ?” It is also possible that some may not
feel much need to get the right answer if their minds are already made up, a phe
nomenon not unheard of at both ends of the political spectrum.
This summary of some of the barriers to better climate monitoring reveals a
serious challenge that is currently producing a net reduction in the global climate
monitoring capability at the same time that international policy negotiators are
taking the greenhouse warming problem seriously. Clearly, improved information
is required to guide the dauntingly tortuous mitigation (or lack thereof) of green
house gas emissions over the next century. The emerging climate monitoring
information can reveal that our greenhouse warming projections were either too
high or too low. Given this information, future mitigation decisions can be
strongly aﬀected. Without this key information, we will be ﬂying in the dark much
longer.
Role of controversy

Context for controversy
In most of the great political, social, and environmental challenges of our age, con
troversy and disagreement are key features of the public dialogue. A good rule of
thumb is that the intensity of the debate tends to be inversely proportional to the
available knowledge on the subject. However, there are spectacular exceptions to
this rule of thumb. Consider the pro-life versus pro-choice abortion debate. Here
the debates are prolonged and vociferous, even though the science of reproduction
and its prevention are rather well understood. Obviously, the continually improv
ing scientiﬁc understanding of reproductive science will have little to do with
changing the tone of this debate. The abortion debate is about legitimate clashes
of value systems that new scientiﬁc understanding is unlikely to diminish.
This extreme example provides an instructive context for understanding the
character of the intense controversies and disagreements concerning humancaused greenhouse warming. There would not be much of a global warming con
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troversy if increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere were perceived to pro
duce an eﬀect of theoretical curiosity – but an eﬀect deemed irrelevant for serious
changes in the climate. I can visualize scientists disagreeing, as they typically do,
in scientiﬁc conferences on points of correct or incorrect explanations of various
phenomena. A few might get passionate about their own viewpoint, but the dis
agreements would not normally prevent the key players from going out later for
coﬀee, beer, or dinner together.
Interestingly, this is a reasonable characterization of what happens at climate
conferences, even now. Things change, however, when a member of the scientiﬁc
community is arguing for a political position “in the name of science.” Even in this
case, the mood is generally polite, but the questions to the speaker are typically
pointed and sometimes emotional. My interpretation is that working climate sci
entists are not comfortable dealing with the unfamiliar science/nonscience inter
face. Our instincts are to continue to ﬁght fair scientiﬁcally and to openly admit
uncertainty, even when unscientiﬁc weapons are employed. In eﬀect, serious sci
entists are trying to ﬁnd the scientiﬁc truth, whereas advocates typically appeal to
science to advance their personal agendas. This mismatch often leads to an ampli
ﬁed sense of “scientiﬁc” controversy, at least to an uninformed observer.
Genuine scientiﬁc uncertainty and disagreement
The above observations are not oﬀered to assert that scientists should not argue.
On the contrary, the whole culture of physical science is about disagreements and
alternative explanations. But the discipline of science is about settling disagree
ments using the scientiﬁc method. The very ethic of science is designed to get to
the truth through hypothesis testing by careful experimentation.
A good test for determining whether or not the scientiﬁc method is being used
to evaluate assertions about the science of the problem is whether or not previous
assertions are altered in the face of contrary evidence. Many instructive examples
of legitimate scientiﬁc disagreement have energized new understanding in the
light of improved information.
The example of the physical explanation of the spectacularly large Antarctic
“ozone hole” phenomenon is especially instructive in this context. The new infor
mation on the ozone hole discovery changed within about 2 years the way estab
lishment science understood ozone depletion. My own small part in that story was
in advancing a testable hypothesis on whether the ozone hole was a natural phe
nomenon. 21 Our hypothesis (the only identiﬁed plausible “natural” alternative)
was indeed tested and was found to be physically consistent; however, it failed by
nearly a factor of 10 as an explanation of the sharp ozone decreases. In real science,
if the numbers are oﬀ, the hypothesis fails. There are self-proclaimed “scientists”
who still use terms such as “ozone-hole hoax” to describe the state of ozone sci
ence. Clearly, such “scientists” are ignoring compellingly large and convincing
ozone decreases, as well as the strong scientiﬁc evidence available to explain the
decreases.
It is important to recognize that scientiﬁc disagreement is a cornerstone of the
scientiﬁc ethic. Contrary to our legal traditions, all theory, all models, and all data
are, in eﬀect, “guilty until proven innocent.” Moreover, the proof of innocence in
science is inevitably relative. Einstein, in principle, “shot down” Newton’s laws of
motion. In practice, however, we live our daily lives implicitly assuming the virtual
correctness of Newton’s laws without fear that the departures from the “true
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physics” could cause us any observable problems. Thus, we are comfortable with
scientiﬁc understanding that is “good enough” for application to the purposes at
hand.
I suggest that this “good enough” principle provides useful guidance for view
ing the human-caused greenhouse warming problem. Obviously, anything as
complex and interactive as climate oﬀers plenty of opportunity for legitimate sci
entiﬁc disagreement. My own view is that the climate science community has been
straightforward in acknowledging the signiﬁcant remaining uncertainties in the
projections of possible future climate changes. Most importantly, we still acknowl
edge a factor of three (1.5°-4.5°) range of uncertainty in the equilibrium globalmean surface temperature response to a doubling of CO2. 22 In addition, I have
asserted that there is a greater than 90% chance that a doubling of CO2 would pro
duce a warming within that range. 23 We scientists acknowledge that adding the
eﬀects of sulfate particles (a result of fossil fuel burning) produces an uncertain
cooling oﬀset eﬀect. We also freely acknowledge that the aerosol cooling eﬀect was
given insuﬃcient attention in the 1990 IPCC Report. 24
These observations strongly indicate that the great controversy about green
house warming is not really about the uncertain state of the science. In the scien
tiﬁc community, the uncertainty is widely acknowledged. We do, however, fre
quently argue about the signiﬁcance and validity of new claims and new results.
The path to sharpened scientiﬁc truth is always a rocky one.
The misuse of scientiﬁc information
The current, highly energized greenhouse warming debates go well beyond scien
tiﬁc controversy. They are driven by arguments that are not scientiﬁc, at least in the
sense that practicing scientists use the term. The arguments are frequently, and
legitimately, centered around clashes in values and priorities. Unfortunately, how
ever, assertions are being made about climate change “in the name of science” that
are not based on fundamental, quantiﬁable climate science. How is this so? There
are many techniques available to use or misuse scientiﬁc knowledge to support
one’s personal viewpoint, which may or may not have much to do with the lessons
from the science itself. Actually, it is easy to “mine” the lore of climate facts to jus
tify a particular, preset point of view.
The most obvious misuse of climate knowledge comes from the openly stated
uncertainties in the predicted global-mean surface temperature increase for dou
bled atmospheric CO2. The widely accepted range of 1.5°– 4.5° leads to some
intriguing arguments. Those who are legitimately afraid of the economic conse
quences of CO2 mitigation (who I call “Ostriches,” with their heads in the sand),
almost independent of the scientiﬁc evidence, tend to appeal to the information
that buttresses the case for the numbers to be at or below the low end of the range.
“I just know the real result will be on the low side because… .” Those who are legit
imately concerned about the environmental consequences of high CO2 levels
(who I call “Chicken Littles,” who see the sky falling), almost independent of the
scientiﬁc evidence, tend to appeal to the information that buttresses the case for
the warming numbers to be at or above the high end of the range.“I just know that
the real results will be on the high side because … .”
Like it or not, the truth is that we do not know the truth about where the ﬁnal
answer will lie. The inconvenient reality is that uncertainty “just is.”If we knew that
our previous best estimate was, say, on the high side, the scientiﬁc community
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would most assuredly lower the best guess. It would be unscientiﬁc to do other
wise. It is clear that well-meaning, but agenda-driven, people will still legitimately
disagree for nonscientiﬁc reasons. In eﬀect, these are values-driven positions that
have little to do with the true state of scientiﬁc understanding. People who use
such “science” to reinforce their personal opinions are not interpreting science as
scientists understand it.
Intriguingly, in the greenhouse warming debates, the natural variability of the
climate system is frequently misused in a manner surprisingly analogous to the
misuse of scientiﬁc uncertainty, as explained above. In this case, Ostriches say that
the unforced natural variability of climate is so large that the observed warming
trends over the past century are explainable by appeals to the natural variability
of, say, global-mean surface air temperature. Thus, for the observed, roughly 0.6°
warming over the past 130 years, Ostriches can properly argue that this might be a
natural warming cycle that has nothing to do with the increasing greenhouse
gases. However, Chicken Littles can point out that we might have been in a natural
cooling cycle over the past 130 years, and thus the greenhouse eﬀect is probably
larger than it currently appears from the data. The problem with both these argu
ments is there is no evidence to conﬁrm either of them. That is one of the reasons
it is very diﬃcult to appeal to the temperature record to lower the uncertainty
limits on greenhouse warming projections very much. Natural variability, like
uncertainty, “just is.” No values-driven debating tricks will make this reality dis
appear. When either uncertainty or natural variability is systematically used to
push a prestated position, be wary. Science may just have been misused, to the net
loss of a more rational eﬀort to establish what is really going on in the science of
this daunting problem.
The key role of “oﬃcial” assessments
Over the last two decades there have been roughly a hundred or so published
greenhouse warming evaluations and assessments. Almost all have been prepared
by single governments or by nongovernmental organizations. Almost all have car
ried the strong ﬂavor of the perspectives and viewpoints of the entities producing
them. Almost all have been virtually ignored on the global scene, apparently
because those evaluations were perceived as not credible to entities other than
those who wrote them. It was clear that U.S.-based evaluations, including the most
recent one, 25 were regarded with some mistrust by other countries.
In the ozone-depletion problem, there was a similar history. This pattern was
broken, however, with the ﬁrst truly international ozone assessment 26 sponsored
by the World Meteorological Organization. This eﬀort was empowered by a large
increase in participation by the world ozone science community and, thus, in the
authority of the assessment. An encouraging result was a marked increase in the
level of attention and action by the world policy community. In contrast to the
current greenhouse warming situation, however, ozone depletion awareness esca
lated rapidly thereafter, with the 1985 27 documentation of the Antarctic “ozone
hole,” a veritable smoking gun that showed the actual problem to be much more
severe than had previously been predicted by the ozone science community.
The viability of the greenhouse warming assessment process was strongly
improved following the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change () in 1988 and its report on Climate Change: The  Scientiﬁc
Assessment in 1990. 28 The  process substantially changed the way the world
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policy-making and decision-making communities deal with the greenhouse
warming issue. The internationalization of the process led to a common platform
in which the major contributors to this problem (essentially all human beings) can
begin to discuss ways to cope with its implications. In spite of the predictable nit
picking (too aggressive, too timid, too political, insuﬃciently political),  has
proved to be an enormous international success, at least in my opinion.
The  process and its assessment products were far from an instant suc
cess. When the 1990  Report was released, it received a small mention in a
back page of the New York Times. Almost no other newspapers picked up the
story. In eﬀect, it was a nonevent in the U.S. media. Ironically, the impending 1990
 Report had been a very large event in the personal lives of the reporters who
were covering the high-amplitude stories that were fueling the greenhouse warm
ing controversy. The reporters had been chasing some assertions that the 
report might reach some startling new conclusions. Those of us being inter
viewed by reporters almost daily before the release of the 1990  Report expe
rienced a precipitous drop in the frequency of interview requests after the release.
My colleagues and I inferred that the  Report was apparently “too dull” to
receive major interest from the press. In eﬀect,  was saying what climate sci
entists had been saying for some time: The greenhouse warming problem is real;
human-caused climate change could be substantial; the climate models are cred
ible; and the science has signiﬁcant uncertainties that must be recognized. I later
asked some reporters about this and they acknowledged that our inferences were
correct. Without major changes in the public perception of this problem, it was
not seen by the reporters as being very newsworthy. In eﬀect, the controversy was
much more interesting “news” than the problem itself. The need of the media to
ﬁnd intense and newsy stories had unfortunately overwhelmed whatever obliga
tions it may have had to inform its readers about the signiﬁcance of the  con
clusions.
The evolving real greenhouse warming controversy

In the months preceding the December 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference, a remark
able shift occurred in the media focus on the greenhouse warming problem. A
ﬂurry of articles appeared in the major media that were speciﬁcally designed to
inform the public about the science underlying greenhouse warming. Suddenly,
the science had become newsworthy, and the obligation to educate the public had
assumed a much higher priority.
What drove this major shift in media attention toward this long-standing issue?
The obvious answer was the Kyoto Conference. This assemblage of representatives
of essentially all the nations of the world was charged with beginning the virtually
unthinkable – changing the way the world uses fossil fuels to produce its massive
energy demands. Suddenly, people all over the planet were involved, and green
house warming was no longer a bit player. Quite literally, the Kyoto process itself
was threatening to change everyone’s personal world, in possibly large, threaten
ing, and unpredictable ways.
The implications of the Kyoto process led to a ﬂurry of major advertisements
and infomercials designed to buttress and/or defend particular points of view.
Environmentally oriented persons and groups emphasized the threats that ele
vated levels of greenhouse gases might cause for life on earth, human and other
wise. Fossil fuel producers and users emphasized potential damage to the economy


and to the speciﬁc industries that produce and directly use fossil fuels. Both posi
tions were expressing valid concerns.
Fascinatingly, the media jumped back into the greenhouse warming problem
at a level that substantially exceeded the level at which they had pursued the orig
inal controversies. The media now realized that there were thousands of stories in
the upgraded greenhouse story, phase two.
One can understand this dramatic shift in media attention by performing a
simple thought experiment. Imagine, by some miracle of scientiﬁc wizardry, that
the science of greenhouse warming is now deﬁnitively complete, that climate sci
entists can state with amazing precision the ways climate would change under any
variety of scenarios of future atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and
radiatively active airborne particulates. Would the greenhouse warming contro
versies go away? Hardly. Indeed, I argue that greenhouse controversies will actu
ally escalate substantially, for a host of readily understandable reasons. Some of the
reasons are outlined below.
To illustrate the ﬁrst reason, assume that the “deﬁnitive” state of climate science
is being used to evaluate the standard  “toy” scenario of ramping up to a dou
bling of CO2 over preindustrial levels and holding it there indeﬁnitely. Also
assume that the midrange global-mean estimate for this problem (~3° for dou
bled CO2) is actually the correct answer. What kinds of speciﬁc climate changes
might we expect to see? According to Manabe and Stouﬀer 29 and , 30 we
would expect (a) land to warm more than oceans, (b) a substantial retreat of
northern hemisphere sea ice, (c) sea level to rise more than a meter over the next
several hundred years, (d) a sharp reduction in the overturning circulation of the
North Atlantic ocean, and (e) substantial reductions in midcontinental summer
soil moisture (~25%). Also, we would expect increases in the intensity of tropical
hurricanes / typhoons, at least for those that tend to reach mature stages. 31 Sharp
increases in summertime heat index (a measure of the eﬀective temperature level
a body feels on a humid day) would be likely in moist subtropical areas. 32 The
above list of changes, if realized, would place signiﬁcant stresses on many aspects
of life on earth. It is likely there would be many losers and some winners. The
values and equity clashes resulting from this kind of a human-caused climate
change scene are likely to be intense and long lasting.
For the second reason to expect ampliﬁed controversy, note that there remains
an important possibility that the actual climate sensitivity could be near the lower
limit of the generous ranges of the current best estimates (~1.5° for doubled
CO2 ). Even this lower level of climate sensitivity to added CO2 can become prob
lematic, however. As pointed out in the 1994 IPCC Report on Radiative Forcing of
Climate Change,33 our current fossil fuel-use social trajectory is pointing well
toward a quadrupling of CO2 levels over their preindustrial values. At those high
CO2 levels, even this lower level of warming response to CO2 increases, and its
potential impacts become surprisingly “unsmall” (see the doubled CO2 eﬀects for
the midrange estimate above).
A third reason is that, near the current upper limits of climate sensitivity for the
current societal CO2 trajectory, the large projected climate changes indicate that
the potential impacts would likely become dauntingly large.34
The above hypothetical cases point out that there almost inevitably will be a
growing global requirement to move toward a change in the world’s use of fossil
fuels. That, of course, is what the Kyoto Conference was all about—to begin the
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process of nudging the world away from its current fossil fuel usage proﬁle in the
interest of preventing substantial climate change.
The Kyoto process was widely criticized for doing too much, for doing too little,
or for being too lenient on the CO2 emissions being produced by the other guy
(country, industry, generation …). Obviously, this “Who pays and how much and
when?” debate is already the source of major controversy that is guaranteed to
escalate as these “agreements” evolve toward real commitments by real countries,
real industries, and real individuals. Now the real controversies begin. Now values
clashes become substantive, and ubiquitous. Most of us want to ensure that our
particular set of wants and needs are not disproportionately impacted. Equitydriven values debates will inevitably be contentious and emotional.We thus are left
with the conclusion that Kyoto’s real purpose was to initiate the eﬀort to nudge us
down from our current social trajectory that is pointing toward quadrupled CO2
levels.35 The really hard decisions will have to be made in a future series of “Kyoto”
conferences.
Beyond the Kyoto process, the controversies are almost guaranteed to escalate
further. Underlying the Kyoto approach is what appears to me to be an implicit
assumption: We can proceed reasonably on the policy side if we can all quietly
assume, for now at least, that an eventual doubling of CO2 levels would lead to an
acceptable level of climate change, but that higher CO2 levels would become pro
gressively problematic. From the current scientiﬁc information base, what major
entities have concluded that? Certainly not the  1995 assessment.36 The
uncomfortable answer is that no major bodies have reached such a conclusion. So
what is going on? I suspect that this implicit assumption is actually driven by the
widely, but not unanimously, perceived enormous diﬃculty in capping the eventual
CO2 at a doubling, let alone at lower levels. The Kyoto process seems to have quietly
and wisely concluded that it needed to begin from some point that allows incre
mental actions to begin, even if they are small steps relative to the real problem.
Thus, the real greenhouse warming controversy is almost guaranteed to esca
late further. In order for the Kyoto process to have had any rational hope of suc
cess, the other half of this eﬀort had to be left oﬀ the table. Other half? Well, yes.
The Kyoto debates were about who pays for the initial costs of reducing CO2 emis
sions. The part left undiscussed was the debate about who “pays” for the impacts
caused by the unmitigated CO2 emissions. The tacit agreement to allow signiﬁcant
climate change (CO2 doubling or more) was “left home” in the Kyoto process. This
highlights another fundamental values debate that will surely add daunting levels
of complexity and emotion to the process. The equity issues are multidimensional:
climate change winners versus losers; rich versus poor; environment versus econ
omy; our generations versus future generations…. In short, the values, equity, and
impacts debates on the cost of realized climate change will inevitably be addressed
in a substantially more focused way than is currently underway. The stakes and the
emotional levels of the arguments will be very high. There will likely be clear win
ners and clear losers. It will take a long time, decades to a century, to sort all this
out. This is because the costs of suﬃciently aggressive mitigative action are likely
to be very high, clearly so if net global CO2 emissions are to be sharply reduced.
However, the “costs” of doing too little to prevent signiﬁcant climate warming are
also likely to be very high and would be levied for many centuries.
Simply put, this problem has no soft landing spot. This is the real greenhouse
warming controversy. Think of it as our “present” to our great grandchildren.
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Abstract
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc),adopted at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992, has a rich, almost unique history, and a powerful and persuasive structure. In
the years since the Convention was adopted, Parties have seen progress in the imple
mentation of many of its provisions. Enough confidence was engendered among the
more than 175 Parties that ratified the Convention to begin a new process of adopt
ing a legally binding instrument for greenhouse gas emissions limitations from
industrialized countries. The result of this process was the Kyoto Protocol, which was
adopted in December 1997.This paper critically reviews the history of the evolving cli
mate regime and assesses the unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol as the Parties prepare
for the Sixth Conference of Parties in November 2000. How one might judge this
regime, what “yardsticks” of success one might employ, and what the future may
hold both for its successful implementation and the lessons that it might advance
when humanity is confronted with another global environmental issue—these and
other issues are addressed in this paper.
Introduction

The science of climate change is characterized both by profound uncertainties and
by rapid advances resulting from ongoing research. It follows that any governance
system in this area must seek not only to stimulate the growth of knowledge but
also to provide mechanisms for integrating new insights into the system without
triggering a time-consuming legislative process. In the case of climate change, to
do this requires recognition of the challenge and a determination to deal with it.
Such a dynamic is likely to involve the articulation of a new worldview that rede
ﬁnes human aspirations and gives rise to a restructured ethical system to guide
human/environment relations. Almost certainly, this worldview will take as its
point of departure the perspective of ecology, which stresses linkages among the
elements of complex systems, in contrast to the perspective of technology, which
emphasizes the separation of complex systems into discrete parts that can be dealt
with as self-contained entities. Success in the development of an effective gover
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nance system for the Earth’s climate will require a concerted effort to nurture these
new intellectual underpinnings as well as an effort to design the speciﬁc elements
of the climate regime being established.
There was a time when the need for a formal instrument such as the Conven
tion was challenged. According to this view, letting the regime evolve more infor
mally through the development of what is commonly referred to as “soft law” was
a better option. Proponents of formalization stress the role that treaties and con
ventions can play in establishing legal obligations and in minimizing opportuni
ties for members to ignore the dictates of regimes with impunity. “Soft law” advo
cates, by contrast, emphasize the virtues of more informal arrangements: avoiding
the complications of the ratiﬁcation process and allowing regimes to adapt to
changing circumstances in a ﬂexible manner. The general conclusion was that
there is no need to think of these alternatives as mutually exclusive.
Accordingly, it was agreed that to be effective the climate regime would require
the loyalty of both public and private actors throughout the world. Partly, this was
a matter of providing opportunities for all members of the international commu
nity to participate in a meaningful way in formulating provisions to be imple
mented through the framework of an international agreement to protect the
Earth’s atmosphere. More profoundly, however, there was critical need for the
evolving governance system to have the support of both the international state
system and non-state participants. In addition, meaningful deliberation requires
the empowerment of those who are directly affected by an issue through some rec
ognized method for bringing their voice into the process.
The climate regime cannot succeed in the absence of a concerted effort to
address the priority concerns of the world’s developing countries. While the afﬂu
ent residents of the industrialized countries are increasingly attentive to matters
of environmental quality, many developing country leaders are understandably
concerned that a focus on environmental issues will deﬂect worldwide attention
Almost certainly, this worldview will take as its point of departure the perspective
of ecology, which stresses linkages among the elements of complex systems, in con
trast to the perspective of technology, which emphasizes the separation of complex
systems into discrete parts that can be dealt with as self-contained entities.
from their economic problems, or even lead to the promulgation of restrictive
rules that hinder their efforts to achieve sustained economic growth and a rea
sonable standard of living for their citizens. Given the fact that the increases of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) now resident in the Earth’s atmosphere are attributable
in large measure to the industrialization of ‘First World’ countries, and that no cli
mate regime can be effective in the absence of acceptance and active participation
on the part of the principal countries of the developing world, there is no avoid
ing the need to accommodate the development concerns of developing countries
as part of a planetary bargain relating to climate change.
While it is certainly attractive to focus attention on one round after another of
negotiations, much of the work of bringing the terms of the resultant regime to
bear on concrete problems must occur in more circumscribed settings. Partly, this
is a matter of encouraging individuals, industrial enterprises, and the govern
ments of speciﬁc countries to alter current patterns of behavior. In part, it is also


a matter of facilitating the efforts of pairs or small groups of states to transcend
rigid insistence on simplistic principles, such as the doctrine of polluter pays, and
to enter into mutually beneﬁcial agreements leading to net reductions in green
house gas emissions. Underlying all of these approaches is the need to set aside any
The climate regime cannot succeed in the absence of a concerted effort to address
the priority concerns of the world’s developing countries.
expectation that the provisions of the climate regime will be adhered to in prac
tice just because they are enshrined in a convention, and to begin thinking about
the development of an array of implementation and strengthening techniques.
It is futile to ask governments of member states to take actions that are not fea
sible in economic, technical, or administrative terms. While it is frequently
assumed that governments desiring to achieve well-deﬁned goals have the capac
ity to alter the behavior of their citizens in the proscribed manner, this is often not
the reality. This is particularly true of many developing countries and former
socialist countries whose governments may be sharply limited in their ability to
deliver on commitments made in good faith in connection with the creation of
international regimes. It follows that an effective governance system for climate
change mitigation must provide substantial assistance to governments that are
prepared to make a concerted effort to implement the rules of the regime within
their own jurisdictions. The appropriate tools for such an effort include technol
ogy transfers, training facilities, and additional development assistance earmarked
for those endeavoring to implement the terms of the climate change regime.
History of the climate change negotiations

While the science and politics of climate change are more than 100 years old, the
best place to begin to document the history is the Toronto Conference on “The
Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security” held in June 1988. The
fast pace of developments from this time on has a history that is quite unique to
the development of the climate regime. To whit—when the suggestion for adopt
ing an international convention on climate change by 1992 was made at this Con
ference, many states, including the United States (which has had a remarkable
inﬂuence, albeit mixed, in the development of the climate regime), believed it to be
an extremely early and, therefore, implausible target. The United States hosted the
ﬁrst negotiating session on the subject in February 1991, in Washington, D.C. The
United States was also one of the ﬁrst major countries to ratify the Convention.
One of the principal reasons for this rapid change is the institutional innovation
that took place during this time. Deserving special mention in this regard is the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (). The  was established by
the World Meteorological Organization () and the United Nations Environ
ment Programme () in November 1988. The secretary-general of ,
speaking at the opening session, emphasized the scientiﬁc nature of ’ work in
assisting 160 member countries in measuring, standardizing, collecting, and dis
seminating atmospheric data. Despite this scientiﬁc emphasis, and given that the
predicted global warming as one of the most important long-term challenges facing
humanity, the secretary-general said that  could not stand by while the conse
quences of the scientiﬁc studies were considered. The Executive Director of 
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concurred with this assessment and hailed the formation and the launching of the
 as a milestone in global cooperation to address the challenge of climate change.
Prior to the adoption of the First Assessment Report by , resolutions had
been passed by  and  to convene the ﬁrst open-ended negotiating ses
sion for a framework convention on climate change. The ﬁrst set of these meetings
took place in Geneva in September 1990 and was attended by over 70 countries. At
this meeting, the  Executive Director emphasized that both he and the Sec
retary General of the  had been asked by their governing bodies “to prepare
for negotiations now.” The / notice set out a number of points to be
taken into consideration during the negotiation process, including:
• gases that ought to be included in atmospheric concentrations;
• stabilization and emission reductions targets; and
• proposed dates, base years, and the criteria for calculating emission levels (per
capita per unit of  or , according to the area of the country, its climatic
conditions, the size of its natural carbon sinks, energy consumption per pro
duction unit—or a mixture of criteria).
Apart from the detail on what the Convention should accomplish, there was
agreement to a large measure that “a meaningful legal act for adoption in 1992
should be a target.” The question, however, was whether this should be accom
plished at the expense of agreeing to an instrument of a purely declaratory nature.
As this debate within / continued, the United Nations General
Assembly established a single Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee ()
under its auspices for the preparation of an effective framework convention on cli
mate change. It authorized the Secretary General of the United Nations, with the
assistance of the Executive Director of , and the Secretary General of ,
to convene the ﬁrst negotiating session in February 1991 in Washington, D.C. Work
on the Framework Convention, according to the General Assembly, was to be
The First Session of the INC convened in February 1991, and in May 1992 the
Fifth Session concluded the negotiations. Thus, barely ﬁfteen months after the
INC began its work, it completed negotiations on a framework convention. This
Convention, signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in June 1992 (Rio Summit), received the required number of ratiﬁ
cations by December 22, 1993, and entered into force on March 21, 1994.
completed prior to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel
opment in June 1992 and opened for signature during the Conference that month.
Thus, the United Nations General Assembly, where the developing countries have
an overwhelming majority, challenged its members to develop and conclude an
international agreement of enormous consequence in a fairly limited time.
Contrary to the history of typical developing country engagement in interna
tional environmental affairs, their participation in climate negotiations was quite
spirited and constructive. The Special Committee of the  on Developing
Countries attempted to channel this interest in ways that would be conducive to
long-term active involvement of developing countries. The task was, and still
remains, to translate what has now been accepted as concern on critical issues into
speciﬁc policy measures. As Mostafa Tolba, then Executive Director of , cor


rectly pointed out, the three issues that would dwarf the entire negotiating process
are ﬁnancial requirements, technology transfer, and economic reforms.
The climate negotiations have been both complex and extremely signiﬁcant for
the future of international relations. In his statement at the ﬁrst session of the ,
the UN Secretary General characterized the signiﬁcance of the climate negotia
tions by saying that a parallel exists between the San Francisco Conference that
created the United Nations and the process being set in motion at the  meet
ing. Similarly, in terms of complexity of subject matter, many have drawn a paral
lel between the climate negotiations and the United Nations Conference on Law
of the Sea (), which took nine years to negotiate and adopt the Law of the
Sea Convention. Some have even gone so far as to say that the climate change
regime is more complex than . Even a casual observer of the negotiations
would attest to both the signiﬁcance and inherent complexity of the task at hand
for the —ﬁrst for the drafting of the Convention, and now its implementation.
On the substantive side, progress at the ﬁrst session was less than satisfactory,
particularly on the organization of the work. Many countries stressed the impor
tance of addressing the issue of global climate change in an integrated and com
prehensive manner and taking full account of the special circumstances and needs
of developing countries. Yet, there was signiﬁcant opposition to considering emis
sions reductions, preservation and expansion of sinks, and ﬁnancial and technical
assistance in separate working groups. In particular, developing countries feared
that if these topics were addressed by separate groups, less attention would be
given to emission reductions and ﬁnancial and technical assistance. Another con
cern was that forests in developing countries would be targeted as a panacea for
the global warming problem since they are a sink for carbon dioxide, a principal
greenhouse gas. It was clear, however, that all of these topics could not be
addressed in the plenary. After intensive discussions, agreement was reached on
the establishment of two working groups: one to deal with commitments and the
other with mechanisms. The progress made by the working groups was integrated
by the plenary, and the ﬁnal text treated as one package.
This brief review of the process of building a climate regime indicates that the
approach that the international community adopted in addressing global warm
ing was different from any previous attempts. The First Session of the  con
vened in February 1991, and in May 1992 the Fifth Session concluded the negotia
tions. Thus, barely ﬁfteen months after the  began its work, it completed
negotiations on a framework convention. This Convention, signed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992 (Rio
Summit), received the required number of ratiﬁcations by December 22, 1993, and
entered into force on March 21, 1994. At the time of this writing, the total number
of ratiﬁcations stands at 176.
The unique nature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The key provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change () is its objective, which is outlined in Article 2:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
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In other words, the objective calls for a ﬁne balance, which achieves stabiliza
tion of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere within a time frame suf
ﬁcient to:
• allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change;
• ensure that food production is not threatened; and
• enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner
The other key element, one that took all of the combined energy of the indus
trialized countries, and nearly derailed the very possibility of adopting  at the
Rio Summit, dealt with the kinds of commitments that industrialized countries
ought to make to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Of particular note in this
regard are Article 4.2(a) and Article 4.2(b). Article 4.2(a) and (b) read as follows:
The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I
commit themselves speciﬁcally as provided for in the following:
a. Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthro
pogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying
longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objec
tive of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the pre
sent decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
would contribute to such modiﬁcation, and taking into account the dif
ferences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic struc
tures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable eco
nomic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances,
as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of
these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties
may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and
may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objec
tive of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
b. In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall com
municate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention
for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12,
detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subpara
graph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emis
sions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not con
trolled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in
subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to
their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This
information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its ﬁrst
session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7.
One truly unique feature of , which has been emulated in other forums
since then, is in the “prompt start” that the Parties agreed to, enabling the imme
diate continuation of preparation for the First Conference of the Parties (-).
Because of the prompt start, the  remained in session and met for six more


times before -. During these meetings the industrialized countries, led by the
United States, began voicing the view that  was seriously ﬂawed. Speciﬁcally,
despite the clause that had been adopted in 1992 for “equal but differentiated
responsibilities” between developing and developed countries, the United States
maintained that it was vital that the developing countries join in the next phase of
commitments.
The Convention entered into force in 1994. The ﬁrst Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties (-) was held in Berlin, Germany in March and April of 1995.
Because of “prompt start,” this meeting turned out to be the most substantive of
any ﬁrst  meeting of any international environmental agreements. The high
lights include:
•
•
•
•

Parties agreeing to Bonn, Germany as the home of the  Secretariat;
Parties agreeing to the “Berlin Mandate;”
Parties agreeing to a “pilot phase” for Activities Implemented Jointly (); and
The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate ().

The Berlin Mandate

Among these results, the adoption of the Berlin Mandate was the subject of some
very intense debate. The developing countries succeeded in ensuring that the
result adequately reﬂected their concerns. The Mandate called on Parties to:
Aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the commitments in Arti
cle 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other Parties included
in Annex I, both
• to elaborate policies and measures; as well as
• to set quantiﬁed limitation and reduction objectives within speciﬁed timeframes, such as 2005, 2010, and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Mon
treal Protocol, taking into account the differences in starting points and
approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain
strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other
individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate con
tributions by each of these Parties to the global effort, and also the process of
analysis and assessment referred to in section III, paragraph 4, below; Not
introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaf
ﬁrm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance the imple
mentation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development,
taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7.
While the debate between the industrialized and developing countries on the
timing of commitments by all was underway, several leading private sector actors
formed the Global Climate Coalition and began advancing the view that the
uncertainties in the science of global climate change meant that any action by any
group of countries, developed or developing, was unwarranted. As a result, the
Parties felt it important at their Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties
(-), held in Geneva, Switzerland in July 1996, to adopt a Ministerial Declara
tion ﬁrmly stating that the science of climate change is compelling, and that legally
binding commitments are warranted. It made particular note of the Second
Assessment Report () of the . The Declaration further recognized and
endorsed “the  of the  as currently the most comprehensive and author
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itative assessment of the science of climate change, its impacts and response
options now available.” Thus, following -, it was clear that all of the prepa
ration for the next  would focus on the endorsement of legally binding com
mitments. This led to a ﬂurry of activities around the world. Examples from the
United States alone include:
• The Economists’ Statement on Climate Change in January 1997;
• The Ecologists’ Statement on Consequences of Rapid Climatic Change in May
1997; and
• The Scientists’ Statement on Global Climatic Disruption in June 1997.
A Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was held in
1997 in New York from June 23-27 to review progress since the Rio Summit, pro
vided further evidence of the global community’s desire to make climate change
the deﬁning issue in terms of its ability to cope with global environmental chal
lenge. At this Session, virtually all of the world leaders emphasized the need to have
a meaningful Protocol adopted in Kyoto at -. Further, the speech by Presi
dent Bill Clinton at this Special Session was entirely devoted to climate change.
The U.S. President subsequently launched the White House Initiative on Global
Climate Change that same year. The U.S. Senate, on the other hand, had serious
reservations about the activities of the White House. This concern was reﬂected in
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, a non-binding resolution that severely restricted the
U.S. negotiating position, which was adopted by the U.S. Senate while Parties were
preparing for - to adopt the Kyoto Protocol. The Senate resolved that:
1. The United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or
thereafter, which would:
A. mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emis
sions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement
also mandates new speciﬁc scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties
within the same compliance period; or
B. result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and
C. any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratiﬁcation should be accompanied by a
detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may
be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should
also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed ﬁnancial costs and
other impacts on the economy of the United States which would be
incurred by the implementation of the protocol or other agreement.
Throughout these developments the  held eight sessions in preparation for
- in Kyoto.It even held a day-long “resumed”eighth session in Kyoto on Novem
ber 30, 1997. Prospects for agreement appeared very slim at the end of this session.
Highlights of the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997 after eleven days of inten
sive negotiations that, in addition to the Conference delegates, engaged Ministers
of Environment, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Treasury, and in some cases even


Heads of State and Government. The delegates worked late into the night for three
nights in a row, and the last article was adopted on December 11th, after an allnight session that took place after the time allotted for the Conference was over.
The resulting Protocol contains 28 articles and 2 annexes. Decisions 1, 2, and 3,
also adopted at -, directly pertain to the Kyoto Protocol.
• Decision 1: Provides for work on implementation.
• Decision 2: Provides for the determination of methodological issues.
• Decision 3: Provides for the implementation of  Article 4.8, which
addresses the needs of developing countries, speciﬁcally those at risk from the
impacts of climate change, and Article 4.9, which discusses funding for tech
nology transfer to developing countries.
The Protocol, for the ﬁrst time in the evolving climate change regime, requires
legally binding emission commitments from Annex I Parties. It covers the six main
GHGs as listed in Annex A to the Protocol:
•
•
•
•
•
•

carbon dioxide;
methane;
nitrous oxide;
hydroﬂuorocarbons;
perﬂurocarbons; and
sulfur hexaﬂuoride.

The target for each Annex I Party is listed in Annex B. The targets range from a
reduction of 8% to an increase of 10%, calculated as an average over the commit
ment period 2008-2012. If all Parties meet their targets, the overall reduction in
emissions from 1990 levels for that group will be around 5.2%.
The Buenos Aires and Bonn sessions: The road to The Hague

Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol a great deal has happened—particularly
during the Fourth and the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties in
Buenos Aires, Argentina and in Bonn, Germany respectively. At the Buenos Aires
meeting the Parties adopted a plan called the Buenos Aires Plan of Action ().
The primary content of the  was a long list of topics that need to be addressed
by the Parties as they prepare for the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties
scheduled to take place in The Hague, the Netherlands in November 2000. In other
words, the  did not prioritize the issues in any meaningful manner. However,
the meetings of the Parties leading up to and following the adoption of the 
did succeed in narrowing the scope without sacriﬁcing any of the issues of signiﬁ
cance to meeting the objective of the Convention. As Parties prepare for the Sixth
Session the following topics and questions have gained signiﬁcance for resolution.
In preparation for -, a few important points should be kept in mind.
Clearly most of the attention will focus on the details necessary to operationalize
the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. But it is wise not to lose sight of the work that
still needs to be done to implement many of the provisions of the , which has
already been ratiﬁed by more than 175 countries and is in force.
What are the “commitments” contained in the fccc?

Annex I countries agreed to adopt national policies and take corresponding mea
sures to mitigate climate change by limiting their anthropogenic emissions of
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greenhouse gases and protecting and exchanging their greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs. Further, Annex I countries agreed to take the lead in modifying longerterm emissions consistent with the objectives of the Convention, recognizing that
the return to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol) by the end of the decade would contribute
to such modiﬁcations.
The developed countries (not including countries undergoing the process of
transition to market economies) agreed to provide new and additional ﬁnancial
resources to meet full agreed costs incurred by developing country Parties in com
plying with their obligations concerning communications and information. The
developed country Parties also promised to provide resources needed by the
developing country Parties, including funds for technology transfer, in order to
meet the agreed upon incremental costs of implementing their commitments.
It is generally agreed that the extent to which developing country Parties will
effectively be able to implement their commitments under the Convention will
depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their
commitments. This is especially the case with regard to ﬁnancial resources and the
willingness of countries to transfer technology, while simultaneously taking fully
into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are
the ﬁrst and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. Thus, the
question remains how to achieve these ends.
Prior to -, a workshop involving several participants in the climate nego
tiations identiﬁed the following measures for the purposes of enhancing success
of the Kyoto Protocol:
•
•
•
•
•
•

encouraging signature and ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol
encouraging implementation of the protocol pending its entry into force
encouraging more direct and formal private sector participation
building conﬁdence and increasing co-operation
expanding participation by non-Annex I parties
formulating a Buenos Aires action plan

As we prepare for -, it is instructive to note that outside of formulating a
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which focuses heavily on the ﬂexibility of mecha
nisms, virtually everything else remains central to the development of the ele
mentary climate change regime. Before going into the details of what or how these
might be addressed, it may be useful to look at the speciﬁc issues identiﬁed at
- in the .
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action

The  contains a list of 140 items to be addressed over the two years following
-. In addition to the so-called “ﬂexibility mechanisms,” there are a number
of issues that were touched on in the . In a manner that all concerned agree
is fair and equitable, the  talks at some length about designing the mecha
nisms to support long-term climate protection. However, there are other issues to
be considered. These include land use change and forestry and technology trans
fer issues, all of which are being dealt with in  special reports. Further issues
include the role of developing countries in the emerging climate regime, creating
an effective compliance system, including linkages, and interdependence.


What can be done as we wait to develop the details outlined above?

It is important to encourage every possible effort to reduce greenhouse gas emis
sions. Whether or not Annex B countries accept their quantitative obligations in
the near term, it is crucial that they begin reducing their domestic greenhouse gas
emissions as soon as possible if there is to be any hope of meeting the greenhouse
gas reduction goals set for the 2008-2012 commitment period. In some instances,
reductions have been or may be achieved for unrelated reasons, or as a result of
other policies. Whatever the reasons, these results are still important in moving
toward the Protocol’s goals.
There are at least three ways an Annex B country can beneﬁt from reducing
greenhouse gas emissions domestically while conducting the formal processes of
Protocol ratiﬁcation and awaiting its entry into force. First, by documenting and
publicizing its reduction efforts, a nation will enhance its international reputation.
Second, if it helps other countries to learn from its efforts, it will make reductions
by other countries more likely. For example, a country may be encouraged to
reduce its own emissions when it learns just how substantial the economic beneﬁts
of fuel-switching have been for its neighbor. Third, if it can show low or negative
economic costs and signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁts from its actions, a nation
will build domestic political support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
It now appears that the availability of ﬂexibility mechanisms, once their oper
ations are clariﬁed, can play a large part in encouraging voluntary action while the
ratiﬁcation process proceeds. By offering incentives to industry, they, in turn, will
be eager to encourage governments to act if there are corresponding and sufﬁcient
ﬁnancial rewards. Thus, the further development and implementation of the ﬂex
ibility mechanisms discussed in Kyoto are important for encouraging voluntary
action.
It is time to encourage the private sector to become more formally involved in
implementing the goals of the Climate Change Convention, particularly the
design of the ﬂexibility mechanisms contained in the Kyoto Protocol. Not only is
its involvement likely to be critical to the success of the new ﬂexibility mecha
nisms, but the private sector is in a position to bring signiﬁcant inducement to
countries that have not yet signed, or may be hesitant to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol.
Why might corporations become more active supporters of the  process?
In various parts of the world, much to the surprise of national governments, cor
porations are now asking for clariﬁcation of the “rules” governing emissions trad
ing and domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The high degree of
uncertainty, both globally and domestically, as to which actions for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions will receive credit, is making it difﬁcult for corporations
to plan their business efforts, and is discouraging them from taking early action.
Moreover, a number of companies have realized that there are substantial eco
nomic gains to be had by corporations ready to make the global treaty system work
for them. If given a choice, some corporations might have preferred that the Cli
mate Change Convention had never been signed. Nevertheless, recognizing that
more than 175 countries have already ratiﬁed the Framework Convention on Cli
mate Change, many of the world’s leading corporations are now focused on the
opportunities this might create.
It is important that all parties have conﬁdence that each is doing its share to
implement the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Non-Annex I coun
tries are unaware of the efforts that Annex I countries are making to fulﬁl the man
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date of the Climate Change Convention. With a number of Annex I Parties calling
for the expanded participation of non-Annex I Parties in the ongoing effort to
implement the , it is critical that these non-Annex I countries have conﬁ
dence in the fact that Annex I Parties are taking their commitments seriously, as
signiﬁed by their domestic actions.
There are several ways in which conﬁdence building and increased co-opera
tion of non-Annex I Parties might be linked. The ﬁrst is the implementation of the
Clean Development Mechanism (), which was created at the Kyoto Confer
ence.  is going to be important to the efforts that certain non-Annex I coun
tries make in reducing the growth of emissions over the next few years. Thus, it is
important to design this tool with an eye toward the kinds of incentives that would
be most effective and most responsive to the interests of developing countries. In
addition, a commitment on the part of Annex I countries to help launch the 
will underscore their stated desire to support the voluntary involvement of nonAnnex I countries in the implementation of the Convention.
The developing countries are quite concerned about the design of the 
governance system. If its creation is going to be seen as a conﬁdence building mea
sure that will lead to increased co-operation and participation of non-Annex I
Parties, its structure needs to be responsive to their concerns. That is why they are
currently putting so much emphasis on the design of the institutional arrange
ments that will be installed to oversee the allocation of  resources.
Another strategy for building conﬁdence and expanding the participation of
non-Annex I countries might be a process of voluntary independent review ()
of what is already happening in developing countries. Such a review would open
up on-going efforts to outside experts. It might also help to broaden international
understanding, in an independently documented fashion, of the substantial
efforts already underway. This would respond, at least in part, to the concerns
expressed by the U.S. Senate that the developing world is not acting on its com
mitments to reduce emissions.
The  reporting process might make greater use of independent experts than
the country reports required under the . On the other hand, it would likely
be less comprehensive and/or less demanding than the national, sectoral and pro
ject review process that is mandated for funding requests by some multilateral and
bilateral institutions.  would focus exclusively on activities directly related to
the objectives of the Convention and the Protocol. The goals of  would be:
• to ensure that non-Annex I countries can learn from each other;
• to guarantee that consistent information on efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions in non-Annex I countries is provided to the full range of
multilateral institutions seeking such documentation; and
• to provide skeptical policy-makers in Annex I countries with credible
documentation of the substantial efforts already underway in nonAnnex I countries to meet the original objectives of the .
How are the fccc and the Protocol being assessed?

International agreements generally, and international environmental agreements
in particular, are subject to criticism. Unfortunately, and to some extent unfairly,
the  and the Kyoto Protocol have not escaped this sort of fault-ﬁnding. Com
promises that resulted from late-night negotiating sessions and the simple inabil
ity to “tie up all of the loose ends” make these instruments easy targets. However,


these critiques hardly serve any useful purpose, given that these instruments
should be considered “works in progress.”
That said, it is still important to answer the criticism that Kyoto was not even a
modest accomplishment. There have been suggestions that: (a) the Annex I coun
tries will not follow through on their obligations; and (b) even if they did, there
would be no beneﬁcial impact. The implication of this is that Kyoto will make no
difference—it will not even help put us on the path to reducing  emissions in
Annex I countries. That even if all Annex I countries were to live up to the com
mitments they made at Kyoto the total emissions from these countries in 2010
would, in fact, be nearly the same as they are today.
The other fault that critics point out is the Parties’ insistence on using on 1990
as the base year. The suggestion is that there is a fundamental ﬂaw in the whole
approach, and having 1990 as the base year is a fatal error. Most Annex I countries
would agree with this assertion, but for wholly different and often contradictory
reasons. The Non-governmental Organization () community examined this
issue carefully, and came to the conclusion that while having 1990 as the base year
is not ideal, any attempt to change it would cause more openings for further sub
version of the objective of the Convention.
One example in this context will sufﬁce: An  study looked at “business as
usual” projections for 2010 from 1990 levels and concluded that there would be an
emissions increase of between 19% and 33%. The mid-range was an increase of 24%
from 1990 levels. When one takes the overall reductions agreed to in Kyoto and adds
that to the mid-range of the projected increase, the reductions in 2010 would be
approximately 29%. By staying with the 1990 baseline, the Parties could go back to
their respective legislatures and point out that they have agreed only to modest com
mitments –between an 8% decrease and an increase limited to 10%. In the United
States, even these so-called modest reductions were received with howls of protest.
In one sense, having 1990 as the base year was a victory for the environmental
community. However, the presence of potential loopholes in the Protocol was crit
ical for obtaining the acceptance of industrialized countries and the private sector,
as well as wider political acceptability in general. Kyoto provided a delicate bal
ance. It may now be very easily tilted one way or another, unfortunately, in a
manner that will go against meeting even the modest targets contained in the Pro
tocol. The way to address this is not by identifying what is wrong with the Proto
col, but by determining the best means of ensuring that the ﬂexibility mechanisms
are used to accomplish net reductions for Annex I countries.
These things notwithstanding, the Protocol adopted in Kyoto is perhaps one of
the most signiﬁcant international environmental agreements ever crafted. Next to
the Earth Summit, there probably has not been another conclave of governments
that has attracted as many people or produced so signiﬁcant a document as Kyoto.
Noticeably absent from the Protocol are any commitments from developing coun
tries. The Protocol contains new obligations only for industrialized countries, but
its impact will be felt the world over in every walk of human life. On the same
token, if some of the details of the Protocol are not worked out with great care, it
is quite likely that the Kyoto Protocol could also mean nothing. How could any
agreement contain the possibilities for such extremes?
It is beyond dispute that the Earth Summit of 1992 was a historic event and a
prominent milestone in global environmental governance. Though a number of
legal instruments were adopted at that Summit, the most active and prominent
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amongst them was the adoption of the . The success or failure of the Earth
Summit has come to be judged by the success or failure of the .
All of the countries at the Rio Earth Summit agreed that climate change is one
of the most serious environmental and economic problems confronting human
ity. They agreed to cooperate with each other and they agreed on “common but
differentiated responsibilities.” In this case, this was expressed by the industrial
ized countries accepting voluntary commitments to bring their year 2000 emis
sions to 1990 levels, while developing countries joined in some general commit
ments of international cooperation.
At the First Meeting of the Parties in Berlin, it became clear that the industrial
ized countries would not be able to meet their voluntary commitments by 2000.
It was also clear that Parties to the Convention needed to prepare for reduction
commitments for the period beyond 2000. The shared understanding at Berlin
was twofold: First, voluntary commitments will not work, legally binding com
mitments would be needed. Second, it would not be enough for those commit
ments to include only the industrialized countries. It is apparent that developing
country emissions will equal or exceed those of the industrialized countries by
2030 or thereabouts. That notwithstanding, in the name of “common but differ
entiated responsibilities,” countries agreed in Berlin that the ﬁrst round of legally
binding commitments would include only the industrialized countries.
This decision supplied ammunition to those who were opposed to any sort of
domestic U.S. action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. It also sparked a pre
dictable reaction from U.S. industry as well as a cross section of the political elite.
Going into the Kyoto Meeting, the big issue was how to ensure that the outcome
in Kyoto was “fair.” The United States considered anything that did not include
developing countries “not fair.” The widespread inﬂuence of the actors who were
opposed to U.S. undertakings was signiﬁed by the facility with which the ByrdHagel resolution was passed.
At the same time, the developing countries did their very best to ensure that
they did not take on any binding legal commitments in Kyoto. In the end, they suc
ceeded, although the coalition within which they worked, the -77, came close to
falling apart on a couple of occasions. The tensions within the developing world
over the topic were obvious. On the one hand, there were the oil producing coun
tries, concerned about the impact of actions to limit carbon dioxide on their
economies; and on the other were the island nations, vulnerable to sea level rise
and storm surges. The sub-Saharan African countries saw their interests as tied
closely with the island nations because they, too, are vulnerable to damaging
impacts of global warming. The large developing countries such as China, India,
and Brazil felt that it would be unfair to expect them to take on any legally bind
ing commitments to limit their  emissions unless the industrialized countries,
led by the United States, took the initiative. There are yet other countries, includ
ing several in Latin America, with aspirations to join either the expanded North
American Free Trade Agreement () and/or the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (). For these countries, following the lead
of industrialized countries with regards to emissions limitations might be an
acceptable option.
The message from Kyoto is clear. All countries eventually have to accept legally
binding commitments to ensure that the concentration of GHGs in the atmos
phere stays at an acceptable level. But the questions of fairness, and how they are


addressed within the framework of the evolving climate change regime, will deter
mine the stage at which developing countries will join the industrialized coun
tries. Any doubts about the unique role that the United States plays in interna
tional affairs were set aside at Kyoto. The agreement came into existence because
the United States was willing to agree to reductions. While pressures from the
European Union and the  community played a big part, ultimate credit for
reaching the agreement is largely due to the role that the United States was able to
play.
Conclusions

After all was said and done, and the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, the perspectives
from industrialized and developing countries were quite different in terms of what
was achieved. The following table identiﬁes what the “take home” messages were
in terms of key priorities for the different groups of countries. These impressions
are bound to have an inﬂuence on how the next steps in the evolution of climate
regime will be undertaken. Even the fact that the Clean Development Mechanism
appears in both lists does not mean that both groups agree on the real meaning of
the concept and its operational implications.
The task ahead is to see how to make the most of the Protocol: to accomplish
real emission reductions from the industrialized countries; to make it possible for
the developing countries to join in this exercise; and as a collective, to reach the
objective of the Convention.
table 1

key priorities for industrialized and developing countries after kyoto

industrialized countries
Emissions Trading
Joint Implementation
Sinks
Compliance and Verification
Developing Country Participation
Clean Development Mechanism

developing countries
Equity
Technology Transfer
Financial Assistance
Special Circumstances
Common but Differentiated Responsibility
Clean Development Mechanism

The success of the Kyoto Protocol will therefore hinge very much upon what
the industrialized countries will be able to do in the next months and years.
• First, they need to demonstrate to their legislatures and the private sector that
implementing the Kyoto Protocol will not damage their economies.
• Second, they should be able to work with developing countries in a construc
tive way both to expand and deepen their constructive engagement.
The speed with which the developing countries are able to take on such bind
ing commitments is, of course, dependent on industrialized countries. Industrial
ized countries should show their good faith by ensuring that the Kyoto Protocol
enters into force soon. They should meet their commitments by reducing their
 emissions as agreed in the Protocol. In addition, they should implement
other provisions, which are contained both in the  and the Kyoto Protocol,
that deal with their commitments to developing countries by providing ﬁnancial
and technical assistance. In the ﬁrst phase, this means identifying those initiatives
currently underway that meet developing country socioeconomic objectives for
sustainable development, while simultaneously releasing fewer GHGs into the
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atmosphere. Once identiﬁed, assistance should be provided to ensure that feasible
projects are replicated on a broader scale, and to introduce newer, faster, and more
efﬁcient technologies. Developing countries will be comfortable with the idea of
working to reduce  emissions only when it has been demonstrated that emis
sions reductions do not necessitate foregoing their goal of sustainable develop
ment. Only when this comfort level is reached will they be open to the suggestion
of binding legal commitments.
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Abstract
Economically and physically, the countries most immediately vulnerable to the
impacts of global warming are small island developing states (sids). sids are already
beginning to feel the effects of global warming on their economies, their cultures,
and their ecological systems, and should serve as a harbinger for the rest of the global
community. For while geography dictates that sids will be the first to confront the
tangible effects of climate change, it is soon to be a universal problem. Shared vul
nerability was a strong factor in establishing the Alliance of Small Island States
(aosis) in 1990. Since that time, aosis has been a very active participant in the cli
mate change negotiations – advocating stronger commitment from industrialised
countries and intensified involvement of developing countries.
The authors contend that the Kyoto Protocol is a significant improvement over
the Convention on Climate Change, in that it contains quantifiable goals and com
mitments. However, the guidelines that it establishes are regarded as not nearly so
stringent as aosis had deemed scientifically necessary or politically feasible. In
addition, the Protocol still contains serious loopholes and ambiguities that have the
potential to interfere with its effectiveness. It is imperative that steps be taken not
only to strengthen and tighten the language of the Protocol, but to further enable
the participation of non-Annex I countries. This paper closely examines the
strengths and weaknesses of the Protocol, examining articles that pertain to com
pliance, co-operation, and flexibility. Particular attention is paid to Articles 2, 3, 4, 6,
12, and 17.
Introduction

The ten hottest years in recorded history have all occurred since 1980. The World
Meteorological Organization identiﬁed 1996 as the eighteenth consecutive year
with positive global anomalies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
() announced in its Second Assessment Report in 1995 that the planet has
entered a period of climatic instability likely to cause ‘widespread economic,
social, and environmental destruction over the next century.’
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Economically and physically, the countries most immediately vulnerable to the
impact of global warming are small island developing states (). There are
many drawbacks associated with small size, magniﬁed by the fact that the small
island states are not only small, but are spread across a number of small islands.
Small islands have limited resources, which forces specialisation and high depen
dence on imports as well as over-use and depletion of natural resources. The limits
to freshwater supplies are often palpable. Population densities are high, as are
public administration and infrastructure costs, especially in the transportation
and communication sectors. Size and isolation also limit institutional capacity and
domestic markets. Each of these conditions is compounded by the threat of cli
mate change.  are already beginning to feel the effects of global warming on
their economies, their cultures, and their ecological systems. Geography dictates
that  will be the ﬁrst to confront the consequences of climate change, but it is
expected that larger and less isolated economies will soon feel the impacts as well.
What are the most imperative threats of climate change?

Sea-level rise is perhaps the most critical climate change-related threat to , as
it touches the very life force of island communities. Even a sea-level rise of twenty
centimetres could have devastating effects on small islands. In some island groups,
like Kiribati, Seychelles, and Maldives, up to 80% of the land area is less than a
metre above present sea level. Higher islands will also experience serious impacts
on their communities, economic activities, and infrastructural development as a
result of climate change. For most , the most immediate threats posed by
global warming include the following:
Weather: It is predicted that climate change will most likely result in increased
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as tropical storms. Greater
damage from associated storm surges is also expected. Tropical storms are causing
unprecedented devastation in  in almost every region of the world as they
become more frequent, more severe, and much more damaging in terms of their
ﬁnancial costs and damages to infrastructure.
Erosion: In most cases, over half of the population of island communities
resides within two kilometres of the coast. This portion of the island populations
is very vulnerable to sea-level rise and loss of property and livelihood to coastal
erosion.
Freshwater: Inadequate supplies of freshwater and water conservation are crit
ical in all developing countries. The issue is especially imperative for , as sup
plies of potable water can be particularly limited on islands. Small island vulnera
bility is compounded by threats of drought due to climate change, and by saline
intrusion into freshwater lenses and wells because of rising sea-levels.
Biodiversity: Small islands tend to have high degrees of endemism and levels of
biodiversity. However, populations of various species are typically limited in size,
and at high risk of extinction. Even minor changes in temperature and sea level can
result in serious alteration of habitats. Coral reefs, often described as the rain
forests of the ocean because of their rich biodiversity, are particularly vulnerable
to temperature increases, and could be seriously depleted.
Agriculture: Crops can be extremely sensitive to climate factors such as temper
ature and water levels. Warmer weather, droughts, excessive precipitation, and
ﬂoods, all of which may result from climate change, could result in signiﬁcant loss
of crops that may once have ﬂourished on islands.

  
Industry: Small economies are extremely susceptible to external economic and
trade shocks. This creates real constraints for  in the sustainable development
of trade and industry sectors. The potential impact of climate change on 
economies and environments elevates the perceived investment risk levels for
industry.
Culture: Loss of life, loss of livelihood, declines in productivity, and economic
dislocation may all result from the effects of climate change. In addition to the dra
matic economic implications of these circumstances, entire cultures may be oblit
erated.
Economics: The ﬁnancial burdens that stem from the effects of global warming
are likely to have a tremendous impact on the economies of the majority of .
The costs will include population relocation, loss of crops, loss of natural
resources, loss of land and other property, increased illness, loss of human
resources, increased insurance costs, loss of tourism, and scarcity of food and
potable water.
Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration promised that the ‘developing countries most
vulnerable’ would be given special priority. All  should fall within this cate
gory. The ﬁnancial pressures of coping with the effects of climate change are likely
to be overwhelming for the average developing country. Because of their aug
mented vulnerability, this may prove even more of a struggle for . A recent
study examined the likely impacts of an accelerated one-metre sea-level rise on the
Marshall Islands by 2100. The study determined that between ten and thirty per
cent of the shoreline would erode and 60 percent of the arable land would be lost.
There would also be a signiﬁcant increase in the frequency of severe ﬂoods, and the
underground freshwater that the islanders rely on would become increasingly
scarce. The cost of protecting the coast is estimated to be four to six times the coun
try’s current gross domestic product.
What is the role of aosis in the climate change negotiations?

For small islands, climate change is an issue of survival. This shared vulnerability
was a strong factor in establishing the Alliance of Small Island States () in
1990.  now consists of 43 member states from all over the world, including
Africa, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Paciﬁc, and the South
China Sea.
Since  are particularly vulnerable to global climate change, climate vari
ability, and sea-level rise, the concerns being voiced by the members of  pos
sess the genuine quality of those facing real and immediate jeopardy. However, the
very tangible consequences of climate change that small islands are starting to
experience will eventually, inexorably, pose threats to larger island and continen
tal countries. ’ calls for action are not selﬁsh. They are a reﬂection of con
cerns that will become imperative around the planet in coming years. It would
behoove the international community to take note of the actions and recommen
dations of the small island nations.
Throughout the negotiations, the Alliance has maintained a strong and active
presence in the design of the climate change regime. The government of the small
island state of Malta was the ﬁrst to sponsor a United Nations General Assembly
resolution calling for the establishment of an intergovernmental negotiating com
mittee for a framework treaty aimed at combating global warming. At the ﬁrst ses
sion of this committee, in 1991,  submitted a framework of concepts and
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principles to guide the negotiations of what would become the ﬁrst binding inter
national treaty addressing climate change. Many of the essential design features of
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (),
including its emphasis on science, precaution, and equity, were supported by or
derived from  proposals. Although the Alliance was unable to overcome the
reluctance of industrialised countries to undertake concrete emissions reduction
commitments at that time, it worked diligently to ensure that the Convention,
once in force, would provide for the rapid review of the adequacy of Parties’ com
mitments, in the light of the latest science, and would require the Parties to ‘take
appropriate action.’
 had strength in numbers, which was not an insigniﬁcant factor in the
rapid entry into force of the Convention in 1994. By 1995, at the ﬁrst meeting of the
Conference of the Parties (-1), the ’ procedural obligations forced
the consideration of proposals for a new legal instrument to strengthen industri
alised countries’ commitments. Just prior to -1,  submitted a draft pro
tocol to the Convention, which included a proposal for industrialised (Annex 1)
Parties to the Convention to cut their emissions of CO2 by 20% from 1990 levels
by 2005. While no legal instrument was adopted at -1, the  protocol pro
posal provided a rallying point for developing countries and Non-Governmental
Organisations () as well as a centre of focus for media around the world. The
momentum that the  protocol helped generate led to the adoption of the
Berlin Mandate, which set the terms of reference for the negotiation of a legally
binding instrument containing quantiﬁed targets and timetables for Annex 1 Par
ties.
In 1997, at -3, it was agreed that industrialised countries would strive for a
5% reduction from 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. This target fell
well short not only of the  proposal, but also of the 60% reductions recom
mended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (). Nevertheless,
 remains committed to the Kyoto Protocol as the best hope for a response
from the international community to the threat of global warming. Since Kyoto,
 has focused its energies on striving to clarify and further develop the Pro
tocol to ensure that the climate system beneﬁts fully from the 5% reduction.
How does the Protocol fall short?

The Protocol that was developed at Kyoto contains legally binding commitments
to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This characteristic alone deﬁnes it
as a quantum improvement over the largely superﬁcial Convention. The innova
tive ‘ﬂexibility’ mechanisms included in the Protocol, though largely untested,
have the potential to enable signiﬁcant cost savings in emissions reductions, and
to directly engage the private sector in the implementation of an international
environmental agreement. However, due to politics and limited negotiation time,
the Protocol was left with many ambiguities and potential loopholes. ’s work
since the adoption of the Protocol has focused on four aspects of particular con
cern:
• designing a robust and effective compliance system to back up the Protocol’s
binding commitments;
• promoting the use of rigorous scientiﬁc analysis, in combination with the pre
cautionary principle, to ensure that remaining methodological imprecision is
resolved in a manner that promotes the best environmental outcome;

  
• ensuring that the complexity of the Protocol’s ﬂexibility mechanisms does not
open opportunities for Parties to avoid genuine emissions reductions; and
• maintaining the long-term momentum of the regime in strengthening the com
mitments of industrialised countries and seeking ways of engaging developing
countries as their emissions begin to rise.
Both the scientiﬁc and the regulatory components of the Protocol are great
improvements over those of the Convention. However, there are still many sub
stantial ambiguities. It is therefore necessary to closely examine the agenda estab
lished in Kyoto and address the areas of weakness. The most signiﬁcant of these
include:
• adoption of the legally binding and quantiﬁable targets and timetables;
• multilateral commitment to deploying innovative but untested mechanisms, the
details of which remain to be negotiated;
• heavy reliance on approaches that entail considerable methodological impreci
sion and institutional and scientiﬁc uncertainty; and
• vulnerability resulting from political uncertainties that may inﬂuence the future
development of the regime.
 is making a concerted effort to facilitate the resolution of these ambigu
ities. The Alliance is also working to ensure that the untested mechanisms move
forward in the most transparent, accountable, and effective manner possible. The
following section addresses the above ambiguities through a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol. The subsequent section examines
speciﬁc components of the Protocol more thoroughly.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol?

Targets and timetables
The question of targets and timetables was central to the Kyoto negotiations. It was
also the most difﬁcult, and therefore the last to be resolved. In assessing the sufﬁ
ciency of the targets and timetables established by the Protocol, it is important to
consider its legal adequacy, scientiﬁc adequacy, and equity between parties.
Legal adequacy
The terms of Article 3 of the Protocol strengthen the legal character of Annex I tar
gets. The text refers speciﬁcally to emissions limitations and reduction commit
ments rather than objectives. The targets are clear and quantiﬁed. In this way, Par
ties have moved away from the ‘soft’ targets that existed under the Convention,
thus resolving an essential weakness of the Convention.
During the negotiations,  strongly advocated ﬂat reductions, rather than
differentiated targets. The reason for this was that it seemed more likely that ﬂat
reductions would foster equal efforts by all Annex I Parties. At this point, the Pro
tocol contains as near a ﬂat rate as can be expected from the three most important
Parties – the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Differentiation
among the other Parties was necessarily accepted as a political compromise.
Overall, there has been signiﬁcant progress in achieving ‘legal adequacy,’ but the
agreement is still lacking an effective compliance regime. Article 18 addresses issues
of non-compliance, but leaves the speciﬁc guidelines to be discussed at later nego
tiations. A good deal of effort has gone into preparing such a mechanism. How
ever, it has become evident that a more comprehensive approach is necessary.
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Speciﬁcally, the issue is complicated by the fact that the enforcement of legal
requirements will be reliant on the acceptability, accuracy, and reliability of corre
sponding scientiﬁc measures.  has been closely involved in the compliancerelated negotiations, and has stressed the need for the revised system to be:
• preventative and precautionary, in that it should aim to prevent non-compli
ance, before it occurs, and carry out assessments based upon the precautionary
approach;
• comprehensive and coherent, in that it should address issues related to all com
mitments under the Protocol;
• credible, in that it should be able to take up, examine, and effectively resolve
compliance related issues, without political intervention;
• transparent, in that its rules and procedures should be clearly and simply stated,
and the reasoning and results should be based on sound information and be
publicly available;
• graduated and proportionate, in that the procedures and mechanisms should
take into account the cause, type, degree, and frequency of non-compliance, and
the common but differentiated characteristics of Parties’ commitments and
capacities;
• predictable, in that Parties should be informed, in advance, of the range of con
sequences that might be attached to different categories of non-compliance; and
• based on principles of efﬁciency and due process, in order to allow Parties an
opportunity for a full, fair, and timely resolution of compliance-related issues.
Scientiﬁc adequacy
The legal character of the Protocol is only as sound as the corresponding science.
The most important components to be examined when considering the scientiﬁc
adequacy of the Kyoto agreement include the size of the targets, their coverage, the
timing, and the inclusion of sinks.
Targets. Article 3 of the Protocol requires an overall emissions reduction of six
gases by at least 5% from 1990 levels by 2012. This falls well short of the 60% global
reduction called for by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ()
and of the 20% CO2 reduction proposed by .  considers the implica
tions of this discrepancy to be egregious. While there is some uncertainty, the vast
majority of scientists have accepted unequivocally that the global climate system
is changing. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol is the political endorsement of this scien
tiﬁc assessment. Furthermore, there is widespread acknowledgement of the inad
equacy of the current global climate change initiatives. In future commitment
periods it will become necessary to take better account of the scientiﬁc parame
ters, to ensure that the ability to make reductions is not overshadowed by a polit
ical reluctance to take the necessary steps.
Coverage. It is impressive that the Protocol will eventually cover six greenhouse
gases (). However, the inclusion of all of these gases may engender greater
uncertainties with regard to the calculation of emissions from less known sources
and the convertibility of these gases into units of CO2 equivalents, using the esti
mations provided by their global warming potentials.
Timing. Another feature of the Protocol is the new and innovative use of budget
periods or commitment periods. The  proposal suggested a 2005 deadline.
This relatively short time period was based on what seemed scientiﬁcally necessary

  
and politically feasible.  members were disappointed when the end of the
ﬁrst commitment period was designated as 2012 in the Protocol. However, there is
something of a compromise outlined in the Protocol. According to Article 3.2, by
2005 each Annex I Party shall have made ‘demonstrable progress’ in achieving its
commitments under the Protocol. How that progress is to be measured has yet to
be determined.
Sinks. The agreement on sinks, which remained an issue until the eleventh hour,
was the ﬁnal element that enabled the negotiation of the Protocol targets. Without
this measure, the Kyoto Protocol would not have been possible. The agreed-upon
provision will ensure that further  work on sinks is undertaken immediately.
It will also require the Parties to address uncertainties and methodological prob
lems. In addition, once the Protocol review process starts, this mechanism will
ensure that sinks will be dealt with in a veriﬁable and transparent manner.
There is, however, still potential for problems. While the inclusion of sinks may
increase the effectiveness of the Protocol, it may also introduce methodological
uncertainties and possibly distract the regime from focusing on its main policy
A recent study examined the likely impacts of an accelerated one-metre sea-level
rise on the Marshall Islands by 2100. The study determined that between ten and
thirty percent of the shoreline would erode and 60 percent of the arable land
would be lost. There would also be a signiﬁcant increase in the frequency of severe
ﬂoods, and the underground freshwater that the islanders rely on would become
increasingly scarce. The cost of protecting the coast is estimated to be four to six
times the country’s current gross domestic product.
task of shifting the global economy away from dependence on fossil fuels. Offering
sinks as a means of meeting emissions mitigation commitments may also impart
the erroneous idea that sinks are an acceptable and less expensive alternative to
energy efﬁcient or renewable energy technologies. In this way, the cheaper sinkbased option creates a signiﬁcant economic disincentive for the development and
expansion of these technologies. This means that developing countries are likely to
miss opportunities for technology transfer, adding to future emissions problems as
these economies continue to grow. In addition, while trees will sequester carbon
from the atmosphere, there is no prediction or guarantee as to the length of time
they will sustain such a function.  has addressed these issues and a number
of other sink-related problems in several detailed submissions.
Equity
The distribution of emissions reduction commitments between Annex I countries
varies widely. For example, the European Union has committed to -8% of 1990
levels, and the United States to -7%, while Australia’s goal is +8% and Iceland’s is
+10%. These distributions are not based on any identiﬁable, agreed-upon criteria.
Rather, they were derived largely from heavily politicised negotiations, and based
in large part on perceived political and economic ‘ability’ to bear the burden.
Equity would demand that Parties with the capability to do more should pledge
to do so. At this stage, there are solid, equity-based reasons for developing coun
tries, which currently have no obligations under the Protocol, not to take on
responsibility. However, the inability of the Annex I countries to develop a rule
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based approach to differentiation, as demonstrated by the ambiguity of the exist
ing targets, will complicate the agreement and distribution of obligations when the
regime expands to include new Parties.
Innovative, but untested mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol outlines several major innovations for ways of meeting emis
sions reduction commitments. These include:
• Joint commitments or the bubble arrangement under Article 4, which, in effect,
formalises the European Union umbrella arrangement. This provision is also
open to any two or more countries that are willing to commit to each other for
a ﬁve-year compliance period.
• Joint implementation among Annex I countries through project-based trading
of emissions offsets under Article 6.
• Joint implementation between Annex I Parties and developing countries using
the Clean Development Mechanism detailed in Article 12.
• Emissions trading of unused emissions allowances among Annex 1 countries
under Article 17.
Each of these mechanisms is a groundbreaker for international law and is
intended to allow Annex I countries to use market-based and co-operative mecha
nisms to take advantage of lowest cost options for emissions reduction. Each also
challenges the traditional understanding of sovereign obligation and state respon
sibility, as they allow Parties to fulﬁl obligations through activities that take place
outside their territory, and in some cases to subcontract their responsibilities to the
private sector. Tracing these obligations and holding the contracting states liable for
any shortfalls of performance will present unique challenges to the climate regime.
What are the specific components of the Protocol that need to be addressed?

In the post-Kyoto period,  has determined its primary task to be identifying
and eliminating loopholes in the Protocol in order to ensure that scientiﬁc and reg
ulatory uncertainties are reduced as much as possible. Fortunately, the text of the
Kyoto Protocol provides signiﬁcant opportunities to introduce greater rigor into
the Protocol’s commitments and, in particular, its ﬂexibility mechanisms. This
section examines speciﬁc components of Articles of the Protocol. The section that
follows considers the potential for combining measures called for under different
Articles.
Article 2: Policies and measures
There are no binding policies and measures () in the Kyoto Protocol. The
language used to describe possible actions is relatively soft. For example, the term
‘such as’ in Article 2.1(a) implies that the outlined PAMs are provided simply as
examples of actions the Parties may wish to use in meeting their quantiﬁed emis
sions limitation and reduction commitments (). It is possible, however,
that the  listed in Article 2 may be the preferred means by which Parties
achieve their . This use of  may provide an important interim bench
mark for assessing Party compliance, which could, in turn, prove instrumental to
the Protocol’s long-term goals. Article 2 receives no express mention in the Proto
col’s provisions on reporting (Article 7) or ‘in depth review’ (Article 8). However,
it is clearly covered in Article 7(2) by a reference to the obligation for each Annex

  
I Party to provide ‘supplemental information necessary to demonstrate compli
ance with its commitments under this Protocol.’
During the negotiations,  and the European Union supported a mecha
nism for the international coordination of . The idea was to encourage har
monisation at as high a standard level as possible, and to avoid any potential neg
ative impacts on developing countries. Such a mechanism was not included.
However, Article 2.1(b) captures the spirit of the concerns that had prompted
. The last sentences of Article 2.3 and Article 2.4 also preserve the right to
reintroduce proposals for a coordination mechanism.
Article 2.2 requires Annex I parties to negotiate limitations and reductions on
aviation and marine bunker fuels. While this is one of the fastest growing emis
sions sectors, negotiators were unable to agree on how to attribute responsibility
for ship and aircraft emissions that may be expended in international air space or
international waters. With respect to climate change,  is in support of regu
lation of these emissions. However, the majority of , which are so vulnerable
to the impacts of global warming, are also particularly dependent on air and sea
transport for trade and tourism. This catch-22 is compounded by the fact that the
rules agreed to by the Annex I countries will help to predetermine regulations that
may later be applied to developing countries.
Article 2.3 reﬂects an effort, in the context of the implementation of PAMs, to
balance the interests of those countries concerned about the impacts of climate
change, such as , and countries that are worried about the impact of responses
to climate change, like fossil fuel exporters. Petroleum export countries may try to
use this paragraph to challenge  that affect the petroleum market. However,
this provision is balanced out by others that enumerate Party vulnerability in a
manner that is applicable in this situation.
In the same context, Article 2.3 also refers to ‘further action, as appropriate’ that
may be taken by the Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties
(⁄), but nothing speciﬁc is detailed. Article 3.14 contains similar language
and requires preparation for a -4 decision based on consideration of ‘actions
related to funding, insurance, and transfer of technology.’ This has provided an
opportunity for  to raise issues concerning impact-related insurance, and
for countries belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(), for example, to revive proposals related to compensation for economic
loss caused by response measures. Whether this latter action is to be deemed
‘appropriate’ for ‘further action’ remains to be decided.
Article 3, Annexes A and B: Emissions limitation and reduction commitments
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant improvement of the Protocol over the Convention
lies in the binding legal character of emissions limitation and reduction commit
ments, which are clearly stated in Article 3 and Annex B. These quantiﬁed emis
sions limitation and reduction commitments () consist of commitment
periods during which an Annex I Party may not exceed the ‘assigned amount’ of
greenhouse gas emissions indicated in Annex B. This discussion of Article 3
reviews speciﬁc core design aspects of the .
Coverage of gases
Article 3.1 and Annex A of the Protocol list the six greenhouse gases to be monitored
and controlled under the Protocol. The inclusion of methane and nitrous oxide will
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raise signiﬁcant methodological challenges, both with regard to the measurement of
emissions from sources and removals by sinks of these less well known gases. The
conversion of these measurements into accurate ‘carbon equivalents’ by comparing
their global warming potentials () also presents some difﬁculty. Although
Article 5 of the Protocol provides that measurement and  methodologies
accepted by the  and agreed upon at the  will serve as the default approach,
even these have signiﬁcant ranges of uncertainty associated with them. At the Kyoto
conference there were proposals to discount emissions reductions claimed for gases
with higher levels of uncertainty. No agreement was reached, however.
Coverage of sinks
 did not support the blanket inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol out of
concern that the beneﬁts of regulatory ﬂexibility would be outweighed by the
ambiguity caused by methodological uncertainties. In addition, focussing on
carbon sequestration without taking into account biodiversity and environmen
tally positive or neutral forestry principles could be damaging to long term sus
tainable forest management, especially in developing countries. Under tremen
dous pressure from a coalition of Annex I delegations interested in increased
ﬂexibility, the treatment of ‘removals of emissions’ by sinks has been divided into
two categories of activities within the Protocol:
Article 3.3 authorises Annex I Parties to include emissions from sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases that are derived from human activities in
their inventories. This clause is the ﬁrst such category, and refers only to humaninduced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, refor
estation, and deforestation since 1990;
Article 3.4 anticipates that the / will decide on modalities, rules, and
guidelines for a second category of ‘additional human-induced activities’
including those affecting agricultural soils and other land-use change and
forestry categories.
Under these provisions Parties can begin to calculate and subtract removals
from their inventories without further authorization from the /. Once the
/ has approved additional categories, Parties may apply these to the ﬁrst
commitment period and must apply them to subsequent commitment periods.
Article 3.7 is an additional source of concern for , as it allows countries
that experienced a net increase of emissions from their land-use and forestry sec
tors in 1990 to include those net emissions in their 1990 baseline. In effect, this pro
vision creates more leniency for countries that engaged in extensive timber extrac
tion and land clearing during that year by allowing them a higher 1990 baseline
from which to measure net reductions.
Timetables and commitment periods
Article 3.2 provides for an intermediary review of progress toward the Protocol
commitments in 2005. The Protocol’s innovative use of commitment periods pro
vides Annex I Parties with more ﬂexibility with regard to timing and at the same
time appears to allow for a more precise measurement of emissions reductions.
However, extension of the ﬁrst commitment period until 2012 has the potential to
delay action well beyond the timetable of 2005 that  worked to install. The
implications of this delay could be compounded by the uncertain status of emis
sions reductions achieved prior to 2008.

  
Article 3.13 allows for the ‘banking’ of over-achievements. This means that
emissions reductions in excess of a Party’s set goal in the ﬁrst commitment period
may be carried over into a second commitment period. Clearly, if emissions
reductions achieved prior to 2008 are part of an overall trend, they will facilitate
a Party’s efforts to remain below its assigned amount during the ﬁrst commit
ment period. It should be noted, however, that it was not possible prior to the
advent of the ﬁrst commitment period for a Party to formally ‘bank’ emissions
reductions to offset its assigned amount in the ﬁrst commitment period. There
is one exception to this restriction. Emissions reductions units generated through
the clean development mechanism (see Article 12, below) may, from the year
2000, be banked and used to offset some, as yet undeﬁned, ‘part of ’ a Party’s
assigned amount.
Di›erentiation in base year
Article 3.5 allows Parties that are considered economies in transition () to use
a base year other than the uniform 1990 established in the Protocol for measuring
the allotted reduction amounts. This mechanism is contingent upon  approval
of a speciﬁed base year or average base year. However, when executed, this measure
will allow  to use the special base as the starting point for measuring progress
towards long-term Protocol obligations. In addition, any  that joins the Proto
col in the future that has not already submitted its national communication under
the Convention may also submit a baseline other than 1990, with the approval of
the /.
Currently, Bulgaria is to use 1989 as a base year, Hungary to use an average from
1985 to 1987, Poland to use 1988, and Romania 1989. This deviation from 1990 may
therefore be deleterious to the overall effectiveness of the Protocol as these varia
tions of base years decrease the obligations of these countries, and may result in an
increase of the amount of ‘hot air’ that these countries may trade with other Annex
1 Parties in the future. This Article also sets an interesting precedent for any future
‘voluntary’ commitments pledged by developing countries at a later stage in the
development of the Protocol. Further, Article 3.8 allows any Annex I Party to
choose a 1995 base year for the purpose of measuring reductions of emissions of
the three long-lived ‘trace’ gases included in Annex A. This is an issue of some con
cern because unlike Article 3.5, which relegates the authority of approval of base
year changes to the /, Article 3.8 changes can be made without approval
from higher authority.
What are the pros and cons of the flexibility mechanisms?

The most innovative and untested aspects of the Kyoto Protocol can be grouped
together as the four ‘ﬂexibility mechanisms.’ These include Article 4, bubble; Arti
cle 17, trading; Article 6, joint implementation (); and Article 12, the clean devel
opment mechanism (). Although they all have important, distinguishing fea
tures, each is based on the principle that the Protocol will operate most efﬁciently
if Parties and/or private entities are allowed to invest in emissions reduction
opportunities where they are least expensive to achieve. In effect this will allow
Annex I Parties, and in some cases private entities, to purchase or invest in the cre
ation of ‘emissions reduction units’ which can then be used to offset their obliga
tions under the Protocol. Table 1 (page 74) sets out the core issues that have arisen
or are likely to arise and points out where design aspects converge and diverge.
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table 1

summary of flexibility mechanisms characteristics and issues

characteristic

inventory-based transfer

project-based transfer

Article 4
Bubbling

Article 17
Emissions Trading

Article 6
ji

Article 12
cdm

Investors/Transferees

Annex I

Annex I

Annex I

Annex I

Hosts/Transferors

Annex I

Annex I

Annex I

non-Annex I

Limitation
on use in relation
to assigned amount

none

‘supplemental to
domestic action’

‘supplemental to
domestic action’

‘part of’ Article 3
commitments

Coverage of sinks

not explicit

not explicit

yes

not explicit

Environmental
additionality

actual emissions
must be less than
‘assigned amount’

actual emissions
must be less than
‘assigned amount’

‘additional to any
that would
otherwise occur’

‘additional to any
that would occur
in the absence
of the activity’

Financial additionality none

unclear

unclear

unclear other than
administrative
expenses, costs
for adaptation

Government approval

yes

yes

yes (voluntary)

ex ante/
verification rules
under negotiation

ex post/
‘approval’ by
parties involved

ex post/
‘independent
auditing’

notification to
secretariat

verification rules
under negotiation

yes, under Articles under negotiation
5,7, and 8

transferor beware/
reio beware*

under negotiation

under negotiation under negotiation

Transferability
of emissions
reductions units

unclear

yes

under negotiation under negotiation

Private sector
involvement

n/a

under negotiation

‘legal entities’

special provisions
for reios

under negotiation

under negotiation executive board
of cdm

yes

Certification provision ex ante/
notification to
secretariat
Compliance
conditionality
Liability provisions

Institutional
characteristics

‘private entities’

* Regional Economic Integration Organization

After a brief explanation of each of these provisions, selected crosscutting issues
that are raised by each mechanism will be reviewed.
Article 4: Bubbling
Article 4 allows any two or more Parties to enter into an agreement, prior to the
start of the ﬁrst compliance period, to share responsibility for achieving their com
bined . The text was introduced by the European Union to provide a
clearer legal basis for the bubble under which its 15 member states are to combine
efforts and commitments through the rules and institutions of the European
Community, a Regional Economic Integration Organization ().
 and others were sharply critical of earlier versions of this text, primarily
with regard to its potential application to Annex I Parties outside the European

  
Union. Unlike other ﬂexibility mechanisms, there is no opportunity under Article
4 for international oversight of the amount of a Party’s obligations that could be
transferred through a bubble agreement. Nor is there an opportunity for market
disciplines to set the terms of such transfers.
The main concern of the Alliance is that a Party with a fairly large reduction
obligation could team up with a Party that has leeway to increase its emissions. For
example, Russia might determine that it will overachieve its commitment to sta
bilize its emissions at 100% of 1990 levels by 4%. Using global warming potentials
(), this ‘over-achievement’ can be translated into tonnes of carbon equiva
lent. These carbon units could then be determined to represent a portion, say 2%,
of United States 1990 emissions. Under an Article 4 bubble, Russia would agree to
reduce its ‘assigned amount’ from 100% to 96% of its 1990 levels, and allow the
United States to increase its assigned amount from 93% to 95% of its 1990 levels.
The United States and Russia would have to notify the secretariat of the new dis
tribution of  that resulted from their agreement, but there would be no
opportunity for other Parties to challenge the terms of the agreement. These new,
modiﬁed  will replace the amount assigned to the Parties in Annex B as
their legally binding commitment.
Although Article 4 was clearly designed to accommodate the European Union,
any two or more Parties could declare a ‘bubble’ prior to the commencement of the
ﬁrst commitment period. As such, countries like the United States and/or Canada
could form an agreement, say with Russia, in order to discharge some of their
obligations. This could result in a signiﬁcant and potentially unchecked increase
in the amount of North American emissions, which could not be challenged by any
other Party.
There are some who downplay the risk associated with a bubble between the
United States and Russia. There has even been some speculation that without U.S.
participation countries that might otherwise want to establish bubble arrange
ments with Russia would consider it too risky, for economic and other considera
tions, to tie their successful implementation of the Protocol to a currently unsta
ble economy. The risk factor is further emphasised by the requirement that the
bubble be valid for the full ﬁve years of the commitment period. Unlike the trad
ing regime anticipated for Article 17, the exchange of obligations under Article 4
would remain static during the commitment period, and could not be exchanged
in response to ﬂuctuations in the market value of emissions reduction units. The
more restrictive aspect of Article 4 might make it less attractive to the United
States. However, the liability provisions included in Article 4 place the legal risks
associated with failure to meet a bubble commitment on the transferor or seller of
emissions reduction units, in this case Russia.
Article 17: Emissions trading
Articles 3.10 and 3.11 authorise Annex I Parties to ‘trade emissions’ by acquiring
emissions reduction units and transferring any part of an assigned amount,
according to the provisions in Article 17. The relevant principles, modalities, rules,
and guidelines, particularly for veriﬁcation, reporting and accountability are to be
deﬁned by the . Conceptions of what these modalities should look like, to the
extent that they have formed any detailed positions at all, are likely to vary widely.
At the moment, most of the available conceptual work on emissions trading has
been produced by academics and intergovernmental organisations. The Organisa
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tion for Economic Co-operation and Development () and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development () have been particularly engaged.
Perhaps the clearest distinguishing factor between the approach of  and that
of  is the extent to which they would involve private parties in trading.
 literature has thus far examined a system of state to state trades. This would
essentially be a more dynamic form of the European bubble whereby sovereign
States might regularly re-negotiate the exchange of their assigned amounts.
Although potentially complex, such arrangements could rely upon fairly tradi
tional forms of international instruments and mechanisms. Other approaches,
including some of the work commissioned by , call for the establishment
of ﬁscal instruments that could be bought and sold in an open market by both sov
ereign States and private actors. This method would likely draw upon methods
from the international ﬁnancial markets, including stock markets and commodity
exchanges. In fact, most of the various trading scenarios being discussed are mod
eled on stock market rules. However, each national stock market uses different secu
rity criteria, which may make it difﬁcult to harmonise approaches to issues such as
compliance with emissions trading rules. Whichever approach gains favour, it is
possible that one approach may evolve to include the other.
For those seeking to reduce the regulatory uncertainties associated with a
system of emissions trading, it is useful that Article 17 stresses the need for rules on
veriﬁcation, reporting, and accountability. The negotiating process may be further
helped by the fact that the United States, the most adamant proponent of emis
sions trading, has voiced the need for stringent compliance mechanisms. This is to
ensure Parties trading in emissions permits that the emissions obligations on
which the permits are based will be backed by legal consequences. However, while
these principles are advocated strongly, there is an underlying concern that some
Parties have more experience than others with exploiting loopholes.
Developing countries will most likely not be engaged in emissions trading
until and unless they undertake commitments. A main focus for them will be the
extent to which the popularity of this mechanism could reduce opportunities
offered to them, especially under Article 12 (). The text of Article 17 states
clearly that emissions trading must be supplemental to domestic actions and
there are similar clauses in Articles 6 and 12. As such, the / may choose
to limit the amount an Annex I Party may use to offset its obligations through
emissions trading.
Article 6: Joint Implementation
Article 6 and Article 12 are the two ‘project-based’ ﬂexibility mechanisms deﬁned
in the Protocol. Along with Article 3.11, Article 6 allows Annex I countries to offset
emissions reductions units resulting from projects in other Annex I countries. In
the short term, most Article 6 investments are expected to be funded by the wealth
ier Annex II countries or investors, and to take place in Annex I countries with
, where opportunities for energy-related investments will probably be less
expensive. Unlike the other ﬂexibility mechanisms, under Article 6 Parties are not
required to delineate rules beyond those outlined in the Article. The provision
states only that the / may ‘elaborate’ further guidelines, including those
for veriﬁcation.
Developing countries, including members of , may come to view Article
6 as both a competitor and a forerunner for the conceptually similar project-based

  
activities of the clean development mechanism (). The clearest distinction
between Article 6 and Article 12 is in their institutional characteristics. Article 6
seems to be intended to operate primarily on a bilateral basis. Although Parties and
institutions of the Protocol may intervene to enforce aspects of this bilateral bar
gain, including with regard to compliance conditionality, Article 6 does not
require an overall administrative structure such as the ‘executive board’ established
to supervise Article 12 activities.
The less interventionist approach outlined in Article 6 may reﬂect negotiators’
perceptions that the scientiﬁc and regulatory risks associated with emissions
reduction investments in Annex I countries are inherently lower than those in
developing countries. All Annex I countries, including Article 6 hosts, will be
required to report their emissions annually, and to demonstrate progress in meet
ing their commitments under Articles 2 and 3. This suggests that climate changerelated projects initiated under Article 6 will take place within a regulatory frame
work that might be absent from Article 12 projects.
In addition to the more laissez-faire approach of Article 6, its projects will not
be subject to the mandatory administrative and adaptation surcharges imposed by
Article 12. No reference is made in Article 6, as it is in Article 12, to independent
auditing or certiﬁcation processes. This may make Article 6 investments more
attractive to Annex I countries than Article 12 projects. This is an important issue
for developing countries, as it is hoped that Article 12 will generate investment in
developing countries, in particular for adaptation funding. Consequently, 
and many other developing country advocates have an interest in working to
ensure that the lower transaction costs associated with Article 6 do not draw atten
tion and investment away from Article 12 activities. The possibility of adding an
adaptation surcharge to Articles 6 and 17 activities has therefore been strongly
advocated by .
Article 12: Clean Development Mechanism
The concept of a ‘clean development fund’ was introduced late in the Kyoto Pro
tocol negotiations by the delegation from Brazil. It was originally intended to serve
the dual propose of providing an incentive for Annex I Party compliance and pro
viding a source of revenue for developing country implementation of the Proto
col by assessing ﬁnancial penalties against Annex I Parties that exceeded their
assigned emissions amounts.
The Clean Development Mechanism () was approved in its current form
because its proponents downplayed its role in enforcing Protocol compliance.
Instead, the  borrows from pilot arrangements for ‘activities implemented
jointly’ such as Costa Rica’s national ‘certiﬁed tradeable offset’ programme and the
U.S. initiative on joint implementation. Because it evolved from a developing
country proposal and incorporates a number of design principles proposed by
Southern delegations, the  is expected to enjoy greater support than previous
incarnations of ‘joint implementation’ did.
As mentioned earlier, the presence of an ‘executive board’ is the main feature
that distinguishes Article 12 ‘project activities’ from Article 6 ‘projects.’ A number
of developing countries supported the inclusion of a mechanism for multilateral
supervision not because developing country investments are inherently more
risky, but out of a perceived need to develop a transparent and consistent process
for the negotiation of Article 12 projects. Indeed, several delegations suggested that
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the regulatory and scientiﬁc uncertainties associated with Article 12 projects were
more likely to be exploited by Annex I countries seeking the highest ﬁnancial
return on their investments rather than by developing countries trying to sell pro
jects with less than satisfactory features. The intervention of an executive board, as
well as independent auditing and certiﬁcation processes, were installed to reduce
potential risks.
Despite broad-based support for Article 12, the agreement in Kyoto masks sig
niﬁcant remaining political and ideological differences between countries as to
how the  would best function. There are many inherently complex questions
to be answered. There is also tension between those that wish to see the  up
and running quickly, and with the lowest transaction costs possible, and those
that remain cautious and are willing to increase costs in exchange for greater
accountability. Parties at both ends of this spectrum place the  at risk, either
by undermining its credibility or by crushing it with an over-burdensome
bureaucracy.
It was expected that the implications of pre-commitment period banking
would be analysed at -4. However, neither -4 nor -5 saw any closure
on the matter. At this point, Article 12.10 authorises Annex I Parties to offset Arti
cle 3 commitments using certiﬁed emissions reductions ‘obtained’ beginning in
2000. While the ﬁnal decisions on the  may only be made by the /,
there will be considerable pressure from both potential hosts and potential
investors to establish an ‘interim ’ that could pre-authorise projects and pre
certify emissions reductions.
 delegations played a signiﬁcant role in designing and supporting the
inclusion of the . It is clear that some delegations view the adaptation sur
charge provision in Article 12.8 as the price  demanded for a more enthusi
astic encouragement of joint implementation with developing countries. How
ever, others will expect  to continue to maintain a sceptical approach to joint
implementation and to demand the highest level of transparency and account
ability with regard to emissions reductions units generated in developing coun
tries to offset Annex I country commitments.
What are the key issues to be considered
in order to optimise the flexibility mechanisms?

This section touches brieﬂy on a number of signiﬁcant design issues that crosscut
each of the ﬂexibility mechanisms discussed above. Each is discussed within the
context of how it might complement or compete with the other. This discussion is
intended to provide a basis for harmonising the transparency and accountability
aspects of each mechanism at the highest possible level.
Limitation on use: preserving equitable allocations
The bargain struck in Kyoto, however imperfect, represents an allocation of oblig
ations based, to some extent, on an appropriate allocation of burdens among
Annex I countries and between Annex I and developing countries. Each of the
Protocol’s ﬂexibility mechanisms provides an opportunity to redistribute these
burdens through the principle of cost-effectiveness. In order to maintain a sense
of equity and, more speciﬁcally, ensure that Annex I countries take action domes
tically, Articles 6 and 17 require that joint implementation and emissions trading
are supplemental to domestic action. Article 12 states that the  can ‘contribute’

  
to compliance only as a part of Article 3 commitments, as determined by the
/. Each of these qualiﬁers may provide an opportunity to limit the use
of ﬂexibility mechanisms to preserve aspects of the allocations identiﬁed in
Annex B.
Coverage of sinks
Articles 4 and 17 contain no reference to ‘removals by sinks.’ However, they are
likely to be subject to the same restrictions as any other Article 3 effort. The absence
of any mention of sinks in Article 12 provides a solid basis for ensuring that the
 focuses exclusively on high quality and reliable emissions mitigation projects
unless and until Parties agree to sufﬁciently robust criteria and methodologies for
the inclusion of land-use change or forestry projects.
Environmental and ﬁnancial additionality
Additionality requires project proponents to establish that the investment will
yield genuine net reductions in emissions that are additional to what would oth
erwise have occurred. These criteria are relevant primarily to the project-based
transfers of Articles 6 and 12. Additionality can be broken down into the closely
related concepts of environmental and ﬁnancial additionality.
Environmental additionality requires that project proponents demonstrate
that the investment will result in genuine net emissions reductions that would not
have occurred without the investment. In the context of an Article 6 project, envi
ronmental additionality is easily established, as the Annex I host country is operat
ing under its own emissions cap. Thus, any investment that leads to over-achieve
ment of an Annex B allowance should be available for certiﬁcation and transfer.
Environmental additionality is far more difﬁcult to establish in projects of nonAnnex I countries operating under Article 12. Because developing countries are not
subject to emissions reduction obligations there is no reliable pre-determined
baseline against which progress may be measured. It is therefore impossible to
know whether the emissions reduction unit produced by the investment would
not have otherwise been achieved, or that it has not been ‘cancelled out’ by emis
sions growth elsewhere in the country.
Financial additionality requires an assessment of whether the investment
would have taken place in the absence of the regulatory incentive provided by the
Convention or the Protocol. Financial additionality is important to regulators
because it can provide important evidence for environmental additionality; that
is, the additional ﬁnancial resources that are ﬂowing toward climate-friendly pro
jects may provide important evidence that the emissions reductions resulting from
an investment might not otherwise have occurred.
Proof of ﬁnancial additionality is important to developing countries in partic
ular, because it helps reassure them that ﬁnancial resources such as Global Envi
ronmental Facility () funding, ‘regular’ ﬂows of Ofﬁcial Development Assis
tance (), or Foreign Direct Investment are not being redirected to -related
investments from investments that would otherwise have received a higher
national priority. Explicit references to ﬁnancial additionality in draft documents
during the discussions in the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (), and
in the activities implemented jointly () guidelines were not incorporated into
Article 12. In fact, it is not clear that the  will involve the transfer of funds in
any traditional sense of .
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This lack of clarity raises the possibility of multinational corporations ‘launder
ing’ their emissions through techniques not dissimilar to the transfer pricing used to
avoid taxes.A parent corporation based in an Annex I country could pay for its energy
efﬁciency investment in a subsidiary in one non-Annex I country by simultaneously
allowing an emissions increase in a subsidiary based in another non-Annex I coun
try. The reductions generated in the ﬁrst non-Annex I country might then be used to
offset the parent corporation’s emissions in the home country, leading to an overall
global increase. This type of example indicates clearly that the ambiguities of private
sector responsibility and liability that are raised by their participation in ﬂexibility
mechanisms will have to be considered and addressed in the post-Kyoto process.
Certiﬁcation provisions
Each of the Protocol’s ﬂexibility mechanisms requires some form of ‘government
approval.’ This may happen at the point of transfer or at the point that the portion
of the assigned amount, or emissions reduction unit, is added to or deducted from
the obligation of the Annex I Party, as per Article 3. However, only Article 12 pro
vides for a process of auditing and certiﬁcation that would require an objective
assessment of whether the transfer will result in net emissions reductions. The
additional guidelines and rules that will be developed for Article 6 and 17 should
incorporate the precedent set by Article 12.
Compliance conditionality
A further inconsistency in the Protocol’s approach to ﬂexibility is that the compli
ance conditionality measures outlined for Article 6 transfers are fairly strict, while
the others are much more lenient. Under Article 6.1(c), an Annex I Party is pro
hibited from acquiring emissions reduction units unless it is in compliance with
its inventory and reporting obligations under Articles 5 and 7. Furthermore,
should a question arise through the Protocol’s ‘in-depth review’ procedures with
regard to a Party’s compliance with Article 6.4, it may not apply its emissions
reduction units until the question is resolved. As such, the role that compliance
conditionality plays in enforcement of the Protocol could serve as a strong argu
ment for the inclusion of such a measure within Articles 12 and 17.
Liability provisions: Who bears the risk?
As an instrument of public international law, negotiated, signed, and ratiﬁed by
states, the Kyoto Protocol will represent an exchange of sovereign obligations and
be subject to classical international rules of State responsibility. However, the ﬂex
ibility mechanisms outlined above were formulated with the anticipation that the
static obligations reﬂected in the allocation of commitments in Annex B will be
made ﬂuid. This will allow a potentially inﬁnite series of transactions through
which emissions reduction units representing the Annex B commitments are
bought, sold, and reallocated.
Article 4.5 contains the only clear liability provision related to the Protocol’s
ﬂexibility mechanisms. It operates on the principle that the seller or the transferor
of the emissions credit bears the full risk of the transaction. For example, in the
theoretical scenario discussed earlier, if Russia failed to meet its newly calculated
amount, it would be in violation of the Protocol. However, under Article 4.5, the
United States would still be allowed to emit the full 95% it bargained for in the bub
bling agreement, rather than the 93% agreed to in Kyoto.

  
There is considerable logic to the ‘seller beware’ principle which, through lia
bility rules, holds the ‘host’ Party responsible, as the host is in the best position to
ensure that the bargained-for emissions reductions actually take place. The same
logic may well justify extending these principles to emissions trading under Arti
cle 17. However, transitioning and developing economies wishing to participate in
Article 6 or  projects should be aware that Article 4.5 could provide a prece
dent for any liability rules that emerge under that mechanism. Accordingly, host
countries could be liable should the projects they are hosting fail to generate the
promised emissions reductions. In these transactions, a far wider range of actors
may be responsible for the success or failure of the project, including those
involved in its design, funding, and certiﬁcation. This complicates the legal rela
tionships and the chain of liability associated with an ‘emissions reduction unit’
considerably. Disputes could arise between and among states, private entities, and
intergovernmental organisations, each of which may share interest in and respon
sibility for the success or failure of a project.
One way of reducing the regulatory risk associated with project-based ﬂexibil
ity mechanisms is to allow emissions reductions units to be certiﬁed and trans
ferred only after the activity has been completed. For example, should a project
consist of an investment in the retooling of a power plant with a 20-year life span,
only the emissions reduced during the speciﬁed commitment period could be
offset against that period’s assigned amount. There is some basis for this ‘ex post’
approach in the texts of Articles 6 and 12, which refer to emissions reductions
‘resulting from’ project activities. This language suggests that they must have
already occurred to be credited. There will, however, be pressure from investors to
offset the full projected value of their investment as soon as possible.
Conclusion

While much was achieved in Kyoto, there is no room for complacency. Climate
change is happening. The devastating effects that it could have, from the forests of
Southeast Asia to the ﬂoodplains of Africa and China, to the blistering heat of
recent American summers, must continue to drive the development of the Con
vention and its Protocol.
The existence of the Protocol is a demonstration of international recognition
of the need for action. However, there is very strong evidence to suggest that the
commitments being made are not strong enough. The science is overwhelming
and the consequences of inaction are clear. The  has repeatedly described
mitigation actions that are not only technologically feasible, but economically
beneﬁcial. For those of us preparing to watch our crops, our land, our ecology,
and our cultures disappear, it is impossible to contemplate failure to take action.
The future of small island States represents the future of the planet. Islands are
the planet’s coral reefs, offering early warning signals, which only the negligent
would ignore.
The level of effort required to resolve the uncertainties set out in this article
must be placed in the context of the very real possibility that the Protocol may not
succeed. The Protocol could fail if it does not receive the requisite combinations of
numbers and emissions levels of Parties required to bring it into force. If the
United States, the country with the highest level of emissions, cannot build the
necessary political support in Congress to become a Party to the Protocol, failure
is also imminent.
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Scientiﬁc evidence points to the use of fossil fuels by industrialised nations as
the primary cause of global warming. However, given the growth rate in the devel
oping world, unless effective measures are deployed immediately, developing
country emissions will exceed those of industrialised countries within 25 years.
Because of this, it is imperative that steps be taken not only to strengthen and
tighten the language of the Protocol, but to further enable the participation of
non-Annex I countries. The principle employed must truly be that of common but
differentiated responsibilities.
At this point, especially given the comparatively low targets set for developed
countries, it seems that Annex I countries must be fairly circumspect in establish
ing the right environment for the involvement of developing countries in terms of
Annex I emissions efforts and in the transfer of ﬁnancial resources and the right
technologies. The participation of developing countries will be, to a large degree,
dependent on the development and transfer of appropriate, affordable, and envi
ronmentally sound technologies.
Many developing countries, including members of , are already devoting
considerable time, effort, and funding to this work. Political, ﬁnancial, and techni
cal support from the international community will be vital if this work is to progress
further. It is also important to acknowledge that many major developing countries
are undertaking signiﬁcant emissions-saving and emissions-reducing activities.
Examples include the ‘Gazol’ program in Brazil, biomass research and practical
application in India, wind energy in China, and solar water heaters in Barbados.
 put forth a proposal for the assumption of voluntary commitments by
developing countries but it did not survive Kyoto. There is need for considerable
political groundwork to convince many developing countries to make Kyoto-ori
ented commitments. Recognising that many developing countries are already
taking steps, others should be convinced to do likewise. Early action by Annex I
countries will help developing countries to access advancements, and to avoid mis
steps or pitfalls, through a process of technological ‘leap-frogging.’
Ahead lies an interim period of legal and institutional limbo. What is done
during this time to maintain momentum and to ensure integrity of the climate
regime will be a genuine challenge. It is beyond the reach of current norms and
institutions of international law. At the core of this very political issue is the per
sonal issue of obligation. As individuals, and even as governments, many of us feel
an obligation to secure a better future for our children. This human need must
undergo the very difﬁcult process of being translated into international policy.
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Abstract
Energy is central to the current international discussions about climate change
because it is the human activity that contributes most to the buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. It is also a critical element of national plans for economic
and social development among the poorer countries of the world that currently lack
su≤cient energy to power modern cities, industries and transportation systems.
Transformation of the world’s energy systems to promote energy e≤ciency,
increased use of renewable energy resources and cleaner conventional energy use
can promote overall economic and social development while at the same time
e≠ectively addressing the threats of climate change. E≠orts to control greenhouse
gas emissions can go hand in hand with measures to address the needs of
developing countries for increased energy services. Focusing on the positive aspects
of environmentally sustainable development will be more e≠ective in building
support for climate change mitigation than a strategy that primarily emphasizes
the need for limiting worldwide emissions. Increased energy e≤ciency, adoption of
renewable sources of energy, and cleaner use of conventional fuels are the most
promising options for providing the level of energy services needed in the
developing world, while at the same time limiting energy-related greenhouse gas
emissions.
Introduction: What are the environmental, social,
and economic threats presented by climate change?

The potential impacts of climate change include increased frequency of extreme
weather events like drought, ﬂoods, and intense storms; rising sea levels; melting
of glaciers and the Arctic ice cap; and disruption of a wide range of natural ecosys
tems. Such environmental changes will likely cause adverse social and economic
consequences, aﬀecting agriculture and food production, forestry, ﬁsheries, fresh
water resources, and human health.
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The large percentage of the world’s population living near coastal areas will
become increasingly vulnerable to storm damage and infrastructure loss. Sea level
rise due to warming of ocean waters and melting of glaciers could cause extensive
coastal ﬂooding, forcing large population migrations and elimination of entire
cultures in low-lying areas. Dry areas will be prone to increased desertiﬁcation,
and whole forests could disappear as temperature zones shift much faster than
forests can naturally migrate. Reduced water supplies in arid regions could pro
voke international conﬂicts, while food shortages tend to destabilize shaky gov
ernments. Direct health eﬀects could include deaths from intense heat waves as
well as widespread transmission of infectious diseases like malaria and yellow
fever, which are currently conﬁned to tropical areas.
Some of the poorest developing countries will be especially vulnerable to the
adverse impacts of climate change on agricultural production, water supplies, and
the natural ecosystems on which they rely for basic necessities. Many of these
Increased energy eﬃciency, adoption of renewable sources of energy, and cleaner
use of conventional fuels are the most promising options for providing the level
of energy services needed in the developing world, while at the same time limit
ing energy-related greenhouse gas emissions.
countries are located in regions that are already subject to heat waves, drought,
desertiﬁcation, deforestation, ﬂooding, tropical diseases, and natural disasters, as
well as poverty and lack of infrastructure. Some of the low-lying Paciﬁc islands are
likely to become almost completely inundated by rising sea levels. Yet, for the most
part, these countries have not obtained the beneﬁts of the industrialization that
led to interference with the climate system. Moreover, they generally have the least
ﬁnancial and planning resources available to undertake mitigation measures to
protect against long-range environmental threats.
Most of the scientiﬁc research on climate change has been compiled and ana
lyzed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a group of over 2,000
scientists organized in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme and
the World Meteorological Organization. Their ﬁrst report conﬁrmed the serious
ness of the problem and provided the scientiﬁc basis for the UN Framework Con
vention on Climate Change. Their second report, published in 1996, concluded
that there is discernible human inﬂuence on the climate system that is magnifying
the natural greenhouse eﬀect. Eﬀorts to avert these threats will require a reduction
in emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse
gases generated by human activities.
Surface temperatures on the earth have increased over the last century, partic
ularly during the last decade. If current trends remain unchanged, greenhouse gas
emissions will continue to rise substantially during the next century. In order to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, it will be necessary to reduce emissions
below present levels. Moreover, since carbon dioxide and some of the other green
house gases accumulate and remain in the atmosphere for many decades, the chal
lenge of dealing with climate change will last for many generations.
Much emphasis has been placed on the perceived economic costs of addressing
climate change. Yet it is important to recognize that policies designed to establish
sustainable energy systems can both promote sustainable economic and social
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development and at the same time mitigate the impacts of climate change. The
beneﬁts of poverty reduction, improved human health, and better local and
regional environmental conditions provide strong incentives for adopting sus
tainable energy policies, even without considering climate change factors.
What are the sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gases?

The bulk of human emissions of major greenhouse gases come from the energy
sector, primarily as a result of burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) to pro
vide electrical power, heat, transportation, and energy for industrial production
processes. Carbon dioxide is by far the most signiﬁcant of the greenhouse gases, and
over 80% of the carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere by human activities can be
attributed to the use of fossil fuels.1 Methane and nitrous oxides are other important
greenhouse gases released, in part, from the use of fossil fuels. Outside the energy
sector, there are several other potentially signiﬁcant greenhouse gases, including
hydroﬂuorocarbons, perﬂuorocarbons, and sulfur hexachloride, which are used for
refrigeration and air conditioning as well as industrial purposes. The impacts of
these gases are small today, but could become more extensive over the long term.
Carbon dioxide is emitted from many natural sources, particularly from the
decay of organic materials. But these sources are generally balanced by natural
“sinks” that absorb carbon dioxide. Most importantly, new plants take up carbon
dioxide as they grow. Overall, huge amounts of carbon are exchanged yearly
among the oceans, the atmosphere, and land vegetation. Human activities, includ
ing combustion of fossil fuels as well as land-use changes and agriculture, add
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere in amounts that exceed the absorption capacity
of existing natural sinks. This extra carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere
from year to year and reduces the amount of heat radiated from the earth’s surface
into space, trapping more heat in the lower levels of the earth’s atmosphere.
Land clearance for agricultural purposes is a major factor aﬀecting the release
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and the decrease in carbon dioxide absorp
tion by natural sinks. Globally, land use changes account for close to 20% of the
Much emphasis has been placed on the perceived economic costs of addressing
climate change. Yet it is important to recognize that policies designed to estab
lish sustainable energy systems can both promote sustainable economic and
social development and at the same time mitigate the impacts of climate change.
The beneﬁts of poverty reduction, improved human health, and better local and
regional environmental conditions provide strong incentives for adopting sus
tainable energy policies, even without considering climate change factors.
carbon dioxide emissions caused by human activities. Expansion of cultivated
lands has generally come at the expense of forests and woodlands, which have
greater absorption capacities. Many of these croplands have subsequently been
degraded due to unsustainable land management practices that cause loss of top
soil, wind and water erosion, and salinity. In addition, large-scale deforestation is
accelerated by commercial timber harvesting, industrial and mining operations in
forest areas, and construction of roads and highways through wooded lands.
It is the continued reliance on fossil fuels for energy production, however, that
is the main element in projected greenhouse gas emission increases in the future.

1 All statistics quoted are
derived from the documents
cited in the Reference Material
section at the end of this article.
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Stabilization of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere will require sub
stantial changes in the world’s energy systems and technologies in order to reduce
future emission rates. The primary challenge in addressing the long-term impacts
of climate change will be to ﬁnd ways to provide necessary energy services with
out at the same time increasing greenhouse gas accumulations in the atmosphere.
Are there reasons besides the threat of climate
change to consider changes in energy systems?

In many parts of the world, limitations on the availability of energy services create
barriers to socioeconomic development. Increased access to energy is needed in
order to promote income generating activities, educational advancement, avail
ability of health services, and greater opportunities for women.
Worldwide, more than 1.5 billion people lack electricity and approximately two
billion people use traditional solid fuels like ﬁrewood or dung for heating and
cooking purposes. The considerable amount of time and physical energy spent by
women and children in gathering fuel and carrying it over long distances reduces
their ability to engage in other social, economic, and educational activities. In addi
tion, unvented wood and dung ﬁres contribute to indoor air pollution and respira
tory health problems. Acute respiratory infections are the leading cause of death
for young children worldwide, accounting for over 2 million deaths annually.
Because of high capital investment requirements and the need for extensive
transmission and distribution lines, there are many countries where it has simply
not been possible to meet the energy needs of rural populations using conventional
large-scale, fossil fuel-based power plants. Limited economic opportunities in these
rural areas encourage migrations to already overcrowded urban areas. Meeting the
energy needs of rural communities through increased availability of small-scale
non-polluting energy technologies can raise living standards in these areas and also
mitigate climate change impacts and other local environmental threats.
Besides contributing to climate change, combustion of fossil fuels produces
smog, ground-level ozone, particulates, and other forms of local air pollution that
Although industrialized countries are currently responsible for more than twothirds of annual greenhouse gas emissions, by 2025 developing countries are
likely to account for two-thirds of annual emissions, unless they pursue a diﬀer
ent energy path. Cumulative emissions by developing countries, however, would
not catch up to those of industrialized countries for approximately another one
hundred years. Since it is the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that
causes climate change, a country’s cumulative emissions are a better indicator of
its level of responsibility than its annual emission rate.
are directly harmful to human health. Burning fossil fuels also produces emissions
of sulfur and nitrogen oxides that form acid rain, which can damage sensitive
forests and lakes, even far away from the source of pollution. Coal mining and oil
drilling damage fragile land and water ecosystems, while oil spills are a continuing
threat to surface waters, coastlines, and groundwater aquifers.
In addition to environmental and health concerns, energy supply issues may
also play a major role in geo-political tensions and international security matters.
Since major supplies of fossil fuels are concentrated in relatively few areas, eﬀorts

  
to control and exploit these resources have led to political crises and military con
ﬂicts. Countries without domestic supplies are subject to energy security threats
due to their dependence on foreign producers. Some poor countries spend large
amounts of money on imported fuels, reducing the availability of foreign
exchange for other essential domestic investments, and adding to unsustainable
debt accumulation.
Because other sources of energy, like wind, sunlight, rivers, and crop residues
are more widely distributed, using them as alternatives to fossil fuels can reduce
energy dependence. Marketing, distribution, and servicing of these new energy
technologies can provide new economic opportunities for local entrepreneurs as
well as international corporations.
Why do developing countries and industrialized countries
tend to have different perspectives on climate change?

In general, developing countries are more concerned with immediate and press
ing domestic issues such as providing for economic development, employment,
public health, safe food and drinking water, sanitation, and transportation.
Poverty is their overriding concern. About 1.3 billion people in developing coun
tries live on less than U.S.$1 per day.
In many developing countries, the ﬁnancial costs of providing electricity
through extensions of the grid to currently unserved regions are prohibitive.
Moreover, they are facing the prospect of rapidly growing populations. Conse
quently, these countries are concerned that climate change mitigation plans could
substantially increase their energy supply costs, or place limits on their ability to
provide energy for development.
In international climate change negotiations, developing countries have
argued that because industrialized countries are responsible for over 75% of
greenhouse gas accumulations, they should also take the lead on emissions reduc
tions. (Carbon dioxide emissions can remain in the atmosphere for up to one hun
dred years.) Historically, it was the industrialized countries that produced the
majority of greenhouse gas emissions that have now accumulated in the atmos
phere. They also generated suﬃcient wealth from their industrialized economies
to be able to aﬀord to undertake environmental protection measures. Many of the
industrialized countries have, in fact, accepted the challenge from the developing
countries and are working within the terms of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Although industrialized countries are currently responsible for more than twothirds of annual greenhouse gas emissions, by 2025 developing countries are likely
to account for two-thirds of annual emissions, unless they pursue a diﬀerent
energy path. Cumulative emissions by developing countries, however, would not
catch up to those of industrialized countries for approximately another one hun
dred years. Since it is the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that
causes climate change, a country’s cumulative emissions are a better indicator of
its level of responsibility than its annual emission rate.
Energy usage has seemed so critical to national economies that the amount of
energy consumed per capita has become one of the key indicators of moderniza
tion and progress. This, however, is a misleading indicator. It is the availability of
energy services which is the real measure of development, not energy consump
tion. For developing countries, measures promoting energy eﬃciency, renewable
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energy sources, and alternative technologies could allow them to leapfrog over the
relatively ineﬃcient path of economic growth followed by the industrialized
countries and achieve a high level of energy services without the same economic,
social, and environmental costs.
What efforts are being made internationally
to move toward a sustainable energy future?

Most of the recent international discussions on energy have focused on climate
change concerns, rather than on the other signiﬁcant economic, social, and envi
ronmental beneﬁts of altering existing production and consumption patterns. In
connection with the Convention on Climate Change, there have been extensive
debates about the need to reduce worldwide dependence on fossil fuels as well as
the need for new technologies and new approaches to energy supplies.
At this point, however, climate change concerns alone do not provide suﬃcient
motivation to drive the transition towards sustainable energy policies. This might
change, of course, if the impacts of climate variability actually begin to be felt and
can be traced conclusively to accumulations of greenhouse gases caused by human
activities. In the meantime, focusing on the critical role of energy in sustainable
development may provide a more acceptable and eﬀective route towards world
wide recognition of the need to change current energy patterns and policies.
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change set speciﬁc emission
reduction goals only for industrialized countries, in light of their greater respon
sibility for greenhouse gas accumulations and their greater resources for address
ing climate change problems. The convention also recognized that per capita
Energy usage has seemed so critical to national economies that the amount of
energy consumed per capita has become one of the key indicators of moderniza
tion and progress. This, however, is a misleading indicator. It is the availability
of energy services which is the real measure of development, not energy con
sumption. For developing countries, measures promoting energy eﬃciency,
renewable energy sources, and alternative technologies could allow them to
leapfrog over the relatively ineﬃcient path of economic growth followed by the
industrialized countries and achieve a high level of energy services without the
same economic, social, and environmental costs.
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low, and will likely need to
grow in order for those countries to meet their social and developmental goals.
Acknowledging the fact that environmental protection cannot be dealt with sep
arately from economic development, the convention called for ﬁnancial and tech
nical assistance for developing countries, as well as transfers of environmentally
friendly technologies in order to encourage their participation in international cli
mate change mitigation eﬀorts.
Worldwide demand for cleaner energy production has already been stimulated
to some extent by the Convention. Since a large proportion of future investments
in new energy capacity will be in developing countries, it is important to direct
international resources towards low-emission energy investments in those coun
tries. The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention provides new incentives that encour
age public and private investment by industrialized countries in energy eﬃciency
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Still, at this point, most countries will not choose unfamiliar or more expensive
energy options solely because they would help mitigate climate change impacts.
People are more likely to adopt new low-emission technologies because they pro
vide aﬀordable, reliable, eﬀective, and convenient energy supplies. Concerns
about current local air quality and adverse health conditions are likely to be
more compelling than potential long-term environmental consequences.
projects and low-emission technologies that minimize additional greenhouse gas
emissions in developing countries. Moreover, emissions trading markets could
eventually generate large capital ﬂows channeled into developing countries, which
could be used for climate change mitigation projects, including investments in
sustainable energy systems.
Still, at this point, most countries will not choose unfamiliar or more expensive
energy options solely because they would help mitigate climate change impacts.
People are more likely to adopt new low-emission technologies because they pro
vide aﬀordable, reliable, eﬀective, and convenient energy supplies. Concerns about
current local air quality and adverse health conditions are likely to be more com
pelling than potential long-term environmental consequences.
At the 1997 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly addressing
sustainable development, world leaders recognized that energy is essential to an
improved quality of life. They recommended greater international cooperation in
promoting energy conservation and eﬃciency, the use of non-fossil energy
sources, and the development of innovative energy-related technology. In fur
therance of this goal, they decided that the ninth session of the UN Commission
on Sustainable Development in 2001 should focus on energy in its discussions and
negotiations.
A World Energy Assessment sponsored by the UN Development Programme,
the UN Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs, and the World Energy Coun
cil provides background scientiﬁc and technical information for evaluating the
social, economic, environmental, and security issues linked to energy, as well as an
analysis of technology and policy options for more sustainable production and
use of energy.2
What are the best ways to conserve energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

Improved technological performance can provide opportunities for people to
enjoy satisfactory levels of energy services while consuming much less fuel and
generating lower emission levels. Heating and cooling of buildings, transporta
tion, and industrial production are among the most promising areas for energy
eﬃciency gains.
Building design is an area with tremendous potential for energy savings. Better
insulation combined with passive solar design techniques can virtually eliminate
the need for traditional heating and cooling systems. Simple measures like plant
ing shade trees, orienting buildings for optimal exposures, and placing windows
for cross ventilation can dramatically reduce energy requirements. New technolo
gies like windows that let in sunlight but block unwanted heat can improve com
fort while reducing costs and energy use. Inside houses and oﬃces, the overall
energy drain can be minimized by using super-insulated refrigerators, compact
ﬂuorescent light bulbs, and other types of energy-eﬃcient equipment.

2 For further information see
http://www.undp.org/seed/eap
/activities/wea/images/
weahome.gif.
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Redesigned cars can also provide substantial reductions in emissions. Promis
ing technologies include hybrid vehicles that combine small internal combustion
engines with electrical generators, as well as cars powered by fuel cells. Several
major manufacturers are already producing and marketing hybrid vehicles, and
several manufacturers have plans to introduce fuel cell engines starting in 2003. In
addition, transportation requirements can be reduced through urban designs that
eliminate sprawl and long commutes and instead emphasize pedestrian access as
well as mass transit facilities. Moreover, in some cases transportation needs can be
virtually eliminated by communications technologies that can make the home
into an eﬀective workplace.
In manufacturing operations, there are substantial opportunities for improv
ing the energy eﬃciency of energy intensive industries such as iron and steel pro
duction, chemical processing, petroleum reﬁning, pulp and paper manufacturing,
and cement production. Improvements in production processes can boost energy
eﬃciency signiﬁcantly and at the same time reduce material requirements. Cogeneration of heat and power is another promising avenue for cutting emissions.
What sorts of alternative energy sources can be used to produce power?

Renewable sources of energy already in use include solar, wind, hydro and geot
hermal technologies, in addition to biomass. Altogether, renewable energy tech
nologies currently account for about 16% of world energy use. As these technolo
gies become more advanced and widely distributed, they can provide
cost-eﬀective alternatives capable of meeting a large percentage of the world’s
energy requirements. Moreover, they can help address local and national environ
mental problems like urban air pollution and acid rain as well as climate change.
The use of biomass fuels to replace fossil fuels is another way to reduce net
carbon emissions. Biomass fuels are derived from agricultural and other organic
wastes, or from special crops grown for that purpose. Biomass takes up carbon diox
ide as the plants grow and releases it again when they are burned, so that the carbon
dioxide emissions do not add to overall atmospheric emission concentrations. Bio
mass can be used to produce liquid or gaseous fuels, and to generate electricity.
Hydroelectric generators are widely used renewable energy systems, providing
about 20% of the world’s electricity supply. They produce almost no greenhouse
gases and no local air pollution. Water wheels on fast-ﬂowing rivers provided
energy for early textile factories. Now large hydropower plants generate electricity
by damming rivers and allowing the captured water to fall hundreds of feet
through turbines. These large-scale projects have come under intense criticism
because they require ﬂooding of vast tracts of land behind the dams, interfere with
downstream ﬂows, and hinder ﬁsh migrations and spawning. Small hydropower
plants are less destructive to natural ecosystems, however, since they have smaller
reservoirs, or in some cases simply channel the stream ﬂow through the turbines.
Some of the other negative environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities can
be reduced by the use of ﬁsh ladders to help ﬁsh migrate over dams, and mainte
nance of minimum ﬂow rates to prevent downstream damage.
Wind energy has been used for centuries to pump water, mill grain, and power
ships. It is now being promoted as a non-polluting, renewable sources of electri
cal power. High-eﬃciency wind turbines are already being used to produce elec
tricity for commercial distribution. Currently, the installed wind power capacity
throughout the world exceeds ten gigawatts, and its use is growing by about 30%

  
Over the next hundred years the world’s commercial energy system will be
replaced at least twice, given the projected useful lives of power plants and
energy grids. That turnover in energy infrastructure, combined with
replacement of existing industrial, commercial, and residential facilities, will
present opportunities for a gradual transition to sustainable, low-emission
energy systems. The question, in terms of climate change mitigation, is whether
that transition will take place soon enough to avert dangerous interference with
the climate system.
per year. In windy areas, the cost of electricity produced in wind power stations is
competitive with new power plants that use fossil fuels. Small wind turbines
designed for small-scale residential and commercial use are attractive options for
remote rural areas. The electricity can be stored on-site in batteries (for very small
systems) or through compressed air storage for large applications. In areas when
there is an existing electricity grid, the electricity can be fed directly into the com
mercial distribution system.
Solar panels collect the sun’s energy and convert it directly into electricity by
means of photovoltaic cells. As with wind power, the electricity produced can be
stored in batteries and used in small-scale stand-alone power systems. Although
using solar panels to produce electricity is still expensive, it is the least cost choice
in certain niche applications. The photovoltaic market is currently 200 megawatts
per year, and is expected to grow by about 30% per year. Solar panels are most often
used in remote areas not reached by existing electrical transmission systems. They
can also be connected to the commercial power utility, providing needed energy
at peak demand times and avoiding the costs—and emissions—of new central
power stations. Building-integrated applications of photovoltaic technologies
reduce costs by incorporating the solar panels into the structure and surfaces of
homes and oﬃces. Another form of solar energy technology concentrates the sun’s
rays onto receivers using mirrors or special lenses. The collected solar thermal
energy is then used to heat a liquid that drives a conventional electric power con
version system.
Geothermal energy stored in the earth’s crust can be used to heat buildings
directly and to generate electricity. The heat is partially released by the radioactive
decay of elements such as uranium and potassium. In areas where molten rock is
located near the earth’s surface, hydrothermal reservoirs have been discovered
ﬁlled with hot water. These reservoirs can be tapped to power electricity genera
tors for commercial energy production or to provide space heating.
These types of cleaner technologies can provide environmentally sustainable
sources of power. As new investments are made in energy infrastructure, needs for
environmental protection and economic development can be met simultaneously
through the adoption of these new and renewable energy technologies. Over the
next hundred years the world’s commercial energy system will be replaced at least
twice, given the projected useful lives of power plants and energy grids. That
turnover in energy infrastructure, combined with replacement of existing indus
trial, commercial, and residential facilities, will present opportunities for a grad
ual transition to sustainable, low-emission energy systems. The question, in terms
of climate change mitigation, is whether that transition will take place soon
enough to avert dangerous interference with the climate system.
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Are there alternative ways to use fossil fuels
that can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

In some cases it is possible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by switching to
low-carbon fossil fuels like natural gas. Natural gas produces slightly more than
half the carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy produced by burning coal. It
is currently being adopted as a low-cost, low-emission fuel choice for new electric
power plants. In a compressed form it can be used as an alternative fuel for motor
vehicles.
There are also techniques for using fossil fuels in less polluting ways. One exam
ple is the production of syngas, a clean gaseous mixture consisting mainly of
carbon monoxide and hydrogen, which can be made from natural gas, coal, heavy
oils, petroleum coke, and a number of other substances. Syngas can be used to pro
duce electricity and heat, as well as alternative gas and liquid fuels, with low levels
of pollution. With further processing, syngas can become a source of hydrogen for
use in fuel cells.
Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that convert fuels like hydrogen and nat
ural gas into electricity directly, without any combustion, by combining the fuels
with oxygen from the air; consequently they produce almost no emissions, except
water. In the future, besides being used to power nonpolluting electric drive vehi
cles, they might also be used for central and decentralized electricity production.
Since emissions from motor vehicles represent a large percentage of overall carbon
dioxide emissions, commercialization of fuel cell vehicles would have a dramatic
impact on greenhouse gas accumulations, and on urban air quality.
As fuel cells systems become more widely available, hydrogen could become the
preferred fuel for transportation and electricity production. Hydrogen can be pro
duced through steam processing of natural gas or syngas, through gasiﬁcation of
coal or other carbon-based feedstocks and through electrolysis of water. Process
ing fossil fuels to produce hydrogen is currently the least expensive technique, one
which could provide a way to use familiar fuels in new, low-emission technologies
without signiﬁcantly increasing energy costs.
How can developing countries meet increasing demands for energy services to fuel
economic and social progress while limiting climate change impacts?

Energy eﬃciency eﬀorts and investments in renewable energy technologies are
essential for establishing sustainable energy systems both in developing countries
and in industrialized nations. But there are considerable economic and social dis
parities between the richer, high-consuming nations and the poorest ones. Devel
oping countries require greater availability of energy services that can be used for
household needs and productive purposes, which will lead to increased use of
energy.
Rather than focusing on increasing overall energy supplies, developing coun
tries would be better served by using integrated resource techniques to identify the
lowest-cost and most eﬃcient options for achieving their energy goals. This con
cept involves undertaking comparisons of various energy supply technologies,
such as conventional coal-powered plants, wind turbines, hydroelectric genera
tors facilities, and photovoltaic installations, while also considering installation of
end-use technologies that reduce energy demand levels, like compact ﬂuorescent
light bulbs and increased insulation. After evaluating all the potential options, the
lowest-cost mix of technologies can be identiﬁed and adopted as investment pri

  
orities. In many cases, the technologies that seem to be the cheapest and easiest in
the short-term turn out not to be the most cost-eﬀective or eﬃcient from a slightly
longer term perspective, especially when their social, environmental, and health
costs are also considered.
Investments in new production and distribution facilities that emphasize
energy eﬃciency can dramatically reduce energy requirements in comparison with
conventional power plants and manufacturing operations. The additional costs
attributable to the introduction of these energy-eﬃcient technologies will gener
ally be oﬀset by reductions in the price of energy. Because traditional sources of
energy are used so ineﬃciently, and because countries constructing modern facili
ties have the opportunity to utilize new energy-eﬃcient technologies and equip
ment, they can achieve substantial improvements in living standards without sig
niﬁcantly increasing per capita energy use over current levels. Following this path,
developing countries could pursue their economic and social development goals
without substantially increasing their energy consumption or emissions levels.
Most of the two billion people who lack modern energy services live in rural
areas in developing countries. Projected capital costs for extending conventional
electric power grids into these areas are prohibitively expensive, so their prospects
for obtaining grid-based electrical service in the near future are not encouraging.
Decentralized renewable energy systems, however, could provide electrical power
to these remote areas more quickly and less expensively—without producing
greenhouse gas emissions. Introduction of these systems could promote employ
ment and educational opportunities in rural areas, as well as improved access to
health care, clean water, and sanitation facilities.
Renewable energy systems using wind, solar, biomass, and small-scale hydro
electric power are particularly easily adapted for rural electriﬁcation purposes.
Rural consumers relying on ineﬃcient use of fossil fuels like kerosene and diesel
are often already paying high energy prices and would be better served at lower
cost by modern renewable technologies, if these became available to them. Others,
particularly women, who must now spend long hours gathering and using tradi
tional fuels, could gain both time and electrical power that could be applied to
other productive purposes.
What barriers are there to the adoption of sustainable energy technologies?

Primary obstacles to the wider application of energy eﬃciency measures and
installation of renewable energy systems include: low commodity market prices
for fossil fuels; government subsidies that support conventional fossil fuel tech
nologies; energy prices that do not incorporate environmental and social costs;
discrimination in capital markets against small-scale energy and energy-eﬃciency
projects; and general lack of information about new designs for low-emission and
renewable energy systems. In addition, there are formidable economic and insti
tutional forces opposed to a transition in world energy markets away from con
tinuing reliance on fossil fuel technologies.
Current national and international debates about the prospective hazards of
climate change have, to some extent, raised public awareness concerning the need
to alter energy production and consumption patterns. But there is not yet any gen
eral consensus about the impacts of climate change and the need for concerted
mitigation eﬀorts. Much more public education is needed regarding low-emission
energy alternatives.
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Existing subsidies for fossil fuel technologies make it very diﬃcult for alterna
tive energy products to enter markets or achieve competitive positions. World
wide, these subsidies amount to some 200 billion U.S. dollars per year and actu
ally encourage wasteful consumption by failing to pass on to users the real market
costs of providing the energy fuel. Direct government subsidies often take the
form of payments designed to hold down consumer energy prices. On the pro
duction side, subsidies frequently provide incentives and support for fossil fuel
exploration and processing. Although intended to enhance the availability and
aﬀordability of energy services, these subsidies limit energy choices by favoring
existing fossil fuel energy systems and suppliers.
Additional indirect subsidies are granted to conventional energy providers in
the form of tax credits and exemptions, depreciation allowances, preferential
loans and guarantees, and procurement preferences. Public ﬁnancing of conven
tional utilities by means of tax exempt bonds and low interest loans means that
potential competitors seeking to introduce competing renewable energy systems
will have to pay much higher amounts for needed capital. Many countries also
grant monopolies to national utilities, thereby removing the possibility of any real
energy market competition. Restructuring of energy markets to introduce com
petition can reduce costs but, without accompanying regulatory measures, can
also make it less likely that energy suppliers will support public beneﬁts.
Even without the artiﬁcial minimization of prices provided by government
subsidies, fossil fuel prices are already unrealistically low because they do not
include all of the costs associated with their production and use. Environmental
and public health costs are externalized, that is, paid for by society as a whole
rather charged to the producers, vendors, or consumers of fossil fuels. These costs
include public health and cleanup expenditures attributable to air pollution and
water contamination, the eﬀects of acid rain, damages to land and ecosystems due
to fossil fuel extraction and distribution and, of course, the impacts and mitiga
tion costs related to climate change. Unless damages to the environment are
charged back to responsible parties, market-pricing mechanisms will encourage
destruction of resources rather than conservation.
Widespread dissemination of information about the advantages of energy
eﬃciency and alternative energy technologies is needed in order to build aware
ness and conﬁdence among investors, lenders, governments, and consumers. Too
often, ignorance about energy eﬃciency and renewable energy technologies keeps
them from receiving serious consideration in energy planning processes.
What sorts of policies would create an enabling framework
to promote environmentally sustainable energy systems?

Governments can set the overall framework for economic activity, but clearly sus
tainable energy development cannot be accomplished by governments alone. For
the most part, governments are moving away from acting as direct providers of
energy services. Instead, many are taking steps to establish more eﬃcient and envi
ronmentally sustainable energy markets. In general, this will require the breakup
of monopolies and promotion of competitive markets. Since private capital will
be required, maintenance of stable investment, banking, and legal institutions will
become a fundamental priority in order to attract lenders and investors. New
incentives for investments and entrepreneurial ventures will also be needed to
promote environmentally friendly products and services.

  
One of the most important things that governments can do is to help create a
level playing ﬁeld for competing energy technologies. As a ﬁrst step, this will
require elimination, or redirection, of subsidies for conventional fossil fuel tech
nologies. Energy price subsidies are generally designed to help low-income house
holds, but often the intended beneﬁciaries receive only a small portion of the total
subsidy amount, while other consumers who could aﬀord to pay more obtain the
largest share of the government beneﬁt. More carefully targeted measures could
provide the desired support to poorer families without distorting the entire energy
market. Temporary subsidies for energy eﬃciency measures and installation of
alternative energy systems could also help establish competitive opportunities to
attract new market entrants.
Another important step in leveling the playing ﬁeld for energy technologies
will be to set up mechanisms for taking into account the environmental and social
costs attached to the use of fossil fuels. These external costs can be charged back to
One of the most important things that governments can do is to help create a
level playing ﬁeld for competing energy technologies. As a ﬁrst step, this will
require elimination, or redirection, of subsidies for conventional fossil fuel tech
nologies.
those who enjoy the proﬁts and beneﬁts of the energy use through carbon emis
sion taxes, usage fees, or ﬁnes for damages. Resulting revenues could be used to
support more environmentally sustainable enterprises. Governments can also
adopt regulations limiting environmentally harmful activities, including green
house gas emissions, thereby pressuring energy companies to develop and market
new alternatives. Other alternatives for government interventions include tax
incentives, collaborative research and development ventures, and green labeling
schemes.
Government subsidies, supports, and procurement preferences can help open
markets for new technologies and build public awareness of their environmental
and economic beneﬁts. Direct government support may be needed to demon
strate the advantages of some new energy technologies. In order to move beyond
demonstration projects, however, there will have to be established marketing, dis
tribution and service networks for new energy products. Restructuring energy
industries is one strategy for introducing competition and decentralization in the
energy market. With proper regulations and policies that support investment and
competition, governments can promote economic eﬃciency and diversiﬁcation
in the energy sector while also encouraging sustainable development and address
ing the needs of disadvantaged groups. Market reforms can be accompanied by
such measures as environmental performance requirements for energy equip
ment, green certiﬁcate markets or renewable portfolio standards mandating that
a speciﬁed percentage of energy be produced using renewable sources, and
requirements that energy grids be open for inputs from independent power pro
ducers.
One option for promoting energy eﬃciency is through the creation of energy
service companies. These companies introduce eﬃciency measures designed to
reduce energy usage in commercial and residential buildings, and are paid out of
the cost savings they are able to achieve. Customers continue to pay regular utility
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bills, and the energy service company ﬁnances its operations by being able to engi
neer energy savings. After the energy service company has completed its work, cus
tomers will enjoy lower utility bills, and the building will produce lower emissions.
Appropriate ﬁnancing mechanisms for alternative energy producers and con
sumers are critical. In rural areas, micro-credit ﬁnancing for renewable energy sys
tems can help provide access to energy services for currently unserved users who
cannot aﬀord high initial capital costs, but can aﬀord monthly fees similar to a reg
ular utility bill. In some cases, poor households are paying high costs for small
amounts of ineﬃcient energy services based on the use of kerosene, candles, fuel
wood, or diesel generators. Although they might not be able to pay up-front for
solar panels or a wind generator, many probably could aﬀord to pay for them over
time if credit facilities were available. By facilitating the organization of invest
ment pools designed to provide small loans for small-scale electriﬁcation projects,
governments could contribute to the widespread dissemination of low-emission
energy technologies and also promote employment, education, and public health.
What framework does the Kyoto Protocol provide for
international agreement on reducing the threats of climate change?

The Kyoto Protocol established plans for industrialized countries to reduce green
house gas emissions by agreeing to adopt legally binding emission targets which
are to be met in the period extending from 2008 to 2010. Overall, the industrial
ized countries committed to a reduction of their combined emissions by approx
imately 5% from 1990 levels. The speciﬁc targets vary, however, from country to
country. The reduction target for the United States is 7% below 1990 levels, and
Japan’s target is 6%. The European Union has a general target of 8% below 1990
levels, but that is averaged among the group members so that some of the poorer
members will actually be allowed to increase their emissions while others will be
required to make substantially greater reductions. Russia’s target is stabilization of
emissions at its 1990 level. The Protocol will enter into force when it is ratiﬁed by
55 countries, including countries responsible for at least 55% of the total 1990
carbon dioxide emissions from the industrialized country group.
The Protocol contains legally binding commitments only for the industrialized
countries. Under the 1992 Climate Change Convention, developing countries
agreed to facilitate emission reductions. Many are already actively promoting
energy eﬃciency and renewable energy technologies, but they did not commit to
speciﬁc reduction targets.
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions for a “Clean Development Mecha
nism,” which is intended to assist non-industrialized countries in achieving sus
tainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Con
vention on Climate Change, while assisting industrialized countries in achieving
compliance with their quantiﬁed emissions limitations and reduction commit
ments under the Convention. The mechanism will permit industrialized countries
to ﬁnance emission-reduction projects in developing countries as a means of
meeting their obligations under the Protocol. Developing countries could beneﬁt
by receiving ﬁnancing for the adoption of low-emission energy technologies,
while industrialized countries could fulﬁll their emission reduction commitments
at a lower cost.
It is often less costly to achieve emission reductions in areas where new power
supply systems are being constructed, before energy-using infrastructures are

  
established, rather than trying to limit emissions from existing facilities. Thus,
developing countries could potentially obtain substantial investments in energy
technologies that would promote their own national development programs and
at the same time assist industrialized countries in pursuing low-cost climate
change mitigation measures. Although the details of the Clean Development
Mechanism remain to be worked out, it holds out the promise of mutually sup
portive international cooperation in addressing both the sustainable development
and climate change challenges.
Conclusion

Energy is fundamental for socioeconomic growth, but current patterns of energy
production, distribution and use do not support the sustainable development
goals of environmental protection and social equity. Making a transition to new
models for energy markets throughout the world is an enormous undertaking,
requiring complex, long-term strategies that engage consumers and producers as
well as governments. It is an attainable goal, however, to reconcile economic
growth with wider access to reliable and aﬀordable energy supplies and with
reduced environmental harm.
Through international cooperation, and through adoption of appropriate poli
cies and economic frameworks, governments can promote energy eﬃciency, use of
renewables, and cleaner conventional fuel technologies. Perhaps the most impor
tant impact of these measures would be to allow countries that are not yet indus
trialized to follow cleaner routes to development—routes that provide the energy
services needed for improved health care, education, livelihoods, clean water, trans
portation, and communications, while limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
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Abstract
Food security in the twenty-first century has three major components: the availabil
ity of food on the market; adequate purchasing power to acquire food; and human
ability to digest and absorb nutrients. As we enter the new millennium, the global
population continues to grow and apprehensions arise about a potential imbalance
between human numbers and food needs – especially in largely populous countries
such as India and China.
Added to the concern over population growth trends is the possible impact of cli
mate change on agriculture. Global models predict that the overall impact in this par
ticular sector should be minimal.However,regionally, the repercussions are potentially
devastating. South and Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to the climate
change-induced conditions. Climate change will have a direct impact on crop yields
and soil fertility. It will likely also force agricultural migration in many areas.
While industrialised countries are largely responsible for the human-induced
damage to the atmosphere, poor nations and the poor in all nations are those who
will suﬀer the worst consequences.The global community – industrialised and devel
oping countries alike – should work in concert to address the issues of climate change
and its mitigation, and to ensure that all members of the human family have the
opportunity to live productive lives.
Introduction

The concept of food security has been evolving over the last 50 years. Immediately
following World War II, the principal food security concern was increasing food
production to meet the needs of an expanding population. Later, economic access
to food became a matter of concern, since millions were going to bed hungry, not
necessarily because food was not available, but because they did not have adequate
purchasing power to achieve balanced diets. In recent years, the human ability to
absorb and digest food has become an important focus because of poor environ
mental hygiene and unclean drinking water. Thus, today food security has three
major components:
• availability in the market;
• adequate purchasing power;
• absorption facilitated by clean drinking water and environmental hygiene.
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Based on these considerations, the Science Academies Summit held at the M.S.
Swaminathan Research Foundation () in Madras, India in 1996 recom
mended the following deﬁnition of food security:
• that every individual has physical, economic, social, and environmental access
to a balanced diet that includes the necessary macro- and micro-nutrients, safe
drinking water, sanitation, environmental hygiene, primary health care, and
education so as to lead a healthy and productive life.
• that food originates from eﬃcient and environmentally benign production
technologies that conserve and enhance the natural resource base of crops,
animal husbandry, forestry, and inland and marine ﬁsheries.
There is evidence that children with low birth weight are handicapped in brain
development. This may be the cruellest form of inequity, since the new millen
nium is to be the “knowledge millennium” – wherein information, knowledge,
and intellectual property will determine the pace and direction of economic
growth and human wellbeing.

‘About 50% of the deaths of small children are associated with malnutrition’
( 1998). The Food and Agriculture Oﬃce’s () 1996 World Summit set a
target for reducing the number of persons going to bed hungry by half by 2015.
Several experts have expressed doubts as to whether even this extremely modest
target can be achieved. In addition to protein-calorie under-nutrition, the 
estimates that nearly two billion people suﬀer from iron deﬁciency. It has also
determined that deﬁciencies of iodine, vitamin A, and
table 1 share of children under five years of age
other micronutrients are widespread. Such “hidden
who are underweight in select countries
hunger” aﬀects health and productivity. Further, one
country % underweight
country % underweight
third of the children in South Asia and the Sahelian
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66
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33
region of Africa are born with low birth weights, due to
India
64
Tanzania
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nutritional anaemia in pregnant women. There is eviVietnam
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Egypt
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“knowledge millennium”–wherein information,
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knowledge, and intellectual property will determine
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the pace and direction of economic growth and human
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wellbeing.
What has been the Indian experience with hunger
and how does this impact future hunger management?

In 1798 Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Principle of Population, in which
he concluded that poverty and famine were natural outcomes of population
growth, as human populations increase faster than the resources used for subsis
tence can support. About one hundred and ﬁfty years later, in the twenty year
period following the Second World War, India began fulﬁlling Mathus’s predic
tions. The country had suﬀered tragic losses in 1943 when an estimated four mil
lion people starved to death in the Bengal famine, the worst food disaster in
recorded history. Starting in 1947, the newly independent Indian government made


assertive, but largely unsuccessful eﬀorts to assuage star
vation through expansion of farming areas. It was not
until 1968, with the advent of the Green Revolution –
which included continued eﬀorts to expand farm areas,
double-cropping on existing farmlands, and the use of
genetically modiﬁed seeds – that the problem was alle
viated. (The precepts of the Green Revolution were
applied at that time in developing countries around the
world, but India was particularly successful in its imple
mentation.) As we enter the new millennium, however,
the global population continues to grow, and apprehen
sions are arising once again that there may be an imbalance between human num
bers and food needs. The population growth rate in Asia from 1995 to 2000 aver
aged 1.4% per annum ( Population Information Network). There are concerns
that large scale famines in developing countries may require highly populous coun
tries like China and India to resort to extensive food imports (Brown 1995). Some
of the major factors underlying such concerns include:
• a steady decline in per capita availability of irrigation water and arable land as
a result of continuing population growth, as well as the diversion of prime farm
land for non-farm uses;
• increases in food demand to meet the needs of the growing population, which
includes close to 800 million undernourished children, women, and men;
• increases in proportional food demand and higher demand for animal prod
ucts stemming from greater purchasing power and increased urbanisation;
• stagnation or decline in marine ﬁsh production;
• slackening of technological change;
• fatigue of the Green Revolution due to environmental, economic, and social
factors;
• climate change resulting in potential alterations of precipitation, temperature,
and sea level, and possibly of increased ultraviolet-ß radiation.
These factors represent real challenges for both scientists and policymakers and
there is no room for complacency. The Green Revolution, which has saved mil
lions of lives, was made possible through a collaboration of agricultural scientists
from around the world who can legitimately claim credit for converting an atmos
phere of despair to one of hope by transforming the untapped agricultural poten
tial of developing countries into production. Looking back over the past 30 years,
it is clear that organised national and international agricultural research, devoted
to public good and supported largely by public funds and by multilateral and
bilateral donors, can contribute signiﬁcantly to achieving a balance between the
demand and supply of food despite rapid population growth.
Learning from industrialised country practices

The major potential impacts of climate change generally are assumed to include
temperature rise, increased and decreased precipitation, sea level rise, intensiﬁca
tion of ultraviolet-ß radiation, and increased frequency and force of extreme
weather events. While it is undeniable that industrialised countries are responsi
ble for the overwhelming majority of greenhouse gas emissions, developing coun
tries are among those most vulnerable to these eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, developing
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island nations and semiarid regions will bear the burden of the predicted impacts
– regardless of their proportional emissions culpability. As developing economies
continue to grow, the associated demands for increased access to electricity and
transportation that accompany expanding infrastructure will give rise to steep
increases in CO2 emissions.
In 1992, the Climate Change Institute spearheaded a study of eight developing
countries which, together, comprise about 25% of the global population – India,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the PhilipAs developing economies continue to grow, the associated demands for increased
access to electricity and transportation that accompany expanding infrastruc
ture will give rise to steep increases in CO2 emissions.
pines. Funding was provided by the Asian Development Bank and the governments
of Australia, Japan, and Norway. A compelling component of the country studies
was the development of emissions proﬁles.While over half of the greenhouse gasses
emitted from the eight participating countries were attributable to fossil fuels, agri
culture proved to be the largest source for Bangladesh, Sir Lanka, and Vietnam, and
land-use change was the most problematic in Indonesia (Topping 1997).
table 2
country

emissions inventory summary
current
emissions

per capita
emissions

Gg CO2–equivalent

tons/person/yr

Bangladesh
India

51,389–88,048
809,432

0.46–0.78
0.93

Indonesia
Malaysia
Pakistan

708,682
121,367
114,557–128,637

3.7
7.1
0.95–1.1

Philippines

75,196–88,638

1.3–1.5

Sri Lanka
Vietnam

17,677
84,938–112,438

1.0
1.3–1.7

Total

1,941,823–2,033,504 1.1–1.2

comments

Agriculture accounts for about 76% of emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 79%
of emissions.
Land use accounts for 72% of emissions.
Emissions from fossil fuel combustion only.
Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 55%
of emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 45%
of emissions.
Agriculture accounts for about 38% of emissions.
Agriculture accounts for about 44% of emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 52%
of emissions.

Source: Country Study Reports, as cited by Topping, 1997 (Prepared by Gibbs). The Malaysia study only ana
lyzed fossil fuel use.

What is the significance of climate change for food security?

As detailed by Qureshi and Richards in their contribution to the 1997  pub
lication, Impact of Climate Change on Food and Livelihood Security: An Agenda
for Action, the major potential consequences of climate change for agriculture fall
into three categories: direct eﬀects on crop yields, eﬀects on soil fertility, and largescale eﬀects on agricultural zones.
Direct effects on crop yields
• increased soil fertilisation from elevated CO2 levels;
• variation in temperature and water availability to levels beyond optimal for
cultivation of some crops;
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• loss of crops due to elevated force, frequency, and duration of extreme weather
events such as droughts and monsoons;
• increased threat from pests as warmer winters and increased moisture provide
improved breeding conditions.
Effects on soil fertility
While elevated CO2 levels may improve soil fertility to an extent, factors such as
higher temperatures, dramatically altered hydrological cycles, and weather
extremes are likely to outweigh the potential advantages of this eﬀect. In addition,
rising sea levels pose the threat of soil salinisation and possibly cropland erosion.
Large-scale effects on agricultural zones
As temperatures rise and coasts ﬂood, agriculture will be pushed pole-ward and
inland. It has not been conclusively determined whether climate change will actu
ally decrease the amount of cultivatable land because shifts in temperatures and
hydrological patterns may improve potential productivity for some areas. How
ever, agricultural migration may represent competition for land currently being
Given the circumstances, it is also important to promote anticipatory research
for developing technologies and public policies that can help to mitigate the
adverse consequences of droughts and ﬂoods and at the same time maximise the
beneﬁts of favourable temperature and rainfall.
used for cattle, and will most likely have a deleterious eﬀect on natural habitats.
In addition, such shifts would bring about tremendous social and cultural
upheavals.
South and Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change on agriculture. Speciﬁcally, those countries where agriculture is responsi
ble for a signiﬁcant proportion of the Gross Domestic Product () are likely to
feel the consequences.
In most developing countries, the contribution of agriculture to Gross
National Product () is going down, but there is no commensurate drop in the
role of agriculture in providing opportunities for jobs and livelihoods. As such,
much of the onus of providing more food, jobs, and income falls on the farm
sector. Job-led economic growth is the need of the hour. While the challenges are
great, progress in science and technology has opened up uncommon opportuni
ties for a food secure world. Advances in the ﬁelds of biotechnology and informa
tion, space, renewable energy, and management technologies have been spectacu
lar in recent years. At the same time, there is a growing realisation that sustainable
development endeavours must be rooted in the principles of ecology, economics,
gender equity, and ethics. This involves blending traditional technologies and eco
logical prudence with frontier science, leading to the development of eco-tech
nologies. Given the circumstances, it is also important to promote anticipatory
research for developing technologies and public policies that can help to mitigate
the adverse consequences of droughts and ﬂoods and at the same time maximise
the beneﬁts of favourable temperature and rainfall.

table 3

agriculture
as percent of
gdp in selected
countries

country

% of gdp

Bangladesh
India
Vietnam

38
33
42

Source: Qureshi and Hobbie,
1994b (as cited in Qureshi and
Richards 1997)
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What is the role of computer models?

Computer simulation models can provide guidelines for such anticipatory
research. General Circulation Models () have been developed to demon
strate the current global weather system, and to simulate the consequences of
atmospheric alterations – the results of which can then be compared to observed
events and historical trends. In general,  do not have a high degree of accu
racy in predicting changes in precipitation and they are limited when it comes to
extreme weather anomalies. However, there is an overall consensus between 
that rainfall in South Asia will increase in the coming years. In fact, there is agree
ment that doubling of CO2 levels in the atmosphere will result in higher temper
atures, which will give rise to higher humidity and consequently increased pre
cipitation [(Parry 1990), as sited in Qureshi and Richards, 1997].
Extreme rainfall and ﬂooding in Florida and California in 1998 resulted in exten
sive crop-loss as well as in global media attention to the eﬀects of the El Niño South
ern Oscillation () phenomenon in the United States. At the same time, areas
like Indonesia,Australia, South and Central America, and South-eastern Africa were
In the 1980s, El Niño storms caused about $8 billion worth of damage. Subse
quently, at least $800 million has been invested globally in El Niño predictions,
about half of which is attributable to the United States ( 1997).
experiencing uncommonly warm, dry weather.  is a disturbance of the oceanatmosphere system in tropical Paciﬁc Ocean that is sparked by a periodic warming
of the ocean. The consequences of El Niño include droughts, ﬂooding and tempera
ture ﬂuctuations, and can be felt around the globe. It is expected that with atmos
pheric deterioration,  will happen more frequently, and with greater force.
In the 1980s, El Niño storms caused about $8 billion worth of damage. Subse
quently, at least $800 million has been invested globally in El Niño predictions,
about half of which is attributable to the United States ( 1997).
El Niño 1998 was probably the worst of the 20th century. However, it was not
entirely unexpected. Models and satellites were used to forecast the probable
extremes of the weather phenomenon. At that time, it proved diﬃcult to translate
predictions into preventative actions. However, there is now discussion of using
analyses of previous  in conjunction with computer modelling in order to
determine the best damage prevention practices in advance. These include rein
forcing dams and levies in ﬂood-prone areas, ensuring that ﬁre prevention sup
plies are on-hand in areas likely to experience drought, and planting more plants,
or crops that are less susceptible to extreme conditions.
In 1991 Bangladesh was hit by a storm that killed about 138,000 people. Three
years later, a comparable storm hit the same area, and only claimed a few hundred
lives because of a warning system that had been established with support from the
World Meteorological Organisation (Qureshi and Richards 1997).
Computer simulation models of the potential impact of changes in tempera
ture, precipitation, and sea level are now available in many industrialised coun
tries. Data on enhanced ultraviolet-ß radiation on crop and farm animal produc
tivity are also becoming available. The mandate of national and international
agricultural research centres includes attention to the stability of crop and animal
production. Many such centres also hold large ex situ collections of germplasm,


which means that they are in comparatively advantageous positions to help initi
ate anticipatory research for avoiding and mitigating potential adverse changes in
weather and sea level. Several International Agricultural Research Centres
() like the International Rice Research Institute () also have a good deal
of experience studying the relationship between climate and crop yields.
Climate management and sustainable food security:
How can we build on the Indian experience?

In 1979 there was a severe drought in India. The reaction of the government of
India was to develop a detailed strategy for monsoon management. The three
major components of this strategy follow:
First, in each district, the government established a Crop/Weather Watch
Group that consisted of climatologists, agricultural scientists, representatives of
farmers’ and women’s organisations, concerned oﬃcers of government, represen
tatives of ﬁnancial institutions, and members of the media. The tasks to be
addressed by each group included monitoring monsoon progression, developing
contingency plans and alternative cropping strategies to suit diﬀerent weather
probabilities, building seed reserves of alternate crops, and intensifying eﬀorts in
the area of water harvesting and minor irrigation. The aim was to maximise the
beneﬁcial impact of a good monsoon on agricultural productivity while min
imising the adverse impact of aberrant rainfall through eﬃcient water saving and
use, crop life-saving practices, and contingency land use plans.
Second, the most favourable areas () were demarcated in each district,
with the idea of intensifying agricultural production through appropriate public
policies and investment, particularly using minor irrigation and water manage
ment.  were those areas where the moisture retention capacity of the soil was
high and where irrigation facilities were either available or could be created. Com
pensatory production programmes were designed to oﬀset, to the extent possible,
crop losses in the drought or ﬂood aﬀected areas.
Third, strategies were developed for introducing eﬀective relief and rehabilita
tion measures in the areas most seriously aﬀected () either by drought or
ﬂoods. In chronically drought prone areas, such measures included earmarking
community land for establishing cattle camps to save the lives of farm animals,
In 1991 Bangladesh was hit by a storm that killed about 138,000 people. Three
years later, a comparable storm hit the same area, and only claimed a few hun
dred lives because of a warning system that had been established with support
from the World Meteorological Organisation (Qureshi and Richards 1997).
and identifying aquifers which could be conserved as “ground water sanctuaries”
to be tapped for drinking water supply only when absolutely essential.
The above three-pronged strategy has helped to minimise both human suﬀering
and crop losses when monsoon behaviour has been abnormal and resulted in
drought or ﬂoods. Also introduced in 1979 was a Rural Godown Scheme, which was
designed to promote the decentralised storage of harvested produce in order to pre
vent distress sales by farmers when the harvest is good and panic purchase by con
sumers when crop losses are high.This strategy is especially important today, because
globally, hunger is a result of inadequate purchasing power rather than food scarcity.
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What is and should be done in anticipation
of the impact of climate change on food security?

The need for micro-level understanding and management of temperature and
precipitation is evident from the fact that although rainfall may often be normal
in national terms, total food grain production may go down due to climatic vari
ations at the local level. Micro-level management promotes the use of precision
farming techniques, which involves speciﬁc, plant-scale agronomy rather than
area-based methodologies. Plant-scale agronomy is knowledge and informationintensive, and it aﬀords opportunities for making farming intellectually stimulat
ing, in addition to being economically rewarding. These methods will be very
helpful in facing the challenges arising from climate change in that they are
designed to anticipate and adjust to localised ambient changes as they occur, and
do not require activity that originates at the national scale.
Thanks to rapid progress in genome mapping and molecular breeding, we can
now design crops to suit diﬀerent growing conditions. The M.S. Swaminathan
Research Foundation has established a Genetic Resources Centre for Adaptation
to Sea Level Rise in a mangrove forest near Chidambaram in Tamil Nadu, India.
The Centre is focussed on assembling a gene pool for the purpose of breeding crop
varieties that are tolerant to seawater intrusion. This sort of designer crop devel
opment should receive high priority in meeting the challenge of climate change.
Genetic research shows great promise for both agricultural productivity and
nutritional improvement. For example:
• In the United States there have been successful ﬁeld trials of transgenic cotton
– altered to carry the bacterium Bascillus thuringiensis (Bt), which is lethal to
certain insect pests. This method of pest control is proving to be relatively suc
cessful without the deleterious side eﬀects of insecticide sprays.
• According to , one third of the global population depends on rice for more
than half of their staple diet. The fact that the milling process for most of the
rice being consumed removes beta-carotene, a precursor to vitamin A, with the
hull is therefore something to be seriously considered. In January 2000, a group
of European scientists announced that they had begun to address this problem
by genetically modifying rice to carry beta-carotene in its endosperm.
• The Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (), which
is a project of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(), has also been conducting regional research around the world in an
eﬀort to develop wheat and corn seeds that are more resistant to the elements;
diseases; and extreme ﬂuctuations in weather, such as prolonged droughts.
It is likely that genetically modiﬁed crops will be widely grown in the coming
decades in both developed and developing countries. It would therefore be useful
to organise an international network for fostering anticipatory research to meet
the potential impact of climate change on food security. This network would be
serviced by a co-ordinating unit, which would advise on priorities for screening
germplasm for tolerance to climatic changes. Genotypes, which can be used in
breeding strains for tolerance to heat, coastal salinity, ﬂoods, etc, can then be iden
tiﬁed.
 has already established a facilitating entity for International Agricul
tural Research Centres (), interested National Agricultural Research Sys
tems (), called the / Training Group (). This group has


existed since 1991 (formerly known as the Inter-Center Training Group), with the
purpose of strengthening agricultural research and research management train
ing. Using  as a foundation, an international network, comprised of ,
, and advanced research institutes, could be established within the 
system, and serviced by a co-ordinating unit. This action would be an important
step in helping  to optimise the beneﬁts of favourable growing conditions
and to minimise the adverse impact of unfavourable climatic changes. The cost of
servicing the network could be kept low through electronic information linkages
with appropriate advanced research institutions and meteorological departments.
The Co-ordinating Centre could also advise  on the progress being made
in short and medium term weather forecasting, and on the implications for sci
entiﬁc management of farming systems. Weather forecasting is an area where con
siderable progress is being made, and  should take the lead in developing
strategies to enhance the stability of crop production based on the eﬀective use of
weather forecasts. In this way, a small initiative in this area could provide multiple
beneﬁts towards achieving the goal of coupling productivity advance with pro
duction stability.
In addition to tapping frontier science such as genetic engineering, there is an
equal need to preserve and use traditional wisdom. For example, the traditional
water harvesting and saving techniques adopted in the past in India were very
eﬀective in insulating human and animal populations from acute water scarcity.
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain (1996) point out that in the desert region of
Jaisalmer in India, there is an annual rainfall of 100 mm, but there is enough drink
ing water for the people even in severe drought years because of their habit of stor
ing water in traditional rainwater harvesting structures called Kunds. In contrast,
Cherrapunji, a village in north-eastern India, has an average annual rainfall of
15,000 mm and suﬀers from water shortages during summer months because the
surrounding forests have been denuded and the local population has no tradition
of water harvesting and conservation.

Local Action: Governments should sponsor the training of at least one male
and one female volunteer in every village in the science and art of climate
management. These trained villagers could be designated “Climate Man
agers.” Wherever possible, an appropriate technical institution should pro
vide such village-level Climate Managers with information derived from
computer simulation models, so as to help them to be prepared to handle
both adequate and aberrant rainfall.

Conclusion

While industrialised countries are largely responsible for the present situation
where human activities are beginning to inﬂuence climate, poor nations and the
poor in all nations are the ones who will suﬀer the most.
Balanced diet and safe drinking water are the ﬁrst among the hierarchical needs
of human beings. In the past, food production was described as a “gamble in rain
fall”in many countries. Today, we are in the fortunate position of being able to har
ness new scientiﬁc tools to minimise the “gamble” component of agriculture. A
marriage between modern science and traditional wisdom will help to ensure that
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food security is sustained under varying climatic scenarios. The impact of climate
change on agriculture is likely to be harder on tropical countries than on nations
in temperate zones, and, as such, will likely increase the nutritional disparity
between developed and developing countries.
Successful strategies to address climate change must involve the eﬀorts of both
developed and developing countries. Both avoidance and mitigation strategies
should be developed at the local, national, regional, and global levels, in order to
lay the foundation for a common happy future.
Developing countries should formulate nationally designed and accepted plans
for achieving a balance between carbon emissions and absorption. Eﬀective action
at home and emphasis abroad on a “polluter pays” principle should be the twopronged strategy of developing nations in dealing with climate change issues. Pre
vention of deforestation and promotion of greening will help to increase carbon
sequestration.
The global community should work in a concerted manner to avoid large
human-induced changes in climate and to address the consequences already being
felt. The international community and national governments must make every
eﬀort to ensure that all members of the human family have an opportunity for
productive and healthy lives.
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Health and climate change
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Abstract
Climate restricts the range of infectious diseases, while weather aﬀects the timing
and intensity of outbreaks. The ranges of several key disease vectors are expanding
in conjunction with shifting plant communities and retreating alpine glaciers. In
addition, extreme weather events often create conditions conducive to outbreaks of
infectious diseases: heavy rains producing insect breeding sites, driving rodents from
burrows and contaminating clean water systems. Conversely, drought can spread
fungal spores and spark fires. The 1997-98 El Niño-related extreme weather events
spawned “clusters” of disease outbreaks in many regions of the globe. Advances in
climate forecasting and health early warning systems can form the bases for timely,
public health interventions. If climate change continues to be associated with more
frequent and intense El Niño events and the accompanying volatile and severe
weather incidents, we will begin to see the profound consequences climate change
can have for public health and the international economy.
Introduction to global warming: Altering the hydrological cycle

Three aspects of climate change are most important in determining the health
impacts: 1) the overall warming trend; 2) the disproportionate warming during
the nighttime and winters; and 3) the increase in extreme and severe weather. This
paper begins with some of the essential ﬁndings related to the water cycle. This is
fundamental to the discussion of the impact of global warming on human health,
as changes in water and heat distribution can be used to help assess shifts in the
ranges of diseases and the growing intensity of disease outbreaks associated with
a changing climate.
Many regions of the globe are experiencing an increase in severe weather. Some
areas have been aﬀected by prolonged droughts,while others suﬀer from intense rains
and ﬂooding. Hot and humid days are increasing in Northern and Austral summers.
Data from the U.S. National Climatic Data Center demonstrate that in the United
States and most other parts of the world, dry spells and heat waves have become
longer over this century, as global warming dries out soils. At the same time, sudden
downpours and ﬂashﬂoods have also increased over the past century. The question
is, is this due to natural variability, or have we begun to alter the Earth’s climate?
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A comparison of the data on warming, humidity levels and extreme weather
events and the model projections of how the Earth’s heat budget will be aﬀected
by the build-up of greenhouse gases () in the lower atmosphere (e.g., tro
posphere, extending to about 10 kilometers above the Earth’s surface) yields some
interesting corroborations.1 Computer models project that with a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 the hydrological cycle (average residence time of water vapor in
the troposphere) will increase by 7 to 15%. Data indicates that the hydrological
cycle has increased globally. Between 1973 and 1993 it increased 10% over the con
tinental United States.2
Three other “ﬁngerprint” studies indicate that atmospheric accumulation of
 from burning fossil fuels is responsible:3
• Computer models project that ghg build-up will produce the most pronounced
warming in the mid-atmosphere, three to five kilometers above Earth’s surface.

Data indicates that greater warming is occurring at that elevation and in moun
tainous regions —above the layer of sulfur-enriched clouds.
These clouds can produce localized, ground level cooling by blocking incom
ing radiation and by producing rain.
• Models driven by ghg-forcing forecast greater warming during the nighttime and
winters (minimum temperatures or tmins) than during the daytime or summer.

Data from weather stations around the globe indicate that since 1950 tmins have
risen twice as fast as daytime maximums—1.86˚ every 100 years vs. 0.88˚ every
100 years. New nighttime warming records were reached in Dallas, Texas and else
where, in the summer of 1998. Spring is also coming one to two weeks earlier in the
Northern Hemisphere.
Daytime and nighttime temperatures are not changing in tandem, as would
occur with natural variability.
• Models project greater variability in weather patterns and more extreme weather
events as heat builds up in the climate system.

Data demonstrates that there are more prolonged droughts and more heavy rain
events (over 2 inches per day), leading to more ﬂashﬂoods.
This variability—as demonstrated by greater swings in weather—may reﬂect
growing instability and overshoots of feedback mechanisms that stabilize the
climate system.
How might these ﬁndings be explained?
Are the oceans warming?

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), sea sur
face temperatures have risen during this century. This century, sea surface tem
peratures have risen, according to the . However, warming has also been
detected deep in the Atlantic, Paciﬁc, and Indian Oceans, and around both poles.
The oceans may turn out to be the long-term repository of this century’s global
warming.
A warmer atmosphere can hold more water (6% more for each 1˚ of warm
ing), and 85% of evaporation comes from the oceans—the remainder from plants
and soils. In general, high clouds warm, while low clouds cool. However, overall,
the increased water vapor traps more heat (an enhancing feedback mechanism)
and produces more humidity (“mugginess”) and cloudiness. And more atmos
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pheric water vapor and clouds produce more intense and heavy “tropical-like”
drenching rains when the atmosphere does cool enough to cause condensation.
Increased cloudiness also blocks the escape of heat (outgoing long-wave radia
tion) at night, contributing to warmer nighttime temperatures.
How are El Niño events related to global warming?

Rule of thumb: Temperature, pressure, wind, weather
As air warms over heated land surfaces it rises, and atmospheric pressure is low
ered. Greater temperatures produce greater gradients in pressure. Thus, lowered
pressures draw in winds, which bring in weather systems, such as tornadoes.
Meanwhile, warmer ocean surfaces fuel more intense tropical storms such as hur
ricanes in the Americas, typhoons in the Far East, and cyclones in the Indian
Ocean.
In other words, there may be warming below us in the oceans and above us in
the mid-atmosphere, while on the planet’s surface we are experiencing the
increased heat as unusual, severe, and unstable weather. Extreme weather events
may be the most profound—and most costly—manifestation of climate change.
The frequency and intensity of El Niño
The Southern Oscillation phenomenon, or El Niño, happens when the Western
Paciﬁc Warm Pool shifts eastward towards the Americas, disrupting “normal’
weather patterns. Records that have been kept since 1877 indicate that El Niño
events have become more frequent and more severe since the mid-1970s. Once
occurring every 4.2 years on average, El Niño conditions have been present for half
of the years since 1976.4 Was there a “regime shift,” as sea level pressures, coral
records, and marine life range changes along California would suggest?
More and larger El Niño events, and the associated severe weather, could also
be due to ocean warming. La Niña events, when cooler water surfaces in the east
ern Paciﬁc, often follow El Niños. El Niño is a natural climatic mode. However,
The oceans may turn out to be the long-term repository of this century’s global
warming.
heat absorption by the world’s oceans from burning fossil fuels and felling forests
may be altering this natural mode and aﬀecting heat and weather distribution
across the planet. Given the impact of warm seawaters on the jet stream, that
upper-atmosphere current of air is also changing its pattern. Thus, some areas of
the globe experience intense droughts, heat waves, and ﬁres, while others are del
uged.
No one yet knows whether the recent harsh El Niños indicate that global warm
ing may continue to increase and intensify this phenomenon, but temperature
data indicates that the upward trend in warming is associated with more intense
spikes over the past twenty years. Records from earlier in the 20th century suggest
that the warming trends may be associated with increasing variability. Addition
ally, ice core records near the end of the last Ice Age indicate that periods of
increased variability and instability may precede “rapid climate change events.”
Thus, wide swings in weather patterns may become the norm, as sea surfaces and
deeper waters continue to absorb and circulate the heat accumulating in the tro

4 clivar.“A Study of Climate
Variability and Predictability,”
World Climate Research Program. wmo, Geneva (1992).
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posphere. At the same time, abrupt changes in climate—hopefully small enough
to provide a warning and without widespread disruption—may be in store.
What are the health impacts of global warming?

5 World Health Organization.
The World Health Report 1996:
Fighting Disease, Fostering
Development. World Health
Organization. Geneva, Switzer
land (1996).
6 Pan American Health Orga
nization: http://www.paho.org/
7 Ibid.

8 Howard W. French “Wide Epi
demic of Meningitis Fatal to
10,000 in West Africa,” New
York Times 8 May 1996.

Global warming may have grave consequences for the future control of disease. In
the coming decades, in combination with other environmental and social pres
sures, the current world-wide warming trend is likely to increase the exposure of
millions of people to new diseases and health risks. There are indications that this
disturbing change has already begun.
Infectious diseases are currently emerging, resurging, and undergoing redistri
bution on a global scale. In fact, according to a 1996 World Health Organization
()5 report, at least 30 infectious diseases new to medicine have emerged in the
past 20 years. Diseases that are transmitted person-to-person, like diphtheria and
whooping cough, have resurged in many countries where social structures have
deteriorated. Dengue, or breakbone fever, which had essentially disappeared in the
Western Hemisphere, has now reappeared in the Americas, infecting over 200,000
people in 1995.6 Also in 1995, the largest epidemic of yellow fever in the Americas
since 1950 struck Peru.7
Biological changes in organisms, under-funded public health systems, and
social inequities are all contributing to the emergence of infectious diseases. How
ever, environmental changes, including global warming and greater weather
volatility, are playing signiﬁcant roles in this global disease resurgence as well. For
example, diseases involving pest species as vectors (carriers) respond most readily
to environmental change. Other illnesses, like the measles and inﬂuenza, are trans
mitted person-to-person and may be most aﬀected by social conditions and
crowding. However, meningitis epidemics are associated with severe drought con
ditions, which apparently dry out mucus membranes, making them vulnerable to
penetration by colonizing organisms. In fact, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 1995-96
outbreak was among the largest ever recorded; over 100,000 people contracted the
disease and 10,000 died.8
Another exceptional trend is that some infectious diseases are emerging for the
ﬁrst time in developed nations. Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) and
Lyme disease ﬁrst appeared in the United States. Toxic E. coli 0157 has been a par
ticular problem in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Large outbreaks of foodborne illness tend to increase in the summer. Many water-borne diseases accom
pany heavy rains and ﬂooding.
The implications of the impacts to humans are enormous. As with most risks
to human health, children and the elderly, and particularly the poor, are most vul
nerable. From the international policy perspective, the resurgence and spread of
diseases could aﬀect trade, travel, and tourism, and strain already fragile NorthSouth relationships. There have been periods of uncontrollable waves of disease
that radically altered human civilization in the past, such as when Europe’s popu
lation was devastated by bubonic plague in the Middle Ages. That problem was
associated with population growth and urbanization. Now a rapidly warming cli
mate, compounded by widespread ecological changes, may be stimulating widescale change in disease patterns.
Healthy ecosystems, with preserved predator/prey ratios, provide the natural
biological controls over infectious diseases and their carriers. Owls, coyotes, and
snakes, for example, help regulate populations of rodents. Some rodents are
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figure 1: predicting
disease outbreaks
The map shows regions of
heavy rainfall and drought
during 1997–98 and the associ
ated clustering of outbreaks of
emerging infectious diseases.
Extreme weather events have
resulted in a surge in epi
demics, particularly in tropical
regions. Using climate data to
predict the arrival of conditions
that are likely to favor disease
outbreaks can facilitate public
health interventions, such as
vaccination and preparations
and treatment facilities.

involved in the transmission of Lyme disease, hantaviruses, arenaviruses (hemor
rhagic fevers), leptospirosis, and human plague. Likewise, freshwater ﬁsh, birds,
reptiles, and bats limit the abundance of mosquitoes—some which may carry
malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, and encephalitis. Land-use changes and over
use of pesticides can alter these ratios. Augmented climate variability can also alter
the functional balance among predators and prey, which is important for control
ling the proliferation of pests and pathogens.
Warmer temperatures and vector-borne disease
Changing social conditions, such as the growth of “mega-cities,” and widespread
ecological change, are contributing to the spread of infectious diseases. However,
climate restricts the range in which vector-borne diseases () can occur, and
weather aﬀects the timing and intensity of their outbreaks. Rates of insect biting
and the maturation of microorganisms within them are temperature-dependent,
and both rates increase when the air warms. Warming can also increase the
number of insects, provided adequate moisture, although excessive heat can
decrease survival of either microorganisms or their hosts. Between the limits of
too hot and too cold is an optimum range of temperature in which warmer air
enhances metabolism and the chances for disease transmission.
Most insects are highly sensitive to temperature change: ants even accelerate
their pace in warmer weather. Findings from paleoclimatic (fossil) studies demon
strate that changes in temperature, and especially in , were closely corre
lated with geographic shifts of beetles near the end of the last Ice Age, about 10,000
years ago. Indeed, fossil records indicate that when changes in climate occur,
insects shift their range far more rapidly than do grasses, shrubs, and forests.
Insects also move to more favorable latitudes and elevations hundreds of years
before larger animals do.“Beetles,” concluded one climatologist,“are better paleo
thermometers than bears.”9
Mosquitoes are hot weather insects that have ﬁxed thresholds for survival.
Anopheline mosquitoes and falciparum malaria transmission are sustained only
where the winter temperature is always above about 16˚ (61˚), while the variety
of mosquito that transmits dengue fever, Aedes aegypti, is limited by a 10˚ (50˚)

9 S.A. Elias, Quaternary Insects
and Their Environments, Smith
sonian Institution Press, Wash
ington, D.C. (1994). [based on
work of R. Coope and others].
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winter isotherm. Shifts in the geographic limits of equal temperature (isotherms)
that accompany global warming may extend the areas that are capable of sustain
ing the transmission of these and other diseases. The transmission season may also
be extended in regions that now lie on the margins of the temperature and mois
ture conditions that allow disease carriers to reproduce. Similar considerations
also apply to cold-blooded agricultural pests, called stenotherms, which require
speciﬁc temperatures for their survival.

10 W.J.M. Martens, T.H. Jetten,
and D. Focks “Sensitivity of
Malaria, Schistosomiasis and
Dengue to Global Warming,”
Climatic Change 35 (1997): 145
156.

Malaria
Approximately 270 million people suﬀer from malaria worldwide, and over two
billion of the world’s population is considered at risk of contracting the disease.
Each year one to two million people die from this mosquito-transmitted disease.
Malaria generally extends only to places where the minimum winter tempera
ture reaches no lower than 16˚. However, global warming is predicted to bring
warmer winters to many places, therefore increasing the potential for malaria
transmission at higher latitudes and higher elevations. Malaria is already being
reported at unusually high elevations in the mountains of Central Africa as well as
Ethiopia and in parts of Asia. Highland urban centers, like Harare, Zimbabwe and
Nairobi, Kenya are at increasing risk of outbreaks, and are largely unprepared to
deal with them.
One study suggests that the proportion of the globe that could sustain malaria
transmission would increase from 45 to 60% with the doubling of CO2 emis
sions.10 The anopheles mosquitoes that can carry malaria are already present in
the United States, and earlier in the 20th century the disease was prevalent. In
recent decades, the disease has been for the most part under control. In the 1980s,
local transmission occurred only in California. However, small outbreaks of
locally transmitted malaria started occurring in the 1990s in Texas, Georgia,
Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, California, and in Toronto,
Canada—primarily during hot, wet spells. This means that conditions conducive
to transmission may be changing; for example, the increased rain and humidity in
some areas will engender large populations of mosquitoes; and warmer tempera
tures will increase the maturation rate of the parasites within mosquitoes. A per
sistence of similar climatic conditions, combined with inadequate or ineﬀective
control methods, could lead to further localized outbreaks.
Dengue fever
Dengue or breakbone fever is a severe, prolonged, ﬂu-like illness that can be fatal
in certain forms. Unlike yellow fever, which is caused by a related virus and spread
by the same mosquito, there is no vaccine for dengue fever. Dengue fever and
dengue hemorrhagic fever now occur regularly in Asia and throughout Latin
America. In many regions, researchers have demonstrated that large upsurges
often occur during El Niño events. Flooding may create fresh breeding conditions,
although the heavy rains may initially wash away mosquito larvae. In mountain
ous areas where streams may dry or where water is stored in receptacles, drought
may precipitate upsurges.
The mosquitoes that carry dengue fever (Aedes aegypti) and malaria (Anophe
line spp.) are limited by temperature. Frost kills adults and larvae. Thus extreme
weather events may precipitate outbreaks, while warming—especially nighttime
and winter warming—may be altering the range of permissible conditions. Three
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Global change in montane regions
Both insects and insect-borne diseases (including malaria and dengue fever)
are being reported today at higher elevations in Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer
ica. Highland malaria is becoming a problem for rural areas in Papua New
Guinea and for the highlands of Central Africa. In 1995, dengue fever blan
keted Latin America, and the disease or its mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti, are
now appearing at higher elevations. In addition, the displacement of plants
to higher elevations has been documented on thirty peaks in the European
Alps, and has also been observed in Alaska, the Sierra Nevada range in the
United States, and in New Zealand. These botanical trends, indicative of
gradual, systematic warming, accompany other widespread physical changes:
Montane glaciers are in retreat in Argentina, Peru, Alaska, Iceland, Norway,
the Swiss Alps, Kenya, the Himalayas, Indonesia, and New Zealand. Some may
soon disappear.
According to radiosonde data analyzed by the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s Environmental Research Laboratory, the
lowest level at which freezing occurs has climbed about 160 meters higher in
mountain ranges from 30˚ to 30˚ latitude since 1970. The shift to higher
levels on mountainsides corresponds to a warming at these elevations (mid
troposphere) of about 1˚ (almost 2˚), which is nearly twice the average
warming that has been documented over the earth as a whole. Notably,
atmospheric models that incorporate observed trends in stratospheric ozone,
sulfate aerosols, and  predict that, at least in the Southern Hemisphere,
the warming trend at high mountain elevations should exceed that of the
Earth’s surface. Thus, mountain regions—where shifts in isotherms are espe
cially apparent—can serve as sentinel areas for monitoring global climate
change.
other complementary sets of biological and physical factors are consistent with the
observed resurgence of  in highland regions, all suggesting that global warm
ing is already having biological consequences (see box).
It is projected that global warming will signiﬁcantly increase the range con
ducive to the transmission of both dengue and yellow fever. As if to conﬁrm these
predictions, dengue fever has been recently reported at higher elevations than
before, at 1,240 meters in Central America, 1,700 meters in Mexico, and Aedes
aegypti was found at 2,200 meters in the Colombian Andes.11
Encephalitis
Mosquitoes can transmit several viruses that cause inﬂammatory brain diseases in
humans. Among these encephalitides are Japanese, eastern equine (in the United
States), Venezuelan equine, and others. The most common of these infections in
the United States, for example, is St. Louis encephalitis (). Epidemic outbreaks
are strongly associated with periods of a few days when temperatures exceed 30
oC. Particularly wet late winter months, followed by summer drought may exac
erbate the threat.
Global warming in the United States could result in a more frequent and more
northerly occurrence—even up to Canada—of a disease that is currently limited
mainly to southern parts of the country.  passes through several bird species,
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including sparrows, pigeons and blackbirds. Its epidemic vector is often mosqui
toes that commonly breed in sewage or wastewater ponds. For this reason, 
tends to break out in urban or suburban areas. The ﬁrst major epidemic was in St.
Louis in 1933, the driest year since 1837. Since 1980, there have been outbreaks in
Florida, Mississippi, New Orleans, Texas, Arizona, California, and Colorado.
Climate variability and health
A global warming trend has been documented since the late 1800s. Many clima
tologists project more intense heat waves and extreme precipitation to accompany
that trend.
Extreme events, such as droughts, ﬂoods, storms, and ﬁres, directly cause death
and injury, and can contribute to conditions that can be devastating to human
health. Heat waves and winter storms both cause an upsurge in cardiac and respiThe Second Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) Report asserts
that the frequency of very hot days is likely to increase, resulting in an approxi
mate doubling of heat-related deaths in affected cities.
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ratory deaths. Floods soak agricultural ﬁelds, creating pools and ﬁlling ditches,
thereby increasing fungal growth and providing new breeding sites for diseasecarrying insects. Floods also can spread microorganisms that cause diarrhea by
contaminating clean water sources with sewage runoﬀ and overﬂow. Prolonged
droughts, punctuated by heavy rains, support upsurges in “nuisance organisms,”
such as insects and rodents, by providing food and breeding sites.
Heat waves are unhealthy for humans and wildlife. Many climate change sce
narios project more prolonged and intense heat waves. In the summers of 1995 and
1998, increased deaths from heat waves occurred across the world, from India to
the United States. In Chicago in 1995, hundreds died from the intense heat wave
that gripped the region. High humidity, an increased heat index, and lack of relief
at night were key meteorological factors.
The Second Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change () Report12
asserts that the frequency of very hot days is likely to increase, resulting in an
approximate doubling of heat-related deaths in aﬀected cities. More frequent,
warmer weather means more frequent adverse eﬀects. Tetanus bacteria thrive in
warmer soils, as do many fungi, such as the one that causes San Joaquin Valley fever.
Australia suﬀers from a seasonal problem of amoebic meningoencephalitis that
proliferates in warm inland water in summer. The projected warming of nighttime
temperatures will be crucial for insect survival and can allow the range of many dis
ease vectors to expand. Warming of over-land water pipes is also of concern.
What are the biological impacts of a prolonged El Niño?

The most prolonged El Niño period in recent history persisted for ﬁve years (1990
to 95), causing myriad environmental impacts. El Niño shifted to the cold La Niña
phase in 1996 and 1997 and then back to one of the earliest starting, and certainly
the largest and strongest El Niño of the century form 1997 to 98. Globally, the
impacts of the extreme weather events were profound. La Niña then returned,
ushering in severe weather with the opposite pattern—rains where it had been dry
and drought where there had been heavy rains.


Both El Niño and La Niña bring climate extremes to many regions around the
globe. During the cold phase from 1995 to 1996, many regions of the world experi
enced intense rains and ﬂooding, following prolonged drought. Such rains have
been associated with outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis and Ross River virus
in Australia, and malaria in Argentina, southern Africa, and Pakistan. In New
Orleans, for example, ﬁve years without a killing frost (1990 to 1995) engendered an
explosion of mosquitoes, cockroaches, and termites.With large established popula
tions, the termites have persisted inside oak trees and houses, despite a frost in 1995.
The cumulative meteorological and ecological impacts on the marine environ
ment of the prolonged El Niño of the early 1990s have yet to be fully evaluated. In
1995, warming in the Caribbean produced coral bleaching for the ﬁrst time in
Belize, as sea surface temperatures surpassed the 29˚ (84˚) threshold that may
damage the animal and plant tissues that make up a coral reef. In 1997, Caribbean
Sea surface temperatures reached 34˚ (93˚) oﬀ southern Belize, and coral
bleaching was accompanied by high mortality levels in starﬁsh and other sea life.
Coral diseases are now sweeping through the Caribbean. As these diseases perturb
marine habitat, such as coral and sea grasses, they can also aﬀect the ﬁsh stocks for
which these areas serve as nurseries.13
Disease clusters: The 1997-98 El Niño event
In 1995 there was a heat wave in June during an El Niño in Colombia, followed by
heaviest August rainfall in 50 years with the commencement of a La Niña. What
followed was a cluster of diseases involving mosquitoes (dengue and Venezuelan
equine encephalitis), rodents (leptospirosis), and toxic algae.
The 1997-98 El Niño event was the strongest of the century. Its impacts were felt
worldwide. Extreme droughts and ﬁres occurred in Asia, across Mediterranean
nations, in the Amazon, in Mexico’s tropical rainforest, in Central America, and in
Florida, in the United States. Respiratory illness, cardiovascular disease, and eye
irritations rose dramatically in many of these regions. Droughts led to increased
cholera in many tropical regions. Heat waves killed thousands in India, and hun
dreds in the United States and Central Europe. The Horn of Africa was deluged
with ﬂooding and experienced upsurges of cholera, malaria, and Rift Valley Fever,
which killed both humans and livestock. In Latin America, ﬂooding along the
Paciﬁc Coast and in southern Brazil resulted in increases in cholera and , and
many South American nations experienced outbreaks of rodent-borne hantavirus.
In the southwestern United States, rodent populations began to explode in January
and February of 1998, which was extremely early, and cases of  occurred during
that spring. The most devastating ﬂoods since 1949 occurred in China as El Niño
waned, and La Niña began its cooling of the Western Paciﬁc Ocean.
Note on compounding factors
Excessive forest burning, deforestation, and other practices also contribute to ﬁres
and ﬂoods. Such local environmental changes can increase vulnerability to
extreme weather events. Thus environmental and energy policies can compound
each other and increase social and public health impacts.
Rodents and disease
Throughout the United States, Latin America, Southern Africa, India, and Europe,
rodents are increasing as crop pests and as carriers of disease. Climate variability,
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changes in land use, and deforestation increase food sources for rodents and
decrease the number of predators. Combined, these factors are contributing to
rodent population increases in many areas. A disturbance in one factor can be
destabilizing; multiple perturbations can aﬀect the resistance and the resilience of
an entire system.
This type of synergy is evidenced in the southwestern region of the United
States. Following heavy spring rains in 1993, rodent populations multiplied ten
fold, and hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (), a deadly new disease, emerged.
Over 150 people in the United States have suﬀered from this viral disease and
almost half of them have died. Outbreaks of  have also occurred in many Latin
American nations since 1995.
In the United States, a prolonged drought prior to the event may have reduced
populations of rodent predators such as owls, coyotes, and snakes. At the same
time, the heavy rains provided a crop of grasshoppers and pine nuts, which served
as nourishment for the deer mice that carry hantaviruses. Thus,  may be
deemed a “new disease,” the transmission and dissemination of which are most
attributable to the increased climate variability accompanying climate change.
In southern Africa rodent populations exploded in 1994, following heavy rainfall
in 1993 that had been preceded by a prolonged drought.As a result, the maize crop in
Zimbabwe was crippled, and plague broke out in Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozam
bique. In South Africa a rodent-borne virus was responsible for the deaths of 81 ele
phants in Kruger Park. Other forms of hantaviruses have resurged in several Euro
pean nations, particularly in the former Soviet Union and in the war-torn former
Yugoslavia. In 1994, plague resurfaced in India following a blistering summer, when
temperatures reached 51 ˚ (124˚), and an unusually heavy monsoon season.
Are marine-related diseases increasing?
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In marine systems, ﬁsh, shellﬁsh, and sea mammals help regulate algae—some
toxic, others anoxic; still others are transporters of cholera bacteria. Destruction
of habitat worldwide is reducing predator populations, and global warming may
be increasing the ability of many disease vectors to survive and reproduce.
Seashores throughout the world are subject to increasing pressures from resi
dential, recreational, and commercial development. These stresses may become
more severe, because human populations in the vicinity of seacoasts are growing
at twice the inland rate. Some of the pressures that we exert on coastal ecosys
tems are summarized in the accompanying box. All can increase the growth of
algae.
Long-term surface and deep-ocean warming, in combination with coastal pollution, can promote the proliferation of toxic “red tides” and may encourage other
diseases, such as cholera from bacteria that reside in and take refuge in the plank
ton. The die-oﬀ of manatees oﬀ the coast of Florida in 1996 apparently resulted
from a toxic red tide enhanced by an oversupply of nutrients and warm sea sur
faces.14
Data from the eastern seaboard of the United States and the Caribbean suggest
that diseases of marine life and of habitat (coral reefs and sea grasses) are increas
ing, as are the number of humans exposed to them. Among the possible conse
quences of disruption in almost any marine ecosystem is an increase in the oppor
tunistic pathogens that can abet the spread of human disease, sometimes to
widespread proportions. One example is cholera.
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Marine ecosystem stresses
• Excessive amounts of dissolved mineral and organic nutrients in coastal
waters, particularly from nitrogen overload—derived from sewage, agri
cultural fertilizers, and acid precipitation—resulting in an environment
that favors plant over animal life.
• Reduced acreage of wetlands, which serve as “nature’s kidneys” to ﬁlter
nitrogen and other wastes that ﬂow from the coastal environment.
• Overﬁshing, which can reduce the population of beneﬁcial predators of
algae and animal plankton (zooplankton).
• Chemical pollution and increased penetration of ultraviolet-ﬂ radiation,
which may increase mutation levels in near-shore sea life of all kinds, and
disproportionately harm zooplankton and ﬁsh larvae.
• Warming of coastal waters and the associated trend toward stable, thermal
layers that inhibit vertical circulation increase the metabolism and growth
of algae, and are conducive to more toxic algal species such as cyanobac
teria and dinoﬂagellates. Warming may also compromise the immune sys
tems of sea mammals and coral, and encourage the growth of harmful
bacteria and viruses in their tissues.
Cholera
We tend to think of our modern world as cleansed of the epidemic scourges of
ages past. Yet cholera—an acute and sometimes fatal disease that is accompanied
by severe diarrhea—aﬀects more nations today than ever before. The Seventh Pan
demic began when the El Tor strain left its traditional home in the Bay of Bengal
in the 1960s, traveled east and west across Asia, and penetrated the continent of
Africa in the 1970s. In 1991, the cholera pandemic reached the Americas, and
during the ﬁrst 18 months more than half a million cases were reported in Latin
America, with 5,000 deaths.15 Rapid institution of oral rehydration treatment with
clean water, sugar, and salts limited the fatalities in the Americas to about one in
a hundred cases. However the epidemics also had serious economic consequences.
For example, in 1991 Peru lost 770 million in seafood exports and another
250 million in tourist revenues due to fear of the disease.16
The microbe that transmits cholera, Vibrio cholerae, is found in a dormant or
“hibernating” state in algae and microscopic animal plankton, where it can be
identiﬁed using modern microbiological techniques. However, once introduced
to people though consumption of contaminated water or contaminated ﬁsh or
shellﬁsh, cholera can recycle through a population when sewage is allowed to mix
with the clean water supply.
In late 1992, a new strain of Vibrio cholerae, O139 Bengal, emerged in India along
the coast of the Bay of Bengal. With populations unprotected by prior immuni
ties, this hardy strain quickly spread through adjoining nations, threatening to
become the agent of the world’s Eighth Cholera Pandemic. For a time, in 1994, El
Tor regained dominance, but by 1996, O139 Bengal had reasserted itself. The emer
gence of this new disease, like all others, involved the interplay of microbial,
human host, and environmental factors.
The largest and most intense outbreak of cholera ever recorded occurred in
Rwanda in 1994, killing over 40,000 people in the space of weeks, in a nation
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already ravaged by civil war and ethnic strife. The tragedy of cholera in Rwanda is
a reminder of the impacts of conﬂict and political, as well as climatic and ecolog
ical, instability on public health and biological security. Also, epidemics may,
themselves, contribute directly to political and economic stability.17
How will plant pests, pathogens, and weeds be affected by climate change?

Together, plant pests, pathogens, and weeds destroy about 50% of growing and
stored agricultural produce yearly, worldwide. This amounts to a loss of some
242 billion annually.18 In the context of human health, climate change presents
a particular concern for reasons including the following:
• Global warming could increase the range of plant pests and pathogens.
• More extreme weather events could increase the intensity of outbreaks. Floods
foster fungi, while droughts favor locust, aphids, whiteﬂies, and rodents.
• There is evidence that weed species and herbivory by insects could increase
with elevated soil fertilization associated with increased CO2 levels.
Soils may also be aﬀected by warming making agricultural systems more vul
nerable. These same dangers hold for forests. The thawing and melting now occur
ring in Alaska, for example, has weakened pine trees. Now more vulnerable, the
remaining stands are being devastated by spruce budworm and spruce bark beetles.
How will air pollution and global warming interact?

The aﬀects of air pollution from burning fossil fuels and the aggregate impact of
climate change can compound in several ways to increase such respiratory diseases
as asthma and bronchitis. Among the combined aﬀects and interactions:
• particulate matter from air pollution directly invades airways;
• nitrogen oxides () contribute to ground-level ozone, which damages the
lung’s air sacs (alveoli). This reaction is heat-dependant, i.e., warming increases
the conversion;
• greater humidity with climate change provides more air droplets that also
increase the  to ozone reaction;
more
ﬂooding events associated with climate change increases the formation
•
of moulds in soils and in houses;
• greater humidity provides more surface for the transmission of allergens such
as pollen and fungi, and of microorganisms;
• warmer winters and earlier springs can produce heavier pollen and mould
loads;
• more heat waves and unhealthy air masses can concentrate pollutants over sig
niﬁcant periods of time; and
• droughts and associated ﬁres cause short-term, and uncalculated long-term
respiratory and cardiovascular illness.
These synergies and combined aﬀects are yet compounded again by growing
cities and the “heat-island eﬀect.” Some, like the widespread ﬁres of 1997 to 1998,
are among the unexpected public health “surprises” that could occur.
Costs of diseases and climate variability
The global resurgence of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera, coupled with the
emergence of relatively new diseases like Ebola and Mad Cow disease (though not


attributable to climate change), aﬀect global health and welfare, as well as trade,
tourism, policy, and economic security. The impacts of disease on humans, agri
culture and livestock are costly. The 1991 cholera epidemic cost Peru over 1 bil
lion in lost seafood exports and tourism.19 In India, airline and hotel industries lost
over 2 billion from the 1994 Indian plague.20 Cruise boats are turning away
from islands wracked by dengue fever. This could pose threats to the Caribbean’s
12 billion tourism industry, for example, which employs 500,000 people.
In the United States, Pfeisteria piscida outbreaks, which have caused ﬁsh mor
talities and human illness (prolonged memory loss and respiratory symptoms),
have cost seafood and tourism companies and federal agencies millions of dollars.
These outbreaks occur in the summer when waters warm, and often follow heavy
rains providing a fresh pulse of nutrients.21
Worldwide, the rise in severe wind and ﬂood-related events has caused extra
ordinary losses for property insurers. In the United States, Federal Emergency
Management Agency payments quadrupled in the 1990s from those in the 1980s.22
Prior to 1989, single-event insured losses had never exceeded 1 billion per year.
Since then, annual insured losses have risen four- to ﬁve-fold. The causal events
include:
•
•
•
•
•

Hurricane Hugo, 1989—5.4 billion
Hurricane Andrew, 1992—16.5 billion
The winter storms of 1993—1.8 billion
The 1993 summer ﬂoods—10 billion
Hurricane Opal, 1995—2.1 billion23

With continued extreme climate variability and the spread of diseases, health
and environmental costs may grow. Insurers already estimate that health-related
and environmental restoration claims over the next 30 years may reach 50 to
125 billion.
Conclusions

Climate change will have wide-ranging and mostly damaging impacts on human
health. Longer and hotter heat waves may take more human lives annually in large
cities. More extreme weather such as storms and hurricanes may kill and injure
more people, contaminate drinking water, and inﬂict psychological trauma. The
combination of climate change and environmental degradation can create ideal
conditions for the emergence, resurgence and spread of disease.
Warmer and sometimes wetter weather may already be extending the range of
infectious diseases such as malaria and dengue fever beyond regions where they
are endemic and inhabitants have some immunity. Other diseases likely to
increase and change in connection with the climate include Guinea worm, leish
maniasis, lymphatic ﬁliasis, onchocerciasis, and Chagas’ disease, which altogether
aﬀect more than 147 million people already.
The health, social, and economic costs of unstable and severe weather are
clearly mounting. In 1997 and 1998, droughts and ﬁres devastated forests (the
“Earth’s Lungs”) from Indonesia to the Amazon, from Greece and Spain to Mexico
and Florida. At the same time, ice storms and ﬂoods have severely impacted the
United States and Europe.
The combined impacts of extraction, mining, reﬁning, transport, and com
bustion of fossil fuels is healthy neither for ecosystems nor the global environ
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ment. We cannot aﬀord to continue “business-as-usual” (). Changing course
will not be easy, but it is necessary. There are costs associated with acting now to
slow global warming. However, in terms of future health care, productivity, inter
national trade, tourism, and insurance costs, the savings could be huge.
The transition to clean energy could be healthy for the environment and for
economies. Some economic analyses suggest that changing energy policies will be
costly, but these studies omit the associated damages we may endure by continu
ing BAU. They also do not include technological innovation. Studies that do
include the beneﬁts of energy-eﬃciency and new technologies ﬁnd that the
energy transition can spark new growth in the United States and in the global
economy.
Development, clean water, and energy sources provide the underpinnings of
public health. Thus the underlying question is not whether to develop, but how to
develop cleanly—and how to make the necessary energy transition in such a way
as to enhance the global economy?
Greater energy-eﬃciency and recapturing emitted heat energy for use (co-gen
eration) are “no-regret” policies. These changes can save money for industries,
governments, and individuals, while reducing air pollution and the threat of cli
mate change. The new markets generated by energy-eﬃcient industries and
nations developing with clean energy sources can be the engine that drives the
global economy in the coming century.
An international fund to drive the Clean Development Mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol could help catalyze the development of “infant-industries” for
renewables, spur transfers of technologies, and encourage widespread and equi
table development. One proposed solution is to tax the 1.5 trillion daily ﬁnan
cial transfers a fraction of a percent. Such a tax, which would also slow down the
speculative investments that have encouraged unmanageable loans in the 1990s.,
would generate billions of dollars yearly for clean development. This fund could
go a long way towards insuring economic and social stability in the 21st Century,
and permit re-stabilization of the climate system, upon which we all depend.
Major points

24 National Climatic
data Center:
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/

25 W.J.M. Martens, T.H. Jetten,
and D. Focks “Sensitivity of
Malaria, Schistosomiasis and
Dengue to Global Warming,”
Climatic Change 35 (1997): 145
156.

• Infectious diseases are emerging, resurging, and undergoing redistribution on
a global scale.
• Climate change is playing a signiﬁcant role in the global resurgence of infec
tious diseases.
• Infectious diseases kill more than 17 million people annually.
• Meningitis epidemics are being associated with the severe drought in SubSaharan Africa. It is the largest epidemic to accompany a drought ever
recorded. In 1996 over 100,000 people contracted the disease, and 10,000 have
died.24
• In southern Africa and India in 1994, heavy rainfall, preceded by drought, led
to explosions of rodent populations and subsequent outbreaks of the plague.
• Following a Mexican epidemic of dengue fever, three cases of the disease were
reported in Texas in October 1995.
• It is predicted that global warming will increase the area of the globe aﬀected
by malaria signiﬁcantly. Approximately 270 million people are infected with
malaria worldwide. Global warming may cause one million additional deaths
from malaria each year.25
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• Following heavy rains in 1993, rodent populations multiplied ten-fold and han
tavirus pulmonary syndrome, a deadly new disease, emerged in the United
States.
• Long-term deep-ocean warming has been reported and may be harming
marine life.
• Ocean warming, particularly in combination with coastal pollution, can pro
mote the proliferation of toxic “red tides” and may encourage other diseases.
• Recent die-oﬀs of manatees oﬀ the coast of Florida may have resulted from a
toxic red tide, enhanced by an oversupply of nutrients and warm sea surfaces.
• Health-related and environmental restoration insurance claims over the next
30 years may reach 50 to $125 billion.
Global warming data 26

• The world has warmed by almost 1.0˚ over the past century and an average 2
to 3˚ warming is predicted by sometime in the 21st century.
• Past climate changes have occurred rapidly, with changes of 2 to 3˚ occurring
within decades.
• The scientiﬁc consensus is that air pollution from human activities is partly
responsible for global warming.
• Global sea level has risen between 10 and 25cm in the last 100 years and will rise
faster still in the coming decades.
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Abstract
Forestry is a valuable piece of the climate change mitigation portfolio. Human activ
ities related to forests and soil are responsible for approximately 20% of the total
anthropogenic emissions. The ongoing loss and degradation of forests and soils will
not only contribute to future climate change; it also imposes tremendous environ
mental,economic,and social costs,particularly on the peoples and resources of many
developing countries. These costs include loss of species and biodiversity, degrada
tion of watersheds, silting of hydroelectric facilities, declines in agricultural produc
tivity, and increasing scarcity of fuelwood. This paper discusses the current status of
forestry as a mitigation strategy and its potential treatment under the Kyoto Proto
col and beyond. It is based partially on the 1997 Biotic Offsets Assessment Workshop
in Baltimore, the purpose of which was for forestry and offset experts to come to
some agreement regarding the state of the science and policy of forestry-based off
sets. An appendix of the primary conclusions for policymakers from the Baltimore
conference is included.
Introduction

In early literature about climate change mitigation, forestry was heralded as a
potential panacea. In recent years, discussion of forestry’s mitigation role has
become more pragmatic and sophisticated. The credible literature no longer refers
to forestry as a “solution” to the problem of climate change, but continues to cite
forestry and other land use measures as a valuable piece of a global mitigation
portfolio.
In the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol, however, signed at the fourth Confer
ence of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (),
the future role of forestry for mitigation purposes remains unclear. Although sinks
are clearly built into the “netting” of Annex B countries’ emissions under Article
3 of the Protocol, treatment of sinks in project-level mitigation interventions
undertaken under Articles 3, 6, or 12 has been left for further clariﬁcation. To some
extent, the ambiguities in the Kyoto Protocol are the result of the brevity of the
Kyoto conference. To a signiﬁcant degree, however, the Protocol’s ambiguous
treatment of sinks is the result of policy and technical issues being raised by inter
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est groups and countries that are critical of relying on forestry and related miti
gation interventions as a means of achieving the Protocol’s reduction mandates.
This issue is discussed later in this paper.
At the same time that critics are asking questions, numerous studies, including
those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), have concluded
that forestry-based and other biotic climate change mitigation measures should
play an important role in mitigating greenhouse gas () emissions and climate
change. According to the , forestry and other biotic measures can slow carbon
emissions to the atmosphere by reducing rates of deforestation and forest degra
dation. In addition, these measures have the potential to increase the incremental
sequestration of carbon in terrestrial biota through activities such as reforesta
tion, assisted regeneration, and agroforestry.
A review of the climate change literature and debate on the subject of forestry
and sinks inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is a great deal of misun
derstanding about forestry as a potential climate change mitigation strategy. This
paper poses a series of questions important to forestry’s current status as a miti
gation strategy and to its potential treatment under the Kyoto Protocol and
beyond. The paper is based partially on the work of the Land Use and Biotic Mit
igation Policy Project (Project), a policy and technical initiative undertaken by
Trexler and Associates, Inc. in 1997 with the primary objective of signiﬁcantly
advancing the technical and policy understanding of whether and how forestry
and related biotic climate change mitigation measures can credibly and effectively
contribute toward societal objectives in the climate change arena. The Project is
working to develop technically and politically credible answers to questions being
raised in the climate change debate and to improve understanding of the under
lying issues.
Many workshops have been organized around the theme of carbon offsets, par
ticularly around joint implementation () and the “activities implemented
jointly” () pilot phase. Forestry projects and issues routinely play a role in these
meetings and workshops, but rarely have forestry and land use issues been given
exclusive attention. In 1997 the Project convened a workshop that brought
together nearly 30 international experts to consider key questions regarding the
use of forestry for climate change mitigation purposes. The goal of the Biotic Off
sets Assessment Workshop in Baltimore was to bring together well-informed and
inﬂuential forestry and offset experts who would seek to come to some agreement
among themselves regarding the state of the science and policy of forestry-based
offsets. The Baltimore workshop focused on project-level forestry-based mitiga
tion strategies, rather than incorporation of forest-cover changes at the national
level into a country’s baseline or future emissions budgets (the so-called “netting”
approach). The workshop participants were a diverse and uniquely qualiﬁed set
of individuals from the academic, government, not-for-proﬁt, and private sectors.
The workshop’s conclusions are used to help shed light on some of the questions
posed below.
Are forestry and land-use change important to the problem
of climate change and climate change mitigation objectives?

Since before the Industrial Revolution, land-use changes, ﬁrst in temperate and
later tropical zones, have been key contributors to rising levels of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere. Indeed, carbon emissions associated with land-use change
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have been responsible for almost one-third of the net increase in atmospheric
loading of carbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution. Currently, the relative
importance of land-use change based emissions is declining as fossil fuel emis
sions continue to rise. Yet, even today human activities are estimated to emit
between 1 and 2 gigatonnes () of carbon annually from the world’s forests and
soils. This is approximately 20 percent of total anthropogenic emissions. In many
developing countries, land use-related emissions continue to signiﬁcantly exceed
fossil fuel emissions. Additionally, land use change contributes to methane and
nitrous oxide emissions, primarily as a by-product of biomass burning.
The links between land-use trends and potential climate change go well beyond
the fact that deforestation and forest degradation are an ongoing and signiﬁcant
source of greenhouse gas emissions, thus accelerating the buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. Several other important linkages that continue to be the
focus of intensive scientiﬁc and political debate are:
• The apparent importance of CO2 fertilization to slowing the buildup of CO2 in the
atmosphere. The CO2 fertilization effect—in which rising levels of CO2 in the
atmosphere contribute to enhanced plant growth—is believed to be responsi
ble for the sequestration of a billion tons of carbon per year in the world’s
forests, thus slowing future climate change. There is some question, however,
as to how long this fertilization effect will play this climate change mitigation
role.
• The potential importance of intentionally undertaken forestry and other land-use
based climate change mitigation measures. Numerous studies, including those
of the , have conﬁrmed the potential importance of mitigation measures
in this sector. One particularly notable example is the potential role biomass
energy could play in substituting for fossil-fuel emissions in industrialized as
well as developing nations.
• The potential for increased land use-based ghg emissions in future years due to
climate change-induced alterations in temperatures, ﬁre regime changes, soil
carbon oxidation rates, and other variables, and the associated importance of
understanding how biological systems may adapt to climate change. It may
require great efforts in some areas just to maintain the forest cover we already
have.
This is a brief review of the ways in which forestry and land use change are
linked to the larger subject of climate change. This review should illustrate the
need for careful consideration of these issues as facets of the effort to understand
future climate change, mitigate future climate change, and adapt to climate
change.
What is the projected future contribution of deforestation
and land use change to greenhouse gas emissions?

There is no reason to believe, under “business-as-usual” circumstances, that the
absolute contribution of deforestation and forest degradation to global GHG
emissions will decline signiﬁcantly any time soon. Vast stretches of tropical forest,
currently a storehouse for hundreds of billions of tons of carbon, remain threat
ened by deforestation or degradation. According to the ’ 1995 Second
Assessment Report, more than 650 million hectares of forest are likely to be lost by
2050. More than 75  of carbon are likely to be emitted from deforestation alone.
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In addition, hundreds of millions of additional hectares of forest and agricultural
land will be degraded, resulting in the release of a portion of the carbon currently
stored there to the atmosphere.
The ongoing loss and degradation of forests and soils will not only contribute
to future climate change; it also imposes tremendous environmental, economic,
and social costs, particularly on the peoples and resources of many developing
countries. These costs include loss of species and biodiversity, degradation of
watersheds, silting of hydroelectric facilities, declines in agricultural productivity,
and increasing scarcity of fuelwood.
How can forestry and land use-based measures
contribute to climate change mitigation goals?

Numerous studies over the past 10 years have discussed how forestry measures
could or should contribute to climate change mitigation efforts both in industrial
ized and developing countries. These studies have included work by the , gov
ernment agencies, research institutes, and nongovernmental organizations such as
the World Resources Institute. Much of this research supports forestry as a mitiga
tion strategy both for its climate change potential and for the additional environ
mental and socioeconomic beneﬁts that would accompany reduced deforestation
rates and expanded reforestation programs on suitable lands. Forestry and land
use-based interventions that have the potential to signiﬁcantly contribute to cli
mate change mitigation options fall into one of three major categories:
• Protecting existing carbon reservoirs from losses associated with deforestation,
forest and land degradation, urbanization, and other land management prac
tices.
• Enhancing carbon sequestration and expanding carbon stores in forests, other
biomass, soils, and wood products (including through reforestation, afforesta
tion, and forest management efforts).
• Using biomass to substitute for fossil-fuel use, whether directly (production of
biomass energy) or indirectly (substituting wood for steel, cement, or other
fossil fuel-intensive products).
International policymakers have repeatedly called for slowing the loss of forests
and restoring forest or tree cover. In 1989, 68 environmental ministers from
around the world signed the Noordwijk Declaration in the Netherlands, calling
for a net increase in global forest cover of 12 million hectares per year to help slow
climate change. Similar ideas are reﬂected in international policy initiatives
including the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, the Global Forestry Program, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Forestry, and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The  and the Kyoto Protocol also explicitly mention these objectives.
The literature surrounding forestry-based mitigation efforts places heavy
emphasis on reforestation potentials, both in tropical and temperate zones. How
ever, efforts to slow deforestation and to manage existing forests are probably
more important for long-term climate change mitigation than efforts to acceler
ate reforestation. Even critics of plantation forestry acknowledge forest conserva
tion as a priority. Barnett (1992) concludes, “protection of existing forests [over
the planting of new ones] should be a priority action in combating climate change.
This vitally important consideration must be recognized wherever the issues of
climate change and forest conservation emerge.”While slowing deforestation rates
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is by no means easy, large-scale reforestation efforts must grapple with severe eco
nomic and infrastructural constraints and even environmental concerns. Indeed,
because protection of threatened forests can serve many environmental, eco
nomic, and social interests, many analysts argue that forest protection offers one
of the most socially cost-effective climate change mitigation technologies.
Nevertheless, reforestation and variants on the reforestation theme—includ
ing natural regeneration in cases where ﬁre can be controlled in grasslands and
other areas—does have major mitigation potential. Large amounts of land are
potentially available for reforestation in both temperate and tropical zones.
Options being explored include:
•
•
•
•

pasture, cropland, degraded or arid land reforestation;
reforestation of recently harvested stands;
planting along highway rights-of-way and riparian corridors; and
planting in windbreaks and other agroforestry applications.

Using forest-based or other biomass fuels to displace or substitute for existing
or future fossil fuel use also has tremendous potential as a climate change mitiga
tion strategy. Opportunities exist, for example, to utilize large quantities of agri
cultural and forest residues that otherwise would go to waste. There are also
opportunities to develop specialized biomass crops primarily for energy produc
tion. If tied to efforts to increase both the efﬁciency with which biomass is con
verted to energy and consumed by end-use users, in principle biomass energy
could supply a large proportion of commercial energy demand in tropical coun
tries in coming decades. It has to be recognized, however, that such a project faces
daunting technical and economic challenges.
What has the ipcc said about forestry’s potential to help mitigate climate change?

In its Second Assessment Report in 1995, the  identiﬁed forestry and other
land use-based mitigation measures as capable of slowing carbon emissions by
reducing rates of deforestation and forest degradation while increasing the incre
mental uptake of carbon by terrestrial biota through means such as reforestation,
regeneration, and agroforestry (Brown et al. 1996). The  concluded that inter
vention could realistically reduce cumulative net anthropogenic emissions over
the next 50 years by more than 70  of carbon. Between 1995 and 2050, by slow
ing deforestation, promoting natural forest regeneration in the tropics, and imple
menting a global forestation program, the  concluded that 12 to 15 percent of
cumulative fossil fuel carbon emissions could be offset.
What are the technical concerns being raised regarding the use
of forestry and land-use projects for climate change mitigation?

The debate over forestry’s potential role in climate change mitigation efforts has
varied widely over the last decade, from the assertion that forestry could virtually
solve the climate change problem to the position that there is absolutely no role for
forestry in a portfolio of mitigation policies and measures. Although many issues
have been raised in this debate, they can be broadly grouped into several categories:
• Whether forestry and land use change projects can be reliably quantiﬁed, mon
itored, and veriﬁed.
• Whether land use-based mitigation measures might be prematurely lost, lead
ing to reversal of their mitigation beneﬁts.
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• Whether pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts impede
basic economic development or result in negative environmental impacts in
developing countries.
• Whether pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts impedes
progress on achieving actual emissions reductions and technology transfer
objectives in the energy sector.
This following section addresses the technical issues relating to the use of forestry
and land use-based mitigation efforts. The discussion reﬂects conclusions of the
previously mentioned technical workshop on biotic mitigation options.
Are there particular difficulties associated with quantifying, monitoring,
and verifying the performance of forestry and land use-based offsets?

Substantial progress has been made in deﬁning and reﬁning approaches and
methods for monitoring forest carbon stocks and ﬂows. Experience with a small
number of JI projects and monitoring ﬁeld tests suggests that some of the key chal
lenges are being met and that forest carbon monitoring can be done at a reason
able cost with relatively high levels of accuracy and precision.
Workshop participants agreed that there continues to be a need for standard
ized methodologies that project developers can relatively easily and consistently
apply to potential projects. Participants concluded that the absence of standard
ized methodologies is attributable to the evolution happening in the ﬁeld, rather
than to evidence of what is technically feasible.
How significant are benefit permanence and associated
biotic risk factors for biotic mitigation projects?

Additionality
The supplementarity of individual mitigation projects continues to be a source of
debate for most project types. Notably, additionality has rarely been raised as a
concern for forestry projects, since so few existing projects have been economically
motivated. There is little question that many forestry projects will be able to meet
or exceed whatever additionality standard is agreed upon in the future.
Leakage
The possibility that indirect and feedback efforts occurring outside a project’s
boundaries will reduce a project’s beneﬁts is commonly identiﬁed as a concern for
mitigation projects. Although leakage is a potential problem for almost all types
of mitigation projects, forestry projects are often characterized as “leakage-prone.”
Current thinking suggests, however, that the options available for dealing with
leakage are similar across mitigation project types, including forestry.
Reliability
The different risks faced by some types of forestry mitigation projects make pro
ject reliability and beneﬁt permanence particularly relevant. Projects intended to
be permanent (e.g., forest conservation, watershed and natural forest regenera
tion, soil restoration) face risk factors that could interfere with that permanence.
Interventions not intended to be permanent (e.g., reforestation or agroforestry for
timber and other economic products) raise questions the value of delay and the
length of time needed for an intervention to be considered equivalent to an emis
sion reduction measure. For some forestry mitigation options (e.g., wood prod
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uct substitution for energy-intensive building materials, biomass energy), the
issues are no different than those facing other kinds of mitigation projects.
Forestry critics frequently raise the issue of the permanence of land use-based
mitigation projects. There is very little literature or analysis available, however, on
the subject. There is little systematic assessment of biotic risk variables that may
interfere with the permanence of a project’s beneﬁts even when a project is
designed to generate permanent beneﬁts. Beneﬁt permanence becomes particu
larly complex when considering projects involving harvesting of timber or other
biomass. The fate of harvested carbon becomes crucial in determining the long
term or “permanent” impacts of the project or type of measure involved. Partici
pants at the workshop quickly concluded that permanence is probably the trick
iest issue in forestry-based mitigation efforts. Participants also determined that
although it can be framed technically, the permanence debate is fundamentally
policy-based. Policymakers ultimately will need to determine what permanence
means for offsets and how these deﬁnitions will apply to forestry and land usebased projects.
Quantifying, monitoring, and verifying project beneﬁts
The ease and accuracy with which the beneﬁts of mitigation options can be quan
tiﬁed, monitored, and veriﬁed varies widely. Forestry and land use-based options
ﬁt this pattern. A range of approaches are available for monitoring changes in
forest carbon, including remote sensing and ground-truthing, inventory-based
monitoring, and research-based monitoring. An area of particular confusion that
should be avoided is equating quantiﬁcation of national-level sinks through socalled netting with project-level beneﬁt quantiﬁcation. The issues involved are
very different.
It is important to recognize that not all forestry types and not all forestry pro
jects are interchangeable in the context of accomplishing climate change mitiga
tion objectives. Different forestry types and projects will have different mitigation
characteristics. It is as inappropriate to lump all types of forestry together as it is
to group together other large categories of mitigation options. In either case, mit
igation interventions vary dramatically in their quantiﬁability, cost-effectiveness,
and long-term outcome.
Do forestry-based mitigation strategies advance or detract
from countries’ sustainable development objectives?

Some critics of forestry initiatives express concern that forestry projects could
impede socioeconomic development in developing countries, or even cause envi
ronmental damage. Issues commonly raised include:
• that the land occupied by forestry offsets would somehow deprive countries of
alternative economic development opportunities and potentially impede
national sovereignty over their natural resources; and
• that resources going into forestry offsets would somehow displace funding that
otherwise might become available for activities more directly beneﬁcial to eco
nomic development.
These potential problems are most commonly linked to the prospect of largescale forest plantations being pursued for climate change mitigation. However,
there is no reason to anticipate that massive tropical reforestation projects will be
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a favored approach to climate change mitigation. Beyond the political and envi
ronmental issues raised, it is far from the most cost-effective mitigation approach.
Thus far, no forestry project that has been implemented for climate change miti
gation involves the types of plantations that have been a primary source of con
cern for forestry critics.
Often overlooked in this debate is the tremendous role that forestry-sector pro
jects, appropriately designed and implemented, can play in societal priority areas
such as biodiversity conservation, sustainable development, watershed protection,
and food production. Inclusion of biotic carbon offset projects among the strate
gies for addressing international concerns about climate change may increase avail
able resources to support sustainable land-use and forestry practices, both of which
are unlikely to be adequately funded in the absence of such a mechanism. Indeed,
biotic carbon offset projects, which include both forestry and land-use manage
ment options, provide an opportunity to support efforts to reduce deforestation
and protect vulnerable forest ecosystems, many of which will be lost or degraded
in the near to mid terms (many within 20 years) without additional support.
Forestry critics, while raising the concerns cited, acknowledge that forestry
projects can result in environmental and social beneﬁts, including improved food
supply security, availability of raw materials to industry, protection of hydrologi
cal services, conservation of biological diversity, and soil protection (Barnett
1992). Workshop participants concluded that while one could design forestry pro
jects to maximize negative beneﬁts, as some cited examples might suggest, it
should not be particularly difﬁcult to avoid this outcome during project design
and approval. They also felt that the potential beneﬁts of existing forestry projects
are signiﬁcant and observable enough that it is inappropriate to focus excessively
on hypothetical negative impacts.
One workshop participant noted that a primary problem with the current
debate is that participants often have visions of project extremes rather than trying
to work with the bulk of projects on the middle ground. He commented, “I see
two sets of types of projects. We are interested in projects that are at the intersec
tion of these two types. We don’t want simple plantations, and we don’t want pro
jects that are so social in nature that the carbon beneﬁt is ‘virtual.’ In between are
kinds of projects that can be done, can be veriﬁed, and are socially relevant pro
jects. The problem is that people have visions of extremes, and it tends to overly
inﬂuence policy discussion.”
Will forestry offsets impede progress on achieving actual emissions
reductions and technology transfer objectives in the energy sector?

Some observers of forestry-based climate change mitigation efforts express con
cern that pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts will impede
progress on achieving actual emissions reductions and interfere with technology
transfer objectives. Forestry is sometimes portrayed as a negative contributor to
climate change, even when the technical ability of individual forestry projects to
offset CO2 emissions is undisputed. This concern involves three assumptions:
• Land use-based emissions reductions are somehow less signiﬁcant than other
reductions. There is no dispute, however, that land-use changes release more
than 1  of carbon to the atmosphere annually. The need to reduce these emis
sions is just as real as that for other kinds of emissions.
• Forestry-based mitigation opportunities will supersede other mitigation pro
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jects. There is little empirical evidence to support this argument. While forestry
has been a popular mitigation measure, the range of projects pursued through
the  pilot phase has been extremely diverse. There is no reason to believe that
any individual intervention category will overwhelm the ﬁeld of mitigation
efforts.
• Forestry projects offer few or no technology transfer opportunities. To the con
trary, combinations of forest management, reduced impact logging, forest con
servation, and reforestation measures provide ample opportunities for tech
nology transfer.
Many of these technical and policy issues can in all likelihood be addressed
through development and dissemination of improved information about the role
of biotic offsets in a global climate change mitigation strategy. There is little doubt
that appropriate land-use projects can advance rather than impede a country’s
economic and environmental objectives.
Why are “co-benefits” so emphasized in forestry
and other land-use mitigation projects?

The term“co-beneﬁts” has been coined in the forestry debate to better describe the
signiﬁcant non-carbon beneﬁts often accompanying biotic offset projects. Litera
ture and professional discussions rarely focus on the beneﬁts of biotic options
beyond cost-effectiveness. Yet the non-carbon beneﬁts associated with biotic
options are signiﬁcant.
Many forestry interventions offer tremendous opportunities to advance bio
diversity conservation, soil and watershed conservation, rural economic develop
ment, and the interests of indigenous peoples. Climate change mitigation fund
ing has the potential to dramatically expand the funding for these goals and
improved forestry practices, all of which are likely to otherwise remain under
funded.
Participants in the Biotics Workshop concluded that co-beneﬁts have not been
sufﬁciently factored into the offsets and climate change mitigation debate. This
omission has been to the detriment of land use-based mitigation opportunities.
Participants drew several conclusions regarding co-beneﬁts:
• Based on experience with existing offset projects, the co-beneﬁts of available
forestry mitigation options are plentiful.
• Co-beneﬁts are of interest to both environmentalists and developing countries
and may generate support for certain forestry-sector mitigation options.
• Co-beneﬁts allow developing countries to meet multiple objectives, including
biodiversity and rural development objectives. This situation is analogous to
the commonly accepted technology-transfer co-beneﬁts of energy projects.
The threat of climate change is only part of the equation in motivating a renewed
political interest in tropical forestry programs. Just as important is the perception
that the large-scale use of forestry for climate change mitigation would inject
much needed resources into the forestry sectors of countries around the world.
Slowing forest loss and land-use degradation can advance sustainable develop
ment, energy production, and environmental goals in tropical countries, while
adding to terrestrial carbon stores. It is conceivable that billions of dollars could
be spent annually on forest protection, forest management, reforestation, and bio
mass energy programs intended to help mitigate global climate change. Much of
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this money would almost certainly ﬂow from industrialized to non-industrialized
countries, whether through direct nongovernmental investment, government-to
government payments, debt relief, or other means.
How much experience has been accumulated through
existing forestry and land use-based mitigation efforts?

Since the late 1980s, more than two dozen pilot climate change mitigation projects
have been implemented in the forestry sector, involving commitments of more
than $50 million. This ﬁgure may be small by the standards of international aid
and capital ﬂows, but it is signiﬁcant in the context of climate change mitigation
spending. There are several reasons that forestry has been a popular climate
change mitigation option:
• Early offset funders wished to clearly differentiate their offset projects from
their day-to-day energy-sector business activities.
• Forestry-based offsets were seen as cost-effective and easily implemented at the
pilot project scale.
• In a strictly voluntary mitigation regime, the many co-beneﬁts of forestry pro
jects have been particularly appealing to offset funders.
Forestry and land-use mitigation projects are underway in both industrialized and
developing countries. They have been based on a range of forestry and other landuse change interventions, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

reforestation and agroforestry;
protected area establishment or reinforcement;
expansion of sustainable forestry;
reduced impact logging;
conservation easements;
soil carbon enhancement; and
research and development on fast-growing trees.

A brief introduction to the experience with these categories of projects is pro
vided below:
Temperate reforestation
Well over a dozen projects are underway in Annex I countries including the United
States, Russia, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands. Although individual pro
jects are generally modest in size, overall, thousands of hectares are involved. Lands
targeted by these reforestation projects are ecologically or economically sensitive,
and include national parks, other public lands, and non-industrial private land
holdings. Project beneﬁts include soil and water conservation, enhancement of
wildlife habitat, and rural economic development. Long-term carbon contracts,
sometimes up to 99 years, ensure that the projects’ carbon beneﬁts are long-lived.
Tropical reforestation
Reforestation projects are underway in several tropical countries. This group of
projects includes the ﬁrst carbon offset project, an agroforestry and sustainable
development project in Guatemala that was initiated almost 10 years ago. Lands
involved in these reforestation projects include national parks, other public and
communal lands, and private lands. As with temperate reforestation projects, the
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beneﬁts of tropical reforestation projects include soil and water conservation,
enhancement of wildlife habitat, and rural economic development.
Forest and harvest management
Of these, perhaps the best known is the Malaysia Reduced Impact Logging (RIL)
Project, which was initiated in 1994. Estimates suggest that through careful plan
ning and personnel training carbon emissions during harvesting could be reduced
by as much as 50 percent in some regions of the world. Extensive research has been
carried out to document these beneﬁts. RIL components can also be found in the
Rio Bravo Conservation and Forest Management Project in Belize and the Noel
Kempff Mercado project in Bolivia.
Tropical forest conservation
Although this project category constitutes the most widely discussed forestry cli
mate change intervention, the number of projects underway in this area is quite
small. Current projects include the Rio Bravo Conservation and Forest Manage
ment Project in Belize, the  project in Costa Rica, the Mbaracayu pro
ject in Paraguay, and the Noel Kempff Mercado Project in Bolivia. Each project
involves a different approach. Examples of these approaches include:
• the purchase of private inholdings within a national park;
• buying out timber concessions and doubling the size of a national park; and
• the purchase and transfer of private lands to long-term public protection.
Each project includes signiﬁcant biodiversity beneﬁts, as well other project cobeneﬁts. Host country support for these projects has been strong. In several cases,
it is expected that the carbon beneﬁts will be shared between the host country and
project funders. Most of the projects have demonstrated the ability of forestrysector projects to conform to carbon offset evaluative criteria.
In addition to these individual project-based interventions, several broader
innovative forestry initiatives and programs are being pursued for climate change
purposes. One example can be found in Costa Rica, which has established its Cer
tiﬁed Tradeable Offsets () program. The  program is based on a national
system of forest protection and reforestation incentives. Another example is the
Forest Resource Trust in the state of Oregon in the United States, in which large
numbers of individual reforestation interventions will be aggregated into a
statewide and risk-insured carbon pool.
Biomass utilization
A small number of projects are underway in both industrialized and developing
countries to experiment with and demonstrate opportunities for commercial uti
lization of biomass in the energy sector as a means of displacing fossil fuels.
Soil Carbon Enhancement
A few projects are pursuing enhancement of soil carbon reserves. One project,
in Saskatchewan, Canada, pays landowners to pursue no-till agricultural prac
tices. The proposed Halophyte Cultivation Project in Sonora, Mexico, would also
result in signiﬁcant soil carbon replenishment.
These brief examples provide some insight into the range of measures being
pursued around the world for offset purposes. Through these projects a great deal
is being learned about the use of forestry for climate change mitigation. This expe
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rience has also helped clarify the questions still needing to be resolved with respect
to forestry’s use for climate change mitigation.
How do forestry and land use-based mitigation projects
systematically differ from energy-based mitigation projects, if at all?

Most observers evaluate climate change mitigation projects through their ability
to address several key questions:
•
•
•
•

Are they additional to what would have happened but for the project?
Are the project’s beneﬁts reliable and long-term?
Can the project’s beneﬁts be accurately quantiﬁed, monitored, and veriﬁed?
Do the projects provide signiﬁcant co-beneﬁts?

Forestry and land use-based mitigation measures are often discussed as if they
are fundamentally different from mitigation projects undertaken in the energy
arena. Participants in the Baltimore Workshop generally agreed that many biotic
offsets would be of comparable mitigation quality. They also concluded that
implementation of land-use initiatives would involve the same degree of difﬁculty
as most energy projects.
Workshop participants did, however, express some concern over the contro
versy surrounding the general characteristics of different types of mitigation
interventions and associated assertions that some categories are inherently better
than others. In the case of forestry interventions, this debate was contributed to
by a naive community of forestry experts who have openly shared the strengths
and weaknesses of measurement capabilities with a policy community that is not
sufﬁciently prepared for interpreting this discussion. As one participant said: “We
[forestry experts] have done some damage in getting too involved in technical dis
cussions. As a result, we have confused policymakers. The technical issues for
forestry are no more perplexing than they are for energy offsets.” Voicing support
for this view, another participant stated that “the central issue we need to address
is not what our conﬁdence level in our forestry measurements is, but to make it
clear that forestry offsets can accomplish the same levels of accuracy as energy at
equivalent levels of effort. The issue is comparability.”
As a result of these discussions, a primary conclusion of workshop participants
was that forestry-sector offset projects are not dissimilar to energy-sector projects.
There are relatively few systemic differences between the project categories, and
they can run in different directions (e.g., additionality vs. permanence). Partici
pants concluded that it is not feasible to make blanket statements at the sectoral
level about the comparable quality of energy-sector and forestry-sector projects.
Participants concluded that forestry projects should not be held to higher perfor
mance standards than energy-sector projects, nor should they be generically dis
counted against energy-sector projects. Workshop participants concluded that the
speciﬁc characteristics of individual projects need to be taken into account when
judging compliance with any crediting system that is established for climate
change mitigation. Whether a project is within the forestry sector or the energy
sector, it should be required to prove individual compliance with offset standards.
How are forestry and land-use projects treated
under the fccc and the Kyoto Protocol?

Reducing land-use changes resulting in high  emissions and enhancing land
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use sinks are important components of the  and the Kyoto Protocol. Relevant
provisions of the two instruments include:
•  Article 4(2)(a): Parties shall adopt national policies and take corre
sponding measures on the mitigation of climate change by . . . protecting and
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.
• Kyoto Protocol, Article 2.1(a)(ii): Annex I Parties shall implement policies
relating to protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs, and promotion
of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation, and reforestation.
• Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.3: Industrialized Parties shall net out forestry sources
and sinks in calculating their emissions.
• Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.1: Any Annex I Party may transfer or acquire emission
reduction units from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by
sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks.
• Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.3(b): Annex I Parties may use the certiﬁed emission
reductions accruing from project activities to contribute to compliance with
part of their quantiﬁed emissions reduction commitments.
With regard to forestry-based mitigation strategies, the outcomes of the third
Conference of Parties (-3, at which the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol)
are widely regarded as ambiguous. The discussions of sinks at -3 were not gen
erally in the context of project-based mitigation efforts. Rather, they focused pri
marily on sinks within the context of whether and how forestry would be netted
against fossil-fuel emissions for the purpose of determining compliance with
emissions reduction targets.
The forestry outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol can be summarized as follows:
• Reforestation, afforestation, and deforestation since 1990 will be netted against
other  emissions by Annex B (former Annex I) countries.
• Reforestation and afforestation “sinks” projects that can meet an unspeciﬁed
“but for” or “additionality” test will be eligible for crediting under Article 6 of
the Protocol (joint implementation), albeit not until the ﬁrst budget period.
• The Clean Development Mechanism () provides for crediting of “certiﬁed
emissions reductions,” but does not deﬁne the types of emissions reductions
that will be included. While some environmental organizations and develop
ing countries have argued that this means that forestry-sector projects should
be excluded, this opinion is widely disputed. It is interesting to note that a
number of potential forestry interventions do constitute “emissions reduction”
projects rather than sink enhancement projects.
The ﬁrst response to the ambiguity surrounding land-use projects left by the
Kyoto Protocol occurred at the follow-up Subsidiary Body meetings in June 1998
in Bonn, Germany. One of the few areas in which progress was made was in the
land-use change and forestry area. Even so, advances were procedural rather than
substantive. As a result of the Bonn meetings, the  was charged with prepar
ing a special report on several key land use and forestry issues. This special report,
in conjunction with the   treatment of forestry options in its ongoing Third
Assessment Report, should signiﬁcantly contribute to the discussion of the role
sinks are able to play under the Kyoto Protocol both domestically and interna
tionally.
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What is the difference between “netting” sinks in estimating
national ghg emissions (Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol)
and pursuing individual sinks projects (Articles 6 and 12)?

When considering the role of land use-based emissions reduction and sequestra
tion projects, it is important to differentiate between national netting of emissions
under Article 3.3 of the Protocol and pursuit of forestry and other mitigation mea
sures at the project level. Article 3.3 delineates how forests ﬁt into industrialized
calculations of compliance with emissions reduction targets:
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since
1990, measured as veriﬁable changes in stocks in each commitment period
shall be used to meet the commitments in this Article of each Party included
in Annex I.
There is still considerable uncertainty as to how this paragraph will be applied.
What is clear, however, is that language of Article 3.3 applies to the “netting” of cer
tain categories of land use change and forestry interventions in Annex B countries
against those countries’ fossil fuel emissions for purposes of evaluating compli
ance with Parties’ obligations under Article 3.3. There is a clear difference between
quantifying beneﬁts at the national level for this type of netting, vs. the quantiﬁ
cation of beneﬁts at the project level. The methodologies are different, the uncer
tainties are different, and the accuracy and precision of the quantiﬁcation process
is likely to be quite different. Of particular importance, the fear of large loopholes
in the Protocol is likely to be signiﬁcantly greater in the case of national-level net
ting than it is in project-by-project beneﬁt quantiﬁcation. As a result, the policy
and technical concerns and debates that have characterized discussions of netting
before and during the Protocol development process cannot simply be transferred
over to the discussion of project-based mitigation interventions.
How much of a role will forestry play in future climate change mitigation efforts?

Historical land-use change has been a key contributor to anthropogenic emissions
of CO2, totaling almost one-third of all emissions since the Industrial Revolution.
Forest loss and degradation will continue to release more than a billion tons of
carbon to the atmosphere each year into the indeﬁnite future. This clearly creates
a place for forestry in the societal menu of climate change mitigation options. Both
the  and the Kyoto Protocol acknowledge forestry’s importance.
As with most mitigation options, the total potential of forestry measures
depends on many variables and is difﬁcult to reliably predict. A range of studies
suggests that 1 to 2  of carbon beneﬁt per year is achievable through temperate
and tropical forest conservation, regeneration, and reforestation. Expanded com
mercial biomass utilization for energy and products could add to this ﬁgure. Even
when not permanent, the beneﬁts of biotic projects can help slow the rise in
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 for several decades or more.
Many forestry interventions offer tremendous opportunities to advance biodi
versity conservation, soil and watershed conservation, rural economic development,
and the interests of indigenous peoples. Climate change mitigation funding has the
potential to dramatically expand the resources to meet these goals and improve
forestry practices, which would otherwise be likely to remain underfunded.
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As the priority level of climate change mitigation efforts continues to increase,
more attention will be focused on the need to pursue the full range of available
mitigation options. More interest groups are recognizing the importance and
value of forestry and land-use mitigation measures. Dozens of environmental,
conservation, and sustainable development organizations, as well as privatesector entities, have demonstrated increasing awareness of the value of forestry
options by signing the Call for Inclusion of Forest-Based Joint Implementation in
the Kyoto Protocol, which urged delegates not to overlook the many beneﬁts of
forestry sector interventions.
As with most mitigation measures, in-depth work is required for forestrysector interventions to develop the protocols and modalities by which projectlevel mitigation efforts can be reliably and consistently implemented. How can
forest areas truly under threat of loss be identiﬁed? How can they be effectively
protected for the long-term? How can reforestation and other projects effectively
contribute to long-term climate change mitigation goals? These questions deserve
concentrated political and analytical attention. The Land Use and Biotic Mitiga
tion Policy Project is starting to provide such attention and has reached several
preliminary conclusions:
• For land use-based emissions reduction and sequestration, it is important to
differentiate between national netting of emissions under Article 3.3 of the Pro
tocol and pursuit of forestry and other mitigation measures at the project level.
• The issues facing forestry interventions are often the same ones facing other
mitigation options. In most cases, the challenges facing forestry and other pro
ject-level mitigation efforts require policy rather than technical solutions (e.g.,
deﬁning additionality, leakage solutions, permanence).
• Some issues, such as quantiﬁcation of project-level beneﬁts, pose less of an ana
lytical problem than is widely believed because accurate measurement tech
niques are increasingly available and remaining uncertainty can be effectively
addressed.
From the standpoint of a host country, forestry deals will be implemented if
project beneﬁts, to either the government or private landowners, are larger than
those from alternative land uses (e.g. logging, pasture). In other words, the bene
ﬁts of the carbon offset must be greater than the costs of opportunity. Beneﬁts
might include biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, enhanced eco
tourism potential, and expanded marketing of non-timber forest products. These
co-beneﬁts will be weighed against the opportunity costs of diminished timber
sales and secondary processing opportunities, such as value-added revenues,
employment and other multipliers.
What are the priorities for moving forestry issues forward?

Most of the priorities for advancing project-based mitigation objectives in the
forestry sector are the same as those in other project-based mitigation sectors.
Based on the conclusions of the Baltimore workshop referenced in this report,
however, the following prioritization of issues can be put forward:
• CO2 Beneﬁt Permanence: Permanence was identiﬁed by workshop participants
as perhaps the most technically challenging of the issues considered. It is also
the issue most commonly ﬂagged by forestry critics. Permanence is also fun
damentally a policy issue that requires additional consideration with regard to
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•

•

•

•

technical issues such as the value of delaying emissions, “how long is long
enough,” and how to incorporate risk factors (e.g. ﬁre) into project beneﬁt
quantiﬁcation and evaluation.
Standardization of Guidelines and Criteria Across Project-Based Mitigation:
Workshop participants concluded that most issues facing forestry-based off
sets are the same issues facing other types of offsets. Lack of standardization in
the ﬁeld contributes to the concern and confusion surrounding forestry-based
offsets. Once standardization begins, it will become easier to systematically
evaluate the performance of forestry-based offsets against other project types
and determine the degree to which forestry efforts can be integrated into a
larger post-Kyoto climate change mitigation regime.
Leakage: Leakage concerns may pose a signiﬁcant threat to incorporation of
forestry-sector mitigation efforts into a credit-based regime. Although leakage
also affects energy-sector projects, there is disagreement as to whether some
types of leakage are unique to forestry projects and whether the magnitude of
the leakage issue is greater for forestry than for energy-sector projects. Just as
important, the issue of whether project-speciﬁc leakage assessment is even
appropriate remains unresolved in both the energy and forestry sectors.
Protocols for Dealing with the Fate of Forest Products: The treatment of forest
products for forestry-sector mitigation is linked to all three priorities already
identiﬁed. It is also an important issue in its own right, and one for which no
process for standardization has been attempted.
Forestry Project Beneﬁt Quantiﬁcation, Monitoring, and Veriﬁcation: A great deal
of beneﬁt quantiﬁcation, monitoring, and veriﬁcation work has recently been
carried out for forestry-sector mitigation options. Nevertheless, few, if any, stan
dardized protocols have been developed in a way that is accessible to either pro
ject developers or climate change policymakers. Extensive practical work in this
area is still needed. At the same time, project quantiﬁcation issues are seemingly
becoming less important to the future of forestry mitigation as an issue.
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Appendix: Conclusions for policymakers from the Biotics
Assessment Workshop, Baltimore, Maryland, September 1997
Excerpted from: 1998. Trexler and Associates, Inc. The Role of Forestry as a Climate
Change Mitigation Strategy: Report of a Workshop Held in Baltimore, Maryland, Sep
tember 5-7, 1997. Prepared for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Workshop participants felt strongly that certain conclusions from this unusual
gathering of forestry-related expertise should be reported to the policy community.
During the course of the workshop, participants also concluded that a number of
technical issues and questions that have been raised in connection with the feasi
bility and appropriateness of forestry and land use-based offsets can be straightfor
wardly addressed based on existing technical knowledge.The following conclusions
reflect these two categories of findings.
Forestry and land use-based carbon offset projects can be an effective tool that can
provide an important component of any domestic or international climate change
mitigation strategy.
There was strong general agreement that biotic offset projects could provide impor
tant and cost-effective contributions to national or global climate change mitiga
tion strategies. Participants felt that one particular benefit of forestry is that it can
be done on a small scale. It was cautioned repeatedly, however, that biotic offsets are
not a panacea or “the” answer to climate change and that forestry and other land
use-based projects are likely to be a small component of an overall global mitigation
portfolio. At the same time, biotic mitigation strategies have an inherent flexibility
that can build on experience and be adapted to the special circumstances of a par
ticular location, culture, or political situation.
There are three types of forestry and land use-based offset projects: those aimed at
protecting existing carbon reservoirs and sinks (e.g., avoiding carbon emissions from
deforestation and other land-use changes); those aimed at adding to existing carbon
reservoirs; and those aimed at substituting biomass for fossil-fuel-based products
(e.g., energy, cement, and steel products).
Participants recognized that it is important to avoid treating forestry mitigation
options as a monolithic block and that is inappropriate to group all biotic mitigation
technologies under the same tent for purposes either of embracing or dismissing
their climate change mitigation potential. Many different potential forestry-based
mitigation strategies currently exist. Slowing deforestation, for example, can be as
real a CO2 emissions reduction project as a fossil-fuel substitution or demand-side
management project in the energy sector.
There is no question that forestry-based carbon offset projects can help slow the rise
in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 for several decades or more. This will provide
time to implement CO2 mitigation policies and measures that require long lead
times, including conversion to more efficient electrical generation technologies.
Workshop participants agreed that biotic carbon offset projects can help provide
time to make long-term investments and changes. Even the short-term removal of
carbon from the atmosphere provided by some forestry-based offset projects can
have an impact on the rise in atmospheric concentrations of CO2. It was agreed that
while permanence of the carbon benefit is important and should not be ignored,one
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service that biotic offsets can provide – buying time while delaying ghg emissions
– is a significant scientific and policy benefit. It was also agreed that one can look at
certain forestry projects as being permanent in the sense of ensuring carbon stor
age or sequestration over a very long period of time.
Inclusion of biotic carbon offset projects among the strategies for addressing inter
national concerns about global climate change may increase resources available to
support sustainable land-use and forestry practices, both of which are unlikely to be
adequately funded in the absence of such a mechanism.
Workshop participants coined the term “co-benefits” to better describe the signifi
cant non-carbon benefits often accompanying biotic offset projects. The group dis
cussed how debate on this issue tends to take the position of why forestry “isn’t all
that bad.” Rarely does one hear in the literature or professional discussions why
biotic options are good for reasons other than cost-effectiveness (e.g., advancement
of biodiversity goals). Yet non-carbon benefits associated with biotic options are sig
nificant. It was agreed that biotic options provide significant ancillary benefits and
that there are many reasons why these options should be pursued. As some in the
group noted, the carbon offset could in actuality be considered the ancillary benefit:
the reasons for pursuing these projects often are – or often should be – other reasons
that promote environmental and socioeconomic goals.
Biotic carbon offset projects, which include both forestry and land-use management
options, provide an opportunity to support efforts to reduce deforestation and pro
tect vulnerable forest ecosystems, many of which will be lost or degraded in the near
to mid terms (within ~20 years) without additional support.
Workshop participants felt strongly that biotic offset projects can provide a mecha
nism in support of sustainable development practices in developing countries.
Inclusion of biotic options among the strategies for addressing international con
cern about global climate change will increase resources available to support sus
tainable land-use and forestry practices. It was also agreed that time is of the
essence, since many forests face severe threats in the near future. Workshop partic
ipants felt that JI is a unique funding mechanism that could help save threatened
areas while they still exist. Time is crucial in this respect. Several participants agreed
with the observation that “It will be a lost opportunity if we don’t catch it while it’s
there. The question is not whether we can capture the benefit later, it’s whether we
can capture it at all.”
Forestry and energy carbon offset projects both provide carbon benefits over differ
ent timeframes. Some give relatively immediate but long-term benefits (e.g., forest
protection), whereas others provide most of their offset benefits over several
decades (e.g., long-rotation forest plantations). However, as with energy-sector pro
jects, the carbon benefits of projects should not be credited to the project until it has
actually accrued and is verifiable.
Biotic offset projects can provide both short- and long-term benefits. The issue of
perpetuity in connection with biotic offset projects – the timeframe over which a
project offers its benefits – has been contentious and is often raised by critics. It was
noted that even energy projects cannot claim to yield perpetual emissions reduc
tions; a 200-year timeframe before gas reserves are depleted (and gas that is con
served today is emitted) would still only be a delay of emissions.
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The precision with which we can measure carbon accumulation in onsite vegetation
associated with forestry carbon offset projects is very high – up to ( 10%, with a con
fidence of 95% in most situations.
A project’s carbon benefits can be measured with a high degree of precision. A
number of the workshop participants, with extensive fieldwork experience in this
area, felt confident that a ±10% figure is achievable. The effort to reach this high
level of precision will vary among projects. Workshop participants noted that this
level of precision is comparable to that found in many energy-sector carbon offset
projects.
Whatever the concern associated with the level of measurement precision achiev
able for a given project, it is always possible to report the net carbon benefit based
on the lower bound of the achieved confidence interval. Doing so makes the carbon
benefits claimed highly credible in relation to energy projects, for which estimates
may be more precise.
Participants felt strongly that even though some forestry projects will be unable to
match the quantification precision of many energy projects, this is no basis for argu
ing that forestry projects should not play a role in mitigation efforts or in a CO2 trad
ing regime. If considered appropriate by policymakers, means are readily available to
adjust the quantified benefits of different project types for uncertainties of this sort.
Where appropriate, such adjustments should be applied to energy sector as well as
forestry-sector projects.
It is relatively easy, and the cost is often modest, to measure on-site carbon stored or
sequestered as a result of a forestry carbon offset project. Measurement is similar to
the cost and ease of measuring carbon savings associated with many energy carbon
offset projects.
Participants concluded that as a technical and practical matter, the cost of measur
ing carbon in biotic offset projects is not significant; in any event, it is comparable to
the technical and practical cost issues associated with many energy offset projects.
It was generally agreed that this was a non-issue despite being commonly raised by
critics.
Some categories of biotic projects are capable of meeting a crediting regime, what
ever that regime might be.
Workshop participants felt that while the characteristics of forestry-based offset
projects vary widely with respect to quantifiability, leakage, persistence, and other
variables, there are forestry-based measures that can successfully conform to any
crediting regime that might be developed in the future.
Accounting for the leakage of carbon benefits, if any, associated with biotic carbon
offset projects is similar to that associated with many energy projects.
Participants concluded that leakage is an issue to consider in both energy and
forestry-based projects and that the potential sources of leakage facing both cate
gories of projects are often similar (although magnitudes may differ).
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Third-party verification of accrued carbon presents similar technical issues in both
forestry and energy projects. For both types of projects, verification improves the
accuracy of carbon claims; it can enhance and verify the environmental and social
benefits of biotic offset projects.
Participants generally agreed that third-party verification is desirable for offset pro
jects generally. Some questioned whether such a mandate might not simply add
another bureaucratic layer to offset projects. Participants observed that third-party
verification is an issue of credibility of measurement and analysis, rather than one of
standard-setting.
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Adaptation to climate change and variability
in the context of sustainable development 1
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Abstract
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc)
demonstrated international agreement that global co-operation is required to for
mulate and implement adaptation strategies. However, the development of further
understanding of adaptation, and movement towards international agreement on
what steps should be taken in order to facilitate it,has lagged well behind mitigation.
This paper describes a variety of current perspectives on adaptation.It then moves
on to report on the state of knowledge and thinking as reflected in recent research
in Uganda, Antigua and Barbuda, and Pakistan. On this basis, the paper concludes
with the identification of several possible approaches to the development of inter
national co-operation on adaptation in the context of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.

Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognises both
adaptation and mitigation as essential responses to the risks of climate change.
Mitigation is the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the sequestration of
carbon dioxide in vegetation and soils to help stabilise the concentration of green
house gasses in the atmosphere. Adaptation is all adjustments in socio-economic
systems designed to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Since the Convention
was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, there has been much focus has been on mit
igation, and little attention paid to adaptation. However, the recognition that
adaptation to climate change is imperative, and even urgent, is growing. This
paper is a discussion of the range of possible adaptation responses and how they
can be integrated into national economic development planning and investment.
Adaptation in developed and developing countries

Adaptation can reduce the impacts of climate change in both developed (Annex
I) and developing countries. It has been authoritatively concluded that in devel
oped countries the capacity to adapt is high (National Academy of Sciences 1992).
This conﬁdence must be qualiﬁed in three ways:

1 This paper is based on
research that was supported in
part by the U.S. Agency for
International Development
working through the World
Resources Institute, Washing
ton D.C. and by the United
Nations Environment Programme with support from the
Global Environment Facility
(gef).

154

   
• First, adaptation is most applicable to heavily managed socio-economic sec
tors. In the National Academy Report these sectors are listed as farming, man
aged forests and grasslands, water resources, tourism and recreation, settle
ments and coastal structures, human migration, and domestic tranquillity.
Natural landscape and marine ecosystems are delineated in the Report as areas
that are sensitive to climate change and where adaptation is questionable.
• Second, the costs of adaptation remain largely uncharted (Rothman et al. 1998;
Bein et al. 1999). It is commonly assumed that the costs will be relatively low in
relation to national wealth, but this may not be the case. It will depend on the
magnitude and rate of climate change, which remain uncertain.
• Third, conﬁdence in the ability to adapt assumes that climate change will be
slow and incremental, and will not involve dramatic events such as sudden
shifts in ocean circulation. The probability of these events is presumably low,
but they could be catastrophic.
These caveats notwithstanding, the view that developed countries can cope
with the necessary adaptation without broad international agreement or con
certed actions is widely accepted. Recognition is growing, however, that adapta
tion measures adopted in one country might have consequences for other coun
tries. This applies most clearly in transboundary situations. For example, when
adaptations to changing hydrological regimes are made in a country that shares a
river basin with neighbouring countries, the repercussions are likely to be
regional. Adaptation policies and measures may also aﬀect the terms of trade, both
regionally, in cases such as the European Union and under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, and globally, through the World Trade Organization. As
such, it seems likely that some international agreements or understandings will
eventually be required.
In developing countries, especially the poorer, least developed, and most vul
nerable to the eﬀects of varying climate, the capacity to adapt is generally much
lower than developed countries. This is due to a relative lack of ﬁnancial resources;
less access to technology; weaker scientiﬁc research and development capacity;
fewer eﬀective institutions, social and governmental organisation; and less devel
opment of skilled human resources. In addition, not only is the actual amount of
national wealth a factor, but its distribution is also important. Countries with
larger proportions of the population living in poverty have less adaptive capacity.
The uncertainty about the response of natural ecosystems and potential loss of
biodiversity is another impediment to the development of sound adaptation poli
cies, especially in tropical countries.
The large divergence of adaptive capacity between fully developed and least
developed countries is the major reason why the impacts of climate change are
likely to be much greater in those regions where climate change, measured in
terms of mean temperature change, is projected to be least ( 1996a). These
regions can be described as low latitude or tropical. Signiﬁcantly larger changes in
mean annual temperature are projected for middle and high latitudes. However,
the fact that the more highly developed countries, with greater adaptive capacity,
are largely located in these regions is expected to reduce impacts.
Since the  was agreed to in 1992, major emphasis has been placed on
attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of this writing (June
2000), negotiators were seeking ratiﬁcation and implementation of the Kyoto Pro
tocol. The goal is to complete these negotiations by the time of the sixth meeting


of the Conference of the Parties (-) to be held in The Hague in the Nether
lands in November of 2000. So far, there has been little discussion of international
co-operation for adaptation, with the exception of National Communications
under the Convention.
This paper is intended to place adaptation more ﬁrmly in the context of sus
tainable development. By drawing attention to the importance of both mitigation
and adaptation as components in a balanced portfolio of responses, it is the
author’s intention to help stimulate more debate and more rapid progress. Sub
stantial mitigation will take considerable time to achieve. Adaptation measures to
address existing and future vulnerability can be taken now.
The Climate Convention context

From the outset of the negotiations for the  in the late 1980s, adaptation to
climate change was treated as secondary to mitigation. The ultimate objective of
the Convention is stated as the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer
ence with the climate system.” What followed this initial formulation was over
whelming concentration on mitigation: how much mitigation is needed, when, at
what rate, and what is the appropriate distribution of responsibility for achieving
agreed upon targets on schedule? The requirement that the agreement be inter
national stems from the global nature of climate change. Since all countries con
tribute greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, albeit in unequal amounts, it is
imperative that all countries agree on their respective responsibilities in order to
avoid the “free rider” problem—where non-Parties enjoy the beneﬁts of the steps
taken without actually participating.
Nevertheless, the Convention does recognise the eventual need for adaptation.
This is speciﬁed in Article 4.1 of the Convention as well as in Article 4.4, which pro
vides that “Annex II Parties shall also assist the developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse eﬀects of climate change in meeting the costs
of adaptation to those adverse eﬀects.” According to one commentator,“This pro
vision is the clearest expression of the acceptance that the Convention is as much
about adaptation as it is about mitigation” (Yamin 1998).
Over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the life of the Convention, up through the agreement
on the Kyoto Protocol, a disproportionate amount of attention has continued to
be devoted to mitigation. Six considerations help to explain the reluctance to
address adaptation:
• Adaptation has been thought of as a long-term strategy that can be delayed
until the eﬀects of climate change are more evident and less uncertain.
• Adaptation has been so broadly deﬁned that the potential range of adaptation
measures is extremely large. At the same time, there is still neither adequate
information on the costs of adaptation nor an agreed upon basis for the deter
mination of priorities.
• The developed country Parties have been concerned about exposing them
selves to substantial and ill-deﬁned demands for assistance under Article 4.4.
Guidance provided by the developed countries to the Convention’s ﬁnancial
mechanism, the Global Environmental Facility (), has so far worked to
restrain the provision of assistance for adaptation.
• The GEF was initially established in response to developing country demands
for international funding to meet the additional costs of responding to the need
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for global environmental protection. A criterion for  funding, therefore,
has been that global environmental beneﬁts be demonstrated in order for an
initiative to be eligible. In the case of adaptation, it is generally believed that the
beneﬁts are overwhelmingly domestic, and therefore additional funds beyond
normal development assistance are not justiﬁed except where genuinely global
beneﬁts can be demonstrated.
• Many development activities already account for present day climate as well as
its associated probable future variability and extremes (in theory, at least).
Since it is not yet, and may never be, possible for atmospheric science to dis
tinguish with certainty between normal climate variability and climate change
on either a local or regional scale, it follows that there is no scientiﬁc basis for
distinguishing between adaptation measures to natural climate factors (and
their costs) and to climate change.
• Throughout the international negotiations, developing country representa
tives have regarded adaptation as a potential source of outﬂows or costs. Mit
igation measures, however, have been seen as potential sources of inﬂows or
ﬁnancial assistance (through Joint Implementation and the Clean Develop
ment Mechanism).
Of these six biases against addressing adaptation more aggressively, two have
lost much of their credibility: lack of urgency and lack of global beneﬁts.
Lack of urgency
The recent dramatic increase in the ﬁnancial costs of weather-related natural dis
asters has helped to create a sense of urgency. While it cannot be scientiﬁcally
proven that the magnitude of the climate variability and extremes currently being
experienced is linked directly to climate change, there is certainly a possibility that
this is the case. Atmospheric scientists generally agree that such a pattern is con
sistent with the changes that could be expected as a result of atmospheric desta
bilisation and intensiﬁcation of the hydrological cycle caused by climate change.
The cost of weather-related disasters in 1998 exceeded the cumulative cost of all
such disasters in the 1980s (Annan 1999). The extreme losses of 1998 can be attrib
uted to the unprecedented strength of the 1997-98 El Niño event. Here, again, a link
to climate change is possible but not proven. Despite these necessary qualiﬁca
tions, the link between climate change and current extreme events is suﬃcient
cause for alarm, and has fuelled the sense of urgency.
Lack of global beneﬁts
The argument that adaptation measures do not yield substantial global beneﬁts is
oﬀset by the recognition that the costs of adapting to climate change have, in eﬀect,
been imposed on all countries by the historical emissions of greenhouse gases pri
marily from the developed country Parties. Indeed, the acceptance of responsibil
ity in meeting the costs of adaptation, as stated in Article 4.4, is tacit recognition
of this culpability (Fankhauser 1996). Furthermore, the prevention of large-scale
losses from climate-related natural disasters can have substantial global beneﬁts.
In the case of Hurricane Mitch, for example, the economic losses in Guatemala
and Nicaragua equalled approximately ten years of economic growth. Such set
backs are occurring more and more frequently, and are a real cost to global eco
nomic development. This is in addition to the growing costs of emergency relief
and rehabilitation for disasters, the growing threat that is posed to political and


In the case of Hurricane Mitch, the economic losses in Guatemala and Nicaragua
equalled approximately ten years of economic growth. Such setbacks are occur
ring more and more frequently, and are a real cost to global economic develop
ment. This is in addition to the growing costs of emergency relief and rehabilita
tion for disasters, the growing threat that is posed to political and social stability,
and the potential increases of transboundary and transoceanic refugees. In the
case of Hurricane Mitch, for example, the economic losses in Guatemala and
Nicaragua equalled approximately ten years of economic growth.
social stability, and the potential increases of transboundary and transoceanic
refugees.
The remaining four reservations about adaptation are addressed in this paper.
While completely satisfactory answers are not yet available, it is becoming increas
ingly clear that the costs of adaptation to climate change need not be a huge black
hole with an unlimited capacity to absorb ﬁnancial resources. Ways are being
sought to distinguish the costs of adaptation to climate from adaptation to climate
change. While this distinction cannot be based on a rigorous scientiﬁc distinction
between climate, climate variability, and climate change, there is an emerging
sense of what might be considered reasonable incremental costs. At the same time,
developing countries are recognising that there is a strong case to be made for
additional assistance in their eﬀorts to meet the costs of adaptation. The outcome
is likely to depend more on negotiation than on science, but the gap in positions
no longer looks unbridgeable.
What is meant by ‘adaptation to climate change?’

The  does not deﬁne adaptation, and there is generally a lack of a formally
agreed-upon deﬁnition. The closest thing to an authoritative deﬁnition may be
found in text from an  Technical Analysis where it is stated that “adaptation
refers to the adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems in response to
actual or expected climate stimuli, their eﬀects or impacts. It refers to changes in
processes, practices and structures to moderate potential damages or to beneﬁt
from opportunities associated with climate change” ( 1996b).
It is sometimes claimed in the new research and policy literature on adaptation
to climate change that adaptation is a new ﬁeld about which there is little knowl
edge or experience. This is true if it is applied strictly to anthropogenic climate
change. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that an entirely new ﬁeld of sci
ence is being created. While the scope of adaptation is clearly very wide, the range
is dramatically reduced if a distinction is made between adaptation to climate and
adaptation to climate change (Burton 1997).
Adaptation to climate has always been an essential part of the evolution and
survival of both natural and human systems. In all regions, the pattern and design
of human settlements and infrastructure, agricultural practices and crop selec
tion, and a range of various other activities have been successfully adapted to the
prevailing climate over the centuries. In each of the socio-economic sectors at risk
from climate change there exists both theoretical and practical knowledge con
cerning responses to climate as well as climate variability and extremes (Washing
ton Advisory Group 1999). The character of this knowledge diﬀers from sector to
sector. In agriculture, for example, there is a great deal of practical knowledge and
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local experience in every farming community. This is the basis of day-to-day deci
sions individual farmers make about factors such as cultivators, timing, and meth
ods of cultivation. This fundamental knowledge is augmented by a considerable
body of knowledge encompassed in crop models, which correlate to the responses
of various types of crops with a wide range of climatic and weather variables.
Weather and climate variables are also taken into account in design standards
for components of infrastructure. For example, in water management, trans
portation, forestry, tourism and recreation, health protection, and coastal zone
management, factors of climate variability and extremes are always an element in
design and decisions, either formally or informally. In addition, residential, com
mercial and industrial properties, bridges, highways, drainage channels, and docks
and harbours are frequently subject to weather and climate-related standards that
are oﬃcially approved, the implementation of which is commonly the responsi
bility of construction companies and other members of the private sector. Thus,
adaptation to climate change is not something that must start from scratch. It is
an incremental process that can build upon a long history of previous adaptation.
What is new is the need to adapt much more rapidly because of the impact of
human activities on climate. This is likely to be more diﬃcult and more expensive,
and is a legitimate charge against the global economic resources that are available
through such ﬁnancial mechanisms as the Global Environment Facility.
In order to develop the science of climate change adaptation, it will be neces
sary to build on this existing knowledge in increments that allow for new and,
probably wider, ranges of variability and extremes than have previously been con
sidered. However, there is one important new element that implies that the science
of adaptation to climate change will require more than incremental changes to the
sum of previously employed methods for adapting to climate change. Risk man
agement for climate and weather variability and extremes has previously been
quite compartmentalised. Diﬀerent weather variables with diﬀerent underlying
causes aﬀect diﬀerent sectors. Accordingly, those concerned with weather and cli
mate variability have developed their sciences quite separately from one another.
In this way, agricultural priorities, and therefore techniques, are likely to be dis
tinct from those applied in forestry, water resources management, and building
and infrastructure design. For example, farmers are more concerned about the
likelihood of frost or drought, and less concerned with the heating and ventilating
of large buildings for human occupation. The sciences of agronomy, hydrology,
forestry, architecture, construction design and engineering, and human health
have all developed unique approaches and terminologies for risk assessment. Now
they are confronted with a risk to which they are all vulnerable, albeit in diﬀerent
ways and to diﬀerent degrees. This common threat is forcing a convergence of
methodologies and terminologies towards what might be called integrated risk
assessment for climate change. This process is only beginning, and its momentum
is apparent in the growing ﬁeld of integrated assessment modelling.
The identification of adaptation needs and their assessment

Within this broad conception of adaptation to climate change it becomes neces
sary to specify, within each country and each locality, what the adaptation needs
are and to prioritise them. In developed countries it has thus far been assumed that
the various socio-economic groups will have the capacity to adapt, and that little
or no overall planning or policy is required. To the extent that preparatory action


Thus, adaptation to climate change is not something that must start from scratch.
It is an incremental process that can build upon a long history of previous adap
tation. What is new is the need to adapt much more rapidly because of the impact
of human activities on climate.
is thought necessary, it has tended to focus on research for future adaptation that
has concentrated on climate impact studies.
In developing countries the search for adaptation needs and the development
of priorities has received a little more attention. The reasons for this are that the
need for adaptation is likely to be greater and the capacity is known to be less.
Developing country governments have also been hoping, and in some cases
requesting, that Annex II Parties will assist them in meeting the costs of adapta
tion. It is therefore in their best interests to be able to demonstrate that adaptation
needs exist and can be assessed. The decisions of the Conference of Parties ()
reﬂect recognition of this.
The Global Environment Facility has been designated the ﬁnancial mechanism
for the Convention, and it functions under the guidance of and with accountabil
ity to the . At the ﬁrst meeting of the Conference of the Parties (-), held
in Berlin in 1995, it was agreed in Decision 11/.1 that adaptation would take place
in developing countries in three sequential stages, using short, medium and long
term strategies. The stages are speciﬁed as follows:
• Stage I was deﬁned as the planning level, to involve studies for identifying the
impacts of climate change, those countries or regions that are particularly vul
nerable, and policy options for adaptation and capacity building.
• During Stage II, as envisaged in Article 4.1(e) of the Convention, measures are
to be implemented in those countries/regions that have been identiﬁed in Stage
I as particularly vulnerable. These activities are to include capacity-building to
prepare for adaptation.
• Stage III will concentrate on measures to facilitate adaptation, including insur
ance, as envisaged in Article 4.1 (b) and Article 4.4 of the Convention.
At the fourth meeting of the  in Buenos Aires in 1998, based on communi
cations between the Parties to the Convention Secretariat, it was agreed that it was
time to move from Stage I to Stage II.
During the ﬁrst few years of the Climate Change Convention, support to devel
oping countries under Stage I was limited (with few exceptions) to assistance in
preparing National Communications. This is expected to continue under Stages
II and III. One commentator cites “reluctance on the part of the  to ﬁnance
adaptation measures” (Yamin 1998), which is said to be “fuelled by donor concern
about responsibility for adaptation costs” (Yamin 1998). The reluctance stems in
part from the ’ constitutional mandate to fund actions that result in “global
environmental beneﬁts.” Adaptation beneﬁts are assumed to be domestically con
centrated and to generate no easily quantiﬁable global environmental beneﬁts
(Werksman 1993).
There has been some additional support for adaptation studies. Prominent
among these are the U.S. Country Studies Program (Smith et al. 1996), and the
Country Studies supported by the  through the United Nations Environment
Programme, which sponsored analyses in Cameroon, Pakistan, Estonia, and
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The sciences of agronomy, hydrology, forestry, architecture, construction design
and engineering, and human health have all developed unique approaches and
terminologies for risk assessment. Now they are confronted with a risk to which
they are all vulnerable, albeit in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent degrees. This
common threat is forcing a convergence of methodologies and terminologies
towards what might be called integrated risk assessment for climate change.
Antigua and Barbuda in 1998. In addition, the Netherlands has supported a
number of Country Studies, and one project has been carried out in Uganda in
association with the World Resources Institute with the support of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (Apuuli et al. 2000). The  also supported an
important regional initiative in the Caribbean ( 1995), and the World Bank
and others have supported development of an adaptation strategy for Bangladesh
(World Bank, forthcoming). However, these are exceptions that prove the rule
about the relative lack of major or widespread support for adaptation to date.
A review of these studies reveals no case in which a speciﬁc adaptation measure
is identiﬁed that clearly applies to climate change alone, and does not also yield
additional or co-beneﬁts from the reduction of damages from known climate
variability. Most of the studies have focused primarily on the potential impacts of
climate change and have devoted little attention to adaptation beyond the creation
of long lists of needed adaptation measures. However, discussions of the contents
of three of the studies, which may be considered exceptional, are included here.
Uganda

In the course of the Uganda study, a useful distinction emerged between crosscut
ting measures with regard to a variety of government policies and programmes
that are multisectoral, and single sector measures. These sectoral measures may be
further subdivided into groups that can be considered general and speciﬁc. When
this three-fold grouping of adaptation measures is applied to other adaptation
studies, almost invariably examples of all three types are identiﬁed. In the case of
Uganda, the following crosscutting measures were proposed at a workshop that
was attended by government experts, policymakers, university-based scientists,
and environmental non-governmental organisations (Republic of Uganda 1997).
Proposed multisectoral and crosscutting measures
• strengthening Uganda’s meteorological services so that they could provide reli
able medium to long-term drought and ﬂood advisories;
• strengthening the Early Warning Information capacity, especially for food
security and short-term climate prediction;
• incorporating climate change and variability information and projections into
Uganda’s long-term development plans, such as the National Environment
Action Plan (), the Water Action Plan (), the Forest Action Plan
(), the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (), and the Decentralisation
Process;
• conducting an inventory of existing practices and policies used to adapt to diﬀ
erent climates in all agencies and sectors in order to begin more detailed iden
tiﬁcation of adaptation measures for evaluation and adoption;
• ensuring that the Uganda Disaster Preparedness Committee () includes


long-term climate change and climate variability hazard reduction in its workplan;
• promoting awareness of climate variability and change and potential response
alternatives throughout Ugandan society.
Proposed general sectoral measures
• reviewing agricultural policies to ﬁnd ways of reducing existing vulnerability
and avoiding creation of new vulnerabilities;
• renegotiating the Nile Waters Agreement to include climate change response
plans;
• reviewing the Uganda Forest Action plan to ensure that climate variability and
change have been adequately considered.
Proposed speciﬁc sectoral measures
• reducing reliance on monoculture planting of matoke bananas;
• expanding irrigation and increasing irrigation eﬃciency;
• adopting contingency plans aimed at managing current climate variability, for
both droughts and ﬂoods, at both the national and local levels, but especially
in the most vulnerable districts;
• ensuring that development on potential dam sites along the Nile River and
other basins is controlled to ensure future development without encum
brances;
• encouraging water conservation at all community levels, using appropriate
methods, including market based systems;
• enhancing and strengthening the Uganda Tree Seed Project to ensure that orig
inal biodiversity is protected against climate change and climate variability;
• reducing geographic fragmentation of forests to ensure that forest types can
freely migrate in the face of climate change;
• encouraging oﬀ-site biodiversity protection in order to avoid species extinction.
Antigua and Barbuda

Probably the most comprehensive study to date of climate change impacts and
adaptation needs at the national level was completed in Antigua and Barbuda in
1998. This is largely because the country is relatively small, with about 170 square
miles (440 km2) and a population of about 64,000, which meant that no part of
the national territory was excluded from the study. Thus, the six sectors examined
account for virtually all the economic activity and environmental resources of the
country. The study encompassed coastal zones, ﬁsheries, agriculture (including
forestry and livestock), water resources, human health, and human settlements
and tourism.
For each of these sectors, detailed studies of potential impacts were made, and
a list of more than 60 adaptation needs was assembled. No attempt was made to
establish priorities for adaptation between sectors, although some preliminary
screening of adaptation measures was carried out within sectors.
The report concludes that the major sources of impacts are likely to be hurri
canes, sea level rise, and drought. It is not possible to say with conﬁdence to what
extent hurricanes may increase in frequency and severity, or how rapidly sea level
rise may occur, nor how much more frequent and intense the area’s recurrent
droughts may become under climate change. It is clear, however, that all three of
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these phenomena now cause substantial damage to the economy, and that present
adaptation measures are insuﬃcient. Antigua and Barbuda presents a clear “win
win”or “no regrets”adaptation case. Augmentation of present measures is needed,
and will yield higher beneﬁts the more rapidly climate change related impacts
intensify. The water resources and human settlements and tourism sectors illus
trate the situation.
Water resources
Potable water supplies in Antigua and Barbuda are already limited, especially in
the dry season and during the recurrent drought years. There is competition
among users for available water. When supplies are not suﬃcient to cater to all,
municipal uses and the commercial hotel sector receive water services at the
expense of agriculture. High variability between seasons and between years com
pounds the diﬃculty of water management. According to the report, “There is no
national water resources management policy or strategy to cope with the stressed
water situation and the possible impacts of climate change.” The report proposes
a general, sector-wide adaptation approach, which would require the launching of
a Water Resources Management Action Programme that would include, but not
be limited to, the following components:
• more eﬃcient management of existing supplies and infrastructure;
• the initiation of institutional arrangements to limit future demands and to
establish integrated water resources management;
• the strengthening of water resources monitoring and information systems;
• promoting conservation.
In Antigua and Barbuda, as elsewhere, improved water management is an
urgent requirement. Such actions would yield beneﬁts in the near term, regardless
of climate change. With climate change these actions are likely to be even more
beneﬁcial. Conversely, unless water management is improved, the impacts of cli
mate change will be that much greater.
A number of speciﬁc measures have been proposed in addition to the general
measures outlined for the Water Resources Management Action Programme,
including:
displacement devices that reduce the amount of water toilet tanks hold;
low-ﬂow faucets;
watershed rehabilitation;
setting up new reservoir capacity to capture and store excess ﬂows produced by
altered precipitation, run-oﬀ patterns, and storms;
• digging deep wells.
•
•
•
•

These are in addition to the existing plans of the Antigua Public Utilities
Authority (), which call for increased desalination capacity, exploration of
deep aquifers, automatic water transmission control, and decreased “leakage”
through waste control measures and diminished illegal connections.
Human settlements and tourism
Hurricanes and tropical storms are the major risk to human settlements and infra
structure in Antigua and Barbuda. Even a small increase in the frequency or intensity
of such storms could have severe eﬀects on the national economy. In September 1989,


Hurricane Hugo caused an estimated $154.1 million (East Caribbean Dollars) in
direct damage, including $130 million to buildings. This amounted to 17.6% of the
Gross Domestic Product (), which was comparable to ﬁve or more years of eco
nomic growth at current average rates. In September 1995, Hurricane Luis had worse
consequences, and the cost of direct damages was estimated at $364.5 million,
which was 30.5% of , equal to about ten years of economic development.
The following adaptation measures have been proposed to reduce the vulner
ability of human settlements and infrastructure to climate change:
• hazard mapping, which involves identifying the areas that are most vulnerable
to the eﬀects of climate change on maps;
• ﬂood control, which includes cleaning watercourses and drains, and preven
tion of ﬁlling-in of the natural drainage system;
• land use controls and enforcement, which includes:
• implementing zoning regulations to demarcate speciﬁc areas for diﬀerent
types of land use, such as building densities and height limits within each
zone;
• creating building codes and planning and infrastructure standards; and
• establishing setback requirement for coastal zones;
• retroﬁtting existing structures, which involves refurbishing old structures to
bring them up to building code standards and, more importantly, strengthen
ing their resilience against hurricanes and droughts;
• capacity building, which involves strengthening institutions such as the Devel
opment Control Authority and other agencies responsible for environmental
management. It also encompasses improvements in inter-agency co-ordination;
• improving forecasting and early warning systems in order to increase pre
paredness;
• a public education and information systems programme, to heighten the
public awareness of global warming and its eﬀects.
Pakistan

The Pakistan Country Study, also conducted in 1998, concentrated on the water,
agriculture, and forest sectors. Within these three sectors, the Pakistan study is one
of the most sophisticated yet undertaken, especially in its use of socio-economic
scenarios of future growth and development and its treatment of adaptation to cli
mate change in the context of economic development. Pakistan has a hot, arid cli
mate that would support a much lower population were it not for exogenous river
ﬂow, which permits extensive irrigation. Pakistan’s Indus Plains have the world’s
largest contiguous irrigation system, and there is year round cropping in much of
the area. Water potential, waterlogging and salinity, and water use eﬃciency are
the current key issues, and will continue to be in the future. Population growth has
been rapid, from 32.5 million in 1947 at the time of independence to an estimated
138 million in 1999, and is projected to reach approximately 229 million by 2020.
A number of climate change scenarios were employed in the Pakistani study. In
general,
… the results show that while the total water storage in the system remains
insuﬃcient, the water resources operation under various climate scenarios
shows that the problem will become more acute in the future. The problem
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will become more serious if the increase in temperature is coupled with the
decrease in precipitation. The net overall capacity of the system to supply
water in time will decrease in Pakistan unless some urgent actions are taken
(Government of Pakistan 1998).
The adaptation strategy for the water sector may be summed up as “the con
servation and eﬃcient use of water in an informed and eﬃcient manner” (Gov
ernment of Pakistan 1998). The report concludes that water managers will be
forced to re-evaluate the operations of the whole system and revise the allocation
of water for agriculture in various irrigated areas. Adaptation options reviewed in
the report include:
•
•
•
•
•

mitigating the hazards of ﬂoods;
altering streamﬂow regime by the construction of reservoirs;
alleviating economic damages of waterlogging and salinity;
augmenting supplies;
re-allocating the available resources (Government of Pakistan 1998).

With regard to agriculture, the Pakistani study reports that the production of
major crops like wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane will have to double by the year
2020 in order to meet the needs of the country’s growing population. “...climate
change would further demand to increase the annual growth rate in agriculture of
around 0.1% and 0.2% for the periods 1997-2020 and 2021-2050 respectively” (sic.)
(Government of Pakistan 1998). The study concludes that this expansion of pro
duction, and the water inputs it will require, are feasible. However, it will necessi
tate the adaptation of very high eﬃciency irrigation systems as well as improved
agronomic practices. The study uses a coupling of sprinkler and drip irrigation
systems with chemigation facilities as an example of this.
Conclusions to be drawn from the county studies

Despite the many political and geographical factors that set Pakistan, Uganda, and
Antigua and Barbuda apart from each other, there is one general conclusion that
may be drawn from all three: many of the activities recommended for adaptation
to climate change would be needed in any case. There is a risk level that each coun
try maintains with regard to elemental factors such as the availability of potable
water and crop security. If this risk level is to be maintained, the threat of climate
change is a reason for the recommended actions to be accelerated. At this point,
risk levels in many countries are no longer consistent with sustainable develop
ment, which means that climate change ought to add even more force to the argu
ment for accelerating adaptation. However, adaptation to climate change is not
limited to the simple hastening of development activities that would have hap
pened in any case. It will only be successful if complemented by parallel changes
in policy, management practices, and innovations in monitoring, forecasting, and
research. In addition to the concurrence of results among the three studies dis
cussed here, these conclusions are consistent with those emerging from other
studies, such as the U.S. Country Studies Program, as well as the more limited
adaptation studies that have been completed in developed countries.
The assessment of adaptation measures

Attempts to measure the costs of adaptation to climate change are few and far
between. In the impact and adaptation studies cited, the common pattern has been


that major emphasis is placed upon impacts, and then lists of possible adaptation
options are generated. In some cases a preliminary screening of measures has been
carried out, but there has not been a thorough assessment of adaptation to date.
This is not for lack of methodology or guidelines on how to proceed, nor for a lack
of theory on cost. It is simply a matter of time before well-grounded estimates of
adaptation costs become commonplace.
In 1999, Stratus Consulting prepared the Compendium of Decision Tools to
Evaluate Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change for the Secretariat of the
. Despite the use of the word “strategies” in the title, most of the tools in
this volume actually refer to the evaluation of speciﬁc projects. The Compendium
describes nine tools that are applicable to multiple sectors, including beneﬁt-cost
analysis, risk analysis, expert judgement, and a range of screening techniques.
Twenty-three additional tools are described for selected sectors: water (5), coastal
zones (5), agriculture (11), and human health (2). These largely consist of physical
and economic models, as well as some more general methodologies.
A more detailed description of the application of beneﬁt-cost analysis has also
been prepared for the  (Smith et al. 1997). In addition, guidelines for impact
and adaptation assessment have been prepared and widely disseminated in coun
try study programmes (Feenstra et al. 1998; Carter et al. 1994; Benioﬀ et al. 1996).
More theoretical groundwork on the potential costs of adaptation has been
developed in a number of papers (Fankhauser and Tol 1996; Yohe 1996). Method
ological questions regarding the costing of adaptation are also addressed in the
work of the  and elsewhere.
In a practical demonstration of the application of beneﬁt-cost methods, Smith
and others (Smith et al. 1998) discuss three case studies: ﬂood prevention measures
on the Meuse river in the Netherlands; augmentation of storage capacity by 25%
in a proposed water supply reservoir in the western United States; and adaptation
to a one-metre sea level rise in the height of a bridge between New Brunswick and
Prince Edward Island, Canada. In theory, in all three situations there is a case to
be made for precautionary or anticipatory adaptation measures involving changes
in project design. However, in each case the beneﬁts of these measures would only
justify the cost under the most severe assumptions about the occurrence of
extreme events and the discount rates most favourable to the project. Discount
rates greater than 5% result in virtually zero present value for avoided climate
change impacts in the middle and latter part of the next century. In order for the
bridge raising and the dam enlargement to be justiﬁed, it would be necessary to
assume a 100% probability of a one-metre rise in sea level or a 10% decrease in pre
cipitation respectively.
The Smith analysis does not negate the argument that precautionary or antic
ipatory adaptation merits consideration, especially when considering long-term
infrastructure investments. The same group of experts have proposed three
“simple rules” to guide adaptation decisions:
• Adaptation measures should be considered now, rather than delayed until
more concrete evidence of climate impacts is available;
• Measures to increase ﬂexibility and robustness in project design are justiﬁable;
and
• Public (governmental) action to facilitate adaptation is needed, because with
out it autonomous adaptation will either not take place or will be less than opti
mal (Fankhauser et al. 1999).
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The literature also strongly suggests, however, that there is likely to be little jus
tiﬁcation for massive investment in adaptation measures in the short-term. It
seems that adaptation measures can be justiﬁed, but at the project level the costs
will be limited to marginal increases in the aggregate costs of projects justiﬁed in
their own right, regardless of the impacts of climate change, or its speed.
This conclusion seems likely to be viable at the project level, i.e. when it relates
to speciﬁc adaptation measures, and to some extent within sectors. However, as is
demonstrated by the case studies of adaptation completed to date, there is an argu
ment to be made for a more strategic approach to adaptation. So far none of the
adaptation literature addresses the costs of the multisectoral and crosscutting
measures that are being advocated to strengthen the capacity to adapt. When it
comes to speciﬁc adaptation measures, it seems reasonable to make assessments
based on the marginal increments that can be justiﬁed in project design to reduce
potential losses from climate change related impacts. Where broadly based
national programmes of water management (Pakistan), coastal zone management
(Antigua and Barbuda), and management of ﬂoods and droughts (Uganda) are
involved, it is not entirely clear how the beneﬁts of incremental strengthening or
acceleration are to be measured. Yet, at this stage in the evolution of the climate
change regime, it is the strengthening of national capacity to adapt, and the mod
iﬁcation of existing development plans to take climate change into account, that
are most urgently required.
Adaptation and mitigation in the context of sustainable development

The conventional view has been that climate change is primarily a pollution prob
lem. The problem begins with the emission of greenhouse gases from human
activities, resulting in increased atmospheric concentrations, which give rise to clifigure 1
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mate change and adverse impacts on human socio-economic activities and on
natural systems. It is this “pollution” view which has led to the emphasis on miti
gation or the reduction of emissions. It is a rather linear cause and eﬀect perspec
tive. In fact, the relationship between people and climate is interactive and there is
a long history of adaptation to climate (and slowly changing climate) that has been
taking place over thousands of years, long before the emergence of anthropogenic
climate change as a public policy issue.
Figure 1 is a simpliﬁed view of climate and society as an interactive process. The
climate cycle is represented by ovals ( to ), and human intervention in the
cycle is represented by rectangles (- to -). One can enter the cycle at any
point, and all the components operate continually. Following convention, the
ﬁgure “begins” with the state of human activities at what can be assumed to be the
present (). The environmental impact of human activities () can be described
by the formula  = , where environmental impact is a function of the level of
population (), the aﬄuence or level of consumption prevailing in the population
(), and the technology in use to extract natural resources, produce goods and ser
vices, and dispose of (or recycle) wastes (). In the case of climate change, the rel
evant consequence is the emission of greenhouse gases. The storage of carbon in
biomass is also a result, although it is not depicted in Figure 1. Human Interven
tion 1 (-) consists of the measurement of emissions (and carbon sequestra
tion) and eﬀorts to control or reduce them through activities such as increasing
energy eﬃciency, fuel switching, and tree planting.
As a result of population, aﬄuence, and technology, as well as eﬀorts at reduc
tion, a level of greenhouse emissions prevails at any one time, which gives rise to
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (). The second human inter
vention (-) consists of atmospheric, oceanographic, biogeochemical, and
other research aimed at better understanding the relationship between emission
levels (cumulated over time) and actual recorded concentrations of greenhouse
gases. The carbon cycle, for example, has yet to be measured in a full and consistent
way. Some estimates show that, given the amount of carbon dioxide that has been
emitted from anthropogenic sources, atmospheric concentrations should in fact
be higher than they are. This is referred to as the problem of the missing carbon.
Greenhouse gas concentrations (), rather than the emissions, are used in
global atmospheric models. The development of such Global Atmospheric
Models () (-) is a necessary step in linking concentrations with projec
tions of climate change (). While the models have become increasingly sophis
ticated over the past decade, they still fall well short of the level of detail and reli
ability required to predict the amount and rate of climate change.  are
especially criticised for lack of speciﬁcity at the regional and local scale, the level
at which impacts are studied, and for providing much more information on
means than on changes in variability and extremes. The models are also often
designed to provide projections of climate conditions that are expected to prevail
under an “equilibrium” condition of double the pre-industrial level of greenhouse
gases. However, this assumption may be extremely inaccurate.2
It is the task of the “impacts community” to assess the impacts on human and
natural systems on the basis of the information made available through climate
models and studies of climate variability and extremes (-). Like the , the
early generation of impact studies also relied heavily upon double-CO2 scenarios.
However, more recently, the impacts community has begun to pay more attention

167

2 For further information on
climate change modelling, see
Mahlman, this volume.

168

   
to the repercussions of climate variability and extremes, including present day cli
mate as well as longer-term change.
The results of some impacts studies, especially on natural ecosystems, provide
new understandings of feedback mechanisms () which can aﬀect  concen
trations. For example, climate variability may lead to the melting of the permafrost
in high latitudes, which, in turn, is expected to release substantial quantities of
methane, which is a greenhouse gas, thus adding to the greenhouse eﬀect.
Knowledge of impacts can be obtained from studies based on climate scenar
ios as well as current climate variability and extremes, and also from direct expe
rience. Farmers, for instance, adjust their agricultural practices according to the
weather, including their recent weather-related losses. There are also similar, often
less obvious, adjustments being made in other economic sectors. This constitutes
the ﬁrst step in the adaptation process (-).
Adaptation is not opposed to mitigation or an alternative to it. Progressively more
aggressive adaptation is also a path towards eﬀective and long-term mitigation.
Adaptation to climate change can be broken down into three levels of activity
(Smit et al. 2000). A number of diﬀerent terms have been used to describe these
levels. For the purposes of this discussion, the terms Tactical, Strategic, and Meta
bolic are used. Tactical, or Level 1 adaptations (-), are those that can be taken
by individuals, small communities, or entrepreneurs in the private sector. They do
not necessarily require government intervention, although the choice of adapta
tions adopted can be greatly aﬀected by government policy. Tactical adaptations
can reduce vulnerability to climate change, and thereby reduce impacts ().
Climate change is likely to result in impacts that exceed the capacity of actors
at the individual and private level, however. In addition, public infrastructure and
public goods are also vulnerable to climate change. This makes a case for govern
ment actions to reduce vulnerability by strategic interventions. Thus, a second
level of adaptation is the Strategic Level. The government involvement can be at
the sector level, including initiatives such as improved natural resources manage
ment, conservation of water resources, or protection of biodiversity. It can also
happen more broadly, by means of an overall adaptation strategy. No country has
yet adopted a broad adaptation strategy across sectors, but preliminary studies
have been conducted in Uganda and Bangladesh. This work, perhaps with the sup
port of the , may eventually lead to the preparation of crosscutting multisec
toral adaptation strategies (-).
As with Level 1, some impacts will remain after the implementation of Level 2
adaptation, which represent vulnerabilities that cannot be easily removed in the
short-term by policy interventions (). This brings into play the idea of Level 3,
which is adaptation at the fundamental level, the Metabolic Level. The term Meta
bolic is meant to suggest the functioning of society as a whole, from the local to
the global scale. It includes the adaptation measures adopted at Levels 1 and 2, but
also extends to a broader category of changes including lifestyle, values, and tech
nology. Precise prescriptions vary and are often hotly debated, but they include
such measures as adopting “voluntary simplicity” in high income societies; envi
ronmentally friendly behaviour such as action to reduce one’s individual ecologi
cal footprint; the widespread development and deployment of environmentally
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friendly technology; and the “dematerialization” of the economy. These and other
measures have been seen as the core elements in a move toward sustainable devel
opment. To the extent that such adaptation succeeds, people are likely to be less
vulnerable to climate change and variability. These same measures will also pro
foundly change the  = formula, with the consequence that greenhouse gas
emissions will be reduced.
From this perspective the distinction between adaptation to climate change
and mitigation becomes moot. Adaptation is not opposed to mitigation or an
alternative to it. Progressively more aggressive adaptation is also a path towards
eﬀective and long-term mitigation.
Muddling through

Gradually, the reasons for the past lack of attention to adaptation are being removed.
It is increasingly being recognised that some marginal, incremental investments in
adaptation measures at the project level are now justiﬁable. Studies show that the
costs of such measures are not likely to be large, at least in the short-term. Even the
diﬃcult question of how to distinguish between the impacts of normal climate vari
ability and anthropogenic climate change can be suﬃciently clariﬁed by research to
encourage belief that negotiations can prove tractable and that reasonable decisions
can be made on the basis of projections and models of climate change and its poten
tial impacts, with reasonable and transparent assumptions. The remaining ques
tions have more to do with the mechanisms for adaptation, and to what extent adap
tation can be eﬀectively addressed by itself, or can be addressed simultaneously with
mitigation. The day may come when adaptation becomes so central to the climate
regime, and the need for international co-operation so urgent and necessary, that a
special Protocol for Adaptation may be negotiated.
In the Kyoto Protocol adaptation funding is speciﬁcally linked to mitigation for
the ﬁrst time. Article 12, which deﬁnes the Clean Development Mechanism (),
provides a levy for mitigation agreements to assist the most vulnerable develop
ing countries in meeting the costs of adaptation. Negotiations are currently
underway on the subject of the precise rules for implementation of the , in
anticipation of the day that the Kyoto Protocol will be ratiﬁed and go into force.
While these negotiations are naturally focused on the mitigation aspects of the
, a number of important questions arise with respect to adaptation.3 In the
context of sustainable development and the ongoing negotiations, several other
questions are now demanding attention.
Will the adaptation levy that exists within the text
of the  be extended to other Protocol tools?
The Kyoto Protocol contains guidelines for three mechanisms of international co
operation in the reduction of  emissions. These are:
• Joint Implementation (), as discussed under Article 6, which involves trans
fers of emission reduction units () created by emission reduction or
sequestration actions in one Annex B country to sources in another Annex B
country in return for ﬁnancial and other assistance.
International
emissions trading (), as detailed under Article 17, which
•
enables transfer of assigned amount units () between Annex B countries.
• The Clean Development Mechanism (), covered in Article 12, which
involves the generation of certiﬁed emission reductions () in developing

3 Many of these questions are
addressed in Farhana Yamin,
“Adaptation and the Clean
Development Mechanism,” in
The Clean Development Mech
anism. Draft Working Papers,
World Resources Institute,
Washington D.C.: 1998: 43.
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One of the stumbling blocks in the implementation of the UNFCCC has been the
unwillingness of the developing country Parties to make any commitments to the
reduction of their own emissions. At the same time, the developed country Parties
have been slow to respond to the need for adaptation assistance. One way forward
might be to develop a comprehensive approach to mitigation and adaptation in
which developing countries would commit to some reduction in GHG emissions
(and incidentally qualify to participate in JI and IET), while the developed coun
tries would agree to a more ﬂexible approach on adaptation assistance.
countries to be transferred from the developing country Party to an Annex B
Party in exchange for ﬁnancial and other assistance.
Of these tools, only the  carries the adaptation levy. Other things being
equal, this would seem to bias the choice in the direction of  and , and hence
reduce the extent to which the  is used, and accordingly reduce (or fail to
increase) the potential funds to be generated for adaptation. Accordingly, there is
some question as to whether, in the interests of equity and in the generation of
adaptation funds, the adaptation levy should not also be extended to all three of
the mechanisms. This is, of course, a matter for governments to decide, but the
answer will depend, in part, on the need for adaptation assistance.
How much money will be generated for adaptation?
Even if the adaptation levy were to be extended to all three mechanisms, it is not
clear how much money is likely to be generated for adaptation, or whether this is
likely to be adequate. Preliminary estimates suggest that even with the most
favourable assumptions the  is not likely to generate substantial funds in the
near term (Haites 1999). At the time of this writing, there were no estimates of the
costs of aggregate adaptation needs in developing countries. However, research
suggests that the open-ended need for funds that has been conjectured by some is
unlikely to materialise, provided reasonable and transparent assumptions are
made about impacts and the pace of climate change.
Will su≤cient adaptation funds be made
available for the most vulnerable countries?

It was agreed at - in Buenos Aires that it is time to advance to Step II for adap
tation. The implication of this is that the developing countries that have been
identiﬁed as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change should begin
receiving capacity-building assistance. Given the diﬃculties currently being expe
rienced with the Kyoto Protocol and the , the amount of resources made
available to these countries through the  may actually be increased to enable
progress in the implementation of Stage II, irrespective of the level of the mitiga
tion eﬀorts.
How should funds be allocated among the vulnerable countries?
If the Kyoto Protocol comes into force as proposed, and if the adaptation funds are
generated by the  (or all three mechanisms), how should the international
community proceed with the allocation of the funds among the more vulnerable
countries?


Thus far the assumption has been that funds would be allocated on a projectby-project basis, in conjunction with feasibility studies. The ﬁnancial distribution
might also be inﬂuenced to some extent by a vulnerability index.4 An additional
approach would be to develop a formula or guidelines linked to mitigation eﬀorts.
One of the stumbling blocks in the implementation of the  has been
the unwillingness of the developing country Parties to make any commitments to
the reduction of their own emissions. At the same time, the developed country
Parties have been slow to respond to the need for adaptation assistance. One way
forward might be to develop a comprehensive approach to mitigation and adap
tation in which developing countries would commit to some reduction in 
emissions (and incidentally qualify to participate in  and ), while the devel
oped countries would agree to a more ﬂexible approach on adaptation assistance.
What is the proper relationship between mitigation and adaptation?
As it stands, the more eﬀective the  is, and the more it is used, the more funds
can be expected for adaptation assistance. Logic suggests that the reverse relation
ship should also hold true. Presumably, the more mitigation is implemented, the
less need there will be for adaptation. A more appropriate relationship would
therefore be one in which adaptation funds are increased in an inverse relation
ship to the achievement of mitigation targets and schedules. This logic stems from
an economic optimisation perspective, in which mitigation and adaptation are
seen as competing alternatives in a “zero sum” game. In other words, necessarily,
the more of one, the less of the other. In terms of practice, rather than theory, it
seems closer to the truth to suggest that the global community, as well as individ
ual countries, will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to achieve enough of either. There is a strong
prospect that climate change will not be slowed at a fast enough rate to prevent sig
niﬁcant impacts. The precautionary principle might therefore be extended to the
development of a mixed strategy of mitigation and adaptation, neither of which
would be dependent upon the other for its ﬁnancial support or its agreed pace of
implementation.
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Abstract
In recent centuries, increased economic productivity has come about predominantly
as a result of technological change, enabling greater outputs from given levels of
labor and capital. However, human progress has often come at the expense of nat
ural resources and the environment, as is evidenced by the excessive concentration
of greenhouse gases (ghgs) in the Earth’s atmosphere, resulting in the growing
threat of climate change.
While technology is at the root of climate change, technology can also be an inte
gral part of its mitigation. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (fccc) emphasizes technology transfer as an important element in the mit
igation of climate change. Yet, in order for technology to be an effective tool, it will
be essential to formulate a worldwide strategy that ensures proper development,
transfer, and adaptation of technologies.
This paper is an exploration of the potential role of technology transfer in the cli
mate change regime.The discussion begins by examining the fundamental elements
of technology transfer, specifically as a component of a larger economic cycle. The
steps that will facilitate technology transfer are then considered, followed by a dis
cussion of how the concept of technology transfer is evolving within the climate
change regime. The author then details several topics deserving of close attention in
future negotiations, including capacity building, developing information resources,
setting up knowledge networks, and establishing new mechanisms for innovative
financing. The chapter concludes with a discussion of specific elements of the Clean
Development Mechanism and the fccc as they pertain to the abilities of developing
countries to take part in climate change mitigation activities, and a summary of the
potential for developing country participation.

Introduction: What is the role of technology transfer in climate change mitigation?

The role of technology in economic decisionmaking is generally not fully under
stood. This is perhaps because most technological developments throughout
human history have come about as a result of individual initiatives rather than as
the direct result of speciﬁc actions by governments. There have been some cases
where government policies or investments have directly resulted in development
of speciﬁc technologies, such as with space and military technologies. However, in
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general, the time lag between the initial actions that spur the development of a
technology and its actual dissemination is so extended that the public loses sight
of the interrelationship. Governments also frequently embark on these programs
with a notable lack of transparency, which distances the public from what actually
happens. Yet, technological change is an important and ongoing part of human
progress, in both its positive and negative manifestations.
Technology has provided the human population a means of avoiding the
Malthusian prediction of total disaster. Thomas Malthus stated that
“...as population doubles and redoubles, it is exactly as if the globe were halv
ing and halving again in size until ﬁnally it has shrunk so much that food and sub
sistence fall below the level necessary for life. Because of the law of diminishing
returns applied to nature’s ﬁxed supply of land, food production tends not to keep
up with the population’s geometric-progression rate of growth.” 1
However, Malthus believed capital and labor were locked into a rigid, linear
relationship. He clearly did not realize the role that technology could play in alter
ing the productivity scenario over time. In recent centuries, increased economic
productivity has resulted predominantly from technological change enabling
greater outputs from given levels of labor and capital.
While Malthusian predictions effectively have been evaded, unfortunately, the
role of natural resources and the environment in the production process has gen
erally been ignored. Consequently, human progress has been accompanied by
growing misuse and abuse of natural resources, one repercussion of which is the
excessive concentration of greenhouse gases () in the Earth’s atmosphere,
resulting in the growing threat of climate change.
While technology is at the root of climate change, it should also be an integral
part of its mitigation. However, the effectiveness of such an application will be
reliant not only on new directions for technological development, but also on an
improved dissemination process—enabling swift and efﬁcient global distribution.
The importance of technology transfer, therefore, arises from the fact that the cur
rent system has inherent weaknesses that frequently hinder expeditious distribu
tion, particularly from developed to developing countries. If the global problem
of climate change is to be addressed, then a worldwide strategy that ensures proper
transfer, adaptation, and development of technologies will be necessary.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (),
which was accepted during the Rio Summit on Climate Change in 1992, empha
sizes transfer of technology as an important element in the mitigation of climate
change. Yet, since then, progress in this area has been slow. In fact, a precise deﬁn
ition of what needs to be done has not yet been established. At the First Confer
ence of the Parties ( ) in Berlin, it was determined that the Convention Sec
retariat would have to
“… prepare an itemized progress report (according to the types of activities
speciﬁed in paragraphs 34.15 to 34.28, inclusive of Chapter 34 of Agenda 21) taken
by the Parties listed in Annex II to the Convention with respect to their commit
ments related to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and the know
how necessary to mitigate and facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”2
In subsequent sessions of the  and its various subcommittees, emphasis has
been placed on the software and policy aspects of technology transfer. As far back
as the meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation () in February and
March of 1996, the term technology transfer was clariﬁed to include practices and
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processes for enhancing removals by sinks as well as facilitating adaptation to cli
mate change. These may include soft technologies such as capacity building, infor
mation networks, training, and research; and hard technologies such as equip
ment for controlling, reducing, or preventing anthropogenic emissions of 
in the energy, transportation, forestry, agriculture, and industry sectors.
What is involved in technology transfer?

To fully understand the process of technology transfer, it is important to examine
technology within the larger economic context. In the ultimate analysis, govern
ment support for the development or dissemination of technology will only take
it so far. The ﬁnal phase of adaptation and use of any technological process or
innovation will happen only if there is economic rationale for its use. Typically,
therefore, whether or not government programs focus on the development of a
particular technology, the crucial ﬁnal steps required for commercialization may
not be taken, simply because an economic agent may not ﬁnd the technology to
be economically beneﬁcial.
The same considerations must also apply to the transfer of technology from
developed to developing countries, mainly because the actual movement of hard
ware or equipment from one country to another is only one component in the
economic process. The technology being transferred must effectively ﬁt into the
overall cycle. A transferred technology may fail if the skills and capacity to main
tain it at a level that is economically advantageous are expensive or not available.
If a technology is economically viable in and of itself, then it is essential to provide
the necessary resources for maintenance of the equipment and processes inherent
to the technology, at a cost that makes its adaptation economically beneﬁcial.
Along these lines, a technology that is inherently labor-saving cannot be justi
ﬁed in a labor surplus economy, and equipment that is energy efﬁcient will not be
accepted or disseminated unless the existing price of energy reﬂects scarcity to an
extent that would economically justify energy saving measures. It is therefore
important to understand that the proper development and transfer of technolo
gies for mitigation of climate change must be preceded by the establishment of
conditions that make the technology economically attractive. There are two major
prerequisites in this context:
• The development of local capacity, skills, and know-how must match requisite
levels of technological change, innovation, and up-grades.
• Prices of both the inputs and outputs for the production process of a given
technology must be rationalized to remove any distortion that would skew the
choice of technology.
Development of local capacity should not be limited to technical and scientiﬁc
training. Rather, it should aim at development of infrastructure that will enable
the rational introduction and use of appropriate technology. Developed countries
have, for the most part, increased their incomes using technology with high pol
lution levels. Only when income has reached a certain peak has environmental
improvement been given attention and allocated appropriate resources. However,
experience has shown that properly deﬁning property rights, creating awareness
of the costs and beneﬁts of environmental quality, and strengthening institutional
frameworks for regulation and monitoring of environmental laws can signiﬁ
cantly lower the peak of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.3

3 The Environmental Kuznets
Curve is basically a representa
tion of the relationship
between environmental quality
and income.
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Historically, in developed countries, environmental quality deteriorated until
incomes reached fairly high levels before environmental protection became a
focus. Developing countries should be able to bring about improvements in envi
ronmental quality at much lower income levels. Developing countries are now in
a unique position to beneﬁt from the developed country experiences with institu
tional innovations for preserving and improving the environment. At the same
time, developed countries have an opportunity to help create this capacity for
environmental improvement in developing countries, which is an essential pre
requisite for the adoption of appropriate technologies.
What are the steps that will facilitate technology transfer?

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change () has stressed the impor
tance of technology transfer as an element of global warming mitigation strategy.
Responding to the needs of the governments that are party to the , the Panel
completed an in-depth special report that covers all aspects of technology trans
fer in the context of climate change.
Theoretically, in a perfect world, markets would operate without constraints or
restrictions, including political barriers. Under such circumstances, technology
transfer would take place in a manner that led to efﬁciency in all areas of produc
tion. In an ideal world, it would be expected that technology, capital, and other fac
tors of production would ﬂow to those places where the costs of production,
goods, and services would be minimized. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Even
in the most progressive market-based economic systems, technology transfer is
restricted—both explicitly and implicitly—in the form of existing legislation or
speciﬁc government policies.
The existing global market is rife with imperfections that render it non-con
ducive to the unrestrained ﬂow of technologies between states. Additionally,
another detractive element has existed since before the industrial era—the exces
sive use and mistreatment of natural resources and the environment. In essence,
these resources have not been valued as assets to be maintained and preserved. As
mentioned earlier, it is always important to examine technological advancement
If technology transfer is to be successful, then development of local capacity
before the actual ﬂow of any hardware is essential. This applies not only to the
adoption of the incoming technologies, but also possibly to the adaptation of
technologies for local conditions.
within the context of the larger development and economic picture. The excessive
concentration of  in the Earth’s atmosphere, for example, is the direct result
of externalities: the cost of remedying the damage done is not being included in
the price of the use or production process of fossil fuels. Due to the nature of the
emissions, the cost of addressing their effects has now been imposed on the global
population.
The future of technology transfer will depend greatly on suitable capacity being
created in developing countries, and on institutional arrangements being made
for successful implementation of environmental policies. However, another ini
tiative that could result in signiﬁcant beneﬁts would involve research and devel
opment partnerships between industrialized and developing countries. This


arrangement would not only have the cost advantages of the generally less expen
sive technical and scientiﬁc staffs in developing countries, but it would also create
conditions for technology absorption in the developing countries. Now that intel
lectual property rights are more precisely deﬁned at the global level, there is much
greater incentive for contractual agreements between entities in developed and
developing countries.
In order to facilitate technology transfer between developed and developing
countries, bilateral and multilateral organizations should focus on creating capacity
that also requires partnership with institutions in recipient countries. These efforts
should essentially involve the development of knowledge networks that combine
the knowledge and understanding of select organizations with the responsibility for
implementation of sustainable technology choices in other organizations.
How is the concept of technology transfer evolving in the climate change regime?

If climate change is to be mitigated, then methods must be developed with which
appropriate technologies can be harnessed as rapidly and efﬁciently as possible.
This is particularly important for those countries that do not have the means to
develop or purchase environmentally efﬁcient technologies. The text of the 
emphasizes that future mitigation of  emissions, particularly in the develop
ing world, will take place only if technology transfer to developing countries is
facilitated. This will be true even for countries that are experiencing major indus
trial expansion or systemic economic modernization.
As mentioned earlier, technology transfer is not merely a movement of hard
ware or equipment. Hardware, or physical capital, is only one component of the
overall economic process. If technology transfer is to be successful, then develop
ment of local capacity before the actual ﬂow of any hardware is essential. This
applies not only to the adoption of the incoming technologies, but also possibly to
the adaptation of technologies for local conditions.
Local capacity can be built essentially through two sets of activities. The ﬁrst
group of activities is directed at human resource development; the second is
related to the software aspects of technology, which are frequently ignored in both
developed and developing countries. In this context, software can be deﬁned as the
overall chain of policy measures, and the institutional frameworks whereby the
adoption and use of the right technology is facilitated and ensured. In a world
where economic rationale must underlie the use of speciﬁc technologies or pro
duction processes, ignoring these software aspects would effectively result in the
dumping of capital equipment or hardware. Without the underlying economic
rationale to maintain and use such hardware efﬁciently, this would only lead to its
disuse or rejection over time.
A crucial stage has been reached in the negotiations for implementation of the
, wherein developing countries, the non-Annex I parties, must clearly artic
ulate exactly what is required to push the concept of technology transfer in a
manner that was intended in the . Unfortunately, while considerable atten
tion has been paid to the political necessity of facilitating technology transfer since
the  was drafted and adopted, concrete measures and recommendations have
generally been absent. It is expected that   deliberations will provide some
attention to this subject, particularly in the wake of the  technology transfer
report.
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What are the technology transfer issues that
should be focused on in future negotiations?

To some extent, the ambiguity of the  has given the Annex I countries a very
convenient means by which to plead that technology transfer cannot be insured
by Annex I governments. Their argument is that the technologies are commer
cially available and can be purchased by the developing countries that intend to
use them. However, while this simple posture has been voiced in many forums,
reality is far more complex. The transfer of technology can, in fact, be accelerated
through government actions. Government policy would not supercede or surpass
the commercial processes by which technology transfer actually occurs. Rather, it
would assist the commercialization process—retaining the incentives and beneﬁts
that the developer of a technology normally looks for when investments are made
in research and development and in the evolution of technological solutions. It
would be useful for non-Annex I Parties to formulate a set of concrete proposals
for future consideration. These solutions could cover the following sets of activi
ties:
Building local capacity in developing countries
As mentioned earlier, development of local capacity requires training programs
and human resource development. These can be initiated within government
departments that are responsible for formulating incentive mechanisms and poli
cies that facilitate technology transfer. At the grassroots level, capacity can be built
into the corporate sector by training people on speciﬁc technological innovations
that may not be easily available in some developing countries. In the past, training
programs have been favored by a number of bilateral assistance organizations.
However, there has been a general reduction in these activities. This may be hap
pening in conjunction with the progression of industrialization in a number of
developing countries.
While traditional forms of technical training are not required to the extent that
they once were, there is now a growing need at the grassroots level for trained
managers and specialists with expertise in environmental beneﬁts and cost-bene
ﬁt assessments related to speciﬁc technological options. Ideally, training for posi
tions such as these would not be carried out by parachuting specialists from devel
oped countries into developing countries, but through collaborative ventures
whereby the training process takes advantage of skills and talents that are already
available in the developing countries. This would be the most durable and sus
tainable approach to training and human resource development.
With regard to local software capacity building, merely training government
policymakers may not be adequate. In some cases, there may be a need to create
institutions outside of the government, or to strengthen existing organizations
appropriately. One example of this is the regulatory commissions charged with the
responsibility of pricing services provided by natural monopolies such as electric
utilities. The training of regulators and ofﬁcials in such organizations becomes
increasingly important if internalization of environmental costs is incorporated
into the pricing of services such as electricity or other forms of energy that are
being used in increasing quantities in the developing world. Rational pricing,
including the internalization of resource use and pollution abatement costs, is an
essential prerequisite for the use of the correct technology.


Developing information resources
Although commercial information on technology is generally available and efﬁ
ciently transferred throughout the world, certain aspects of such information are
not easily available. For instance, the speciﬁc environmental beneﬁts of technolo
gies are not easily known and require careful evaluation, speciﬁcally under local
conditions. The practical feasibility of using a certain technology varies from one
place to another because the conditions under which the technology may be used
may vary substantially. For example, refrigerators operating in a country where
Peddling of technologies that may only have global beneﬁts, i.e. reduction of ghg
emissions, is not likely to be successful in developing countries. Developed coun
try policymakers must also understand, however, that technology that addresses
local environmental problems will generally be globally positive as well. Projects
that focus on local pollution levels and energy efﬁciency will also reduce global
ghg emissions levels.
the electricity supply has large ﬂuctuations of frequency and voltage will need a
different compressor than those that will be used in a country where stability of
voltage and quality of power supply can be taken for granted. Different compres
sors will use different amounts of energy, which means that the environmental
implications of the technology will vary from one location to another.
It should also be emphasized that in a number of developing countries, while
information on speciﬁc technologies may be available, there may be a huge cost,
in terms of time and money, associated with actually attaining the information.
The establishment of networks to provide such information at zero or low cost
would make a substantial difference in the understanding, assessment, and
launching of technological initiatives for environmental protection. The Inter
national Energy Agency () has several programs for providing information
to its members, but most of these require fees. It would be useful if multilateral
and bilateral assistance organizations would help developing countries gain
access to  information that might be relevant to the country’s needs and ini
tiatives.
Setting up knowledge networks
The importance of knowledge ﬂows and the networks that support such ﬂows
cannot be overemphasized. Given the vintage of the plants and equipment in
developing countries, there is much room for energy efﬁciency improvement. If
existing technologies are upgraded,  emissions will be reduced substantially.
However, capital is scarce in most developing countries, and there is no institu
tional framework for ﬁnancing innovation and replacement of energy inefﬁcient
equipment. As such, these innovations are not likely to happen without informa
tion networks and integrated initiatives, as well as capacity building measures.
Given the potentially huge economic beneﬁts from such innovation, motivat
ing an industrial owner to become involved with such innovative programs should
not be difﬁcult. However, this motivation will only exist if the beneﬁts are essen
tially local in nature. Peddling of technologies that may only have global beneﬁts,
i.e. reduction of  emissions, is not likely to be successful in developing coun
tries. Developed country policymakers must also understand, however, that tech
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nology that addresses local environmental problems will generally be globally
positive as well. Projects that focus on local pollution levels and energy efﬁciency
will also reduce global  emissions levels.
Successful cases of local technology development and transfer of knowledge to
address environmental problems, particularly in the industry sector, have beneﬁted
demonstrably from networks that facilitate the creation and ﬂow of knowledge.

The Tata Energy Research Institute () is part of a coordinated effort
between small-scale industries in India, the premise of which is a knowledge
network among small-scale, local industries that require similar technical
innovations. The participating industrial partners are characterized by a large
number of small-scale units, particularly foundries, glass factories, and brick
manufacturers.
Working with the bilateral assistance organization Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (), and an expert on cupolas from the
United Kingdom,  was able to facilitate a major improvement in the
design of a small foundry unit near Calcutta. This development for the
foundry industry, in partnership with the industrial manager and owner, has
had dramatic results in terms of energy efﬁciency improvements and emis
sions reductions. Since the pilot industrial unit is located within a cluster of
similar units, the chances of quick dissemination are good. It is expected that
the improved technology established in this single unit will now be emulated
by other units in the same cluster.
This innovation would not have been possible without the cooperative
efforts of the research institution and the progressive bilateral assistance
organization, and the expertise of the U.K. consultant. The ﬁnal, essential,
ingredient was the foundry owner’s entrepreneurial spirit and willingness to
be involved in an innovative exercise.
Innovative ﬁnancing of new technologies
The transfer of new technologies from the developed to the developing world can
be facilitated through innovative ﬁnancing methods that will not necessarily sub
vert ﬂows from the market. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy ()
in its various programs develops superior technologies that can be emulated at the
international level. If there is a new technology that is signiﬁcantly advanced over
what is currently available, the  solicits bids for a large-scale purchase for
the production and supply of the technology. Once a bid is accepted, the 
places an order for the units, and then makes them saleable under existing market
conditions.
The market price might be much lower than the purchase price paid by the
. Were this the case, the government would subsidize the new units so that
they would not distort the market, and would therefore support similar innova
tions in subsequent purchases and sales. Bilateral and multilateral organizations
should speciﬁcally target programs of this nature whereby technologies can
receive a jump-start through purchases using such innovative ﬁnancial methods.


What is the importance of the Clean Development
Mechanism when considering technology transfer?

The Clean Development Mechanism () is often touted as a ﬁnancial oppor
tunity whereby developing countries can promote the use of environmentally
sound technologies. This, however, is not the central objective of the . As
clearly articulated in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the purpose
of the  is basically to promote sustainable development in non-Annex I coun
tries. Hence, technology transfer that is done merely for the reduction of 
emissions is really secondary to the objectives of sustainable development, as they
are deﬁned by the society to which such technology transfer takes place.
It is important to remember that if the  is to be used as a vehicle for tech
nology transfer, it must meets the objectives of both sustainable development and
 emissions reductions in the host country. In order to ensure this, proper train
ing is required for the decisionmakers that will be involved with each project. This
is important in the developed countries as well as the developing countries. How
ever, in the developing countries the focus would have to be not on simply training
decisionmakers and project developers to evaluate  emissions reductions for
every project, but also enabling them to weigh its value in meeting the overall goal
of sustainable development, as complex as this task would undoubtedly be.
Why is technology transfer so integral to the fccc?

Two other aspects must be discussed in the context of technology under the .
First, there would be lasting and tangible beneﬁts from the establishment of
research partnerships between developed and developing countries. The World
Trade Organization () and the current patenting regime now cover most
countries, which means that intellectual property rights are fairly secure interna
tionally. It should therefore be possible to ensure that contractual arrangements
between developed and developing country organizations minimize the possibil
ity of disputes or misuse of intellectual property rights. This will create a number
of opportunities for joint technology development, which might even be achieved
at substantially lower cost than if the technology were developed solely in a indus
trialized country. The computer software industry is already realizing the advan
tages of such a scenario. A number of software companies that are based in devel
oped countries are establishing facilities in countries like India, where the city of
Bangalore is already acquiring the characteristics of a new silicon valley.
Second, while all of the micro-level initiatives and programs can be taken in
hand as discussed above, it is vitally important for developing countries to start
shaping and developing a technology vision for the future, including initiatives to
ensure environmental protection and natural resource conservation at the local
level. This is an area where efforts must be made to involve think tanks and
research organizations in both developing and developed countries. The Batelle
Memorial Institute and the Electric Power Research Institute recently undertook
an important initiative that effectively shut out institutions and organizations
from developing economies. Given that the impact of technological innovations
in the next century will be the greatest in developing countries, this is fairly egre
gious. The developing world is likely to experience major energy-related expan
sion, speciﬁcally in the industry and transportation sectors, as well as with the
increased purchase of the household use of consumer durables (i.e. large electri
cal appliances).
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Conclusion

Developing country governments and organizations must take the initiative by
articulating long-term technology policies and developing technology visions for
the future. Multilateral and bilateral organizations can play an important role by
supporting these efforts. It may even be necessary to think in terms of this being
the ﬁrst step for key developing countries where governments, domestic corporate
entities, and local research organizations can collaborate with multilateral and
bilateral organizations to examine the prospects for future economic growth. In
order for this to be successful, technology policies will have to be in place to ensure
that projects with local beneﬁts will also result in positive global environmental
outcomes.
It is time that the developing countries come to understand the beneﬁt of such
an exercise and articulate the need for cooperative action involving all of the key
players. It is also time that, in the context of technology transfer, the Group of 77
and China develop a detailed proposal for  , and for subsequent exercises
that will be undertaken for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the .
This is an area in which institutions like  have substantial experience. It would
be ideal if  could join with other organizations to develop a road map for a
future that would serve the interests of both developing countries and the global
community at large.
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Private capital flows and climate change:
Maximizing private investment
in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol
Bradford S. Gentry
Yale/undp Collaborative Program on the Urban Environment

Abstract
For a growing number of decision-makers, understanding and building on the links
between international private capital flows and climate change is an increasingly
critical e≠ort. For developing countries this is true both because (i) private capital is
the primary engine of economic growth and, therefore, of sustainable development,
and (ii) the Kyoto Protocol has the potential to substantially increase private invest
ment in developing countries.
This paper describes the links between private capital flows and environmental
performance. It starts by reviewing the recent history of private capital flows to
emerging markets.The impacts of environmental issues on investor decision-making
are then described. Finally, some initial suggestions are made on ways to integrate
environmental and investment frameworks, including under the Kyoto Protocol –
with particular attention to the Clean Development Mechanism.

Overview

Private capital ﬂows and climate change—what are the links? To some in the envi
ronmental community, the question has little meaning because they focus on the
use of public monies—particularly Oﬃcial Development Assistance () —
when thinking of climate change and developing countries. To others, the answer
is easy because the links are all negative. In their view, increased private investment
means only expanded industrial activity and natural resource exploitation and,
thus, increased emissions of greenhouse gasses and destruction of carbon sinks,
such as rainforests.
For a growing number of decision-makers, however, the question is neither
meaningless nor easy. In fact, it is increasingly regarded as one of the most impor
tant questions being asked. From a developing country perspective, understand
ing the links between private capital ﬂows and climate change is crucial for two
major reasons:
• Private capital is the primary engine of economic growth and therefore must
be recognized as a core driver of sustainable development as well.
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• The Kyoto Protocol has the potential for substantially increasing private
investment in developing countries.
This paper takes an instrumental approach. It does not attempt to address the sci
entiﬁc, ethical, or political issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and its ﬂexible
implementation mechanisms. Rather, it assumes a goal of maximizing private
investment in developing countries under the Protocol and proceeds from there.
The paper starts by reviewing the recent history of private capital ﬂows to emerging
markets. The impacts of environmental issues on investor decision-making are then
described. Finally, some initial suggestions are made on approaches to integrating
environmental and investment frameworks, including ways they might be applied to
the Kyoto Protocol. Speciﬁc attention is paid to the Clean Development Mechanism.

Why the shift in attention from oda to international private capital flows?

figure 1
Private Capital Flows to Develop
ing Countries vs. oda 1990
through 1999. Source: World
Bank (2000). Global Develop
ment Finance 2000. Washington,
D.C. (1999 data is preliminary)

The numbers are stark and speak for themselves. As shown in Figure 1, transfers of
ODA to developing countries averaged around $50 billion per year from 1990
through 1999. At the same time, private investment in developing countries
exploded from under $50 billion in 1990 to a high of over $300 billion in 1997.
Even with recent ﬁnancial crises, net private capital ﬂows to developing coun
tries were still four to ﬁve times larger than oﬃcial ﬂows in both 1998 and 1999. As
economic recovery picks up pace in many parts of the world, the diﬀerential will
only increase.
In general, the shift from  to international private investment as the major
vehicle for resource transfers from industrialized to developing countries is a good
thing. Developing country governments cannot achieve sustainable development
acting alone. They cannot create or provide
all or even a majority of a nation’s capital.
Rather, as discussed below, their role should
be to set and oversee the frameworks for pri
vate economic activity, including both
investment and environmental factors.
The shift does not, however, decrease the
importance of eﬀectively applied .
Many developing countries have been left
out of the global ﬂows of private capital.
Between 1990 and 1996, nearly 80% of the
private investment in the developing world
went to three regions: Asia, Latin America,
and Central Europe, and within those, to
twelve countries: Argentina, Brazil, China,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. While
these countries represent a large percentage
of the world’s total population, they are few in number. Other developing nations
are struggling to increase their share of private ﬂows. Those that have not been
successful to date—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa or parts of South Asia—are
in serious danger of being left further and further behind economically. To the
extent that  can be applied to help more developing countries build their
capacity for attracting a larger share of global private investment—and weather-
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ing the storms inherent therein—it is an appropriate and important use of public
money. This is especially true in the climate change arena, given the historical
roots of the problem in the industrialized countries.
In what ways are the di≠erent forms of international
investment linked to the environment?

International private investment is not all the same—nor are the environmental
eﬀects of the diﬀerent forms. It is important to distinguish among three major
components of private capital ﬂows: (1) foreign direct investment (); (2) port
folio equity investment; and (3) debt. Each has diﬀerent links to environmental
performance. Each exhibits diﬀerent responses to ﬁnancial crises. Interestingly,
the policy recommendations on how to manage private capital ﬂows coming from
both the environmental and investment communities seem to be converging, with
a focus on predictable and eﬀective legal frameworks, greater access to informa
tion, and strategically applied public investment.
Foreign direct investment
As shown in Figure 2,  is the largest and most durable component of private
capital ﬂows to developing countries. Typical  is investment by a multinational
company—either from an industrialized or a developing country—in a local com
pany, either wholly owned or through a joint venture.  occurs in many sectors,
including resource extraction, manufac
turing, infrastructure, and banking. Pre
liminary data from 1999 suggests that 
made up 80% of all foreign investment in
developing countries. The total amount of
 going to developing countries is
expected to continue to grow in the future.
 also has the most direct links to
environmental performance, as it often
goes into production operations. Environ
mental damage can result from increased
land use, increased pollutant loads, and the
secondary eﬀects of expanded production
(i.e. along transportation corridors or in
new settlements). Environmental perfor
mance can also be improved, however,
through increased eﬃciency of raw mater
ial use, greater attention to the environmental characteristics of products, and
more eﬀective protection of sensitive areas.
Portfolio equity investment
Portfolio equity investment is at the other end of the spectrum, having been the
smallest and one of the more volatile components of private capital ﬂows to devel
oping countries, with the least direct—but still critical—links to the environment.
It consists of publicly traded ownership shares in private companies, often
referred to as stock. While portfolio equity investment in developing countries
increased rapidly in the early and mid 1990s, its percentage share dropped
markedly before starting a recent recovery.

figure 2
Flows of fdi, Portfolio Equity, and
Debt to Developing Countries
1990 to 1999. Source: World Bank
(2000). Global Development
Finance 2000. Washington, D.C.
(1999 data is preliminary).

190

   
Many developing countries have been left out of the global ﬂows of private cap
ital. Between 1990 and 1996, nearly 80% of the private investment in the devel
oping world went to three regions: Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, and
within those, to twelve countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey.
The links between portfolio equity investments and environmental perfor
mance are less clear and more complex than those for . Initial public oﬀerings
of shares in companies () provide new capital to the ﬁrms involved, and thus
may act like . Later trades in the secondary markets, such as on stock
exchanges, can help spur economic growth, with good and bad eﬀects on the envi
ronment (e.g. greater political pressure for environmental protection versus
increased consumption of environmental resources). Secondary market activity
can also help slow economic growth—for example, through the rapid withdrawals
from developing countries witnessed over the past few years—with good and bad
eﬀects on the environment (reduced consumption versus unsustainable resource
use spurred by economic need).
Yet, the opportunities portfolio ﬂows present as a point of leverage for envi
ronmental policy are vast. Worldwide, portfolio ﬂows of both equity and debt
comprise the largest segment of cross-border transactions—55 percent in 1996.
Portfolio equity and debt investors hold the purse strings to more money world
wide than is available from any other type of investment source, dwarﬁng the
resources potentially available from . For example, according to the IFC, in
1996 the world’s total market capitalization topped U.S.$18 trillion, far in excess of
total global  ﬂows of $320 billion.
Debt
Debt,including both commercial bank lending and portfolio debt instruments (such
as bonds), is the third major component of private capital ﬂows to developing coun
tries. In 1999, it appears to have fallen dramatically from its 1997 high of $103 bil
lion, to a low of $19 billion. Interestingly, during the recent ﬁnancial crises, com
mercial bank lending was one of the most volatile of all types of private capital ﬂows.
Many diﬀerent types of debt instruments exist, from commercial bank loans to
power stations to medium-term bonds issued by large companies. The environ
mental eﬀects of debt run the gamut from  to portfolio equity. Government
bonds present the greatest mystery in terms of leverage points for aﬀecting their
environmental performance. Some are used to fund improvements in environ
mental infrastructure. Most, however, go into general government revenues, with
potential investors having essentially no reason to consider the environmental
performance of the underlying government operations.
How does the environment a≠ect investor decision-making –
from risks to opportunities, identifying points of policy leverage?

Since one can ﬁnd legitimate examples of private investment being both good and
bad for the environment, the critical question is how the opportunities for
improving environmental performance can best be captured.
One set of answers can be developed by understanding and building on the
ways in which environmental factors aﬀect investor decision-making. For ,


improved environmental performance only happens when it increases the
investors’ commercial advantage. In developing countries, this usually occurs for
one of ﬁve major reasons:
• improving access to export markets, such as through the adoption of environ
mental management systems or the award of product “eco-labels”;
• increasing productivity, through more eﬃcient use of raw materials;
• maintaining a “social license” to operate, in the face of local and international
pressure from neighbors, , shareholders, and customers;
• accessing ﬁnance, since international ﬁnanciers increasingly require environ
mental risks to be addressed and, in cases such as World Bank loans, separate
environmental guidelines to be met;
• making “environmental” investments, such as in water systems or cleaner
energy production.
These commercial advantages for foreign direct investors provide leverage
points for environmental policy-makers. This is true in both the developing coun
tries receiving the investment and in the countries that are the sources of the
investment, which are usually, but not always, among the industrialized countries.
When considering how best to use the Kyoto Protocol to increase private
investment in developing countries, all of these factors should be considered.
Thoughts on how best to build on these links between private capital ﬂows and
environmental performance are oﬀered in the following sections.
How are opportunities for private investment created
and how does this change the role of government?

The shift to private investment is also changing the role of many governments, as
they move from being the provider of services to being the enabler and overseer
of their provision by private parties. Governments enable private investment by
setting the frameworks within which private economic activity occurs. Govern
ments oversee private investment by monitoring both the frameworks and the pri
vate activity, and taking action when either fails to perform.
The basic frameworks for private investment and other market activities
include deﬁnitions of various property rights, the manner in which such rights
may be held or transferred, and how any particular rights may be protected. Only
with such basic legal rights in place can private investment ﬂourish. It does so by
taking these basic building blocks and arranging them in a myriad of ways that
increase the value to potential customers. Many of these arrangements change
over time, in ways that are impossible to predict when the underlying property
rights are created.
This combination of ﬂexibility within an overall market framework allows the
creativity of private actors to ﬂourish in ways consistent with societal values. This
is where the policy recommendations of the environmental and investment com
munities come together. Both want clear, predictable, transparent regulatory
frameworks, consistently applied. Both want to see ODA used to build the capac
ity of host countries to adopt and maintain such frameworks. Increasingly, it is in
each of their interests to have environmental considerations integrated into
national investment frameworks.
The concept of market frameworks allowing ﬂexible implementation is also
where private investment and the Kyoto Protocol start to come together. One of
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the core roles for governments is to help build demand for private investments,
particularly those with positive environmental content. This means developing
both market frameworks and mechanisms for internalizing environmental costs.
In the context of climate change, setting market frameworks includes deﬁning the
range of property interests that may be traded. Internalizing environmental costs
means creating demand for those property interests by limiting or reducing allow
able emissions of greenhouse gases from operations in industrialized countries.
Many developing countries object to the Clean Development Mechanism and
the other “ﬂexible” implementation mechanisms provided in the Kyoto Protocol.
Some do so because of the unfairness of letting industrialized countries “buy their
way out” of a problem they caused. Some are concerned about losing their future
ability to develop by selling their right to use the air today. Still others worry that
any such trading systems will be so complicated that they will be impossible to
administer. These are all serious concerns.
At the same time, many of these countries are actively seeking to attract more
private investment into other parts of their economies, frequently in operations
that exploit other natural resources such as minerals, oil, and timber. Many of the
investors in these operations are from industrialized countries. Many of the prod
ucts from these operations are consumed in the industrialized world. Govern
ments decide the terms on which to make the resources available to investors,
either directly through concessions or indirectly through regulatory and tax
frameworks. Presumably they do so only when the proposed operations are seen
as beneﬁcial to the local economy or when they help meet other governmental
objectives. Within this context, host country governments may monitor private
activities and take action, should they conclude it is warranted.
A similar conceptual approach is appropriate for any sales of interests in reduced
emissions of greenhouse gases. It is up to the host countries to determine whether
they want to make such property interests available. They should only do so on
terms with which they are comfortable. For example, they might choose to allow
only relatively short-term interests to be developed and sold. Concerns over diﬀer
ences in bargaining power between governments and international investors might
be reduced through eﬀorts to harmonize the types of interests being oﬀered for sale.
Even if a developing country decides to make such investment opportunities
available, however, the details of the  still remain to be understood and nego
tiated. Some of the issues are scientiﬁc—how can the levels of emissions reduc
tions be determined and monitored? Others are legal—how should industrialized
countries that violate their emission reduction commitments be punished?
The focus of this paper, however, is on how to design the  to maximize
opportunities for private investment in developing countries. Some principles for
helping to achieve this goal are suggested in the following section.
How can private investment be maximized through market frameworks
and oversight, rather than through centralized approval processes?

Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol deﬁnes the basic features of the  to include
the following:
• beneﬁts to developing countries from project activities generating emission
reductions;
• use of certiﬁed emission reductions () by Annex I countries to meet part
of their emission limitation and reduction commitments;
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• development by the Conference of the Parties () and supervision by an
Executive Board;
• certiﬁcation of eligible emissions reductions by operational entities, including
private and public parties, to be designated by the ;
• certiﬁcation according to speciﬁed requirements, including voluntary partici
pation, as well as real, measurable, and long-term beneﬁts that are additional
to those that would otherwise occur;
• auditing and veriﬁcation of project activities under rules determined by the
;
• use of a share of the proceeds from  activities to cover administrative
expenses, as well as to contribute to an adaptation fund for particularly vul
nerable countries.
Although these basic elements must be included in the , whatever form it
takes, a huge number of critical details have yet to be deﬁned. How they are reﬂected
in the ﬁnal structure will make all the diﬀerence for the ’ success or failure.
For example, much of the process to date appears to have focused on identify
ing the government body that will approve the trading rights, and how it will do so.
The quickest way to strangle the ’ potential for increasing private invest
ment in developing countries is to force all transactions through centralized
global, or even national, approval processes. As illustrated in Figure 3, the best way
to maximize the ’ full investment potential is through centralized frame
works for the decentralized generation, transfer, and oversight of emission reduc
tion credits. This approach is also consistent with the core government roles of
deﬁning market frameworks and then overseeing the performance of a myriad of
market actors.
Finding a balance between the need to ensure that the terms of the Protocol are
figure 3
Centralized approvals versus cen
tralized frameworks for decen
tralized implementation – impli
cations for investment flows.

met and to still leave room for markets to function in a ﬂexible and timely manner
is the key challenge for negotiators. Any eﬀort to develop frameworks for decen
tralized implementation of the  needs to consider three major components:
• the overarching framework for the ;
• methods for maximizing the generation of certiﬁed emission reductions; and
• methods for maximizing the resources transferred with their sale and use.
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Each of these components faces a huge number of issues. Some ideas for nego
tiators are oﬀered in the following sections.

figure 4
Credits, resources and maximized
private investment.

Building the market framework

The overall structure of the  is the framework within which private invest
ment will occur and be overseen. As illustrated in Figure 4, it starts with the
/ Executive board
deﬁning the rules for granting
credits against emission reduc
tion commitments to Annex I
country governments.
It also requires Annex I gov
ernments to put domestic emis
sion reduction requirements in
place and to oﬀer credits against
those requirements for qualify
ing investments in developing
countries. Until such require
ments and credits are in place,
private investors will have only
limited incentives to invest in
.
According to Article 12, the
Annex I country governments
must also provide resources to
the , both for administra
tive expenses and for the Adaptation Fund. If they do not make the required pay
ments, they will receive no credits. These ﬁnances would come, in part, from fees
paid by the users of Certiﬁed Emission Reductions (). It could also include
amounts taken from general tax revenues, such as . If participating countries
and/or the  Executive Board wanted to take a larger share of  proceeds
directly, they could also seek to impose a tax on all sales of . How to balance
the additional administrative burden of collecting such a tax with the desire to
allow the markets as many diﬀerent opportunities as possible for transferring
 is a critical issue for any such taxing mechanism.
The / Executive Board will also set the framework for the creation and
trading of the  among developers, sellers, buyers, and users. Some of the pos
sible features of these activities are shown in Figures 5 and 6 below.
Before moving to these more detailed aspects, however, it is important to
return to the goal described in this paper—maximizing private investment under
the  while meeting the terms of the Protocol. At its core, this means creating
predictable and veriﬁable frameworks that both allow and promote decentralized
action by a wide range of parties, public and private. Only by allowing such pri
vate sector creativity to ﬂourish will the ’ full potential be realized.
Maximizing the generation of cers

For developers and sellers of , this requires workable mechanisms for deﬁn
ing and overseeing the property rights to be traded, leaving as much room as pos
sible for ﬂexibility in how the actual trades are conducted. As shown in Figure 5,
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figure 5
Maximizing the generation of
Certified Emission Reductions.

this can be done through decentralized certiﬁcation and veriﬁcation programs
similar to those used under a wide range of international product standards.
The basic features of such a system include both certiﬁcation and veriﬁcation
functions. Both start with and provide a vehicle for implementing rules and guid
ance from the  and the  Executive Board across a wide range of individ
ual transactions. For certiﬁcation of emissions reductions, those rules are initially
overseen by national accreditation and tracking bodies (possibly using the
national standards organizations already in existence in most countries around
the world). Those national organizations will both accredit certiﬁers and track
the certiﬁcations made through notices and fees submitted by certiﬁers. Should
a certiﬁer fail to follow the rules, their right to certify would be revoked. Accred
ited certiﬁers will be paid by developers (public or private) to review the emis
sion reductions proposed for certiﬁcation. If they meet the rules set by the
/ Executive board, a certiﬁcation will be issued and the  may be freely
traded.
Ideally, such trades should be left free to take a wide variety of forms, including:
• sales by developers directly to the ultimate users in Annex I countries (similar
to the  scenario described above);
• sales by developers to brokers and other intermediaries who then locate buyers;
or
• sales to “pools” of credits, shares in which are oﬀered for sale by public or pri
vate parties (similar to the portfolio investment scenario described above).
For auditing and veriﬁcation, a similar basic structure is used, with one major
diﬀerence: its primary function is to check samples from the certiﬁcation process,
not to approve every . Only if problems are found will more extensive inves
tigations be undertaken. International or national bodies can accredit the audi
tors. They will then conduct periodic audits to verify that the national accredita
tion bodies and the individual certiﬁers are performing their functions as
prescribed by the / Executive board. Government inspectors and, possi
bly, authorized  might also provide a supplemental check on the 
oﬀered for sale.
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The result is a system for maximizing the generation of  that both meet
the requirements of the Protocol and are available for trading in a wide variety of
ways.
Maximizing the opportunities for private investment in cers

Such a result clearly ﬁts the needs of potential buyers and users of the , max
imizing the opportunities for private investment and resource transfers to parties
in developing countries. As shown in Figure 6, the money ﬂows two ways under
this structure: ﬁrst, to the sellers of the  (and then up through the national
certiﬁcation chain); and second, to the adaptation fund through the Annex I gov
ernments. As noted above, other alternatives also exist, such as a tax on each sale
of a .
Buyers of  would pay the market price directly to the sellers, whether they
are developers, intermediaries or pools, public or private. The buyers themselves
may be public or private, pools, intermediaries, or even the ﬁnal users. Ultimately,
the  will be purchased by those wanting to use them—including Annex I gov
ernments and ﬁrms needing help meeting their domestic emission reduction
figure 6
Maximizing resource transfers.

requirements, or  and others wanting to force further reductions by taking
the emission rights oﬀ the market.
Users of  would then provide notice and pay a fee to an Annex I govern
ment in exchange for a credit against domestic requirements. In turn, the Annex I
government would make a contribution to the expenses of the / Execu
tive Board and the Adaptation Fund in exchange for credit against its Protocol
commitments. As with the certiﬁcation system, the system of using  to meet
domestic emission reduction targets would be overseen by internationally accred
ited auditors.
What are the potential benefits of centralized frameworks
with decentralized implementation and oversight?

Decentralized implementation and oversight within a centralized framework is
one of the best ways to maximize private investment under the . It maximizes


the opportunities to generate . It maximizes the ﬂexibility among sellers and
buyers. It is founded on the requirements of the Protocol. Adherence to those
requirements is regularly veriﬁed.
Will this approach work? It is too early to say. The technical and policy issues
facing the creation and monitoring of emissions reductions still need to be
addressed. Political issues in determining the substance of the certiﬁcation
requirements, such as the details of the “additionality” rules, still need to be
resolved. Even assuming that an approach along these lines is adopted, the capac
ity of many governmental and private parties to administer such a system eﬀec
tively will need to be improved substantially.
What this approach does do is provide a basis for concrete discussions between
developing countries and the private investment community on how the 
might best engage private investment. Until recently, even if a private ﬁnancial
institution had heard of the  (and many have not), it was viewed as too illdeﬁned or far oﬀ to be paid much attention. As more concrete approaches are
developed, particularly those based on current investors’ conduct, these attitudes
are changing and opportunities for dialogue are emerging.
Where is progress being made?

Little progress has yet been made on the  through the formal negotiating
process. At the November 1998 - in Buenos Aires, a two-year period for fur
ther study was agreed upon. At the October 1999 - in Bonn, a greater degree
of comfort with the basic concepts was apparent, but no speciﬁc agreements were
adopted. The Sixth Conference of Parties, in The Hague in November and Decem
ber of 2000, will be a critical session for the future of the .
Instead, real progress on the design and implementation of trading mecha
nisms is being made through a series of experiments by private ﬁrms, national
governments, and multilateral organizations. Included are the:
• establishment of internal emission trading programs within multinational
production companies such as BP/Amoco and Shell;
• development of protocols for third-party certiﬁcation of CO2 emission reduc
tions by ﬁrms such as Ecosecurities and ;
• production and sale of carbon oﬀset credits by organizations around the world,
from Costa Rica to the State Forests of New South Wales, Australia;
• purchases of carbon oﬀset credits directly by electric power utilities (such as
 Corporation) and indirectly through commodity markets (such as the
Chicago Board of Trade and the Sydney Futures Exchange);
• formation of investment funds speciﬁcally designed to invest in carbon rights
such as the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund; and
• design of national CO2 trading programs in countries such as the United King
dom and Norway.
These “experiments in social learning” are helping to uncover both the obsta
cles to and the opportunities for converting the theory of emissions trading into
reality on a global scale. They are also starting to provide a concrete foundation
for progress on the overall design of the . These “real world” activities help
ﬂesh out the possible interior of a “decentralized”  mechanism, i.e. the pro
cedures for developing , trading , and maximizing private investment
in  projects (Figures 5 and 6).
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Where should negotiators go from here?

In order to spur more private investment in developing countries, however, gov
ernments need to agree on the “centralized” framework for the  within which
speciﬁc trades will occur (Figure 4). Industrialized countries need to impose
domestic requirements that enhance the value of  investments in developing
countries. Developing countries need to adopt both general and -speciﬁc
frameworks that encourage private investment.
Both industrialized and developing countries need to recognize that it is in
their mutual self-interest to break through the “chicken and egg” question of who
acts ﬁrst by agreeing to proceed together down the  or similar path. Many spe
ciﬁc questions about the  remain to be answered. Eﬀorts to develop those
answers should be undertaken in light of the goal of increasing overall investment,
both public and private, in developing countries.
Negotiators from developing countries should explore and understand the
links between private capital ﬂows and environmental performance, particularly
in considering their position on the . Doing so will provide a solid founda
tion for deciding whether, and if so on what terms, they want to work on design
ing the  to help maximize private investment in their countries.
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Investors’ views on climate change
Camilla Seth, Surdna Foundation
Andrew Kasius, EA Capital 1

Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions that have the potential to mobilize significant
financial resources to mitigate global climate change. However, the emissions reduc
tions called for by the Protocol will require broad based public and private collabora
tion as well as clear national and international policies to help establish new trading
mechanisms and institutions. Because this is the first time the private sector is being
called upon to participate in such a large-scale, global environmental effort, there is
some uncertainty how the investment community will respond and when it will
begin to engage in the carbon market in a meaningful way. This paper makes gen
eral observations about how the investment community has responded to climate
change, and the extent to which the larger policy discussions are having an impact
on investment activity. The paper also discusses investments that are compatible
with climate change mitigation objectives, but which are taking place completely or
somewhat independently of the global policy framework. The investors’ views
described here are based on interviews across a variety of investment sub-sectors, as
well as an accumulated impression developed over several years of working at the
intersection of finance and the environment.
Introduction

The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions that have the potential to mobilize signif
icant ﬁnancial resources to mitigate global climate change. Flexibility mechanisms
outlined in the Protocol, including joint implementation (), the Clean Develop
ment Mechanism (), and emissions credit trading, allow for international
collaboration in reducing greenhouse gases (), thereby establishing the path
by which a large proportion of the ﬁnancial resources could be directed to advance
clean development in developing countries. The emissions reductions called for
by the Protocol will require broad based public and private collaboration. Clear
national and international policies must be established, the rules must be kept as
simple as possible, and appropriate incentive structures must be created and com
municated. It should be noted that this is the ﬁrst time the private sector is being
called upon to participate in such a large-scale, global environmental effort that
requires the establishment of new trading mechanisms and institutions, new
emissions valuations, and targeted investment. The questions remain, however,
has the private sector heard the call, and has it been in the right language?

1 The authors wrote the major
ity of this article while both
were working for EA Capital, a
New York City based financial
services firm. Camilla Seth is
now Associate Program Officer
for the Environment at the
Surdna Foundation. Andrew
Kasius is a Senior Associate at
EA Capital.
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Monitoring and representing “the perspective” of a sector as large and diverse as
the ﬁnancial sector is an extremely difﬁcult task; to do so on an environmental
issue such as climate change is even more challenging. With the exception of a
select few institutions and individuals, the mainstream investment community
does not appear to be convinced that environmental issues have any bearing on
their business. In the United States in particular there is still very limited discussion
of climate change in the ﬁnancial services sector. It is therefore difﬁcult to make
conclusive statements about the industry’s perception of the issue. Thus, this paper
focuses on some general observations about how the issue is being discussed,
where, and the extent to which it is having any impact on investment activity.
The investors’ views described here are based on interviews across a variety of
investment sub-sectors, as well as an accumulated impression developed over sev
eral years of working at the intersection of ﬁnance and environment. In research
ing the ﬁnancial community’s views on global climate change as a business issue,
soliciting opinions from speciﬁc individuals was often easier than identifying the
policy of the ﬁrms they represent. Frequently, these individuals requested that
their comments remain anonymous until they were better able to gauge their
ﬁrm’s policy on this issue.
Which segments of the investment community
are engaged on the climate change issue?

Overall, the climate change issue has not provoked the active interest of the invest
ment community. One might expect that those investors with exposure to the sec
tors with the greatest carbon liabilities, such as electric power, building, and trans
portation, would be the most concerned. After all, if binding global regulations
emerge, these are the sectors that will be the focus for emissions reductions,
through technology and process upgrades, or through credit trading. However,
only a small subset of these investors are actively incorporating climate change
into their investment criteria. These include:

2 Even though more than
U.S.$1 trillion, or 10% of all pro
fessionally managed money, is
now screened in some way, the
fraction of such funds screened
on environmental grounds is
very small.
3 There are approximately 800
venture funds based in the
United States that each have
over U.S.$25 million under man
agement. In Europe there are
many fewer.

• Corporate (strategic) investors: Leading strategic investors in the energy sector
in particular have initiated notable emissions baselining efforts and
exploratory offset trades to establish themselves in what they see as an emerg
ing market. Several have also made headlines around the world with their
ﬁnancial commitments to alternative energy technology development.
• Some institutional investors: Of this very large investment base, only a select
group of insurance companies, primarily in Europe, have begun to look for
investments in alternative energy sources and other “low-carbon”technologies.
Because the insurance industry operates by managing long-term savings and
investments, it cannot ignore the possible effects of climate change on long
term pension and life-insurance investment portfolios. Even though the
socially responsible investment funds () are much more aware of the issue
and are more likely to incorporate it as an investment criterion, as a whole, they
represent a very small percentage of institutional capital.2
• Venture capital and private equity funds: There are only four venture capital
funds in the United States3 that are focused on emerging energy technologies.
The climate advantages of these technologies are one aspect of these technolo
gies’ perceived strength and market advantage, but by no means the sole or even
leading criteria.

  
Why are certain segments of the investment community
not engaged on the climate change issue?

Investment banks, commercial banks, and most institutional investors (pension
funds, mutual funds, universities, and foundations with large endowments, etc.)
have not yet recognized the relevance of climate change to their core business
interests. Explanations for the lack of interest by these investors include:
• Policy vacuum: The United States continues to lack a clear policy framework
around climate change at the federal level. This policy vacuum is contributing
to inaction on the part of the private ﬁnancial sector. In Europe, where a greater
number of clear policies on climate change have been articulated by govern
ment, private industry and the ﬁnancial sector have begun to respond more
seriously. Some notable emerging industrial champions in the United States are
acknowledging that human contribution to global climate change will be a sig
niﬁcant business issue in the future. These ﬁrms are in the minority, however.
The same ﬁrms were also particularly adamant about the failure of the federal
government to provide sufﬁcient leadership in this area. Over time, the ﬁnan
cial markets may come to support or reject these industry leaders.
• Conﬂict of interest with clients: Firms in the investment or commercial banking
sector representing companies with potential carbon liability will be hesitant
to publicly announce that they perceive climate change as a legitimate issue
worthy of regulatory interest. Investment banks and ﬁnancial advisory services
are likely to follow the lead of their clients and conventional thinking within
each industry on this issue.
That said, leading investment banks are developing greater interest in the
alternative energy market. Providing underwriting services for initial and sec
ondary public offerings is a highly lucrative business. Leading analysts at major
investment houses such as , Goldman Sachs, and Robertson Stephens
have undertaken coverage of this industry and are now incorporating climate
change criteria into their analyses.
• Incentive structure/political neutrality of capital markets: The incentive struc
ture within the ﬁnancial services industry places value on revenues generated
in the near term, with bonuses tallied on an annual basis.As an investment issue
global climate change is, at the very earliest, a mid-to-long term issue. Analysts,
traders, and money managers are unlikely to face either any risk or upside
within their investment time horizon. Institutional investors or lenders are
likely to be concerned with risks of this time horizon but, to date, have shown
little interest in the issue.
For those investors who are concerned or actively engaged
with the issue, what are the main factors that have influenced them?

Several factors have stimulated the interest of those few investors interested in cli
mate change. They include:
• Public relations beneﬁts: Many early-stage investments in Activities Imple
mented Jointly () and Joint Implementation () projects and similar
carbon-related initiatives have, arguably, primarily been stimulated by compa
nies’ interest in being seen as good corporate citizens by consumers, stake
holders and governments. Indications are that other factors described below
are beginning to carry more weight.
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• Strategic beneﬁts from being an early actor: Several early investors got involved
in AIJ and JI projects in order to learn ﬁrst-hand about the range of opportu
nities available and how such projects might work. This, they believed, would
put them ahead of the game once formal frameworks were developed, and
would enable them to identify the cheapest and most effective offsets.
• Potential investment opportunities in low-carbon technologies: A few investors
were primarily stimulated by what they saw as good investment opportunities
in new technologies, including distributed and renewable energy technologies.
Larger energy companies also see this as a diversiﬁcation in their energy tech
nology holdings or as a hedge against regulatory action against their core busi
ness areas.
• Meeting their own internal environmental policy objectives: Some leading com
panies have developed their own environmental policies, including those to
reduce emissions of CO2 from their own operations. Shell, BP Amoco, Elf, and
Totalﬁna are among the leaders in stated reductions of emissions and in terms
of developing alternative, low-carbon fuels and technologies.
• Risk mitigation opportunities: Some investors have been reviewing ways to mit
igate their risk exposure to high-carbon sectors and companies. Insurance
companies, primarily in Europe, have recognized that the time horizon for pro
jected climate change effects is not so dissimilar from the time horizons incor
porated into the actuarial calculations of the industry.
How does the level of awareness of climate change in the
financial services sector differ between the United States and Europe?

4 Returns on disaster bonds
are linked to the level of finan
cial loss due to natural disasters
during a given time period and
whether or not the insurance
claims resulting from these dis
asters exceed a prescribed
dollar amount. In return,
investors are given a good
return and only lose on their
dividend or principal in the
event of massive weather
related damages. Weather
related hedges are proving to
be a popular way for gas and
electric companies to hedge
against mild weather. Warm
weather in winter reduces nat
ural gas consumption while
cool weather in summer
reduces electricity consump
tion. Structured hedges payout
in the event of such occur
rences. Other companies are
similarly affected by weather,
including, for example, snow
blower manufacturers, air con
ditioner makers, etc.

Awareness of climate change is generally higher in Europe, particularly among the
insurance and reinsurance industries. This can be attributed to a history of poli
cies in Europe which now complement climate objectives, and to a general sup
port by the European populace for more activist ﬁscal policy. For example, in a
number of European countries, a carbon (or energy) tax has already been imple
mented. In the United States it is generally accepted in the policy and advocacy
communities that similar taxes are unlikely, due to the resistance of many large
corporate interests, as well as an unwillingness on the part of the population to
change consumption habits. Tax incentives are typically the preferred ﬁscal tool to
redirect investment and consumption in the U.S.
Within the insurance industry, U.S. and European companies see this issue
through different lenses. For example, the U.S. insurance industry is focused more
on the mitigation of climate related damages and claims, and has invested in
efforts to study building codes and revise actuarial data on policies. Innovative
ﬁnancial solutions such as disaster bonds or weather hedges have emerged.4 In
Europe there is more interest and openness in considering the causes of climate
change—and ﬁrms have begun to invest in technologies and companies that might
address these causes. There are also a select few companies where strategic invest
ment decisions are being made, in part, with climate change liabilities as an invest
ment criterion.
How do investors perceive the climate change policy environment?

In general, investors see the policy environment as very weak and as a primary
factor limiting their involvement in the debate. When questioned about climate
change, many investors in the United States point out that the strength of the

  
ﬁnancial sector is in its political neutrality and in its ability to respond to the
opportunities created by a given policy framework. Given the current debate in
Washington, D.C., most investors do not see regulation of carbon as a near-term
possibility and are therefore not devoting resources to addressing potential busi
ness implications as yet. Strategic and institutional investors have expressed hope
that the U.S. government will take more of a leadership position on this issue.
What kinds of investment opportunities are being created
by climate change and how are investors responding to them?

“No-regrets” investments in low-carbon technologies
Where capital investments have been made, they are “no-regrets” investments, i.e.,
those that make strategic and economic sense, that are insulated from regulatory
risk from climate change treaties, and that might have some ‘credit’ potential. For
example, it makes sense for utilities to improve the efﬁciency of their boilers and
generating equipment in order to compete in the emerging competitive market for
electricity. Optimizing the heat rate of a power plant from 33% to 40% makes sense
from a business perspective, and it also reduces risk from regulatory requirements
based on climate change.
From a technology investment perspective, climate change is only one of sev
eral factors inﬂuencing the development of new areas of opportunity. Global
restructuring and privatization, deregulation in the United States, rising environ
mental standards in general, and the growing power needs of the developing
countries are all drivers creating opportunities for technologies that may also have
climate beneﬁts. These low-carbon technologies include energy efﬁciency, renew
able energy, and certain types of distributed generation.
Over the past few years, corporate investment in the alternative energy ﬁeld has
proliferated. BP Amoco, for example, has shaped much of its investment strategy
around next generation fuels and technologies. This has included not only
expanding their traditional business of oil and gas exploration, development, and
downstream distribution, but also moving into new areas such as photovoltaics
and cleaner transportation fuels in key markets.
Competitors such as Shell, Texaco, and Suncor Energy have similar initiatives
underway to stake claims in the future energy market. Shell has made public com
mitments to invest $500 million in developing its ﬁfth core business, Shell
In general, investors see the policy environment as very weak and as a primary
factor limiting their involvement in the debate.
International Renewables, over the next ﬁve years. Also, Shell Hydrogen has been
developed to create infrastructure solutions to meet the expected growth of fuel
cells, a non-polluting, efﬁcient source of electricity that many believe will grow
rapidly over the next several decades. Texaco Energy Systems has been created to
leverage Texaco’s gasiﬁcation and catalyst expertise and apply it towards fuel cell
applications. Suncor in January 2000 announced that they would launch a $100
million fund to invest into renewable and alternative energy projects.
Electric utilities have also expanded their venturing activities.  Corpora
tion recently announced the formation of a $500 million fund to target second
and third round stage investments into non-fossil fuel based energy and telecom

205

206

5 The evolution of the SO2
market in the United States
provides a useful example of
the potential efficiency of the
market in meeting environ
mental objectives. It was
expected that a secondary
market in trading would
emerge as the most cost-effec
tive way to reach private sector
obligations. There were indus
try estimates that projected the
cost of investment necessary to
meet obligations would be near
U.S.$100 billion. In the early
1990s the U.S. Government and
consultants to the U.S. Environ
mental Protection Agency were
forecasting that the average
price for SO2 credits would
range between U.S.$600 and
U.S.$1500/ton. All the predic
tions were wrong. As of today, a
median price for SO2 trades is
U.S.$100/ton. The total volume
of investment in SO2 credits
during the last three years has
been roughly U.S.$4 billion.
6 Canada, Finland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden have all agreed to par
ticipate in the PCF. Corporate
participants include BP Amoco
and six Japanese electric power
companies. A complete list of
participants can be found on
the Fund’s website: www.proto
typecarbonfund.org

   
munications technologies. Sempra Energy, Duquesne Enterprises,  Energy,
and others have made signiﬁcant investments into similar ventures.
Of late, the public equity markets have become enamored with alternative
energy stocks. In the United States, stocks for fuel cell makers Plug Power, Ballard,
and Fuel Cell Energy skyrocketed in value in 2000. Capstone Turbines, a leading
microturbine manufacturer, saw its stock price rise 200% on the day of its initial
public offering. (Although, like Internet stocks, these often drop back down to less
stratospheric levels after investors initial euphoria.) Other stocks related to alter
native energy such as Astropower, a leading photovoltaics manufacturer, and
Unique Mobility, a components manufacturer for next generation automotive
technologies, have also gained ground. European companies such as Johnson
Mathey, makers of fuel reformers for fuel cells, and Vestas, the leading manufac
turer of large wind turbines, have experienced similar growth in value.
Numerous automobile manufacturers such as Ford, DaimlerChrysler, General
Motors, Honda, and Toyota have also made notable investments into new tech
nologies such as fuel cells, ﬂexible fuel vehicles, electric vehicles, and hybrid-elec
tric vehicles. Ford and Daimler Benz have invested hundreds of millions into Bal
lard for the development of the fuel cell power-train. Hybrid electric vehicles such
as the Honda Insight and the Toyota Prius are already on the market in limited
production, while GM’s Precept and Ford’s Prodigy models are expected on the
market by 2003. Fuel cell vehicles continue to develop and are likely to ﬁrst be seen
in transit applications such as buses.
Carbon offset investments/trading
Some more active and entrepreneurial players are looking at carbon trading
opportunities that are arising from the Protocol. U.S. investors appear to be more
interested in this than investors in Europe, perhaps due to a greater familiarity with
emissions trading regimes such as the SO2 market created by the Clean Air Act.5
U.S. carbon brokers indicate that trading activity for carbon offsets is acceler
ating. Buyers of credits and options for credits have been participating in trades
with an emphasis on credits for the years 2006 through 2010. This reﬂects some
consideration of the timetable of the Kyoto Protocol.
In January of 2000, the World Bank launched its Prototype Carbon Fund ()
as one trading mechanism available within the global carbon offset market. The
Fund is capped at $150 million and is scheduled to terminate in 2012. The 
will provide a mechanism whereby buyers and sellers of carbon offsets can invest
The Global Climate Coalition, the most powerful corporate lobby in the United
States that is opposed to the Kyoto Protocol and related regulations, has been sig
niﬁcantly weakened in the last year.
in a pool of carbon investments, generated by the carbon emissions reductions
created by projects in countries where the project costs are lower. The  is not
without controversy and there are many who question its structure and potential
impact. Still, the  is drawing signiﬁcant interest from governments and the pri
vate sector. To date, the  has received commitments from six nations and ﬁf
teen companies.6 Twenty countries have expressed interest in hosting  pro
jects, and additional private sector co-investment is sought. This fund is an

  
example of a collaborative public-private partnership, created to address the
ﬁnancing needs of the carbon market.
Other pooled funds are likely to develop as the rules of the carbon market are
established—especially those that will afford credit for early action. Meanwhile,
Credit Lyonnais and Arthur Anderson plan to launch a U.S.$400 million fund to
invest in energy infrastructure projects intended to generate carbon credits. At the
time of this writing the fund is still in the planning stage and is due to be launched
later in 2000. Prime investment targets are likely to be projects in developing coun
tries that will qualify as  projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Several smaller
funds exist, such as the $150 million DexiaFondElec Energy Efﬁciency and
Emissions Reduction Fund and the upcoming $65 million fund by Union Bank
of Switzerland.
Given the much greater uncertainty surrounding the potential for forest
based carbon-offset investment, few forest products companies or investors in
the forestry sector, have, as yet, shown great interest in the opportunities gener
ated by the Kyoto Protocol and the .7 Hancock Timber Resources, a division
of Hancock Natural Resources Group (), is a notable exception.  is
the world’s leading forest and agricultural investment management organisation
for institutional clients, with $3.2 billion and 3.2 million acres under man
agement. The company recently announced the establishment of a forestrybased carbon offset investment fund targeted towards Australian forestry invest
ments. The Fund will be based in Sydney in order to build on the work of State
Forests, a New South Wales government trading enterprise that has significant
forest acreage under management and has pioneered trading in carbon credits.
The location will also allow access to the new carbon sequestration credit market
being developed by the Sydney Futures Exchange, the largest futures exchange
in the region.
Do investors see climate change as creating new
liabilities, and how are they responding to them?

Most investors are still unsure of exactly what their liabilities will be. In Europe,
greater clarity surrounding public policy on climate change has prompted greater
levels of dialogue—seeming to indicate that potential liabilities may be taken more
seriously.
The activities of some strategic investors indicate that they are proactively
trying to mitigate potential liabilities—although it can also be said that they are
pursuing new opportunities. They are taking early action to familiarize themselves
with possible offset alternatives, to develop baseline estimates of current and past
emission rates, to understand and gain experience with trading mechanisms, and
to provide input to the policy debate. Examples include:
• BP Amoco’s internal trading system for carbon emissions, their participation
in a forestry offset project, and voluntary pledges to reduce the company’s 1990
emissions levels by 10% by the year 2010.
• American Electric Power’s () efforts to improve internal efﬁciency mea
sures including power plant operations and customer efﬁciency projects, their
participation in the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and early forestry
offset projects.  felt that they were unprepared for dealing with the sulfur
emissions requirements of the Clean Air Act and are trying to be better pre
pared for the outcome of the climate change debates.
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Arguments from certain industry groups that carbon regulations would place
a large portion of their corporate value at risk seem to indicate that these compa
nies should be disclosing such potential risk to their investors. This is an area that
merits further attention from ﬁnancial advisors. It should be noted that the Global
Climate Coalition, the most powerful corporate lobby in the United States that is
opposed to the Kyoto Protocol and related regulations, has been signiﬁcantly
weakened in the last year. Automakers Ford and DaimlerChrysler left the coali
tion in December of 1999, followed by Texaco in February of 2000. These compa
nies still claim that the Protocol’s regulatory approach is too costly. As indicated
above, all are now voluntarily increasing their investments in alternative tech
nologies.
What can be done to stimulate greater interest
and response among the investment community?

Policy framework that supports investment in
low-carbon technologies and other mitigation solutions
A variety of policy measures can help, including production tax incentives for
alternative fuels, a better link between government research and development
funding, private commercialization ﬁnance for low-carbon technologies, emis
sions disclosure regulations, support for the establishment of national registries
and information on carbon trends, and carbon taxes. Some measures, such as a
fuel tax, will be more or less feasible, depending on the country. Creating policy
mechanisms that would allow venture capital, strategic, and private equity
investors in low-carbon technologies to receive carbon credits for their invest
ments would enhance returns on this type of investment and mobilize more cap
ital towards it.
One particularly interesting result of interviews with U.S. investors was broad
agreement that the U.S. government should avoid subsidies targeted at speciﬁc
technologies. The investors held that past programs had been extremely inconsis
tent and success had been limited– perhaps doing more harm than good in the
long-term. In the words of one experienced debt and equity investor, “Instability
of tax incentives makes longer-term capital market interest impossible.”
Alternative to subsidies have been suggested. One is to provide a tax credit
when long-term capital gains have been captured. Credits that are made to
investors who have realized such gains would support—and not distort—invest
ment in sound and proﬁtable projects and companies. Production credits are also
thought to be more effective in stimulating long-term development and success of
the market than simple investment tax credits. Finally, as most of these projects
have high capital costs, any ﬁnancial mechanism that can help reduce capital costs
and allow the projects to be ﬁnanced over the life of the assets (maximizing long
term debt ﬁnancing) will be very helpful.
Education and information dissemination
Accurate information is critical to making wise investment decisions. Exploiting
new investment opportunities will require increased availability of information
on technologies, markets, and regulations to help companies and investors make
investment decisions and identify opportunities related to climate change. As a
result, resources should be devoted to overcoming informational barriers to devel
oping and ﬁnancing new low-carbon technologies.

  
• High-level ceo seminars: Educating the CEOs of energy generation and auto
motive companies in private, exclusive non-political brieﬁngs about the con
sensus on the role of fossil fuel burning in climate change would be highly valu
able. This would help corporate leaders understand the magnitude of the
problem they face, and might encourage them to discuss them with their
ﬁnanciers.
• Investor forums: Dissemination of information could take place through the
facilitation of investor forums for emerging technologies, and through support
for objective studies that can quantify risks and opportunities to investors. Lead
sponsors from the investment community should be sought out and the gov
ernment may play a role in providing information to the group or helping to
support convening the forum (investors interviewed said they would be skep
tical of government- convened forums).
• Publicize investment successes: Broader investment interest might be garnered
by publicizing investment successes in low-carbon technologies within the
investment community. Projects that have successfully met return-on-equity
() and debt expectations should be proﬁled and brought to the attention
of the larger investor community.
Exploiting new investment opportunities will require increased availability of
information on technologies, markets, and regulations to help companies and
investors make investment decisions and identify opportunities related to cli
mate change.
Documentation and disclosure
• Document and quantify potential risks to different classes of investors: Different
classes of investors will be affected by climate change and associated regulation
in varying ways. To help identify these various risks, studies could be prepared
to help inform investors and analysts about the potential ﬁnancial risks to their
investments and how they might price that risk. Lenders with long-term matu
rities for loans could see how future regulations affect their portfolios if they
are heavily weighted towards fossil fuel-based energy sources. Institutional
investors with long-term equity holdings might see the valuation of their secu
rities diminished as a result of regulation. The insurance and reinsurance
industries might be affected both in the types of policies they offer for prop
erty and casualty as well as the potential for increased claims. In addition,
insurers might also see their portfolio of investments affected by regulations
that limit  emissions. A well-designed study to analyze how the different
sectors within the ﬁnancial industry could help each to identify their liabilities
and suggest strategies for mitigating that risk.
• Disclosure of carbon liabilities: Were government or the Securities Exchange
Commission (or its equivalents) to take a stronger stance with respect to the
disclosure of environmental liabilities, including potential carbon liabilities,
greater response from industry and investors might be expected. One sugges
tion would be to convene national or regional forums of ﬁnancial advisors and
equity analysts to examine the issue of long-term value at risk in the portfolios
of large energy companies and energy investors—particularly those who have
been so vocal in opposing the Kyoto Protocol and any regulation of carbon
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emissions. At a minimum, a systematic way to display carbon trends should be
developed and tracked by energy analysts.
Conclusion

Discussion of climate change in the ﬁnancial services sector was previously very
limited. However, over the past two years the climate change debate has evolved
beyond simply questioning the existence of the global warming phenomenon.
Investors’ awareness of the issues and opportunities is increasing. Although cli
mate change goals or sensitivities may still not be a central motivating factor
behind investor’s decision-making, a number are increasingly willing to reference
the climate change beneﬁts of their low-carbon investments.
Insufﬁcient national climate policies, potential conﬂicts with client interests,
and time horizons that don’t match with climate change eventualities all continue
to limit investor interest in climate change-oriented activities. However, these fac
tors are gradually being overcome by the awareness of the public liability of inac
tion or opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, the strategic advantages from early
action, and increasingly diversiﬁed investment opportunities. Changing market
conditions, such as utility restructuring in the United States, have created signiﬁ
cant opportunities for investment in low-carbon technologies, and activity is con
tinuing to intensify in this area. These “no-regrets” investments are already eco
nomically and strategically sound and, further, serve to safeguard against potential
future climate change regulations. Several large corporations have begun to
demonstrate interest in testing the market and gaining experience with develop
ing low-carbon technologies by committing to environmental policy objectives,
and investing in the development of alternative energy technologies. Several major
auto-manufacturers have also started taking precautions in anticipation of future
regulations by investing in new vehicle technologies. In addition, investor interest
in carbon offset investments and trading is developing, and international carbon
trading mechanisms are being established for the ﬁrst time.
In order to foster even greater interest from the ﬁnancial services sector in lowcarbon investment, national and international policies must be unambiguous and
accompanied by appropriate incentive systems. Dissemination of information on
emerging technologies, markets and regulations will be crucial to further private
sector involvement, as will publicity of successful investments in markets where
such technologies are already playing a key role. Finally, in order to capitalize on the
growing awareness of climate change issues and opportunity areas in the private
sector, it will be important to encourage greater alignment between companies’ per
ceptions of their core business interests and their potential climate change interests.
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How developing countries can benefit
from policies to control climate change
David Pearce
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment
University College London

Abstract
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997)
set the foundations for the global control of greenhouse gas emissions, and hence
the control of global warming. While developing countries do not yet have emission
reduction targets under the Protocol, they stand to gain by its provisions. First, global
warming damage is unequally distributed and is likely to affect developing countries
more than developed countries. Second, the Protocol’s provision for ‘joint implemen
tation’ – a limited form of emissions trading – could greatly facilitate the transfer of
clean and more efficient technology to the developing world.There are real prospects
for mutual gain.
Introduction: Developing countries and climate change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change () of 1992
established that accelerated climate change, or ‘global warming,’ arising from the
emission of ‘greenhouse gases’ () posed threats to human wellbeing and
ecosystem integrity; that, while the nature of the threats remains very uncertain,
action should be taken in advance of scientiﬁc certainty (the ‘precautionary prin
ciple’); that developed economies should take the lead in reducing emissions of
,1 and that the ‘incremental cost’ of any actions taken by developing coun
tries under the Convention should be met by the international community
through a ﬁnancing mechanism subsequently agreed to be the Global Environ
ment Facility (GEF). The  emissions reduction targets set under the 
were not legally binding, but centred on the return of industrialised countries’
emissions of CO2 in 2000 to 1990 levels. One matter of serious concern is that these
voluntary targets for 2000 have not been met by many of the signatories.
The Kyoto Protocol to the  was agreed to in December 1997 and is now
open for ratiﬁcation. In contrast to the 2000 targets, the Protocol set mandatory
targets, binding international law, using the period from 2008 to 2012 as the ﬁrst
‘commitment period.’ These targets are shown in Table 1. Countries with manda
tory targets are the ‘Annex B’ countries—primarily, industrialised countries and
the economies in transition (EITs). Under the Protocol, developing countries do

1 The relevant GHGs are:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxides (N2O),
chlorofluorocarbons (cfcs),
hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs), perfluorocarbons (pfcs) and sul
phur hexafluoride (SF6). CFCs
are regulated under the Mon
treal Protocol on Protection of
the Stratospheric Ozone Layer.
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not have targets, although a few countries have subsequently adopted their own
targets (e.g. Argentina). This reﬂects the agreement under the  that the pri
mary responsibility for climate change rests with the developed economies,
although it is increasingly recognised that the rate of growth of  emissions
from developing countries means that they will soon be substantial ‘drivers’ of
future rates of global warming.
table 1

emissions reduction targets under the kyoto protocol
and the eu burden sharing agreement

% reduction from
1990 emissions levels
of 6 ghgs between
2008 and 2012

eu burden
sharing

country
country
Australia
Canada
Iceland
Japan
Liechtenstein
Monaco
New Zealand
Norway
Switzerland
United States
European Union

economies
in transition
all ghgs
(2010)

target
+8
–6
+ 10
–6
–8
–8
0
1
–8
–7
–8

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
U.K.

– 13
– 7.5
– 21
0
0
– 21
+ 25
+ 13
– 6.5
– 28
–6
+ 27
+ 15
+4
– 12.5

domestic
co2
target
(2010)

Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
Slovenia

–8
–5
–8
–8
–6
–8
–8
–6
–8
0
–8
–8

– 20

Since developing countries currently do not assume responsibility for climate
change, and since their policy priorities lie in securing sustained economic and
social development, policies towards climate change control would seem to hold
out little beneﬁt for them. However, this is not the case, and it is important to
understand that developing countries can gain signiﬁcant development advan
tages by participating in various mechanisms established under the  and the
Kyoto Protocol.
How can developing countries benefit from climate change control?

There are essentially four ways in which developing countries can beneﬁt from cli
mate change control:
1. Some developing countries are especially threatened by climate change:
notably, those that are vulnerable to sea level rise and those that are at risk from
major weather events, such as hurricanes, which are expected to increase in fre
quency and severity. Thus, if rates of warming are reduced, these countries can
expect to beneﬁt, even if they take no direct action.
2. The  enabled ‘joint implementation’ () a process whereby a country
with an emissions reduction target can reduce emissions in another country
and count the emissions reduction against its own target. Under the Kyoto Pro
tocol, several forms of joint implementation are permitted. There are guide
lines for partnerships between countries with emission targets and between
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Since developing countries currently do not assume responsibility for climate
change, and since their policy priorities lie in securing sustained economic and
social development, policies towards climate change control would seem to hold
out little beneﬁt for them. However, this is not the case, and it is important to
understand that developing countries can gain signiﬁcant development advan
tages by participating in various mechanisms established under the fccc and
the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex B countries and non-Annex B countries. This latter form of  is called
the Clean Development Mechanism (). Developing countries could there
fore gain by partnering with industrialised countries under the . An essen
tial feature of the  is that any trades must contribute to the sustainable
development of the host nation.
3. The Kyoto Protocol also enables emissions trading, a process whereby coun
tries are allocated ‘permits’ to emit  and can buy and sell those permits in
the open market. Currently, developing countries would probably not be
included in any permit allocation, but it is widely argued that they should be
able to enter such a permit trading system in the future.
4. The  also has a provision for a fund to be generated by what is essentially
a tax on  projects. This fund is to be used for mitigation measures in those
countries that are especially vulnerable to climate change impacts.
The following section focuses brieﬂy on the ﬁrst of these beneﬁts—direct gains
for developing countries through reduced global warming. Emissions trading is
not discussed here because it is likely to be some time before a trading system is
established.2 In contrast, joint implementation schemes already exist and can be
commenced more formally upon ratiﬁcation of the Protocol.

2 For a full discussion of emis
sions trading, see Stewart and
Sands, this volume.

What is the impact of climate change on the developing world?

While the initial responsibility for tackling climate change rests with the devel
oped world, proportionally, it is the developing world that is likely to suVer more
from the impact of climate change. Thus, develop
table 2
some estimates of global warming
ing countries stand to beneﬁt from climate change
damage by world region
control policies in a direct manner.
Table 2 shows two estimates of the scale of dam- region
fankhauser
tol
ages expressed as a percentage of gross national
% gnp for 2x co 2
% gnp for 2x co 2
product () for various regions of the world. The
countries
1.3
1.6
Fankhauser estimates show non- (Organisa- OECD
Non-OECD countries
1.6
2.7
tion for Economic Co-operation and DevelopAfrica
–
8.7
Latin America
–
4.3
ment) countries suﬀering marginally more than
Middle East
–
4.1
OECD countries, while the Tol estimates depict the
EITs
0.07
-0.3
damage as 70% higher proportionally. The Tol estiChina
4.7
5.2
S/SE Asia
–
8.6
mates project signiﬁcant damage in individual
1.4
1.9
developing country regions: Africa, nearly 9%; World
South and Southeast Asia, over 8%; China, over 5%;
Source: Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995)
and Latin America, around 4%. These are the dam
ages associated with a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (‘2
x CO2’), which may occur around the middle of the twenty-ﬁrst century. It is
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While the initial responsibility for tackling climate change rests with the devel
oped world, proportionally, it is the developing world that is likely to suffer more
from the impact of climate change. Thus, developing countries stand to beneﬁt
from climate change control policies in a direct manner.

table 3

important to understand that the eﬀects of global warming will not cease at con
centration doubling—this is just a convenient benchmark for measuring impacts.
The proportionate damage will be even worse if warming is not controlled.
The monetary damage estimates underlying the ﬁgures in Table 2 are not
deserving of too much faith since measuring these impacts is complex and uncer
tain. However, they do illustrate the appropriate orders of magnitude, and support
the view that developing countries may be the main beneﬁciaries of climate change
control. This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the extent to which coun
tries can take defensive measures against the eﬀects of climate change. It is arguable
that the damages shown for OECD countries, for example, are exaggerations
because those countries can aﬀord to undertake actions such as better sea defences,
investments in weather-resistant crops, more robust infrastructure, etc… Develop
ing countries have much less capacity to mitigate damage in this way.
Further insight into the vulnerability of developing countries can be obtained
from estimates of populations at risk from sea level rise. Table 3 provides some cost
estimates for protecting vulnerable states against sea level rise, and the probable
beneﬁts in terms of the population at risk. It is shown that the Paciﬁc and Indian
Ocean islands have high-risk exposure, which can only be reduced by spending
substantial proportions of their GNP on pro
risks from sea level rise
tection. In other cases, such as the Atlantic
Ocean islands, substantial risks can be
% of population at risk
reduced at fairly modest cost.
from sea level rise

Indian Ocean Islands
Atlantic Ocean Islands
Caribbean Islands
Paciﬁc Ocean Islands
Middle East
South Asia

21.5
10.8
9.5
6.8
5.5
4.2

3 Article 12.8: The Conference
of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall ensure that a
share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used
to cover administrative
expenses as well as to assist
developing country Parties that
are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate
change to meet the costs of
adaptation.

cost of
protection
(% of gnp)

Other direct beneﬁts
from climate change control
2.3
0.74
While developing countries may not wish to
1.2
0.09
1.1
0.19
prioritise climate change in their domestic
0.8
0.73
policies, it is worth noting that policies
0.8
0.03
designed to reduce  emissions often pro
0.5
0.10
duce locally beneﬁcial eﬀects. For example, an
energy conservation scheme reduces local pollutants, such as particulate matter and sulphur and nitrogen oxides, but also reduces
carbon dioxide emissions. The fact that global warming control is not a priority for
domestic policy is not reason to ignore the jointly beneﬁcial eﬀects of many domestic policies. This has come to be known as the issue of ‘ancillary beneﬁts’. How large
these beneﬁts are is hotly debated and, of course, it may be more eﬃcient to adopt
policies which directly secure these beneﬁts rather than trying to secure them
through climate change policies. None the less, ancillary beneﬁts provide some
rationale for countries with emissions obligations to act sooner rather than later.

region

without
protection

with
protection

The Clean Development Mechanism Fund
Article 12.83 of the Kyoto Protocol is a feature of potential interest to developing
countries since it requires that some undeﬁned fraction of project revenues be


allocated to what is eﬀectively a ‘ tax’ fund that will ‘...assist developing coun
tries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse eﬀects of climate change to
meet the costs of adaptation.’4
This clause was added because of pressure from the Alliance of Small Island
States. It bears a slight resemblance to an earlier Brazilian proposal for a Clean
Development Fund, which eﬀectively included a tax on non-compliance with tax
proceeds going to a fund for the beneﬁt of mitigation and adaptation measures in
developing countries. Some commentators have noted that if such a tax were sig
niﬁcant in size, it would raise the cost of  projects, which would work against
the main purpose of the .
How can developing countries benefit from Joint Implementation?

Joint Implementation () involves one country paying for emissions reductions
in another country.5 The ‘investing’ country undertakes a project in a ‘host’ coun
try and the  emissions reductions associated with that project are then cred
ited (or partially credited, see below) to the investing country.
The rationale for Joint Implementation
The rationale for  is twofold. First, one tonne of  does the same global
damage regardless of the geographical location of the emission. Thus, the location
of emissions does not matter: if one country pays for the reduction of one tonne
of emissions in another country, the global warming reduction eﬀect will be the
same as if the country reduced the tonne of emissions domestically. Second, the
costs of reducing emissions vary signiﬁcantly between countries.  and devel
oping countries have markedly lower costs than developed countries (,
1997).6 Thus, the overall costs of complying with emission targets will be lower if
emission reduction can be implemented jointly.
The combination of these features means that it is globally more cost eﬀective
to meet the  obligations by engaging in . The principle of global eﬃciency
is recognised in   Article 3.3: ‘...measures to deal with climate change
should be cost-eﬀective so as to ensure global beneﬁts at the lowest possible cost.’
In economic and political terms, global eﬃciency is important for at least two
reasons:
• If more resources are allocated to global warming control than are needed for
any given target, there is a cost to the world as a whole in terms of the foregone
activities that could have been undertaken with the wasted resources. Thus, if
it costs $1 billion to control global warming eﬃciently, but $2 billion is
spent because of an ineﬃcient set of policies, then $1 billion worth of bene
ﬁts are lost in the form of, for example, foreign aid or environmental protec
tion, healthcare, etc...
• If more resources are used than are needed, global warming control will be
unnecessarily expensive and this will deter countries from agreeing to control
emissions. Countries might also defect if they discover that emissions control
is more expensive than they thought when they entered the agreement.
These are very powerful reasons for encouraging . But the distribution of
beneﬁts and costs from  also matter. An agreement can be globally beneﬁcial but
still not be attractive to any one negotiating Party to the agreement. The essence
of , then, is that it should beneﬁt all Parties.
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4 For more complete discus
sions of the CDM, see Gentry,
also Werksman and Cameron,
this volume.

5 The term ‘Joint Implementa
tion’ is used generally here to
refer to the types of activities
mentioned in this section.
6 econ (1997) uses the oecd
‘green’ model to indicate dif
ferences in abatement costs
between countries. In turn, the
green model ‘simulates’ (mar
ginal) abatement costs on a
‘top down’ basis, through the
hypothetical imposition of a
carbon tax. For a 12% reduction
in carbon emissions, the model
shows marginal abatement
costs in 2020 to be around
us$60 tC (per tonne of carbon)
in oecd countries, us$50 tC in
non-China developing
economies, and only us$4 tC in
developing countries. For bigger
emissions reductions these dif
ferentials widen considerably.
Mulongoy et al. (1998) suggest
that forest projects in Annex B
countries could sequester
carbon at us$9-65 tC com
pared to tropical forest projects
at us$2-25 tC, a ratio of around
3: 1. The comprehensive review
by IPCC (Hourcade 1996)
demonstrates an array of esti
mates that cover such a wide
range that no specific conclu
sion on relative costs appears
possible. It is nonetheless pro
jected that abatement costs in
eits will be below those of
oecd countries and that many
‘low cost’ options exist in devel
oping countries. Weyand (1997)
concludes that trading could
reduce costs by 60%, and the
U.S. Administration (1998) esti
mates that U.S. compliance
costs would be reduced by at
least 57% (trading within Annex
I only) and possibly up to 87%
for a ‘bubble’ between the
United States and Eastern
Europe and key developing
countries.
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The need for additionality
A critical condition for a  project to be admissible is that it must be ‘additional.’
Additionality has two meanings, each of which is important.
The ﬁrst is that any project must be ﬁnancially additional. In other words, it
must not involve a diversion of existing development aid funds, but the use of new
and additional funds. Otherwise, the potential beneﬁts to developing countries
from a  project might be lost through reduced aid ﬂows.
Testing for ﬁnancial additionality is complex and diﬃcult. There are some sus
picions, for example, that Global Environment Facility funds are not ‘new’ money,
but have been diverted from oﬃcial aid funds. This conjecture is diﬃcult to prove
because oﬃcial development aid has declined in recent years.
The second requirement is that the  project be environmentally additional,
i.e. it must result in  emissions reductions that would not otherwise have
occurred. Again, if this is not the case, then the global environment has not
gained from the  project. Environmental additionality raises the complex issue
of the baseline, i.e. determining what would have happened if the project had
not existed. For example, a country might have burned coal to generate electric
ity until a  project encouraged it to switch to natural gas or renewable energy.
The  emissions reductions are then additional, provided there is some guar
antee that the host country would have burned coal rather than the alternative
fuel.
Additionality is perhaps the most complex issue that needs to be addressed in
 projects. It is not discussed further here, but it is important to note that devel
oping countries cannot gain from  unless ﬁnancial additionality is assured. They
can still gain if environmental additionality is not fulﬁlled, i.e. they can still secure
net beneﬁts from the project, but then the global goal of  is not achieved.
The types of ji projects that may be eligible under the Kyoto Protocol
Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol is obscure when it comes to delineating the
kinds of projects that may be eligible for  between Annex B and non-Annex B
countries. Elsewhere in the Protocol,  between Annex B countries appears to
include  emissions reductions plus avoided emissions from deforestation,
carbon sequestration from aﬀorestation, and reforestation. Even here, the terms
are not truly deﬁned. Article 12 of the Protocol, which deals with the , does
not delineate what is included and excluded by way of projects. The Conference of
Parties will eventually decide on these issues.
There is justiﬁcation for taking a broad view and assuming that a wide range of
projects should be covered. The rationale for this is that any form of emission
avoidance and any form of carbon sequestration should, prima facie, qualify
because they all result in global environmental beneﬁts. Some may be short term,
some may be permanent, but anything that contributes to emissions reduction
seems valid. Any list may be modiﬁed later because of other considerations, but
excluding certain projects at the outset does not seem rational.
From this broad perspective, the  could then embrace any of the projects
listed in Table 4.
The Clean Development Mechanism and sustainable development
Article 12 requires that  projects contribute to sustainable development in
host countries. In other words, contributing to sustainable development in the


table 4

potential project types for cdm joint implementation eligibility

baseline

cdm option

Energy emissions reduction
Business-as-usual
energy consumption

Demand Side Management (DSM): domestic sector
DSM: industrial sector
DSM: transport
Reduced transmission losses
Improved generation efficiencies

Prevailing fuel mix

Fuel switching in generation
Fuel switching in transport

Non-recovered energy

Recovery of landfill methane
Recovery of coal-bed methane
Recovery of incineration heat/power

Non-energy emissions reduction
Continued deforestation

Avoided deforestation via agroforestry, conservation, and
other sustainable forest uses

Degraded land

Biomass fuel plantations substituting for carbon-intensive
fossil fuels

Non-sustainable forestry

Sustainable forestry

Existing forest management

Improved management practice
Reduced impact logging in natural forests

Low productivity

Raised productivity to reduce incentives to expand
agriculture into forested areas, thus avoiding deforestation
emissions

Fire, pests

Reduced risk of fire by switching from slash-and-burn to
agroforestry, etc.

Sequestration/storage
Degraded land

Afforestation by plantation
Reforestation by plantation
Natural regeneration of secondary forest

Slash and burn

Conversion to agroforestry

host country is a condition of allowing such trades to be eligible for credit against
national emission targets. The diﬃculty is how to test this.
Obviously the  is only one of the available instruments for achieving sus
tainable development, and it may well not be the most important one. Much
depends on the likely size of the  ‘market’ for  projects. However, it is essen
tial to ensure that  is compatible with sustainable development. If it is not,
then the developing world has little or nothing to gain from it. Article 12 makes it
clear that  ‘projects’ demonstrate consistency with sustainable development.
Articles 2.3 and 3.14 require that any negative social, environmental, or economic
impacts be minimised. Unfortunately, since there is no universally agreed upon set
of indicators for sustainable development, demonstrating that  projects are
consistent could either be very diﬃcult (because indicators are disputed) or
extremely easy (because projects may be consistent with at least one of many indi
cators). Mulongoy et al. (1998) suggest that  projects could be tested against
the list of indicators published in 1996 by the UN Commission for Sustainable
Development (). The problem with this is that it might be hard to envisage
projects that would not improve at least one of the  indicators, rendering the
sustainable development ‘test’ redundant. It is also unclear what would happen if
a project made improvements for one of the criteria, but failed on another.
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It seems preferable to pursue a diﬀerent approach. There are two possibilities:
one in which the problem of deﬁning sustainable development is avoided alto
gether, and the other which utilises a general framework for testing the contribu
tion of  projects to sustainable development.
The ﬁrst approach is based on participation in ’s being a voluntary
process. Thus, if a host country chooses to participate, it is presumably doing so
on the basis that it will secure net beneﬁts, which could be construed as suﬃcient
aﬃrmation of sustainable development goals. No separate guidance or tests would
be required. While this is attractive in many ways, it assumes that the host coun
try would be able to conduct what might be a fairly detailed analysis of likely
impacts, and without guidance. It also raises the possibility of the inconsistent
implementation of  projects.
The second approach requires that some guidelines be oﬀered on the sustain
ability of  projects. The essential framework for testing whether the  is con
sistent with sustainable development in developing countries could be as follows:
First, any developing country participating in a  project must secure bene
ﬁts from the project in excess of the opportunity costs of the project. This is the most
basic and the most important principle. It speciﬁes that a country participating in
a project must secure ﬂows of beneﬁts, either monetary or non-monetary, that
exceed what it has to surrender because of the project. The stress on opportunity
cost will help to avoid situations where projects appear beneﬁcial but fail to provide
alternative livelihoods to those aﬀected adversely by projects (e.g. displacement of
slash and burn agriculture).
Second, beneﬁts and costs may appear as monetary revenues from the ‘sale’ of
 credits, and/or as non-monetary eﬀects. A non-monetary eﬀect can be neg
ative or positive. In this case, a negative eﬀect is damage against a party for which
no compensation is paid; a positive eﬀect is when a party receives beneﬁts without
having to pay for them. The emphasis on these ancillary eﬀects will help to avoid
projects which, while yielding signiﬁcant gains in sequestration or emissions
reduction, do so by damaging some other social or environmental asset. Monocultural tree plantations, for example, would be downgraded (though not neces
sarily excluded) because of the potential damage to biodiversity.
Third, beneﬁts and costs accrue to diﬀerent people. Because of the need to
ensure that the  is consistent with poverty alleviation, the incidence of bene
ﬁts and costs matters. There are several possibilities:
• A  project may secure net overall beneﬁts to the developing country, and
it may help alleviate poverty because the net beneﬁts are biased towards the
poor. In this case, there is no conﬂict between the project and sustainable devel
opment. On average, wellbeing is raised and the quality of life for the poor is
improved.
• A project might achieve no overall net beneﬁt and be especially damaging to
the poor. In this case the project is clearly incompatible with sustainable devel
opment.
• A project might secure overall net beneﬁts but be harmful to the interests of the
poor. There is a potential trade-oﬀ, but the high priority given to poverty alle
viation means that this project is unlikely to be regarded as consistent with sus
tainable development.
• A project might not secure a national net beneﬁt for the developing country,
but result in high beneﬁts for the poor. If poverty alleviation is aﬀorded high


priority, such a project might pass a ‘sustainability test,’ although this is open to
dispute.
Fourth, and as a means of enabling the above to be attained,  projects
should identify incentives for project sustainability. There must be incentives in
place to ensure that losers are compensated and that the underlying forces giving
rise to  emissions are addressed. Otherwise, projects will face serious risk of
failure. The focus on incentives should also assist with poverty alleviation since it
is often the disenfranchised or un-empowered poor whose interests are neglected,
but who have the capacity to destroy projects precisely because their concerns are
not taken into account. Incentive mechanisms would fundamentally include
many factors such as land and resource tenure and prices. They would also incor
porate participation, law-making and capacity building.
table 5

summary of the ‘ tests’ for the sustainability of cdm projects

Test 1: The Cost Benefit Test
Do monetary and non-monetary benefits to the host country outweigh the opportunity costs?
Yes: proceed. No: reject.
Ensure that opportunity costs are properly measured to incorporate, as far as possible, any macro
economic impacts of projects, and any environmental gains and losses.
Test 2: The Social Incidence/Poverty Test
Are the most disadvantaged groups affected adversely or beneficially?
Affected beneficially: proceed. Affected adversely: reject or redesign project to account for their
concerns; e.g. compensation, modify nature of project, mitigating investments.
Test 3: The Incentives Test
Are incentives in place to ensure that the project is sustainable?
Land tenure?
Prices?
Resource rights?
Local participation?
Other legal structures?
Capacity?

‘Static’ beneﬁts to developing countries
The basic static requirement for a non-Annex I country to beneﬁt from the 
is:
[Host  Credits + Avoided Ancillary Costs] > Opportunity Cost
The ﬁrst item— credits—refers to the potential for developing countries to
hold some share of the credits () created by the project. A developing coun
try that reduces its emissions or sequesters carbon compared to its baseline, or
what would otherwise have happened, creates a credit that is deﬁned by Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol as ‘a certiﬁed emission reduction’ (). That  is eﬀec
tively sold to an Annex I ‘investor’, and the reductions are added to the investing
country’s Kyoto emission reduction target. The investing country pays the (incre
mental) costs of a project in the host country—this is the ‘revenue’ that goes to the
developing country.  trades have been allowed since the Conference of Parties in
1995. These projects predate and include the ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’
(). In the existing  trades, credits have often been shared between investor
and host. Even though developing countries have no targets under the Kyoto Pro
tocol, they may choose to retain some credits, which have a potential market value
since they may be sold at a later date. Article 3.12 appears to allow for such credits
to be resold since ‘any certiﬁed emission reductions which a Party acquires from
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included in Annex I will benefit
from project activities resulting
in certified emission reduc
tions.

   
another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the
assigned amount for the acquiring Party.’
Article 3.12 also appears to allow credits () secured under  to be resold
to another Party. Since developing countries do not have targets under this phase
of the Kyoto Protocol, it may be assumed that this ‘resale’ option relates to 
credits acquired by investor countries. However, it appears that there is nothing to
stop host nations from sharing in the  generated by a  project and
reselling them. In this way, the credits become a potential source of revenue to
developing countries. On this interpretation, then, the ‘beneﬁts’ referred to in
Article 12.3a7 include the revenues from credit sales. To be clear, this is but one
interpretation, but it has the virtue of reﬂecting existing AIJ practice—whereby
host countries often share the credits with the investor.
If credit sharing occurs, from an investor’s point of view it is equivalent to a ‘tax’
on the  project, where the tax equals the value of the host country’s share of
the credits. Credit sharing raises the investors’ costs and accordingly reduces the
overall market for  projects. It has been suggested that the Conference of Par
ties might determine a universal credit-sharing ratio to apply to all  projects.
If so, the eﬀect remains one of reducing the overall size of the market. However,
credit sharing is only likely to arise because the host country contributes to the cost
of the project. The arguments are then quite subtle. If the host country contributes
to the cost it could be argued that the cost to the investor is less by that amount,
i.e. although the host retains credits, the overall cost to the investor could actually
be less. On the other hand, if the host country contributes, then it is important to
ensure that it is contributing only to an ‘additional’ part of the project: it must not
be the case that the host country input would have happened regardless of the
 project. If the developing country pays for non-additional components of
the project, then by the additionality guidelines of the Protocol, it should not
receive credits. The general rule here is to determine whether the potential resale
of the credits is the motive for reducing emissions. If it is, the project is prima facie
additional.
Host countries are most likely to have an interest in credit sharing if credits are
saleable. However, they might also be interested if they plan to adopt an emission
reduction target ‘voluntarily,’ or expect to have to adopt such a target under later
commitment phases of the Protocol. If developing countries generally expect to
adopt targets in later commitment periods, then the ‘banking’ of such credits (i.e.
accumulating them over time for resale or credit against a future target), may well
be a sensible strategy. It is important to understand that the credits have an economic
value and their price can change over time. These changes will be in favour of devel
oping countries as Annex B countries move up increasingly costly abatement curves.
A developing country could also ﬁnance its own projects and then sell the cred
its. Costa Rica has done this by implementing a fuel tax, the revenues from which
are used to ﬁnance emissions reduction and sequestration projects. The projects
are then certiﬁed and the ‘certiﬁed tradeable oﬀsets’ () can be sold on the
market. Again, investors will only be interested in buying such  if they are
recognised as additional emissions reductions. In this case, additionality appears
legitimate because if Costa Rica did not plan to sell the  then it would not
have undertaken the projects or implemented the fuel tax—the fuel tax and emis
sions reduction projects are not part of the baseline. As a result, the commercial
value of the credits should be included in the ‘credit’ item. Note that these direct


beneﬁts depend on the negotiated shares of the credits between Annex 1 and host
countries.
Dynamic net gains to developing countries
To these static gains and losses must be added any dynamic gains from a ji trade.
Of these, the most relevant is technology transfer, i.e. the import ‘into the host
country of advanced technology.’ Technology may be physical—e.g. capital equip
ment embodying new technology; or managerial—e.g. improved forest manage
ment techniques. While the static gains and losses are hard to quantify, estimating
the dynamic beneﬁts of ji will be extremely diﬃcult.
Once the overall condition for achieving a net beneﬁt to the developing coun
try is analysed, attention should focus on each component of the net beneﬁt equa
tion to see who experiences the gains and losses. For example, a  project might
displace slash and burn agriculture. Prima facie, the opportunity cost will fall on
the relatively poor, and steps would need to be taken to ensure that the net bene
ﬁts of the project were carefully reinvested to ensure that the wellbeing of this dis
advantaged group is improved. If a  project displaces coal burning, this may
have eﬀects on any indigenous mining industry. Again, the groups involved are
likely to be low-income groups.
More on Clean Development Mechanism additionality

For a  project to be additional according to the terms deﬁned here, it must be
a project that the host country would not have implemented without the .
Otherwise the project yields no global beneﬁt in terms of ghg reduction. However,
if the host country only has an incentive to participate in the  project if ben
eﬁts exceed costs, would it not therefore have carried out the project anyway? The
additionality of a  project can be tested by determining if the project’s bene
ﬁts would exceed the costs were the host country to meet all of the costs by itself.
If beneﬁts exceed costs in this scenario, the project is not additional. If the 
project has host beneﬁts in excess of host costs once investor ﬁnancing is included,
then the project meets the sustainable development requirement—it is additional
(globally beneﬁcial) and it yields development beneﬁts for the host country.
There is also a need to ensure that the beneﬁts actually accrue and are sustained.
This raises the issue of the social incidence of the costs and beneﬁts, and the design
of incentive systems. Social incidence and incentives can be seen as conditions for
the realisation of the net beneﬁts of  projects.
Conclusion

Climate change control has rightly been targeted at the developed world because
theirs has been the primary responsibility for ghg emissions. The current view of
most developing countries is that they should not have targets for ghg emissions
reduction. Such targets might involve diverting resources away from their primary
goal of socio-economic development based on domestic investments in capital
assets, health and education, and social concerns. Moreover, developing country
environmental concerns are likely to focus within the domestic sphere of local pol
lution control and resource conservation.
Developing countries can nonetheless beneﬁt from climate change control.
The way is open for partnerships between developing and developed economies
that can bring mutual gain.
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First, a number of developing countries are especially vulnerable to the impacts
of climate change—especially sea level rise and the increased incidence of severe
weather events. Developing countries therefore have a direct interest in ensuring
that the provisions of the  and the Kyoto Protocol are met. The evidence also
suggests that the Protocol will not have a signiﬁcant impact on rates of global tem
perature increase until developing countries also have emissions control targets.
Working with developed economics in anticipation of such future controls is
therefore expedient.
Second, the Kyoto Protocol opens the way for Joint Implementation. Under
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can participate in joint
implementation through the . Developing countries stand to gain in three
ways:
• Through the ‘ tax,’ which may generate funds to be used for climate change
impact mitigation in vulnerable countries;
Through
sharing credits that will be commercial assets when they can be sold
•
through a world market; and
• Through the ancillary beneﬁts that will accrue from  projects—these
include both ‘static’ beneﬁts, such as reduced air pollution, and ‘dynamic’ ben
eﬁts arising from the transfer of technology and capacity building.
Throughout, the beneﬁts accruing to developing countries will depend on the
extent to which the  operates without constraints. For example, the  will
compete with other forms of , which may not involve developing countries. In
addition,  will be in competition with any tradeable permit scheme that is
ultimately established. A  that has too many limitations will not therefore
prosper, and developing countries could lose out on opportunities for net gain.
Nonetheless, there are problems with  projects, notably the complex issue of
establishing ﬁnancial and environmental additionality. Many of these problems
are being worked out through the existing  schemes, which have been established
because of the appeal of a ‘green image’ among investors, because of the desire to
see how such schemes might work, and, occasionally, because investors anticipate
receiving retrospective credit under the Kyoto Protocol. Most important, however,
they have produced a wealth of experience and expertise, which can be brought to
bear on the design of the . While it is unlikely ever to be a major stimulus to
economic development, the  has all the hallmarks of a potential mutually
beneﬁcial bargain between developed and developing countries.
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Abstract
Emissions trading systems as a means of air pollution control have been developed
in recent years to address some important limitations of traditional command and
control environmental regulation. Trading systems address many of the inefficien
cies of command systems and may promote cost-effectiveness by introducing flexi
bility and providing incentives for sources with lower control costs to undertake more
of the control burden. In the United States, for example, experience demonstrates
that emissions trading systems for diffuse air pollutants can work effectively to pro
tect the environment, provide desirable flexibility in the means of control, stimulate
environment-friendly innovation and achieve very significant cost savings if such
systems are properly designed and enforced. Successful U.S. programs have included
trading systems to eliminate lead in gasoline, reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by
50%, reduce smog in Los Angeles, phase out chemicals that deplete stratospheric
ozone, and provide flexibility in air pollution regulation generally.
Emissions trading systems are especially well suited to addressing climate change
because they achieve limitations of net greenhouse gas emissions at far less cost and
stimulate innovation along environmentally friendly paths to sustainable develop
ment. Because greenhouse gas emissions mix globally, net reductions of greenhouse
gas emissions provide the same environmental benefit regardless of where on the
globe they occur. The flexibility afforded by trading systems thus allows emissions
reduction and sequestration activities to occur wherever greenhouse gas limitations
can be accomplished at least cost. In recognition of these advantages, the Kyoto Pro
tocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I countries, as well as between
Annex I countries and developing countries through the Clean Development Mecha
nism ( cdm). Reducing the costs of achieving limitations may promote the likelihood
of successful international agreement on and implementation of more ambitious
limitations measures. Equally important, the cdm can provide important economic
and environmental benefits for developing countries by channeling additional public
and private sector investment capital from the developed countries into sustainable
development in developing countries.
This paper starts with an explanation of the basic features of emissions trading
systems. It then reviews the successful domestic use of trading systems in the United
States. Finally, it discusses the international use of emissions trading to mitigate cli
mate change, including Annex I trading and trading under the cdm.
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Introduction

1 Article 17 provides that such
trading shall be “supplemental”
to domestic actions for meet
ing such obligations. Other pro
visions of the Protocol autho
rize additional forms of trading
among Annex I countries.
Under Article 4 such countries
may implement their limitation
obligations jointly, creating the
potential for trading arrange
ments among the participating
countries. Under Article 6 they
may trade project-based emis
sion reduction units.

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate
Change () authorizes a variety of greenhouse gas () emissions trading
systems in order to combat global warming in an eﬃcient, cost-e›ective manner.
Article 17 of the Protocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I countries
in order to fulﬁll their Protocol emissions limitation obligations.1 Article 12 autho
rizes a di›erent type of trading system, involving developing as well as developed
countries, by deﬁning a Clean Development Mechanism () administered by
an Executive Board established by and accountable to the parties to the  and
Protocol. Under the , Annex I countries that invest in emissions limitations
and sink enhancement projects in developing countries obtain certiﬁed emission
reduction credits () that count against their emissions limitation obligations.
 would be traded internationally. The Protocol provides for the participation
of private entities in the . The objective of the  is to direct capital and
technology to developing countries in order to promote energy eﬃcient and other
forms of environmentally friendly development and to enable the Annex I coun
tries to meet a portion of their  limitations obligations in a cost-e›ective
manner. The implementation of these and other Kyoto ﬂexibility mechanisms is
currently under active discussion and consideration by the Parties to the Conven
tion and Protocol.
What are the basic features of emissions trading systems?

2 For an overview of emission
trading systems and other eco
nomic incentive systems and
their advantages over com
mand regulation, see Richard B.
Stewart,“Controlling Environ
mental Risks Through Economic
Incentives,” in 13 Columbia Jour
nal of Environmental Law 153
(1998); Thomas H. Tietenberg,
“Economic Instruments for
Environmental Regulation,” in 6
Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 17 (1990).

Emissions trading systems have been developed in recent years to address some
important limitations of traditional command and control environmental regula
tion.2 Command regulations impose ﬁxed quantitative limits on emissions by each
pollution source. In order to make this task manageable, regulators typically estab
lish uniform limitations for categories of sources, such as power plants and steel
mills, based on widely available control technologies. In practice, however, the
sources in a given category often vary substantially in both their function and in
the cost of their emissions control. The use in these circumstances of uniform
“one-size ﬁts all” requirements can lead to serious ineﬃciencies. Sources are often
precluded from implementing alternative methods, such as source-speciﬁc process
changes and pollution prevention measures, which may limit emissions far more
inexpensively than generic control technologies. In addition, the current uniform
requirements do not account for the varying cost among sources. As a result,
sources with very high costs are more heavily burdened than sources with lower
costs and societal resources are wasted. The total cost of achieving a given overall
emissions limitation target may be two or three times higher under command reg
ulation than under a more ﬂexible system as a result of these ineﬃciencies.
Emissions trading systems can address many of the ineﬃciencies of command
systems and may promote cost-e›ectiveness by introducing ﬂexibility and pro
viding incentives for sources with lower control costs to undertake more of the
control burden. Under a tradable emissions quota system, a government author
ity issues a ﬁxed number of pollution quotas. Each quota entitles the holder to
emit a given amount, such as a ton, of a pollutant. A source may not emit pollu
tion in excess of the number of quotas that it holds. Thus, the ﬁxed stock of quotas
e›ectively puts a cap on total pollution by all sources. Quotas are allocated to indi
vidual sources by auction or by administrative allocation. Quotas may be traded,
bought, and sold, and held by anyone. Because quota supplies are limited, they will

  
be worth money. Should a source’s emissions exceed its initial quota holding, it
will have to purchase additional quotas. Should it simply use all of its allotted
quota, the source foregoes the potential sale of the quota that would have become
surplus if it had lowered its emissions. Thus a tradable quota system, like a pollu
tion tax system, imposes a price on each unit of pollution emitted. Where quotas
are traded in markets, this price is set by market supply.
Tradable quota systems are designed to allow individual sources ﬂexibility in
deciding what level of emissions limitation to strive for and how to achieve it.
Sources are no longer locked into uniform “one size ﬁts all” requirements. Quota
systems also provide strong incentives for sources to reduce their emissions. Sources
with lower control costs will control their pollution more, and sell or transfer their
excess quotas to sources with higher control costs. As a result, the tradable quota
Emissions trading systems are emphatically not a deregulatory form of laissez
faire. They are part of a regulatory framework establishing overall quantitative
restrictions on emissions.
system will facilitate cost-e›ective emissions limitations. The cost savings that
result, compared to the command system, could be in the range of billions of dol
lars to control a given pollutant in a domestic setting such as the U.S., and trillions
of dollars in the case of international  emissions limitations. Moreover, tradable
quota systems provide long-term incentives for ﬁrms to develop more resourceeﬃcient, less polluting methods of production that reduce emissions less expen
sively. Firms that succeed in this e›ort will save money, enjoy a competitive advan
tage, and proﬁt ﬁnancially from pollution control. Society will beneﬁt because
pollution will remain limited while economic development moves forward. By con
trast, traditional command regulation allows sources to discharge pollutants within
regulatory limits for free, and sources have no incentive to reduce such emissions.
Another emissions trading system relies on emission reduction credits. Under
this system, a source that reduces pollution below the levels ﬁxed by regulatory
requirements or other emissions baselines obtains an emission credit. The source
may then transfer or sell that credit to another source, which can use it to help
meet its emissions limitation requirement. Like tradable quota systems, credit sys
tems provide sources with ﬂexibility and incentives to reduce emissions and real
locate control e›orts from high-cost sources (who will purchase credits) to lowcost sources (who will generate credits and sell them) thereby producing a
cost-e›ective allocation of control e›orts. A credit system does not establish an
initial set of quotas for all sources. Instead, credits are established on an individ
ual basis for those sources that reduce their emissions below the levels required by
regulations. As a result, tradable credit systems tend to have higher transaction and
administrative costs than tradable quota systems.
Emissions trading systems are emphatically not a deregulatory form of laissez
faire. They are part of a regulatory framework establishing overall quantitative
restrictions on emissions. Governments play a vital role by ﬁxing the total amount
of emissions allowed, establishing and enforcing the quota system, and prohibit
ing sources from emitting pollution in excess of the quotas or credits that they
hold. Violations of these requirements, like violations of command requirements,
are subject to administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions. Moreover, trading sys
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tems need not perpetuate existing pollution levels. As illustrated by the U.S. trad
ing programs for lead in gasoline, sulfur dioxide emissions, and ozone-depleting
substances, the number of quotas can be gradually reduced over time in order to
reduce or even eliminate total emissions.
Emissions trading systems may not be well suited to deal with localized pollu
tants that will cause serious harm if too many sources are concentrated in a given
location, or if their emissions are too high. In such cases, the ﬂexibility provided
by emissions trading systems may be a disadvantage, and limitations on trading or
supplemental command regulation may be needed to ensure that localized pollu
tant concentrations are not excessive. Emissions trading systems are most suitable
for widespread pollutants that are emitted by large numbers of sources.
What lessons can be learned from the
U.S. experience with emissions trading systems?

3 Experience with trading sys
tems in other countries as well
as the U.S. is reviewed in
Richard B. Stewart,“Economic
Incentives for Environmental
Protection: Opportunities and
Obstacles,” in Environmental
Law, The Economy, and Sustain
able Development: Europe, the
United States, and the Global
Regime (R. Revesz, P. Sands & R.
Stewart, eds.) (2000).

Globally, the United States has the most extensive domestic experience with emis
sions trading systems.3 Most of this experience has been in the context of air pol
lution control. Two programs have been regarded as especially successful:
• the phase-out of lead additives in gasoline during the 1980s; and
• the program adopted in 1990 to reduce sulfur emissions by 50% over a ten-year
period.
These programs achieved substantial cost savings in meeting environmental
objectives. These cost savings in turn promoted agreement on more ambitious
environmental protection objectives than would have been possible under a tra
ditional command system.
Lead reductions trading
When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency () decided in 1982 to elimi
nate lead additives in gasoline, it opted to institute an emissions credit-trading
program to accomplish the phase-out. Given the severity of the reduction (90%
of the lead additive was to be removed by 1987), there was concern that some
reﬁners, particularly smaller ones, would have diﬃculty complying. The credittrading program added ﬂexibility, which helped ease industry concerns about the
feasibility of compliance. In addition, the  allowed “banking,” under which
credits earned in one time period could be used in another, providing reﬁners
with desirable ﬂexibility in the timing of reductions. These ﬂexibility features
enabled the  to pursue further reductions than it would otherwise have been
able to impose, which provided environmental as well as economic beneﬁts. The
 adopted regulatory requirements that progressively reduced the amount of
lead allowed in gasoline on a ﬁxed timetable. Reﬁners that reduced their gasoline
lead content further and faster than required by the regulations earned credits
that they could sell to other reﬁners that were facing higher costs and having
greater diﬃculties meeting the schedule. Credits earned in one period could be
“banked” for use in later periods. Vigorous trading occurred throughout the pro
gram’s history. An essential element of the program’s success was its low transac
tion costs. Credits were entirely fungible. They could be traded without review or
approval by the . The  monitored compliance and brought strong enforce
ment actions against cheaters. It is estimated that the trading program saved sev
eral hundred million dollars, compared to use of command regulations.

  
SO2 trading
Title IV of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 instituted emissions and
trading programs for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by fossil-fuel electric gener
ating plants, which are the major source of acid rain. The program will reduce SO2
emissions by 50% over a ten-year period. The way the program works is that the
government issues allowances, each entitling the holder to emit one ton of SO2, to
existing plants based on their energy input. Allowances are issued annually and
may be used in the year of issuance or banked for use in subsequent years. The
number of allowances is being reduced over time on a ﬁxed statutory schedule in
order to achieve the targeted 50% reduction. Plants must install continuous emis
sions monitors. Plants whose emissions exceed the allowances that they hold pay
a $2000 penalty per ton and forfeit the corresponding number of tons the fol
lowing year. Allowances are fully transferable. The  has successfully instituted
an allowance tracking system to register trades and accounts on current allowance
holdings.
A substantial market has developed in the allowances, including a Chicago
Board of Trade futures market in the allowances that plants will receive in future
years.4 Because many electric generating companies in the United States own a
substantial number of plants, much trading has also been carried out internally
among such plants rather than through open market sales. As of June 1997 nearly
2,700 transfers of allowances had occurred, involving 42.4 million allowances.
In addition to promoting a more cost-e›ective allocation of control burdens
among plants, the ﬂexibility a›orded by trading has enabled plants to take advan
tage of a variety of emissions reduction methods including the use of low-sulfur
coal and the dispatch of generation demands to low-emitting facilities. Customer
energy conservation programs have also been implemented. These measures are
often far less expensive than the uniform use of a single “end of pipe” ﬂue gas
desulphurization technology that would have been mandated under a command
regulatory approach.
The SO2 trading program is deservedly considered an enormous success. The
program is ahead of schedule and running at far below the costs of a command
system. As of 1996, emissions were more than 30% below the reduction schedule
target. Control costs are less than 50% of the command regulatory alternative,
resulting in more than $5 billion in savings thus far; savings are projected to
increase even more in the future. A strong monitoring and enforcement program
has ensured 100% compliance by sources with quota limitations. Like the lead
trading program, the SO2 trading program has produced both environmental and
economic beneﬁts. The use of emissions trading to address acid rain broke a 13
year political stalemate over dealing with the problem and enabled agreement to
be reached on the ambitious 50% reduction target.
Other U.S. emissions trading programs that have introduced beneﬁcial ﬂexi
bility in pollution control including the following:
reclaim
The  program uses a quota trading system to reduce emissions of nitro
gen oxides and sulfur dioxide in the heavily polluted Los Angeles Basin. The
 program was adopted with the support of regulators, environmental
groups, and industry, all of which concluded that traditional command regulation
had reached its limits in dealing with the pollution problems of Los Angeles.
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4 The futures market, along
with the banking feature, cre
ates significant inter-temporal
flexibility. A plant that reduces
its emissions faster than the
schedule can bank its extra
allowances for its own future
use or sell the extra allowances
to others for present or future
use. A plant that plans to make
its reduction investments later
and accordingly has excess
emissions in the near term can
buy surplus allowances from
others for the current year or
can buy allowances for use in
subsequent years through the
futures market.
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Under , allowances are issued to existing sources based on the amount
that they are permitted to emit under current regulatory requirements. The
allowances’ emissions value is reduced over time. There have been a substantial
number of trades. The program is expected to save hundreds of millions of dol
lars compared to the command alternative.
Ozone depleting chemicals
The United States has successfully initiated an emission trading system to provide
ﬁrms with ﬂexibility in the phase-out of chloroﬂuorocarbons () and other
ozone-depleting substances as required by the Montreal Protocol and subsequent
international agreements. Because the number of producers is small, the number
of trades has been limited, but it appears that the program has yielded apprecia
ble cost savings and provided ﬁrms with beneﬁcial ﬂexibility in complying with
the phase out schedule.

5 The reclaim Program
restricts trading among differ
ent zones in the Los Angeles air
quality region in order to pre
vent increased concentrations
of pollution in a given locality.

epa emissions credit trading programs
The  has introduced several emissions credit trading systems to provide a
degree of ﬂexibility within the command regulatory system for air pollution con
trol. The Clean Air Act prohibits new sources of air pollution from locating in pol
luted regions unless compensating reductions are achieved from existing sources;
under the ’ o›set program, new sources can contract with existing sources to
reduce their emissions and provide o›set credits to the new sources. Under the
“netting program,” an existing source may add a new unit that generates emissions
and achieve compensatory reductions in emissions from existing units without
triggering new regulatory controls. Under the “bubble” program, an existing
source within a given facility can reduce its emissions below the level required by
current regulations and transfer the emissions credit to another source within the
same facility or a di›erent facility, enabling it to increase its emissions.
The netting program, which involves a form in internal trading, has been
widely used and has resulted in many hundreds of millions of dollars of cost sav
ings without impairing air quality. The other programs have been less successful.
There have been very few o›set trades, and bubble trades have been limited. A
major reason for this modest performance is that the  requires advance regu
latory approval of each trade, creating delay, uncertainty, and high transaction
costs. In addition, there are restrictions on trades to ensure that there is no wors
ening of air quality in any location even though air quality standards would not
be violated. By contrast, the lead, SO2, and ozone depleting substances trading sys
tems do not require advance regulatory approval and impose no restrictions on
trades.5 They establish a uniform, homogenous commodity in the form of credits
or allowances, promoting the development of trading markets and attendant cost
savings.
The lessons learned
The formulation process for international market-based mechanisms for limiting
net  emissions can and should beneﬁt from the U.S. domestic experience.
U.S. experiences demonstrate that emissions trading systems for di›use pollu
tants can work e›ectively to protect the environment, provide needed ﬂexibility in
the means of control, and achieve signiﬁcant cost savings if such systems are prop
erly designed and enforced. These ﬂexibility and cost advantages have been instru
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mental in securing agreements on more ambitious environmental protection and
control objectives than would be possible under a command system. Further, this
experience shows that a quota or credit trading system should be designed so as to
minimize transaction costs and facilitate trading by making the commodity
traded homogeneous, and eliminating or minimizing the need for advance gov
ernment approval of trades. U.S. programs have illustrated that it is feasible - at
least at the national level - to design and implement such systems without signif
icant additional administrative expenditure over a command system. These expe
riences also demonstrate the necessity of establishing a strong system of monitor
ing and enforcement to ensure the integrity of the market and the achievement of
environmental protection objectives.
How can emissions trading systems be used to limit net greenhouse gas emissions?

Emissions trading systems are well suited to deal with the challenge of limiting net
 emissions.6  are globally mixed throughout the atmosphere, eliminat
ing any problem of local pollution “hot spots.”Accordingly, it is irrelevant from an
ecological perspective whereon the globe limitations on net emissions are
achieved. Also, the cost savings from using emissions trading to combat climate
change are enormous. There are many di›erent types of facilities and activities
that generate . Di›erences in the current state of capital plant and technology, economic structure, geographical and ecological factors, the stage of development, and available substitutes create very large di›erences in the costs of con
trolling net  emissions among di›erent economic sectors and di›erent
nations. Opportunities for activities to sequester  cost-e›ectively also vary
widely. The potential costs of limiting net  emissions are huge, running to tens
The formulation process for international market-based mechanisms for limit
ing net  emissions can and should beneﬁt from the U.S. domestic experience.
U.S. experiences demonstrate that emissions trading systems for di›use pollu
tants can work e›ectively to protect the environment, provide needed ﬂexibility
in the means of control, and achieve signiﬁcant cost savings if such systems are
properly designed and enforced.
of trillions of dollars over coming decades. It is therefore extraordinarily impor
tant that limitations be achieved in the most cost-e›ective fashion, provided that
such limitations are also equitable and enforceable. Reducing the costs of achiev
ing limitations can promote the likelihood of successful international agreement
on and implementation of limitations measures.
Emissions trading systems can further these objectives by capitalizing on
di›erences in the costs of limiting emissions or enhancing sinks in di›erent sec
tors and nations, and steering investments to the lowest cost -reducing
opportunities. For example, insisting that each Annex I country undertake steps
to limit emissions in order to meet its Protocol obligations entirely through inter
nal limitations is a form of command regulation that treats each nation as a dis
crete source and imposes a ﬁxed quantitative limitation on its emissions. The ﬂex
ibility a›orded by international trading could greatly reduce costs by allowing
some emissions limitations activities to be shifted from countries with high con
trol costs to those with low control costs. The high control cost countries would

6 See United Nations Confer
ence on Trade and Development, International Rules for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading (1999).
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7 See William D. Nordhaus and
Joseph B. Goyer, Requiem for
Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of
the Kyoto Protocol (1998) (esti
mating that while the abate
ment costs of the Kyoto ghg
reductions would be approxi
mately us$276 billion annually
under a scenario that allowed
global tradable emissions,
abatement costs in the absence
of trading would be us$1,971
billion).
8 Article 12(a) provides that
participation in the cdm,
including acquisition of cers,
“may involve private and/or
public entities.” Annex I coun
tries, in adopting domestic reg
ulatory systems to achieve their
emissions limitations targets
under the Protocol, would give
credits to domestic non-gov
ernmental entities that partici
pate in trading credit against
their domestic regulatory oblig
ations for emissions reductions
achieved by reductions in other
countries that they finance,
thereby providing the necessary
incentive for private investment
in emissions reductions in such
countries.

   
ﬁnance, through the trading system, the additional controls in the low cost coun
tries. Use of trading could reduce the costs of achieving the Kyoto Protocol emis
sion limitations by 80% or more compared to systems without trading, generat
ing trillions of dollars of savings.7 Overall targets would be met. In order to achieve
these cost savings, governments should not be solely responsible for identifying
and realizing the best and lowest cost emissions limitation opportunities. Private
sector capital, technology and business experience is necessary for the eﬃciency
and e›ectiveness of such a trading system. This can be achieved by allowing busi
ness ﬁrms and other legal entities to participate in trading, subject to internation
ally agreed standards and procedures, as speciﬁcally envisaged by the  provi
sions of the Protocol.8
The development of an emissions trading system among Annex I countries, as
provided by Article 17 of the Protocol, would generate large cost savings. These
savings would help to ensure that the Annex I countries meet their emissions lim
itation obligations under the Protocol and facilitate further agreements on reduc
tions following the ﬁrst commitment period. Furthermore, as recognized in Arti
cle 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, there are powerful reasons to include developing
countries, which are not subject to emissions limitations obligations, in a 
trading program with Annex I countries that would allow industrialized countries
to meet a portion of their emissions limitation obligations by investing in devel
oping country projects to limit emissions or enhance sinks. It should be empha
sized that any participation in  trading is entirely voluntary on the part of a
developing country. There are four important beneﬁts that the  trading
system would provide for developing countries:
• First,  trading could channel potentially large amounts of capital and tech
nology to developing countries to enable them to modernize plant and equip
ment and develop economically. In this regard, the participation of private
entities in a trading and investment program, as speciﬁcally provided for in
Article 12 of the Protocol, would be essential. The private sector is currently
responsible for over 85% of external direct investment in developing countries.
The amount of bilateral and multilateral assistance from developed to devel
oping countries is limited and cannot be expected to increase signiﬁcantly in
the near future. Tapping large amounts of new and additional private sector
investment through a  trading system would be a major contribution to
economic modernization and growth in developing countries.
Second,
trading projects in developing countries that limit  emissions
•
could provide social as well as environmental beneﬁts. For example, projects to
enhance energy eﬃciency or switch to cleaner fuels will reduce emissions of
sulfur dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides, providing signiﬁcant health
beneﬁts to local populations.
Third,
providing for voluntary participation by developing countries in a
•
trading system with the Annex I countries would generate large additional
cost savings over and above those that could be achieved by an arrangement
that allowed trading only among Annex I counties. Many developing coun
tries lack modern technology and use energy ineﬃciently. As a result, large
emissions limitations can often be achieved at a lower cost by investment in
modernization and new technology in developing countries rather than by
imposing additional controls on sources in industrialized countries. There are
often larger di›erences in control costs between Annex I countries and devel

  
oping countries than among the Annex I countries themselves.  trading
will further reduce the costs of meeting emissions limitation obligations for
the Annex I countries and thereby make it more likely that these countries will
be able to meet their existing obligations. In addition it will increase the prob
ability that Annex I countries will agree to additional and more demanding
emissions limitations obligations in the future. Thus,  trading could help
achieve greater limitations on  emissions, to the particular beneﬁt of
developing countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of
climate change.9
• Fourth,  emission reduction credits against the Annex I countries’ emis
sions limitations obligations during the ﬁrst commitment period can be
earned by Annex I countries beginning in the year 2000. This feature will pro
vide incentives for early investments by Annex I countries in  emissions
reductions through the , e›ectively producing additional economic and
environmental beneﬁts for developing countries, and possibly enabling further
reductions.
How would an emissions trading system among Annex I countries work?

Some basic legal and institutional arrangements are necessary for establishing a
system for trading emissions allowances among Annex I Parties. Such a system
could be established to become operational during the ﬁrst commitment period,
from 2008 to 2012, as authorized by Article 17 of the Protocol.10 Alternatively, it
could be instituted in the period prior to 2008 by a voluntary “early action” agree
ment among those Annex I countries that chose to participate, on terms consis
tent with the Convention and Protocol. Annex I countries participating in such
systems would be subject to national caps on their emissions. In a trading system
established under Article 17 of the Convention, the caps would be those set by the
emissions limitation obligations imposed by the Protocol. In the case of a volun
tary pre-2008 early action trading system, they would be established by the vol
untary agreement of the participating countries.
Under an allowance trading system, each participating country would be allo
cated allowances (net emissions quotas) equal to its agreed-upon net  emis
sions cap. Allowances would be expressed in tons of CO2 or the equivalent.11
Allowances could then be freely bought and sold. Allowances could be issued on
an annual basis, as under the U.S. sulfur trading program, for use in the year of
issuance or a subsequent year. Inter-temporal ﬂexibility could be achieved by
authorizing banking of unused allowances for future use and providing for a
futures market to allow borrowing against allowances to be issued or made avail
able on the market in the future. Alternatively, allowances could be issued on a
multi-year basis and used in any year during the period. The latter is e›ectively the
approach taken by the Protocol for the ﬁrst commitment period.
Parties to such a trading system would commit to ensuring that their net emis
sions for any given accounting period did not exceed their agreed-on cap for that
period, plus any allowances obtained from others, minus any allowances trans
ferred to others. Parties would enjoy the ﬂexibility of determining how they would
choose to implement this commitment. Many Parties might choose to establish
domestic systems of trading in allowances or emission reduction credits. These
domestic trading systems would feed into the international trading system
through trades between private entities in di›erent countries, and facilitate devel
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9 Concern has been voiced
that participating in trading
will be to the long-term disad
vantage of developing countries
because the Annex I countries
will invest in the lowest cost
emissions limitations projects 
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able if and when developing
countries assume emissions
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10 This section is based on a
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unctad, R. Stewart, Jonathan B.
Wiener and Philippe Sands,
Legal Issues Presented by a Pilot
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Trading System, unctad 1996.
11 The relevant agreement
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lents. Initially some sectors,
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and verification uncertainties
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should be overcome in time.
See Richard B. Stewart and
Jonathan Wiener,“The Compre
hensive Approach to Global Cli
mate Policy: Issues of Design
and Practicality,” 9 Arizona Jour
nal of International and Comp.
Law 83 (1992).
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opment of a “thick” international trading market with many participants. Alter
natively, Parties might choose to employ command regulations, emission taxes, or
other measures to limit net domestic emissions in at least some sectors. These
strategies could involve the issuance of tradable emission reduction credits to
domestic entities that reduced emissions below the levels required by command
regulation.
Parties participating in an international trading system would be required to:
• Monitor and report their net emissions to international authorities in accor
dance with agreed-upon procedures and protocols and submit to speciﬁed
inspection and monitoring activities by such authorities;
• Participate in and honor a system of accounting by international authorities of
holdings and trades of emissions allowances;
• Respect free trade in allowances and refrain from expropriating them, while
adopting appropriate domestic legislation in order to implement the interna
tional trading system; and
• Participate in and abide by the outcome of dispute settlement procedures
established by the agreement.
International entities, established pursuant to the  and Protocol or a pre
2008 agreement, would have to carry out three essential functions to ensure the
successful working of a trading system.
• First, an international authority would have to establish basic procedures and
rules for registering and trading allowances or credits, and keep accounts of
trades and current holdings. It is thought that trades would not actually be car
ried out through such an entity, but by one or more exchanges and through
non-exchange transactions in accordance with trading regulations that it
establishes.
• Second, the same or a di›erent international authority would establish and
oversee monitoring and veriﬁcation of the Parties’ net emissions. It would estab
lish procedures and protocols for reports by parties of their net emissions for
each accounting period. The authority or other public or private authorized
entities would receive and review these reports; engage in independent moni
toring and inspection activities as authorized by the agreement; and certify each
Party’s net emissions for each accounting period at the close of that period.
• Third, an international authority would have to establish a system for resolv
ing disputes regarding the trading system, including issues regarding parties’
compliance, and institute sanctions or other remedies for non-compliance.
Parties would be responsible for ensuring compliance by their domestic
sources with measures so as to limit each Party’s net emissions within its agreedupon cap. Parties that failed to meet this obligation, and that failed to buy
allowances in the trading market to cover their emissions deﬁcit, would be certi
ﬁed as non-compliant by the relevant international authority at the close of the
accounting period and would be subject to liabilities and sanctions. A sanction
that could be automatically imposed for deﬁcits would be to reduce the Party’s
allowed emissions in the next budget period by an amount at least equal to its
deﬁcit in the prior budget period, similar to the U.S. sulfur trading system. Addi
tional sanctions, including ﬁnes and exclusions from the trading system, could be
authorized by the agreement that established the system.

  
If these measures assured high levels of compliance by Parties selling
allowances, it would be appropriate to provide that sold allowances would remain
valid in cases of occasional or temporary non-compliance by sellers. In this case,
buyers of allowances would be fully protected. This approach would reduce
investor risk and thereby promote trading. This is the approach of the most suc
cessful U.S. emissions trading programs. It has been argued, however, that inter
national institutions may be too weak to enforce seller liability in the international
context. If so, liability might be imposed on allowance buyers. This could be
accomplished by, for example, discounting the value of their allowances pro rata
by the percentage of non-compliance by the seller. There have also been propos
als for shared buyer-seller liability.
In order to ensure a well-functioning market, one must address the potential
problem of market power. Monopolization or other attempts to restrain trade in
allowances can best be prevented by ensuring the widest possible market with
many buyers and sellers, including large numbers of private entities. Any remain
ing problems of market power might be adequately addressed by domestic or ..
competition law, although thought might be given to developing a form of inter
national competition policy for trading pursuant to the international agreement
establishing the trading system.
How would emissions trading work under the cdm?

Article 12 of the Protocol provides for a trading system between developed and
developing countries. It provides that certiﬁed emission reduction credits
obtained from  projects in developing countries during the period from 2000
to the ﬁrst commitment period 2008-2012 can be used to meet Annex I countries’
obligations during that period. Thus, Article 12 designates the  as an “early
action mechanism” that will provide inducements for investments in developing
countries and environmental beneﬁts beginning in 2000. Operationalizing the
 is, however, a complex task both politically and administratively. It involves
a number of circumstances and considerations that are di›erent from those in a
trading system among Annex I countries. It will, of course, be necessary to estab
lish a structure for governance of the  that will safeguard the interests of the
participating Parties, especially developing country Parties. Under Article 12.4, the
 is to be “subject to the authority and guidance” of the Conference of the Par
ties () to the  and the Meeting of Parties () to the Protocol, and is to
be “supervised” by an Executive Board. It must again also be emphasized that par
ticipation in the  is entirely voluntary.
Developing country parties, unlike Annex I countries, are not subject to emis
sions limitation obligations. This means that the  trading system cannot be
based on tradable emissions allowances or quotas. Instead, credits must be
awarded for emissions reductions achieved by speciﬁc projects. This is the system
established by Article 12.5 of the Protocol, which requires the / to desig
nate “operational entities” to authenticate Certiﬁed Emission Reductions ()
for projects in developing countries ﬁnanced by Annex I Parties and their private
entities. In order to be certiﬁed, projects must provide emissions reductions that
are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project and that pro
vide “[r]eal, measurable and long-term beneﬁts related to the mitigation of cli
mate change.” In addition, under Article 12.7, the / must provide for inde
pendent monitoring and veriﬁcation of project activities, through “modalities and
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procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, eﬃciency, and account
ability,” to ensure that  are valid. There must also be bookkeeping arrange
ments to track  holdings and trades. The system for certifying and recogniz
ing  should be designed to maximize their fungibility in order to provide for
the widest possible trading market.
Active discussions are currently in progress, through the Convention’s Sub
sidiary Body for Implementation and meetings of the /, on the detailed
design of the  and the criteria and procedures for determining project eligi
bility and certiﬁcation of credits. It must be emphasized that the  is not a
single organization. Rather, it is a legal and institutional system that includes a
variety of entities, including Parties, the Executive Board, and a variety of inter
national institutions and non-governmental entities. The role and relations
among these various entities will have to be further deﬁned. It also includes rules,
standards, and procedures linking these components together in fulﬁllment of the
’ objectives, as set forth in Article 12.2 of the Protocol: to assist developing
countries in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ulti
mate objective of the Convention and to assist Annex I parties meeting their emis
sions limitation obligations. With regard to the latter, Protocol Article 12.3(b) pro
vides that Annex I Parties may use  to “contribute to compliance with part of
their” Protocol emissions limitations requirements. Thus, an issue that must be
addressed by the / is whether to impose any limitations on such use of
 and, if so, how any such limitations should be deﬁned.
A central purpose of the  is to mobilize private capital to help fund projects
in developing countries that will promote sustainable development and help miti
gate climate change. Article 12.9 of the Protocol explicitly mentions the participa
tion of private entities in the . Thus, the ’ operational modalities and cri
teria must harmonize environmental and economic considerations. The
environmental integrity of  projects and of the  that they earn must be
assured. At the same time, investors require clarity and consistency of rules through
a  framework with maximum transparency and minimum subjectivity.
Additionally, it will be necessary to provide assistance to developing countries
for building analytical, legal, and institutional capacity to participate e›ectively in
 trading. Such assistance might be appropriately provided by entities such as
the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the  Commission on
Trade and Development (). There is a danger that without such capacity
building, the  could simply replicate forms of development capitalism that
are considered exploitive by observers in many developing countries. Capacity
building, in its broadest sense, should involve a concerted campaign of informa
tion dissemination about current project ﬁnance tools for local developers and
ﬁnanciers and government oﬃcials involved in the  process. It will be essen
tial to build host country capacity to understand the  and negotiate project
terms, including the allocation of . This could be done through multilateral
and/or bilateral funding, by developing standard project contracts for guidance,
and by initiating regional pilot projects and support capacities.
An important set of issues relates to the criteria that a project must satisfy in
order to be eligible to earn . It is intended that there will be a process for regis
tration of projects upon a determination of  authorities that they meet criteria
of eligibility. Under Protocol Article 12.5, undertakings must secure “[r]eal, measur
able, and long-term” climate beneﬁts and achieve reductions in emissions that are
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“additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certiﬁed project activity.”
Active discussions are underway on operationalizing these criteria. It is widely
agreed that ﬁnancial investments in  projects must, in order to earn , be
additional to oﬃcial development assistance, global environmental funds, and
existing Annex I Party commitments to developing countries. Also, as noted above,
a basic purpose of the  is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable
development. This raises the issue of what criteria of sustainability projects must
satisfy, and whether project sustainability determinations should be made solely by
the host countries in which projects are located, or whether international 
authorities should also have some role. In any event, the host country must, in all
cases, approve a project in order for it to qualify under the .
Protocol Article 12.8 provides that a share of the proceeds from certiﬁed pro
ject activities is to be used to cover the ’ administrative expenses as well as
to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
e›ects of climate change to meet the costs of adoption. Measures must be taken to
operationalize these provisions.
Certiﬁcation of Emission Reduction Credits
In order to determine a project’s , one must ﬁrst determine the extent of the
emissions or sequestration services that a project will generate. A certifying
authority must also establish a baseline that deﬁnes the level of net emissions that
would have occurred had the project not been implemented. The di›erence
between the baseline and the net emissions generated by the project determines
the amount of the credit. The determination of both a project’s net emissions and
its baseline present diﬃculties. This, in turn, raises the question of when, how and
by whom  should be determined.
One approach is to certify a project’s credits in advance (ex ante certiﬁcation)
based on its expected net emissions. In many instances, however, projects will be
designed to operate over many years, requiring a degree of predictive uncertainty
and a risk of future project failure. The ex ante certiﬁcation system is based on the
certiﬁcation of a stream of future credits over a period of years, the amount of
which is derived from best possible predictions. If a project fails to generate the
anticipated credits, then liability would be imposed on the project sponsor, the
buyers of credits, or both. Another approach is to certify credits only after the pro
ject is operational, based on its actual emissions performance (ex post certiﬁca
tion). Under this approach,  would be issued periodically during the life of
the project at the end of each of a series of accounting periods, such as every one
to two years. The advantage of ex ante certiﬁcation is that it reduces investor risk
and facilitates securitization of the credits expected to be earned by a project over
its lifespan, whereby ﬁnancial intermediaries could capitalize the value of the life
time stream of project credits and provide the capital to the project sponsor to
cover the initial investment costs. The disadvantage of ex ante certiﬁcation is that
it creates environmental risk and complications in sorting out liabilities when pro
ject performance falls below predictions. There is a growing consensus in favor of
ex post certiﬁcation. It is believed that if a baseline can be established at the outset
of the project, investor risk will be suﬃciently reduced to allow securitization of
the  that a project is expected to earn over its operating life.
Establishing the baseline for a project, however, is a complex, and often-con
troversial undertaking.12 Consider, as examples:

12 Case-by-case determination
of baselines is one of the prob
lems that have been encoun
tered by Joint Implementation
(ji) projects and Activities
Implemented Jointly (aij) pro
jects involving investments by
one country or its private enti
ties in another country to
reduce net ghg emissions.
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• A project to switch an electricity generating plant from coal to natural gas 
would the switch have occurred anyway, because mandated by domestic envi
ronmental regulations?
• An investment in a more eﬃcient electricity distribution system - would the
system have been upgraded anyway purely for economic reasons?
• A project to preserve a forest slated for cutting - will the cutting simply be
shifted to another forest that would not otherwise be cut?
The last example exempliﬁes the problem of “leakage,” in which a project con
sidered in isolation reduces net  emissions but indirectly causes increases in
other locations and sectors. It would be highly desirable to develop, insofar as
practicable and appropriate, generic rules of thumb to resolve these baseline
issues. This could be accomplished by developing international benchmarks
rather than attempting to determine baselines on a project-by-project basis,
which would elevate administrative costs and uncertainty. For example, an inter
national benchmark could specify a given level of energy eﬃciency that would
normally be achieved in a given type of new project, such as an electricity distri
bution system in developing countries at a given level of development. This
benchmark would then establish the baseline to determine the extent to which a
 project that creates a more eﬃcient electricity distribution system would
reduce  emissions.
The design of the cdm’s investment functions
A key issue in the implementation of the  is the design of its investment func
tion. Protocol Article 12.6 provides that the  shall “assist in arranging funding
of certiﬁed project activity as necessary,” but does not specify how this function is
to be discharged. A variety of potential approaches have been discussed.
The centralized fund model

Under a centralized fund model, the  would constitute the sole or primary
source of investments in  projects in developing countries. It would review,
evaluate, and select projects proposed by developing countries for funding. Pro
jects could be developed directly by a developing country, or by private entities
with the approval of the host developing country. Investment funds for projects
would be contributed to the fund by Annex I governments or by private entities
seeking credits against their international or domestic obligations. Instead of
approaching host countries directly, investors would buy  from the 
itself, thus channeling moneys to host countries that have submitted individual
projects or “bundles” of projects to the  for approval and certiﬁcation of cred
its. The Parties participating in the , particularly Annex I Parties, would pre
sumably have to provide an initial capital contribution, but thereafter ﬁnancial
contributions to the  would consist primarily of the receipts from  sold
to Annex I private entities. Most of these receipts would channel back to the devel
oping countries and local project sponsors providing the . This model would
require that the  have a substantial institutional infrastructure to carry out a
wide variety of functions, including:
• project identiﬁcation and selection;
• marketing of project investments; and
• ﬁnancial and investment management.

  
A central investment entity could, in theory, enjoy advantages through special
ization and the ability to realize scale economies. It could develop the capacity and
experience to assess and select worthwhile projects. It could diversify risk for
investors by spreading investments across a portfolio of projects. The fund approach
would also “shield” host countries from direct “buying” and “selling” of . It
could help to meet developing country concerns over their ability to control invest
ment ﬂows and their impacts on their countries. It would also meet equity concerns
by channeling funds to those developing countries who might be comparatively
unsuccessful in attracting investment through a market-based system. This
approach could also create the potential for a secondary market in certiﬁed credits.
The centralized fund model also has a number of signiﬁcant disadvantages:
• Its reliance on a single centralized bureaucracy operating in a somewhat polit
ical setting is likely to produce signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies. Such an organization
would face diﬃculties in generating accurate and timely information about the
costs and risks of various investment alternatives.
• It would also have problems providing appropriate incentives for the fund’s
administrators to adopt measures that will achieve  reductions at least cost.
• A single funding and investment entity would be a  monopoly, to the
potential disadvantage both of investors and project sponsors.
• The  would have a ﬁnancial stake in both the success of its projects and the
continuing value of . This would create a troubling conﬂict of interest.
These factors could signiﬁcantly inhibit the inﬂux of additional private invest
ment into developing countries through the .
The decentralized transactions model

Under this model, the  would deﬁne basic ground rules for the creation of
credits and credit trading. In contrast to the fund model, however, the selection
and ﬁnancing of  projects and the resolution of issues concerning the allo
cation of project beneﬁts and risks would be accomplished through negotiation
and agreement among the Parties and the non-government entities involved in
particular projects. Under this approach, the  would be designed to ensure
that investor and host countries (and their respective private sectors) are given the
maximum amount of choice to select and ﬁnance  projects. Financial trans
actions and  sharing would be determined ﬂexibly, project by project, with
minimal interference from a centralized international bureaucracy.
Under this model, the  authorities would be responsible for establishing
the basic criteria and procedures for approving projects as qualiﬁed for  and
certifying the credits that they generate. The  authorities would also strive to
anticipate the needs of buyers and sellers (including host countries) and provide
services to facilitate trade between them and reduce transaction costs. They could
do this in a variety of ways, including:
• organizing a web project “bazaar” or electronic bulletin board for  project
opportunities and investor interests;
publishing
details of projects for dissemination, etc.; and/or
•
trying
to
match
donors with suitable projects and vice versa.
•
Using these means, the  authorities would seek to meet the provisions of
Article 12.6 which specify that the  “shall assist in arranging funding of certi
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ﬁed project activities as necessary.” The  would also require an independent
certiﬁcation, monitoring, and veriﬁcation process to generate environmental
integrity and business conﬁdence in the system. If successful, this approach could
generate vigorous primary and secondary trading markets in  and promote
eﬃciency and cost-e›ectiveness.
There are, however, a number of potential disadvantages to the decentralized
transactions approach:
• The / and  Executive Board would remain in charge of the over
all design and implementation of a decentralized system. Despite this, this
system might fail to provide suﬃcient governmental control over investment
decisions to meet the concerns of some developing country Parties, including
those who fear that a decentralized approach would not ensure that they would
receive suﬃcient  investments.
• This model would also have to overcome the problems that have plagued Joint
Implementation () and Activities Implemented Jointly () projects. These
projects have been quite limited because no credit could be obtained for pro
ject emissions reductions against international emission limitation obliga
tions. The Protocol resolves this problem by providing credit for  against
Annex I Parties’ obligations. However, the  would still have to address the
high transactions costs involved in a decentralized process of identifying pro
jects, identifying and bringing together investors, project sponsors, and host
countries, and negotiating project agreements. In the / experience, these
transaction costs have often equaled or exceeded the cost of the project itself. It
remains to be seen the extent to which these costs can be reduced under the
 by establishing central or regional clearinghouses and electronic bulletin
boards to reduce investor-host search costs, and by taking steps to promote a
primary market in .
The unilateral host country model

Under a unilateral model, the host country would both develop and invest in a
project and hold the sole or predominant equity interest. This arrangement would
allow a developing country to identify and invest in a project in its own country
and then sell or bank the  that the project generates. This model could pro
mote host country autonomy and ﬁnancial reward. It would also maximize host
country control over projects and assurance that projects would meet the host
country’s sustainable development goals. On the other hand, the Unilateral Model
requires considerable host country project development and ﬁnancial capacities,
as well as ready availability of extensive private sector debt ﬁnancing. At present,
many developing countries may be unable to meet these requirements.
The mutual funds model

Another model would rely on a system of mutual funds. The  authorities would
provide for and encourage participation of a substantial number of ﬁnancial inter
mediaries, established by multilateral development banks, host countries, non
governmental organizations (), and private ﬁrms. An example of such a
mutual fund is the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, which is designed to pool
private and public capital for investments in  projects. Under this approach, a
variety of international, governmental, and non-governmental entities would pro
vide portfolios of  emission limitation projects in which governments or pri

  
vate sector entities could invest. As such, it would provide economies of scale,
reduced transactions costs, and diversiﬁcation of risk for investors, like the fund
model. However, unlike the single Fund model, the Mutual Funds Model would
allow many di›erent governments, organizations, and entities to o›er such funds.
The  would not o›er mutual funds itself, but would be limited to promoting
their development by others and ensuring the integrity of the credits o›ered.
This approach would eliminate the conﬂict of interest problem and signiﬁ
cantly reduce the market power dangers inherent in the model of a single fund
o›ered by the  itself. However, there are questions as to whether, at least ini
tially, the demand and supply for  would be suﬃcient to support a system of
multiple mutual funds. In addition, there would be a need to address developing
country Party concerns by ensuring that there would be suﬃcient governmental
control over the local impacts of investment and ﬁnancial decisions. This concern
might be met by assuring the regional development banks a substantial role in the
mutual funds approach, while allowing host countries and private entities that
wished to o›er funds independently to do so.
Mixed approaches

A variety of other mixed or intermediate approaches that combine elements of the
various models outlined above. The  could seek to promote a variety of
investment approaches simultaneously. For example, it could o›er its own mutual
fund while encouraging the development of similar mutual funds by others. It
could also provide support for decentralized project-by-project transactions
between investors and hosts while promoting the development of mutual funds
for some of these transactions. Host countries could o›er  from projects that
they undertake to the international investor community through mutual funds as
well as on an individual project basis. The  should, in any event, provide a
substantial role for market-based approaches in order to mobilize private capital
into  project investments on a large scale. Also, the investment functions of
the  should be designed so as to attract investments in  projects from the
widest possible array of commercial and concessionary funding sources. 
project capital can potentially be provided by a wide variety of sources, not exclu
sively  emitters. Rules and guidelines for the  should accommodate this
ﬂexibility, especially if it is to attract domestic investments in host countries and
encourage the use of concessionary multilateral funds as well as international pri
vate capital to meet the sustainable development objectives of the .
Equity issues

An important question related to equity is the extent to which an unfettered cap
ital market will prioritize ﬁnancial ﬂows to  countries, sectors, or markets that
are regarded as high risk or otherwise less attractive from a purely market invest
ment perspective. To maximize participation of developing countries, interna
tional and domestic policy guidance must explicitly recognize that developing
country motivation for the  is to increase capital and technology ﬂows into
sectors that implement their development priorities. One solution is capacity
building. But other measures may well be needed. Current discussions in the Sub
sidiary Body for Implementation have emphasized the need for modalities and
procedures for project eligibility that will ensure that  investments take place
in countries that are often marginalized by purely market-based approaches.
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There has been discussion of a  Equitable Distribution Fund, funded by the
industrialized countries, to provide needed ﬁnances for  projects, taking into
account the geographic distribution of existing and planned  projects and the
comparative need of regions and countries to receive assistance in achieving sus
tainable development. It has also been suggested that in some cases there will be a
need for public sector ﬁnance from sources such as the Global Environmental
Facility (), the World Bank, or the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
to catalyze projects, particularly those in countries with poor institutional capac
ity or high-risk ratings. Using concessionary ﬁnance also provides an additional
mechanism by which a host country could direct investment ﬂows, by selecting
multilateral funding for projects deemed within economic or sustainable devel
opment objectives. Another equity issue is whether the  should have a role in
determining how the  generated by a project should be shared among
investors, project sponsors, and host governments.
Other functions of the cdm
The design of the ’ investment function will have important implications
for the Executive Board regarding size, organizational structure, and Board
member qualiﬁcations. In any event, the Board should be small enough so that it
can carry out its managerial and other functions eﬃciently. It should also be sub
ject to the authority and guidance of the /. In addition, the  will have
to arrange for a number of key functions to be executed, however its investment
function is structured.
• First, it will have to provide for “operational entities” for certiﬁcation of net
emissions reductions achieved by projects. If, as it is hoped, there is a large
number of projects, it would be impractical for the  itself or some subor
dinate entity to certify all projects centrally. Certiﬁcation would be more
appropriately implemented by host countries or private entities under proce
dures and criteria established by the , using a process that is subject to
appropriate review and supervision.
• Second, the  will have to provide for monitoring of a project’s emission or
sequestration services and reporting of the monitoring results. In the ﬁrst
instance, monitoring will be appropriately carried out by the project sponsor.
The results could be reported to the same entities responsible for certiﬁcation
of , such as host country governments or designated private entities. The
procedures and requirements for monitoring would be established by or under
the direction of the Executive Board.
• Third, in order to ensure that monitoring is accurate and that projects actually
generate the credits that have been certiﬁed, a veriﬁcation system would have
to be established for . Under Article 12.7, veriﬁcation must be carried out
by an entity independent of those engaged in certifying a project’s credits. Such
entities could include international organizations, private entities, and .
They would follow procedures and criteria established by the , and would
also report to the .
Fourth,
the  would have to arrange for a system for recording the issuance
•
of  and keeping account of  holdings and transfers.
• Fifth, independent entities, such as private accounting ﬁrms, would have to
audit  accounts.
• Sixth, it would be highly desirable to promote markets in  in order to

  
ensure that they are used to their fullest potential and that they facilitate 
investments. There should also be arrangements for providing insurance
against project failure for project sponsors, credit buyers, or holders who desire
it. These tasks would likely best be carried out by the private sector.
In order to stimulate  investment, the  must ensure accurate certiﬁ
cation, veriﬁcation, and auditing in order to maintain the integrity of . These
functions, carried out in a uniform, consistent fashion, would ensure the homo
geneity and fungibility of  from di›erent projects and host countries. Inso
far as feasible, the  system should also be designed to be compatible with the
Annex I trading system. The same criteria should be used for certifying net emis
sions (in the Annex I allowance trading system) or  (in the  system). The
same methods of bookkeeping should be used for trades and holdings of
allowances and funding for . By promoting the fungibility of allowances and
, these steps could help ensure the widest array of opportunities for investors
and the most cost-e›ective emissions limitation projects.
A further set of fundamental issues relates to institutional procedures to resolve
disputes among both State and non-State entities participating in the . The
 represents a highly innovative private/public partnership model of interna
tional law and organization. To function eﬃciently, there will need to be one or
more dispute settlement mechanisms built into . These instruments will have
to deliver clear and determinative decisions in a speedy and cost-e›ective manner.
This is especially important if the private sector is to be attracted to participating
in projects on a large scale.
Conclusion

Experience demonstrates that emissions trading systems, when properly designed
and implemented, can provide signiﬁcant environmental and economic beneﬁts
over traditional regulatory approaches. Emissions trading systems are especially
well suited for addressing climate change because they achieve limitations of net
greenhouse gas emissions at far less cost and stimulate innovation in environ
mentally friendly paths to sustainable development. In recognition of these
advantages, the Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I
countries, and, through the , between Annex I countries and developing
countries. The  will provide a number of important economic and environ
mental beneﬁts to developing countries by stimulating substantial additional
inﬂows of private investment. If properly implemented, the  will ensure that
the developing countries’ participation in these arrangements is truly voluntary,
on equitable terms that will provide suﬃcient control by host countries of invest
ment projects to assure that they promote developing countries’ interests and sus
tainable development objectives.
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Abstract
This article explores the conceptual roots of different aspects of the Clean Develop
ment Mechanism (cdm), including the Pilot Phase for “activities implemented
jointly” (aij); the functioning of the Convention’s financial mechanism; efforts to
secure funding for adaptation; and the negotiations on the regime’s compliance
provisions. The negotiating history of Article 12 is reviewed, with reference to the
specific textual proposals by both industrialised and developing countries that pro
vided the elements of what would become the cdm.This is then followed by a close
textual analysis of Article 12, which reveals significant ambiguities, and an overview
of the wide-ranging perceptions on how the cdm should evolve. Special attention
is paid to the private sector. Finally, a suggestion is offered on how to make the cdm
attractive and simple to use, while maintaining its status as a servant to its ultimate
objective.
Introduction

When it was unanimously adopted in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change () became the most signif
icant economic agreement since the Uruguay Round concluded with the estab
lishment of the World Trade Organisation. Economic development and increased
energy production and consumption have historically been bound together.
When in force, the Kyoto agreement will seek to reorient the global energy market
in order to meet the objective of stabilising concentrations of greenhouse gasses
in the atmosphere. Within the agreement there is a mechanism, distilled from a
range of differing policy ingredients, which has the potential to be a major force
for development while contributing to the long term reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. This key tool is the Clean Development Mechanism ().
The  exists only in text so far, but it could be implemented and applied to
projects as early as 2000. It has already become part of the implementation strate
gies of the largest emitters of greenhouse gasses and has attracted the interest of

1 This chapter draws substan
tially from J. Werksman,‘The
Clean Development Mecha
nism: Unwrapping the Kyoto
Surprise,’ reciel vol. 17, issue 2
(1998).
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2 Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, adopted 11
December 1997. Uncorrected
text at 37 ilm 22 (1998); the
corrected text, and most other
official documents cited in
this article can be found at
the web site of the Secretariat
to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
<http://www.unfccc.de>.
3 Remarks by Ambassador Raul
Estrada y Oyuela, From Kyoto to
Buenos Aires: Technology Trans
fer and Emissions Trading, a
conference held at Columbia
University, New York, 24 April
1998.
4 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,
31 ilm 849 (1992), entered into
force 21 March 1994.

5 The two major references to
the concept in the Convention
appear in Article 4.2(a), which
anticipates that Annex I (devel
oped) Parties ‘may implement ...
policies and measures jointly
with other Parties’, and Article
4.2(d), which requires the
Conference of the Parties,
at its first session, to take
decisions regarding ‘criteria
for joint implementation.’
The text of the Convention
and all official documents cited
in this article can be found
on the secretariat’s website,
http://www.unfccc.de.

   
the private sector. It is perceived as a bridge between the Annex I ‘industrialised’
countries, which are responsible for the bulk of present and historical greenhouse
gas emissions, and the large populous developing countries, whose emissions will
begin to dominate over the next 50 to 100 years. It could assist the ratiﬁcation
process in the United States because it offers opportunities for U.S. business inter
ests, while engaging countries such as India, China, and Brazil in technologybased emission reduction strategies.
The proposals that led to the adoption of the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’
(, Article 12) of the Kyoto Protocol2 emerged late in the negotiating process.
The consensus on the ﬁnal text of the  was reached with unprecedented speed.
The speed of this process, and the centrality of the  in brokering the ﬁnal out
come of Kyoto, led the Chairman of the negotiations to refer to Article 12 as the
‘Kyoto Surprise.’3 Aspects of the  are undeniably innovative and have the
potential to take the climate change regime, and quite possibly international law,
into uncharted territory. However, many of the ’ core concepts can be traced
directly to principles and mechanisms that have been discussed within the climate
change regime since the outset of the negotiations of the Framework Convention.4
In essence, the  will facilitate a form of project-based ‘joint implementa
tion’ (), which will be governed by a multilaterally agreed upon set of rules, and
operate under the supervision of an intergovernmental body. Annex I (industri
alised) Parties that invest in projects in non-Annex I (developing) countries may
use the greenhouse gas emissions reductions accrued from these projects to offset
a part of their emissions reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol.
Proponents of  see such investments as ‘win-win’ opportunities, whereby indus
trialised countries are allowed to achieve their commitments through the most
cost-effective and ﬂexible means, and developing countries gain access to ﬁnan
cial resources and clean energy technologies. However, as Article 12 took shape and
gained momentum, various delegations sought to accommodate the means for
achieving a range of other objectives within the .
This article explores the conceptual roots of different aspects of the ,
including the Pilot Phase for ‘activities implemented jointly’ (); the function
ing of the Convention’s ﬁnancial mechanism; efforts to secure funding for adap
tation; and the negotiations on the regime’s compliance provisions. The negotiat
ing history of Article 12 is reviewed, with reference to the speciﬁc textual proposals
by both industrialised and developing countries that provided the elements of
what would become the . This is then followed by a close textual analysis of
Article 12, which reveals signiﬁcant ambiguities, and an overview of the wideranging perceptions on how the  should evolve. Special attention is paid to
the private sector. Finally, a suggestion is offered on how to make the  attrac
tive and simple to use, while maintaining its status as a servant to the climate
change regime’s ultimate objective.
What are the fundamental ideas behind project-based joint implementation?

Joint Implementation
The ’ theoretical heritage derives from the concept of ‘joint implementa
tion,’ ﬁrst proposed during the  negotiations. While the term ‘joint imple
mentation’ () is not deﬁned in the ,5 it has been used to refer to two dis
tinct, but related concepts:
• project-based  that would allow Annex I countries to obtain ‘carbon offsets’
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or credits towards their emissions reduction targets in exchange for investment
in mitigation projects abroad in either Annex I or non-Annex I Parties where
the costs of such investments are lower; and
• a system of tradeable emissions allowances which, once allocated between Par
ties, or groups of Parties, can be traded subject to a set of prescribed rules.
Both forms of  were conceived to enable Annex I Parties to achieve their com
mitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a more cost-effective manner.
Each was also intended to encourage transfers of ﬁnancial resources and/or tech
nology between Parties. Both forms, however, have provoked concern from Par
ties and observers, who argue that some forms of  shift the responsibility, if not
the cost, of undertaking emissions cuts from developed to developing countries.
There are concerns that this shift in responsibility could make it more difﬁcult to
ensure compliance with emissions reduction obligations.
Proponents of  have argued that such arrangements are legally possible with
no additional justiﬁcation to the text of the Convention. An early launch of the 
initiative was, however, constrained by the absence of agreed upon ‘criteria for
joint implementation.’ According to the Convention, these guidelines were to be
agreed to by the Conference of Parties () at its ﬁrst session (-). Nonethe
less, soon after the Convention entered into force, potential investor countries,
most notably the United States and Norway, began experimenting with projects
designed to demonstrate the feasibility of generating carbon offsets in developing
and transition economies. However, in the context of uncertainty about whether
and under what criteria such offsets would be ‘credited’ by the , and in the
absence of clearly quantiﬁed legally binding commitments, there was little incen
tive to do more than experiment.
Activities Implemented Jointly: Pilot Phase
As a result of legal and political uncertainties, little was done to develop either the
methodologies or the conﬁdence of the  sceptics in time for -. Instead, after
intense negotiations, - established a Pilot Phase for Activities Implemented
Jointly.6 The purpose of the Pilot Phase was to provide a more transparent and
coherent basis for testing the feasibility of .
Constructive ambiguities built into the Pilot Phase decision, including the
newly coined acronym ‘,’ allowed  proponents to claim that the concept of
project-based carbon offset investments had been approved in principle. At the
same time, sceptics could maintain that  was still on trial. The core of the 
decision clearly tipped the balance towards the sceptics by denying  investors
the possibility of obtaining credit, even retroactively, for any emissions reductions
achieved through investments made during the  Pilot Phase.
The negotiations of the  decision and the operation of the Pilot Phase, did,
nonetheless, help to ﬂush out and to elaborate a number of issues of principle and
of practicality that inﬂuenced the development of Article 12 of the Protocol. These
issues will be critical to the ongoing discussions on the . Perhaps most cru
cially, the - negotiations resolved that, despite the references to  in the Con
vention, decisions on whether and on what basis credit for investments could be
offset against commitments could not be taken unilaterally, or through bilateral
agreement between an investor and a host Party. Only rules agreed to multilater
ally, by the , could resolve the issue of crediting.
Despite the unavailability of ‘credit’ during the  Pilot Phase,  proponents

6 Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its First Session,
fccc/cp/1995/7/Add.1, April
1995, Decision 5/cp.1.
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7 The secretariat’s most recent
analysis of AIJ reports indicates
that only nine non-Annex I Par
ties are currently participating
in formally reported aij projects. With regard to geogra
phical distribution, 18 of the 77
projects are based in Latin
America (nine of which are
hosted by Costa Rica), one is in
Africa and two are in Asia. See
http://www.unfccc.de/ccinfo.ai
jproj.html.
8 fccc/sbsta/1997/inf.3.

9 An initial draft of the aij
Uniform Reporting Framework
was presented to the Parties in
fccc/sbsta/1997/3. A modifi
cation of this format, contained
in fccc/sbsta/1997/4, was
adopted by cop-3, in Decision
10/cp/3.

10 For a discussion of the
methodological challenges
associated with AIJ and the Pro
tocol’s flexibility mechanisms
see Activities Implemented
Jointly: Partnerships for Climate
and Development
(iea/oecd:1997); J. Heister,
Baselines and Indirect Effects in
Carbon Offsets Projects: A
Guide for Decision-making
(World Bank: Draft 20 January
1998).

   
made signiﬁcant investments in demonstration projects. By the time of the Kyoto
conference, there were 77  projects. These were implemented amongst a very lim
ited number and range of Parties,7 primarily through bilateral initiatives, such as
the ..  programme, and the Norwegian/World Bank  programme. In the
early stages, only the United States, Norway and the Netherlands developed 
projects with partners outside Annex I.8
The  and its Subsidiary Body on Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice
() developed a uniform reporting format for . The review of these reports
by the  secretariat and the  allowed a number of signiﬁcant political and
methodological issues to emerge, which facilitated discussions on  develop
ment. Many supporters of , in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres,
have recognised rigorous reporting as essential to the successful use of  as a means
of achieving real net reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions.
Thus far, resistance to rigorous reporting standards for  projects has come
from a number of developing countries. These countries are concerned that mech
anisms for monitoring compliance of individual  projects are an initial step
toward extending signiﬁcant emissions reduction and reporting requirements to
developing countries as a group. The ‘Group of 77’ developing countries (-77) pro
vides the primary negotiating forum for non-Annex I countries in the climate
change discussions. The -77 has historically resisted detailed reporting on green
house gas emissions with the argument that they are too intrusive and an imposi
tion on national sovereignty. While none have openly stated so, some developed
countries may also resist rigorous reporting on  as it will necessarily increase the
transaction costs involved in each project. There is also concern that it may reveal
fundamental impracticalities in project approach that render it less attractive.
Under the evolving drafts of the  uniform reporting format,9  partners
must demonstrate, for each project:
• Environmental additionality, i.e., that the  project brings about real, mea
surable, long-term environmental beneﬁts related to the mitigation of climate
change that would not have occurred in the absence of the project; and
• Financial additionality, i.e., that the resources from the Annex I investor are
additional to the ﬁnancial obligations of the Annex I Party under the Conven
tion, as well as to current ofﬁcial development assistance ﬂows.
Demonstrating that  investments have yielded net additional environmen
tal beneﬁts thus requires  partners to construct a ‘counterfactual’ baseline or
reference case that describes what the host country would have done in the
absence of the  project. Furthermore, project proponents wished to discourage
the problem of ‘leakage,’ whereby emissions increase within the host country but
outside the scope of the project. Leakage has the potential to counteract the pro
ject’s environmental beneﬁts. Preventing or accounting for leakage might require
a baseline that would assess potential emissions on a countrywide basis. Such
counterfactual determinations are inherently difﬁcult and, particularly when left
to bilateral negotiation, take place in a context where the investor and the host
share strong incentives to overstate the baseline emissions scenario in order to
inﬂate the offset credited to the project.10
With regard to ﬁnancial additionality, the Pilot Phase  and the uniform
reporting framework were designed to ensure that developed countries did not
use  investments in place of the investment in developing country capacity that

  
they are already required to make under the Convention’s ﬁnancial mechanism.
During the Pilot Phase, the funding for  projects is in addition to the ﬁnancial
obligations of Annex I countries under the framework of the ﬁnancial mecha
nism. It is also exclusive of current ofﬁcial development assistance () ﬂows.
 ﬂows are, however, notoriously difﬁcult to monitor and compare. It is not
clear how Annex I Parties will be able to establish, in the context of declining over
all ﬂows of , that investments in  are ‘additional’ to resources that would
have or should have been committed to the Global Environmental Facility ()
or to other sources of . 11
Just before the Kyoto conference, the  secretariat undertook an analysis of
the  reports. The secretariat conﬁrmed that Parties were struggling with these
methodological challenges and producing inconsistent results.12
End of the pilot phase, start of the Protocol
New  projects were announced immediately following the Kyoto conference.
Japan is currently pursuing a programme of enhancing the capacity of sinks to
absorb CO2. A joint implementation strategy, which largely involves reforesta
tion,13 is underway with Russia.
The  negotiations revealed the depth of scepticism with which many devel
oping countries view . This resistance, in the face of political pressure and the
offer of ﬁnancial incentives, might best be summarised as a combination of con
cerns, most of which focus on the idea that fully operational  programmes could
be used to constrain development choices:
• Unequal bargaining positions in bilateral  negotiations could allow Annex I
investors to impose new conditionalities for access to ﬁnancial resources and
technology transfer.
Annex
I countries might work to promote projects that were not necessarily in
•
the best interest of the host country.
•  funding could divert resources from more broadly applicable  and 
resources.14
The  Pilot Phase continues and, at least until the entry into force of the Pro
tocol, its fate will remain linked to the obligations and the institutions of the Con
vention rather than the Protocol. Efforts will no doubt be made to fold  pro
jects involving developing countries into the . However these issues are
resolved, in the interim period before the Protocol and the  begin to operate,
the practical experience gained through the  will continue to inﬂuence the
development of methodologies and procedures for the .
What is the role of the Global Environment Facility?

The Global Environment Facility () has served, since the adoption of the
Convention, as the operating entity responsible for matching eligible projects in
developing country Parties with funds provided by Annex II Parties under the
Convention’s financial obligations. The  will be of interest to those working
on the  as both a forerunner, and as a potential competitor for  pro
jects. The methodologies that the  has developed over the past five years to
calculate the global environmental benefits generated by its investments may
provide a basis for measuring the value of carbon-offsets accruing from 
investment.
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The  serves as the ﬁnancial mechanism for the other major Rio treaty, the
Convention on Biological Diversity. It represents what can be termed the ‘
approach’ to ﬁnancing treaty implementation in developing countries.15 Follow
ing the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility,’ Annex II Parties
(the wealthier Annex I countries) are required to provide new and additional
funds to cover the agreed upon full incremental costs of measures undertaken by
developing country Parties to implement the Convention. The extent to which
developing countries are expected to fulﬁl their commitments is explicitly reliant
on the compliance of developed countries with their ﬁnancial obligations.16
In order to limit the scope of their ﬁnancial commitment, and to help ensure
the most effective use of the ’s resources, Annex II Parties encouraged the
development of methodologies for calculating the ‘incremental cost’ of green
house gas mitigation projects. In theory, under an incremental cost discipline, the
 funds only that element of a project that results directly in the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, thereby yielding a ‘global environmental beneﬁt.’ Under
this methodology, a project proponent must describe a baseline scenario of the
activity that would have taken place in the host developing country in the absence
of the  investment. The  then provides the funding that makes the alter
native or additional ‘climate friendly’ activity possible.
Thus, both  projects and project-based carbon offset activities developed
under the  will require that the design and identiﬁcation of projects or project
activities that can be demonstrated as identiﬁable emissions reductions. Although
they may use different terminology, both mechanisms require projects to provide
environmental additionality, meaning that they must generate emissions reduc
tions that are additional to any that would have occurred without the investment.
For the , the additionality stipulation is used to justify the investment of an
‘incremental cost’ for an identiﬁable global environmental beneﬁt. For the ,
the additionality clause may ensure that the resulting emissions reduction unit, if
used to offset against a commitment, results in a net emissions reduction.
A recent assessment of the ’s overall performance, commissioned by an
independent review team, highlighted the challenges that the  continues to
face in applying the incremental cost methodology. Although the ’s approach
has improved and become more ﬂexible over time, the review team noted that the
‘present process of determining incremental costs has excluded the participation
of recipient country ofﬁcials in most cases, because of the lack of understanding
of the concept and methodologies.’17 If project-based  is to attract the support
of host countries, the  will have to overcome similar challenges to produce a
methodology that is transparent and practicable. The experience with the 
Project Cycle thus far indicates that the process of identifying and designing pro
jects that truly demonstrate emissions reductions that would not otherwise have
occurred can be fraught with political and methodological difﬁculties.
Developing countries are the primary recipients of  funds. Since Rio, these
countries have consistently expressed their disappointment with the . This is
reﬂected most clearly in their refusal to conﬁrm the  as the ‘permanent’ oper
ating entity of Convention’s ﬁnancial mechanism. This disappointment stems
from the perceived inadequacy of  funding levels, the slowness of the  pro
ject cycle, and the continued dominant inﬂuence of donors and the World Bank
in shaping  policy. Although the Protocol and the  Council have effectively
conﬁrmed that the  is to play the same role in the Protocol that it has with the
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Convention, its rocky beginnings have created an opportunity for an alternative
funding mechanism and helped make the  possible.18
How will the Protocol help developing countries to meet the
financial challenge of adapting to the effects of climate change?

Article 4.4 of the Convention requires Annex II Parties to assist those develop
ing country Parties most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in
meeting the costs of adapting to those adverse effects. The provision was negoti
ated into the Convention by the Alliance of Small Island States (), but other
vulnerable developing countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt would also bene
ﬁt from this Article if they suffered climate change consequences such as sea-level
rise. Annex II Parties have, however, been concerned about the potentially unlim
ited cost associated with this obligation. Annex II countries are additionally wary
of the implication that by compensating countries for the impacts of climate
change they are conceding liability for their role in raising atmospheric green
house gas concentrations. Consequently Annex II stifﬂy resisted links between
Article 4.4 and the Convention’s ﬁnancial mechanism. The ’s focus on incre
mental ﬁnancing was interpreted by donors as precluding it from funding activi
ties other than those that generate ‘global environmental beneﬁts.’ Investments in
coastal zone management, strengthening sea defences, or preparing for shifts in
agricultural patterns are projects that have been viewed as generating domestic
beneﬁts and therefore outside the ’s ambit.
At - delegations from those developing countries particularly vulnerable
to the adverse effects of climate change overcame the resistance of major donor
countries and secured the endorsement of policies, eligibility criteria, and programme priorities that ensure that funding will be provided for a ﬁrst, limited cat
egory of adaptation projects (Stage I projects).19 Since then, the  Council has
adopted an Operational Strategy that provides more detailed criteria for the fund
ing of Stage I projects.20 A handful of projects have been approved as a result.
During Stage I, developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change are eligible for full-cost ﬁnancing of adaptation
activities related to preparing their national communications and national climate
change programmes. This is required under Articles 4.1 and 12 of the Convention.
These ‘enabling activities’ are limited in nature, but can include funds for training,
vulnerability assessment, and planning related to adaptation.  Operational
Guidelines for the funding of enabling activities indicate a ‘typical cost range’ of
‘up to $350,000 per country for the entirety of the enabling activities.’ These
funds would be expected to include not only Stage I adaptation costs, but also costs
of preparation and initial national communication.21
The absence of any meaningful source for adaptation funding under the Con
vention opened a further opportunity for building support for an alternative
funding mechanism. Emerging proposals from the  had the potential to gen
erate income that could be earmarked for adaptation. These resources would be
free of the ’s incremental cost analysis, and would not necessarily entail addi
tional ﬁnancial resources from governments.
How will compliance be enforced?

The history of the treatment of compliance issues under the climate change
regime is reﬂected in the text of Article 13 of the Convention and the subsequent and

18 Kyoto Protocol, Article
11(2)(b); The New Delhi State
ment of the First gef Assembly,
3 April 1998, available at
http://www.gefweb.com.

19 Decision 11/cp.1, Initial guid
ance on policies, programme
priorities and eligibility criteria
to the operating entity or enti
ties of the financial mechanism.
20 Operational Strategy
(Washington: gef), February
1996 pp. 38-39.
21 Operational Guidelines for
Expedited Financial Support for
Initial Communications from
Non-Annex I Parties to the
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,
gef/c.7/Inf, 10/Rev.1, 3 October
1997. In approving this
approach to expediting
national communications, the
gef Council noted that ‘the
financing amounts for the
preparation of enabling activi
ties have been developed on
the basis of an average esti
mate used for planning pur
poses. However, the actual level
of support will vary from coun
try to country and with the con
tent of the enabling activities.’
Joint Summary of the Chairs,
gef Council Meeting April 2 - 4,
1996, Appendix: Council Deci
sions, Decision on Agenda Item
5(b).
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ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (-13). The majority of delega
tions did not support the inclusion of a robust mechanism for enforcing compli
ance with the Convention’s soft and ill-deﬁned obligations.22 Since the Convention
entered into force, negotiations have focused instead on the idea of establishing a
‘non-confrontational’ and ‘facilitative’ multilateral consultative process for resolv
ing questions about the Convention implementation. However, the course of the
Protocol negotiations revealed that strengthened commitments and more sophisti
cated means for implementing those commitments would require a correspond
ingly more elaborate system for identifying non-compliance — and for providing a
range of incentives and disincentives for encouraging compliance.
Proposals for project-based joint implementation appeared to offer a number
of tools for promoting compliance with commitments of a future Protocol:23
•  could provide one of a number of ‘safety valves’ under the Protocol that
would allow Parties experiencing difﬁculty in meeting their emissions reduc
tion commitments through domestic action to bring themselves into compli
ance by purchasing carbon offsets from overseas.
• The threat of suspension of  privileges could be used to ensure Party compli
ance with other aspects of the Protocol, such as reporting requirements.
The
possibility that non-compliance by Annex I Parties could, through the
•
imposition of ﬁnancial penalties, provide a source of revenue for development
assistance is very attractive to non-Annex I delegations.
Establishing pre-set penalties, or ﬁnancial safety valves, as remedies for non
compliance with, or breach of, an international treaty raises complex issues
regarding the nature of international legal obligations. Traditional concepts of
state responsibility envision that international practice demands reparation for a
breach that ‘as far as possible, wipe[s] out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish[es] the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed.’24 Such consequences are difﬁcult to prejudge. Joint
implementation between Parties with commitments and those without commit
ments would have to meet the highest possible standard to conform to the spirit
of reparation. Nevertheless, non-compliance, ﬁnancial penalties, and the link to
development assistance became the conceptual ﬁlter through which  was per
ceived as acceptable to the majority of -77 countries.
What were the initial positions on project-based ji?

Proposals regarding project-based  between Annex I and non-Annex I Par
ties were introduced at the outset of the Protocol negotiations and incorporated
into the Negotiating Text by the Chairman ().25 The proposals ranged from
absolute prohibitions on  (Iran),26 to proposals that would have limited  to
Annex I Parties only (European Union),27 to more detailed elaboration of the con
ditions under which non-Annex I countries would be entitled to participate in
project-based  (United States).28
Although the -77/China position stressed that ‘[e]ach Party included in
Annex I to the Convention shall meet its quantiﬁed emissions limitation and
reduction obligations () through domestic action,’ 29 individual members
of the group began to rebel against an outright prohibition on . Most notable of
these was Costa Rica, whose proposal was based on the country’s active  programme. It later played a key role in designing the .30

  
The Consolidated Negotiating Text () by the Chairman was prepared prior
to the last scheduled session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate ().
It reﬂected the Chairman’s assumptions as to the ‘thrust of deliberations in the
Group to date.’ It supported the prevailing position of the European Union and of
the -77 by only allowing project-based  between Annex I Parties.31
How did the decision to allow non-Annex I countries
to participate in project-based joint implementation come about?

The Brazilian government provided the basis for a breakthrough in the negotia
tions of project-based  between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties with its ‘Pro
posed Elements of a Protocol.’ 32 This sweeping proposal sought to radically rede
ﬁne the climate regime from the ground up.33 Drawing inspiration from 
climate models and emissions scenarios, the Brazilian Protocol sought to intro
duce science-based ‘objectivity’ into the negotiations. The Protocol’s overall objec
tive was to deﬁne a future level of ‘effective emissions’ that could be tolerated from
Annex I countries on the basis of the predicted impact of these emissions on global
mean surface temperatures. It proposed an ‘effective emissions ceiling’ for the
combined emissions of Annex I countries for each of four ﬁve-year budget peri
ods, running from 2001 to 2020. Differentiated individual effective emissions ceil
ings would then be allocated among Annex I Parties on the basis of the relative
proportion of effective emissions that were attributable to each Annex I Party
from modelled emissions projections.
For the purposes of the development of the , the most important element
of the Brazilian proposal was the introduction of a ‘compulsory contribution’ or a
ﬁnancial penalty for non-compliance, which would be assessed against each
Annex I Party that exceeded its effective emissions ceiling at the end of its budget
period. The penalty would then be contributed to a ‘non-Annex I Clean Develop
ment Fund’ for use in funding climate change projects in developing countries.
The size of the penalty was designed to correlate to $10 for every tonne of
carbon equivalent by which the Annex I Party had exceeded its ceiling. This
amount was estimated to reﬂect the likely cost of achieving an equivalent level of
emissions reductions through the ‘… implementation of non-regrets [sic] mea
sures by non-Annex I Parties.’ 34
Further, Brazil proposed an objective basis for distributing the funds among
non-Annex I Parties:
• First, funding would be provided to non-Annex I Parties in response to a ‘vol
untary’ application subject to ‘the appropriate regulations approved’ by the
.
• Second, the funding eligibility of each non-Annex I Party would be capped at
a level based on its relative responsibility for effective emissions during the pre
ceding budget period. An Appendix divided potential proceeds from a Clean
Development Fund into shares based on projected emissions from 1990 to 2010.
The Appendix ranged from China at 32% to Niue at .00005%.
• Third, up to 10% of the Brazilian Clean Development Fund would be available
to non-Annex I Parties for use in adaptation projects.
Critics of the Brazilian proposal doubted that such a radical restructuring of
the regime could be managed in the months left before Kyoto. They pointed out
that the logic of effectiveness resulted in a regime that penalised the large emitters
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in Annex I through higher commitments, while rewarding the largest non-Annex
I emitters with access to the largest share of the funds. There was, however, enough
in the proposal to prove selectively attractive to a wide range of Parties.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant advance came with the formal endorsement by the -77 and
China of a central aspect of the Brazilian proposal. In a submission to the ﬁnal ses
sion of the , the -77 endorsed the establishment of a Clean Development
Fund as a means of enforcing compliance with Annex I commitments while gen
erating revenues for development assistance. The Brazilian proposal was stripped
to its essentials and incorporated into the position of the -77 and China as follows:

35 fccc/agbm/1997/misc.1/
Add.6, page 16.

36 ‘Delegates Say Prospects
Brighten for CO2 Treaty,’
(Reuters News Service, 10
November 1997).
37 Revised Text Under Negotia
tion (‘rtun’) fccc/cp/1997/2.
Although the g-77 formulation
of the Clean Development Fund
was received on 22 October
1997, well after the Conven
tion’s 1 June deadline for sub
stantially new submissions.
38 rtun, page, 9, n. 4, page 18,
note 13.

39 Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
Vol. 12, No. 68, 2 December 1997;
author’s notes.

40 Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
Vol. 12, No. 71, 5 December 1997.

A Clean Development Fund shall be established by the  to assist the
developing country Parties to achieve sustainable development and con
tribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention. The Clean Development
Fund will receive contributions from those Annex I Parties found to be in
non-compliance with its  under the Protocol. 35
The United States embraced the ‘ﬂexibility’ the Brazilian proposal appeared to
offer to Annex I countries having difﬁculty meeting their commitments at home.
Characterising the proposal as a ‘trading system’ and a ‘ﬂexible ﬁnancing instru
ment,’ the head of the U.S. delegation expressed the view that the proposal for a
Clean Development Fund, and its endorsement by the -77, represented a signif
icant basis for hope in the approach to Kyoto.36
The broad-based support for some variation of a ‘Clean Development Fund’
led the  Chairman to include the -77 paragraph in the Revised Text Under
Negotiation (), which went forward to Kyoto.37 Signiﬁcantly, however, the
 continued to reﬂect resistance to project-based  between Annex I and
non-Annex I Parties. There were no provisions for the calculation or transfer of
emissions reduction credits that might result from such a fund. Instead, the -77
text, and its placement in the  maintained its emphasis as a means of enforc
ing compliance.38 Thus, just prior to -, the context was set for an exploration
of how views of such diverging emphasis could somehow coalesce in the creation
of a mechanism that would perform such a variety of functions.
What happened to the Clean Development Fund proposal at the Kyoto conference?

Work on what would become the  began almost immediately as delega
tions arrived in Kyoto. Under the Chairmanship of Brazil, an informal contact
group was established by the Committee of the Whole in the ﬁrst hours of the
negotiations to discuss the Clean Development Fund and other ﬁnancial issues.39
The brief history of the negotiations in Kyoto can be characterised as a struggle
that merged the U.S.-backed proposals for project-based  and -77 proposals for
a fund fed by compliance penalties.
The European Union was trying to ﬁnd its footing in the midst of this struggle.
The initial response from the European Union regarding the emerging  was
suspicion. As promoted by the United States, the  ran counter to the Euro
pean Union’s position against project-based  with Parties that did not have
reduction commitments. The version supported by the -77 would have created a
new institution that seemed to threaten the continued viability of the  as the
main source of Convention funding.40
The -77’s emphasis on the compliance aspects of the Clean Development
Fund became difﬁcult to maintain once the negotiations divided into smaller con

  
tact groups. Compliance, and any role a Clean Development Fund might play in
it, was assigned to a sub-group on institutional aspects of the Protocol. This sub
group was dominated by Annex I Parties, which were therefore discussing the con
sequences for themselves in failing to meet their commitments. Text was actually
introduced that would have channelled ﬁnancial penalties into a Clean Develop
ment Fund.41 However, when it became apparent that it would not be possible to
agree upon the speciﬁc binding consequences that might result from a determi
nation of non-compliance, the direct link between compliance and the fund dis
solved.42
This side-tracking of the compliance issue allowed the contact group on a
Clean Development Fund to focus on the role such a mechanism might play in
facilitating project-based . In the course of two days of negotiation, the original
-77 proposal evolved from a single paragraph attached to the Article on Annex I
commitments43 to a free standing Article of ten paragraphs that was substantially
in the form it would take in the Protocol.44
Within 48 hours, the basic principles and design features for the  were
agreed upon:
• The group deﬁned a mechanism rather than establishing a fund, reﬂecting its
primary role as a processor of transactions, rather than a depository of ﬁnan
cial resources, and assuaging, in part, concerns about the proliferation of inter
national institutions, and threats to the role of the  as the regime’s ﬁnancial
mechanism.
It
was agreed that credit for reductions resulting from  investments made
•
from 2000 onward could be offset against a part of the investor country com
mitments. This resolved the main point of principle that had been left hanging
by the  Pilot Phase.
• New institutional features emerged, including an ‘Executive Board’ and a role
for the meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the
Parties (/). This provided multilateral, intergovernmental supervi
sion in response to -77 concerns about the lack of fairness and transparency
that many felt had characterised bilateral  transactions.
• General criteria were agreed upon to provide a basis for certifying emissions
reductions resulting from  projects. These guidelines reﬂected many of the
same principles that had been accounted for in the  Pilot Phase, such as need
for ‘country-driven’ projects and environmental additionality.
• The task of adopting more speciﬁc procedures for auditing and verifying emis
sions reductions was assigned to the /, reﬂecting ongoing concerns
from a wide range of delegations that  transactions might be open to
abuse.
A
role in the operation of the  for ‘operational entities’ and private and/or
•
public entities outside the Convention/Protocol institutions was agreed upon
in principle. This created the possibility for the direct involvement of interna
tional institutions and the private sector.
• The operation of the  would be expected to generate funds to cover
administrative expenses, thus helping to assuage concerns about the prolifera
tion and the costs of new international institutions.45
• A share of the proceeds from the operation of the  would be used to assist
particularly vulnerable developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation.
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This structure remained in place right through the endgame. At the last minute,
France, operating outside the .. position, resisted the adoption of Article 12
because of its unease over the scope for private sector involvement. The countries
of the Alliance of Small Island States () were as anxious at the possibility of
failure to adopt Article 12 as the representatives from United States, who felt they
had an idea they could sell to the sceptics back home. This was a way for experi
enced U.S. negotiators to argue domestically that developing countries were
indeed going to be involved in the solution to climate change.
The role of  was critical in this process.46 Together with Costa Rica, they
played a vital part in overcoming the differences between, broadly speaking, the
U.S. and Brazilian views. By demonstrating some enthusiasm for the concept
while occupying high moral ground, they lent credibility to the idea of the  as
it emerged. The small island states occupy a very interesting place in the 
debate. There is no doubt that they contributed hugely to its creation, but they are
unlikely to be major beneﬁciaries of new project ﬁnance through the mechanism.
They beneﬁt in two ways, however, which helps explain the real value of the :
• The  countries have interests that are identical to those of the (Article 2)
objective of the Convention. Any action by any State or group of States which
successfully responds to the objective reduces the risk of inundation or salt
water intrusion into fresh water because of sea-level rise or more frequent and
more severe storms. Being powerless to protect themselves from these risks,
other than through international negotiation and agreement, they must invest
trust, time, and expertise in the , even if others take a more immediate eco
nomic return out of the system.
• The  countries will receive an amount, to be determined, from each
transaction, that will go into an adaptation fund. The more transactions, the
more there will be in the fund. The more transactions producing a certiﬁable
global beneﬁt, the greater the chance of avoiding the need to draw on the adap
tation fund.
The cruel irony is that adaptation to climate change on a small island is hard to
contemplate – where is the hinterland to which to retreat? Where are alternative
sources to the existing fresh water ponds? Adaptation may involve building dykes
and other hard structures or moving to islands within an archipelago with more
relief, but will probably end with migrations away from the islands. What fund
could pay the price of that kind of adaptation? What price can you put on loss of
a culture? The  can, indirectly, produce a kind of insurance plan but it will
never amount to compensation.
What happens next in the Clean Development Mechanism negotiations?

47 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.12.

Under Article 12, the  will facilitate a form of project-based  between Annex
I and non-Annex Parties, governed by a multilaterally agreed-upon set of rules,
operating under the supervision of the / and an executive board. Emis
sions reductions accruing from ‘project activities’ carried out in non-Annex I Par
ties, once certiﬁed under agreed-upon principles, may be used by Annex I Parties
to contribute to compliance with their emissions reductions obligations under
Article 3 of the Protocol.47
Thus, agreement on Article 12 resolved a number of critical aspects as to how
the  will manage project-based  between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties
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to the Protocol. However, many gaps remain to be ﬁlled, and the negotiating
dynamic for the next stage of the development of the  remains fundamentally
unchanged. This dynamic can now be characterised as pitting a market-based
approach against an ‘interventionist approach’ based
table 1 the provisions of article 12
on traditional public sector development assistance.
Both approaches stress the need for a system capable of
article
provision
generating credible certiﬁed emissions reductions
12.1
‘Definition’
(), but differ on the best means of achieving this.
12.2
Objective
12.3

‘The transaction’

12.4
Governance
The market-based approach
12.5
Principles for the certification of emissions reductions
A market-based approach relies on healthy competi
12.6
Project finance
tion in a transparent marketplace to provide the most
12.7
Auditing and verification
12.8
Administrative expenses and adaptation costs
efﬁcient and effective means of encouraging hosts and
12.9
Involvement of private and/or public entities
investors to design credible  project activities. The
12.10
‘Banking’ of certified emissions reductions
private sector holds the capital and technology neces
sary to the ’ success. Once the intergovernmen
tal process has set the rules on the types of project activities that will be eligible for
certiﬁcation, the private sector would be entrusted with designing projects, and
would be entitled to hold and transfer .

The interventionist approach
Interventionists are more sceptical of the private sector’s ability to fulﬁl the ’
stated purpose of assisting non-Annex I Parties to ‘achieve sustainable develop
ment.’ Such an approach emphasises the need for the active involvement of public
sector institutions, including home and host governments and international
development institutions, in promoting the design of projects driven by broadbased policy concerns rather than market disciplines.
The market-based vs. interventionist debate is further complicated by the ten
sion between those who wish to see the  up and running quickly with the
lowest transaction costs possible, and those that remain cautious and willing to
increase costs in exchange for greater accountability. Parties at both ends of this
spectrum place the  at risk, either by undermining its credibility, or by weigh
ing it down with an over-burdensome bureaucracy.
What arrangements have been made for the governance
of the Clean Development Mechanism?

Decisions on the operation of the  will ultimately be made by its governing
bodies. Article 12 entrusts the / and an Executive Board with the general
functions of guiding and supervising the ’ operation. The division of labour
between the two bodies is not entirely clear, and some reﬁnements are likely to prove
desirable. For example, the / may wish to delegate some of the more detailed
work, such as the designation of operational entities, to the more focused body.
The Kyoto Protocol left issues relating to the size, composition and modus
operandi of the Executive Board undecided. The functions set out above suggest
that the Executive Board will require a mixture of technical skills and political
authority. The appropriate balance between these will depend, once again, on how
interventionist the  is in the design, funding, and approval of project activi
ties. The more actively involved it is in a project cycle, the greater its need for tech
nical expertise.
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table 2

possible division of labour for the administration of the cdm

general function
Governance

cer management

Project finance

48 In un practice regional bal
ance requires membership in
multiples of five, representing
Asia, Africa, Latin America and
the Caribbean, (non-Annex I);
Eastern Europe and the West
ern European and Others Group
(Annex I). Climate change insti
tutions have traditionally
added an additional seat for
small island developing coun
tries.

specific function
• Provision of authority and guidance
• Determination of ‘part of’ commitment available
for offset
• Supervision
• Elaboration of modalities and procedures
for auditing and verification of project activities
• Designation of operational entities to certify
emissions reductions
• Provision of guidance on the participation
of private and/or public entities
• Ensuring assessment of administrative
and adaptation costs
• Validating and monitoring project activities,
such as baselines or benchmarks
• Certification of emissions reductions
• Arranging funding of certified project activities

cdm
cop/mop
cop/mop
Executive board
cop/mop
cop/mop
Executive Board
cop/mop

Operational entity
Undetermined
(private/public entity?)
cdm (unspecified)

The political composition of the Executive Board will require consideration of
the representational balance between regions and/or between investor and host
countries. Annex I countries will no doubt argue against regional balance, as this
inevitably leaves them with fewer seats than developing countries.48 It must be
kept in mind, however, that the larger the role played by the private sector in fund
ing  projects, the weaker Annex I Parties’ claims for a disproportionate pres
ence on the Board are. If they are no longer in the position of donors, they have
not bought their entitlement to a larger share of the vote.
Article 12 does not rule out the possibility that the function of the Executive
Board could be carried out by an existing institution that shares whatever design
principles have been agreed upon by the Parties. Indeed, Article 12(1) ‘deﬁnes’
rather than ‘establishes’ the . This language is borrowed from Article 11
(Financial Mechanism) of the Convention, where it was used to avoid the creation
of a new institution, thereby allowing the  to operate the Convention’s ﬁnan
cial mechanism. Developing countries are underrepresented on the  Council
and would probably put forth considerable resistance to the authorisation of the
 as the  supervisor. However, it does remain a possibility that the World
Bank will be involved with the management of the .
Is there a system established within the cdm to regulate
the exchange of environmental and financial benefits?

The transaction at the core of the  (Article 12(3)) is described so ambigu
ously that it leaves unanswered the fundamental question of who finances 
‘project activities?’ It also does not address the relationship between the funding
and the extent to which an Annex I Party can use the resulting  to offset its
commitment. Article 12(3)(a) provides that non-Annex I Parties are to ‘benefit’
from project activities. Article 12(3)(b) allows Annex I Parties to ‘use’ the 
that project activities generate. However, there is no direct link between the pro
vision of an investment, and the ownership of the offset. All this will have to be
negotiated.

  
Guidance can be taken from Article 3.12, which provides that  can be
acquired by one Party from another Party. This suggests, but does not require, that
a project activity related investment takes place in exchange for a . Indeed, while
Article 12.6 leaves open the possibility that the ‘ shall assist in arranging fund
ing of certiﬁed project activities as necessary, it is not clear that the  will involve
the transfer of funds in any traditional sense of public or private project ﬁnance.
Explicit references to the need for ﬁnancial additionality were not included in
Article 12. This can be explained, in part, by the perceptions of some negotiators that
private sector investments, which are expected to generate the bulk of  project
activities, are by deﬁnition ‘additional’ to public sector . Such investments could
not, therefore, erode the level of publicly provided development assistance. However,
at and since the Kyoto conference, at least one delegation has proposed that it run its
climate-related bilateral  through the  as a means of generating  offsets.
Either way, the identiﬁcation of investment tied to particular project activity
will clearly help establish the overall ‘additionality’ of the resulting emissions
reduction. Certiﬁcation of  from  project activities will, after all, depend
on proof that ‘reductions in emissions are additional to any that would occur in
the absence of project activity.’
The gap in the transaction between Articles 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b) allows for the
development of a number of proposals that may take the  in unanticipated
directions. The disjunction between the beneﬁciary of the investment and the user
of the  raises the possibility that entities may act as intermediaries between
investors and hosts to pool funds and build a portfolio of projects involving a vari
ety of hosts. The creation of such ﬁnancial instruments could introduce liquidity
into the system, which would allow  or pools of  to be held or trans
ferred. Finally, the transaction gap invites discussion as to how  might be
appropriately shared between an investor and a host.
In what may prove to be the most revolutionary aspect of the , Article 12(9)
invites the participation of private/and or public entities (i.e., non-state actors)
into both sides of an Article 12(3) transaction. Proposals by multilateral develop
ment banks, and both commercial and not-for-proﬁt organisations, reveal that
the non-state actors are already beginning to position themselves as potential par
ticipants in the  project cycle.49 It is clearly in the interests of these actors that
the system be as simple to use as is possible, generating a high number of transac
tions, with incentives designed to maximise the involvement of the private sector
in technology-based solutions to the climate change problem. The higher the
number of transactions, the more players involved. This will increase the size of
the constituency of beneﬁciaries of the mechanism, which will in turn rearrange
the alliances of business interests in the Annex I countries. Business interests that
might otherwise block attempts to implement the Protocol might support it if
they were to proﬁt from it. Creating business community support for the Proto
col, and  within it, will certainly aid ratiﬁcation in the United States. Finally,
more transactions will also increase the capacity of the mechanism to ﬁnance the
facilitation of further transactions, thus producing a virtuous circle.
It is possible, however, that the risks of abuse in the system, or simple failure to
take into account what the ﬂexible mechanism is for – to reduce global greenhouse
gas emissions – might increase with a dynamic system with many powerful private
parties and governments receiving large amounts of new investment. This makes
validation, monitoring, and certiﬁcation vital to the integrity of the system.
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49 See the Prototype Carbon
Fund of the World Bank at
http://www.worldbank.org and
plans by the Inter-American
Development Bank to establish
a pilot cdm programme, press
release NR-119/98,
http://www.iadb.org.
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What are the guidelines for certification, auditing, and verification?

Drawing from the experiences and principles established in the  pilot phase,
Article 12 recognises that the key to credible  will be the rules, procedures, and
principles that will govern the validation of project baselines, the monitoring of
project performance and the certiﬁcates of emissions reductions. The principles
for emissions reduction certiﬁcation, set out in Article 12(5) will require a return
to the fraught political and methodological issues of environmental additionality
that have been raised by both the  pilot phase and  operations.
The /’s approach to emissions reduction certiﬁcation could be any
thing from laissez faire to heavy interventionism. Article 12 certainly opens the
possibility that a  project activity could involve only minimal participation of
governments or intergovernmental institutions. The system must be attractive to
use and efffective in reaching the objective of the Convention.
Laissez Faire
A project activity certiﬁcation scenario that was heralded as ‘ideal’ by an industry
representative in Kyoto described an Annex I-based parent corporation investing
in energy savings in a non-Annex I subsidiary and offsetting the resulting emis
sions reductions to avoid domestic regulations. Certifying such activities would
likely generate a high volume of  . However, without further regulatory
constraint, this laissez faire approach runs the risk of undermining the ’
objective of achieving environmental additionality. It is not clear under these cir
cumstances that the energy efﬁciency project saves carbon from the atmosphere
and if it is being used to enable more carbon to be burned at home. Furthermore,
the absence of constraints on the emissions of developing countries could lead to
substantial ‘leakage’ of emissions. In a worst case scenario, the same parent cor
poration could pay for its energy efﬁciency investment in one non-Annex I coun
try by switching to cheaper but more polluting processes for a subsidiary in the
same or another non-Annex I country. In these circumstances, the parent would
enjoy an increase in emissions, both at home and abroad, and suffer no adverse
consequences.
Interventionism
At the other end of the spectrum, the  certiﬁcation requirements could be as
exacting as the ’s project cycle. Before a  project can claim to have generated
a global environmental beneﬁt, a project designer must construct and position for
validation a baseline of domestic activity that would have occurred had  fund
ing not been provided. In order to avoid what the  describes as the ‘moral
hazard,’ which might tempt governments to lower a domestic environmental base
line in order to become eligible for a larger  grant, the project baseline must
reﬂect a minimal standard of ‘environmental reasonableness.’ In other words, the
level of emissions reductions credited to a project not must be based solely on what
would have taken place, but on what should have taken place. Applied to the above
scenario, this would require that a parent corporation demonstrate that its sub
sidiary was operating in an environmentally reasonable manner before it took
credit for emissions reduced through an additional investment.
The ’s closely regulated project approach design was demanded primarily
by Annex II Parties that were anxious for reassurance that their  contributions
were being well spent, and on activities that would not have otherwise occurred.

  
The  has the potential to reverse this incentive. If the bulk of the ﬁnancial
resources ﬂowing through the  are from the private sector, government
ﬁnance departments will be less concerned with designing rigorous rules. Indeed,
Annex I countries as a group will have an incentive to lower barriers to project cer
tiﬁcation, as it will increase the amount of emissions reduction units available to
offset their obligations.
Applying high standards for validating  project baselines by, for example,
demanding the same standard of environmental reasonableness from  pro
ject proponents as is currently sought from  project proponents, holds some
appeal. However, doing so does increase the possibility that the ﬂow of projects
may remain limited. Good project ﬂow is vital for sustained investment.
Monitoring a project activity to ensure that it is achieving the emissions reduc
tions units it has promised to its investors and certifying those reductions once they
have occurred is to be carried out by as yet undetermined entities, according to
modalities and procedures elaborated by the /. It seems appropriate that
this task be carried out by entities wholly independent of the governments and
operational bodies that are designing and implementing the projects. It has been
suggested that internationally recognised accounting or consulting ﬁrms such as
 International might perform this function. During the  Pilot Phase, both
private sector and not-for-proﬁt agencies have been developing the expertise and
the public proﬁle, which should leave them in position to play this role.50 Alterna
tively, commercial certiﬁcation agencies could be considered. It is quite possible that
an organisation like Société Général de Surveillance (), while acting in the same
way as any private company looking to earn proﬁts, could provide a service to both
private companies contracting in, and governments regulating, international trade.
Once an emissions reduction is certiﬁed as a , it will have monetary value
and can be traded as a ﬁnancial instrument. Secondary markets in certiﬁed emis
sions reduction are likely to develop as well. It would be sensible to consider how
to build this into the design of the  now. There will be an overlap in expertise
between those involved in emissions trading. Since private actors are already get
ting trading regimes off the ground, one can conﬁdently expect this expertise to
be in place by the time the  exists. The Chicago Board of Trade and possibly
trading institutions in the City of London can be expected to have skills available
to facilitate the expansion of this market. What is increasingly clear is that there
will be a connection between  projects and trading, in that  generated
from the project will be used by private actors in markets which will accept their
investments. Project participants can use carbon credits as a kind of insurance
policy, a means of raising extra ﬁnance for new technology, to reduce the cost of
debt, to hold as an investment asset, or to exchange in a domestic, regulated, ‘cap
and trade’ market for CO2.
What are the limitations on the use of the Clean Development Mechanism?

The rapid negotiation of Article 12 did not resolve the concerns of all of the dele
gations about the equity or the effectiveness of the . This is most clearly indi
cated by the limitation in Article 12(3)(b), whereby  may only ‘contribute to
compliance with a part of ’ Article 3 commitments, as determined by the
/. Efforts to restrict this part to a speciﬁc percentage within the text of the
Protocol were unsuccessful, and proponents of this ‘ﬂexibility mechanism’ have
indicated that they interpret the provision as being a qualitative guide rather than
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50 Note the activities of the
multinational environmental
auditing firm sgs
(http://www.sgsgroup.com);
and the establishment by the
u.s. ngo Environmental
Defense of a non-profit com
pany that will provide compre
hensive reporting and tracking
of emissions reductions in com
pany to company emissions
trades. (See Environmental
Resources Trust web site
http://www.ert.net).
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a quantiﬁed cap. Any ﬁnal decision as to the size or character of the limitation will
depend upon an analysis of the volume of  the  is likely to generate. Also
considered will be the transaction costs it may bear, and the extent to which it will
have to compete with the Protocol’s other ﬂexibility mechanisms.
Limitations on the types of project activities
Given the ongoing debate about the , it has been suggested that the /
develop policies to guide which categories of projects will be eligible for certiﬁca
tion. This would be done under an elaboration of Article 12(5), to categories or
project activities which are agreed upon in advance to have ‘real, measurable and
long-term beneﬁts.’ The absence of any mention of sinks in Article 12, in the con
text of their express inclusion in the parallel language of Article 6, will provide a
basis for exploring whether land use change and forestry activities should be
excluded from certiﬁcation until scientiﬁc uncertainties associated with those
projects are reduced.

51 Under Article 6.1(d), an
Annex I Party is prohibited from
acquiring emissions reduction
units unless it is in compliance
with its inventory and reporting
obligations under Articles 5 and
7. Furthermore, should a ques
tion arise through the Proto
col’s In Depth Review proce
dures with regard to a Party’s
compliance with Article 6, it
may not apply its emissions
reduction units until the ques
tion is resolved.

Restrictions on participation: Eligibility criteria
As has been discussed, the creation of ﬂexibility mechanisms also allows the pos
sibility of suspending the right to access those mechanisms as a means of ensur
ing all participating Parties have put into place the necessary regulatory infra
structure and as a means of encouraging compliance with the Protocol’s
obligations generally. Based on U.S. proposals, such compliance conditionalities
were attached to Article 6 (Joint Implementation amongst Annex I Parties).51 As
the Parties begin to review the inconsistencies between the Protocol’s various ﬂex
ibility mechanisms, it may prove appropriate to extend similar rules restricting
access to the  to investors and hosts from Parties that are in compliance with
all the regime’s obligations.
Restrictions on timing: Ex post certiﬁcation
Concerns about the risks associated with some or all of the project activities that
pass through the  might be met by allowing  only after the project activ
ity has been completed. For example, for an investment in the retooling of a power
plant with a 20-year life span, only the actual emissions reduced during the com
mitment period in question could be offset against that period’s assigned amount.
There is some basis for this ex post approach in the text of Article 12, which refers
to emissions reductions ‘accruing from’ project activities (suggesting that they
must have already occurred to be credited). However, the text does not say ‘having
accrued from’ and the ex post approach does not introduce any sense of urgency
or dynamism into the enterprise or reorienting the global energy market towards
sustainable development. There will, however, be pressure from investors to offset
the full projected value of their investment as soon as possible, perhaps prior to
their having ‘fully matured.’
Administrative expenses and adaptation costs
A ﬁnal revolutionary aspect of the  is Article 12(8), which authorises the
/ to ensure that a share of the proceeds from certiﬁed project activities is
used to cover administrative expenses and assist with adaptation costs. This was
the last paragraph of Article 12 that was agreed upon. Its conclusion was slowed by
concerns that it might establish a precedent for the collection of a tax on private

  
economic activity by an international body, which is usually the exclusive preserve
of sovereign states.52 Similar revenue raising proposals had been ﬂoated in the cli
mate change negotiations before, in the context of taxes on wellheads and bunker
fuel. These were rejected as radical extensions of supranational authority.
As adopted, Article 12(8) leaves open the possibility that expenses and costs can
be recovered by national authorities. The Article is unclear as to whether the word
‘proceeds’ is intended to mean ﬁnancial proﬁts generated by an investment (if
any), or some valuation of the  generated.
It is furthermore unclear what role the  will play in authorising the expen
diture of adaptation funding once it is collected. The Parties should anticipate dif
ﬁcult questions as to what kind of projects should be funded in which developing
countries. As adaptation funding is always likely to be scarce in the face of an incal
culable demand, proposals to ‘stage’ adaptation can be expected.
Both the administrative and the adaptation surcharge raise issues with regard
to the ’ ability to compete with the Protocol’s other ﬂexibility mechanisms.
The other mechanisms are not, at present, required to cover their costs or to con
tribute to adaptation. The rate at which  proceeds are tapped will need to be
set with regard to the elasticity of investors’ demand for .
Conclusion

Since Kyoto, the  has been the focus of intense interest and speculation among
governments, the private sector, and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations that have all seen the potential within the text of Article 12 to further
develop or to invent roles for themselves in carrying out its multifaceted functions.
Because it holds the aspirations of so many different constituencies, progress in
elaborating the details of the  may well provide the ﬁrst indications of the
longer-term prospects for the Protocol as a whole.
By way of a contribution to the debate, this article suggests a textual interpre
tation of Article 12. This perspective, together with some appreciation of the pri
vate sector interest in the , could display how the  might be used, or per
haps what would need to be in place before it could be used.
•  Annex I governments appoint a  agency responsible for its partici
pation in the . Depending on the government concerned, one can imag
ine this being (a) wholly within the government bureaucracy; (b) partly within,
as described by European law as an ‘emanation of the State,’ where, for exam
ple, the government may have a controlling share in the business; or (c) wholly
privatised.
• Developing country governments would set up agencies to use the , prob
ably within their foreign trade departments, but in conjunction with their envi
ronment/energy/industry departments. These agencies could sponsor and
promote potential  projects.
Extensive
capacity building efforts are undertaken, perhaps led by United
•
Nations Development Programme, to ensure that developing countries are
able to play the game effectively.
• The two agencies engage in bilateral negotiations to select projects, which in
their view meet  rules that have been agreed to by the /.
The
investor and the host enter into a legal arrangement reﬂecting the terms of
•
agreement including the level of investment and the rights to any  the pro
ject may generate.
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52 As will be seen from a com
parison of fccc/cp/1997/crp.4,
Article 14 and Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol, the characteri
zation of how administrative
costs could be raised was one of
the last parts of the package to
be agreed upon.
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• The Executive Board is notiﬁed that the Parties have agreed to initiate one or
more projects.
• An Executive Board-approved operating entity validates the baseline for each
project.
• Executive Board-approved Certiﬁers are appointed.
• Notice is given to contracting parties and the Secretariat of the  and
posted on the web site.
• Certiﬁers report to the Executive Board. Certiﬁers are paid for, perhaps half
and-half, by the private developers and the Annex I governments.
• On the bases of a report from the Certiﬁers, the Executive Board determines
whether a  is awarded to the project.
• The agreed upon  are then transferred to the investor.
• The / periodically reviews reports from the Executive Board.
Depending on how the Annex I government wishes to involve the private
sector, another dimension could be added to this outline procedure. Each Annex
I Party’s  Agency could co-operate with the Environmental Protection
Authority/Agency to match domestic environmental regulation of CO2 emissions
with the  project . In effect, the government would participate in side
deals to enable private investment overseas to achieve reductions of CO2, which
could be used to set against national emission targets. Given that these are likely
to be subject to a trading regime, a permanent connection can be made between
the  and emissions trading which would have a global reach but be subject to
a more manageable domestic regime.
The State may wish to have a set of contracts, enforceable in the national courts,
with the private sector to ensure that they are not ﬁnancially responsible for any
breach that is incurred at the international level. Or, more accurately, to ensure
that if a State incurs liability through the activities of the private sector, the State
is indemniﬁed. Equally, the private sector will want contractual rights to enforce
commitments made by the State.
This outline raises many questions about the : How will the expertise of
the private sector be reﬂected in the operations of the Executive Board? How can
the UN bureaucracy move fast enough to accommodate the entrepreneurial speed
of the private sector? How are private sector actors kept true to the objectives of
Article 12 since they are not subjects of international law?
The private sector is so essential to the effective operation of the  that their
views must be sought assiduously. What would make them active users of the
system? Clearly speed and low transaction costs are prized. Both developers and
ﬁnanciers lose from delay. The technology producers and suppliers need clear
market openings to attract investment; uncertainty dampens enthusiasm for
unusual investments. We must acknowledge that, hitherto, renewable energy pro
jects have been considered unusual ventures. One hopes this is changing fast, but
it is sensible to anticipate the need to persuade those who are cautious or prag
matic that this new mechanism could really make a difference in how they con
duct business.
The essence of this proposal is to establish safeguards that constantly connect
enterprising commercial activity to the purpose of Article 12, the Kyoto Protocol,
and the . Governments are responsible, under the law, for honouring that
purpose.  can play a vital role in bearing witness, in contributing expertise
to the process, and perhaps even in brokering deals. The role of government is

  
established from the start with the creation of the new agency. It is concluded with
legal responsibility for meeting their targets under Article 3. In between the market
acts, ﬁrst by developing projects and thn by trading the . The private sector
needs as much certainty as possible, as well as low transaction costs. The govern
ments provide this by accepting responsibility for failing to pass monitoring and
veriﬁcation tests. However, this can be reﬂected in the market price for , sim
ilar to the way the government debt is valued in the market today.
Bringing the mechanism to life as soon as possible after its planned 2000 startdate would be a remarkable achievement. It would begin to alter the language of
development assistance. It would reorient technology transfer. It would also coopt many private actors into the international legal regime to protect the planet
from accelerated global warming. The  may prove as brightly coloured a lure
for the private sector as it has for the governments and academics. Bit by bit its
operation will attract risk-takers and entrepreneurs. It will attract idealists as well.
New business will grow up to specialise in using the system. The renewable energy
industry will receive a huge boost. Developers will learn how to adapt their exist
ing businesses to get the most out of the new system.
If developing countries are to be true beneﬁciaries, they are going to have to
learn to play the game well. Enormous capacity-building enterprises will have to
be launched. There is already a risk that the  will be further marginalised as
moneys ﬂow to the largest developing countries, which already attract signiﬁcant
foreign investment. Ideally, developing country businesses should come to the
 with projects they want to sell. Developing country-based  brokers are
already emerging, even if governments act on their behalf initially. The 
should ultimately enable developing countries to set up markets for the secondary
trading of  .
Taking into account the risks identiﬁed above, there remain major opportuni
ties in the  for economic development, venture capital, and climate change
abatement.
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Modernizing biomass energy
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Abstract
Biomass accounts for an estimated one-third of all energy used in developing countries
today. Most of this biomass is used inefficiently and with significant pollutant emis
sions by the more than 2 billion people who cook using direct combustion of biomass.
Contrasting today’s use of biomass energy, several recent major assessments of
future global energy supply show much larger roles for biomass energy by the middle
of the 21st century as part of a global strategy for reducing CO2 emissions to the
atmosphere. When biomass is grown renewably (i.e., at the same average rate at
which it is used for energy), little or no net emissions of CO2 result. Most energy ana
lysts are surprised by visions of such large biomass contributions to energy supply
because biomass ranks near the bottom of the list of preferred energy carriers today.
However, if biomass can be modernized, i.e. converted cost-competitively into more
convenient forms such as gases, liquids, or electricity, then much more significant use
of biomass is conceivable.
This paper discusses modernizing biomass energy within the context of climate
change mitigation. The paper begins by defining modernization, and reviewing its
advantages and disadvantages. It then addresses agricultural, environmental, and
socioeconomic implications of biomass energy modernization for developing coun
tries. Examples of modernization in the context of electricity production and cooking
are provided. Finally, challenges to modernization are noted, along with some sug
gestions for addressing the challenges.
Introduction

Biomass has been called “the poor man’s oil” because its direct use by combustion
for domestic cooking and heating ranks it at the bottom of the ladder of preferred
energy carriers. It might more appropriately be labeled “the poor woman’s oil,” as
women (and children) in rural areas of developing countries spend a considerable
amount of time daily gathering fuelwood needs. They also suffer the brunt of
indoor air pollution caused by direct combustion of biomass for cooking and
heating. Nearly 60% of all human exposure to particulate air pollution is esti
mated to occur indoors in rural areas of developing countries (Figure 1). Studies
in India have measured the inhalation by some women of the carcinogen
benzo(a)pyrene during cooking to be equivalent to smoking 20 packs of cigarettes
per day (Smith et al. 1983).

Note:
Globally, photosynthesis stores
energy in biomass at a rate that
is roughly ten times the present
rate of total global energy use.
Some 40 to 50 exajoules (EJ)
per year (1018 joules/year) of
photosynthetic production (less
than 2% of the total) is used for
energy today (Hall et al. 1993;
Reddy et al. 1997; Nakicenovic et
al. 1998). For comparison, total
global energy use is around 450
EJ/year. The precise biomass
contribution is uncertain
because the majority of it is
used non-commercially in rural
areas of developing countries.
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use. Where policies supportive of biomass use are in place, e.g. in Sweden, Finland,
and Austria, the biomass contribution reaches 15 to 20%. Most biomass in indus
trialized countries is converted into electricity and process heat using cogenera
tion systems (combined heat and power production) at industrial sites or at
municipal district heating facilities. The principal biomass fuels used in industri
alized countries are residues of industrial processes or of logging. The processes
being employed in industrialized countries are clean and efﬁcient—especially
compared to the ways biomass is typically used in developing countries.
58

How might biomass energy help reduce future carbon dioxide emissions?

Because carbon in biomass is extracted from atmospheric CO2 by photosynthesis
during plant growth, the subsequent release of CO2 to the atmosphere when the
biomass is used for energy simply replaces the CO2 previously extracted by the
plant. As long as biomass is grown at the same average rate at which it is used for
energy, it is a carbon-neutral energy source. If the use of carbon-neutral biomass
energy replaces fossil energy, net reductions in emissions of CO2 to the atmos
phere result. Alternatively, if biomass is grown but not harvested, carbon will accu
mulate (i.e., be sequestered from the atmosphere) in the growing biomass until it
reaches maturity. In either case, the inputs of carbon as fossil fuel needed to grow
biomass are a small fraction of the carbon stored by photosynthesis (Williams
1994).
The distinction between (i) growing and harvesting biomass in “perpetual
rotation” for use as a fossil fuel substitute to reduce CO2 emissions and (ii) using
planted trees to extract and sequester carbon from the atmosphere is important.
Until fairly recently, interest in biomass as a mechanism for coping with global
warming has focused on the latter. However, growing biomass on a “perpetual
rotation” basis for use as a fossil fuel substitute would provide substantially greater
CO2 mitigation beneﬁts under a wide range of conditions (Hall, Mynick, Williams
1991a, 1991b; Marland and Marland 1992; Marland and Schlamadinger 1997). With
advanced biomass production and conversion systems (such as those discussed
later in this paper), biomass substituted for coal can be as effective in reducing CO2



273

emissions as carbon sequestration in planted trees, per ton of biomass. However,
fuel substitution can be carried out indeﬁnitely, while carbon storage in trees can
be effective only until the trees reach maturity. Moreover, there are often impor
tant environmental and socioeconomic beneﬁts beyond carbon emissions reduc
tions, such as buildup of soil carbon, jobs created to manage planted tree systems,
local revenue generated from sale of biomass, and local biomass availability for
non-energy uses. Using a “perpetual-rotation” strategy, these beneﬁts will be con
tinuous, with long-term impact (Sathaye et al. 1995; Larson and Williams 1995).
CO2 mitigation strategies involving carbon storage in planted trees will be pre
ferred to fossil fuel substitution mainly in regions where biomass yields are too low
to be economically interesting for bioenergy production, or in remote areas where
the costs of transporting the biomass to markets are too high.
How much of an impact could biomass energy have on future CO2 emissions?

Several recent major assessments of future global energy supply prospects show
large potential roles for biomass energy, including scenarios developed by the Shell
International Petroleum Company (Kassler 1994), by the World Energy Council in a
joint study with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Nakicen
ovic et al. 1998), and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (
1996). The  conducted a detailed exploration of ﬁve alternative low-emissions
energy supply scenarios () for satisfying the world’s growing demand for energy
services in the 21st century (Figure 2) while limiting cumulative CO2 emissions
between 1990 and 2100 to under 500 gigatons () of carbon as CO2. Fossil fuel
“decarbonization,” with long-term subsurface storage (sequestration) of the
extracted carbon, is required in the mid-21st century to meet CO2 emissions targets
in all scenarios, particularly in the coal-intensive and high-demand variants. In all of
the  scenarios, a substantial contribution from carbon-neutral biomass energy
as a fossil fuel substitute is also included. Biomass energy use is greatest and fossilfuel decarbonization and carbon sequestration are smallest in the biomass-inten
sive variant. In this scenario, biomass energy contributes 180  per year to global
energy supply by 2050, with the majority being used in developing countries (Figure
3), where climates are best suited for growing biomass. About two-thirds of the bio
figure 2
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mass would be derived from high-yield energy plantations covering nearly 400 mil
lion hectares (Figure 4), an area equivalent to one-quarter of present planted agri
cultural area. The remainder would be derived from wastes and residues.

figure 3
Primary commercial energy use
by source for the biomassintensive variant of the ipcc
less constructions, shown for
teh world, for industrialized
countries, and for developing
countries (ipcc 1996).

figure 4
Land areas of biomass energy
plantations by region for alter
native less variants (ipcc,
1996).

How are such significant contributions from biomass energy possible?

Most energy analysts are surprised by visions of large biomass contributions to
energy supply for several reasons:
• First, historically the trend has been away from biomass as incomes rise;
• Second, the photosynthetic efﬁciency of biomass is low, making biomass very
land-use intensive and giving rise to potential conﬂicts with other land uses,
such as food production;


• Third, many are also worried about environmental issues, ranging from chemi
cal contamination arising from intensively-managed production of biomass
energy crops to loss of biodiversity associated with large monoculture bioenergy
plantations;
• Fourth, the economics, energy balances, and CO2 emissions balances of most
biomass energy systems developed to date have not been especially favorable.
All such concerns must be addressed if biomass is to play the substantial role
envisioned in the energy scenarios discussed above, but if biomass can be con
verted cost-competitively into more convenient and more efﬁciently-usable forms
such as gases, liquids, or electricity, i.e., modernized, then large contributions from
biomass energy are conceivable.
The  scenarios were developed with the key assumption of biomass mod
ernization:
• Efﬁcient conversion of biomass into convenient-to-use energy carriers for use
in efﬁcient end-use systems renders biomass widely attractive and competitive
in energy markets;
• High efﬁciency of conversion and end use reduces the demand on land resources;
• Dedicated production of suitable biomass energy feedstocks is also modern
ized and expanded, and more effective utilization of wastes and residues is
practiced;
• The high value of electricity and ﬂuid fuels that can be made from biomass
enables biomass to be valued more highly, thereby making it possible to pro
vide greater inputs of material and labor into the biomass production process
so as to ensure sustainable, environmentally-acceptable production;
• The higher value also expands the potential economical supplies of biomass.
What does modernization of biomass production mean?

In biomass production, modernization implies the choice of biomass feedstocks
that (i) offer the potential for high yields, low cost, and low adverse environmen
tal impacts, and (ii) are suitable for use in modern energy systems. Efforts to ﬁnd
optimal combinations of feedstocks, conversion technologies, and end-use sys
tems have not been made in the case of most familiar, “new” bioenergy systems,
which involve the production of synthetic fuels from grains, sugar cane, sugar
beets, or rape seed. Crops such as these were originally optimized for food pro
duction, which meant they were valued for tastiness, protein, starch or sugar con
tent. As a result, these crops tend to be suboptimal for energy use. While relatively
little biomass is grown speciﬁcally for energy today, biomass resources from a vari
ety of activities indicate that very high energy yields are possible compared to that
of conventional agriculture or forestry activities (Figure 5).
While high yields can help minimize the amount of land required for biomass
energy production, biomass is still a land-intensive energy resource. To meet the
 2050 projection of area needed for energy plantations, the developing coun
try establishment rate of high-yield plantations must be about 5 million hectares
per year between now and 2050. For comparison, industrial tree plantations in
tropical regions were established at an average rate of 2.6 million hectares per year
between 1981 and 1990 ( Project 1992), and the 1989 Noordwijk Declaration set
as a target achieving a global net afforestation rate of 12 million hectares per year
by 2000 (Ministerial Conference 1989).
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figure 5
Actual yields from various bio
mass activities (IPCC, 1996).

Will biomass energy production compete for land with food production?

Are there sufﬁcient land resources to support the level of energy crop production
envisioned by the IPCC while having sufﬁcient land for production of food and
other essential needs? The strategies for minimizing potential competition for
land include agricultural modernization and using degraded lands for biomass
energy production.
The simultaneous modernization of biomass production for energy and bio
mass production for food may help avoid competition for land. These “two mod
ernizations” could be pursued synergistically. The availability of low-cost modern
energy carriers (especially electricity) derived from biomass could spur rural
enterprises and generate the income needed to pay for the capital investments and
inputs required for modernizing agriculture (Larson and Williams 1995). Higher
yield agriculture can in turn provide larger quantities of biomass residues that can
be used for energy. If the potential for modernizing and intensifying agriculture
were realized, land for biomass energy would be more available.
Consider recent food-versus-fuel assessments for India (Ravindranath and
Hall 1995; Sudha and Ravindranath 1999)—a country that most casual observers
would consider to have little spare land. Ravindranath and Hall observe that the
total area under crops in India was roughly the same in 1990 (around 125 million
hectares) as it was 20 years earlier, despite population growth averaging about
2.4% per year during these two decades. (Cultivable non-cropland has also
remained stable at about 40 million hectares.) In looking to the future land
requirements for agriculture, Ravindranath and Hall note that the average yield of
India’s most important crop, rice, is only about half the Asian average, one-third
of the yield in China and Japan, and one-ﬁfth the Korean yield. They also note that
in some states of India (Tamil Nadu and Punjab), the rice yield is double the
Indian average.
From these data and an analysis of the barriers to raising crop yields and crop
ping intensities (i.e., cultivation of at least two crops per year through irrigation),
Ravindranath and Hall conclude that there are good prospects for doubling or


tripling average annual yields in India, and thereby for doubling or tripling food
production without increasing cropped area. Such a scenario leaves substantial
amounts of land for other uses.
Targeting degraded lands for biomass energy production is another strategy for
minimizing land use competition (Johansson et al. 1993; Hall et al. 1993; Williams
1994; Ravindranath and Hall 1995; Sudha and Ravindranath 1999). Planting of tree
or perennial-grass energy crops is more likely to lead to improvement of such
lands than planting of annual row crops. In developing countries in aggregate,
Grainger (1988 and 1990) and Oldeman, et al. (1991) have estimated that there are
over 2 billion hectares of degraded lands. Grainger further estimates that some 621
million hectares of these lands are suitable for reforestation. Houghton (1990) has
estimated that previously forested area suitable for reforestation amounts to 500
million hectares, with an additional 365 million hectares available from land in the
fallow phase of shifting cultivation. There are a wide variety of technical, socioe
conomic, political, and other challenges involved in successfully growing energy
crops on degraded lands. However, the feasibility of overcoming such challenges
is demonstrated by the fact that many successful plantations have already been
established on degraded lands in developing countries (Hall et al. 1993; Parham et
al. 1993).
In 1996, China generated crop residues in the ﬁeld (mostly corn stover, rice straw,
and wheat straw) plus agricultural processing residues (mostly rice husks, corn
cobs, and bagasse) totaling about 790 million tons, with a corresponding energy
content of about 11 EJ (Gu and Duan 1998). To put this in perspective, if half of
this resource were to be used for generating electricity at an efﬁciency of 25%
(achievable at small scales today), the resulting electricity generation would be
about half of the total electricity generated from coal in China in 1996.
Where population densities are high, greater use of land for food production
will be required, and dedicated energy crop production will be less feasible. In such
regions, agricultural residues will be an especially important biomass energy
source. In fact, biomass residues might play important roles in such regions pre
cisely because the regions produce so much food—crop production can generate
large quantities of byproduct residues. For example, in 1996 China generated crop
residues in the ﬁeld (mostly corn stover, rice straw, and wheat straw) plus agricul
tural processing residues (mostly rice husks, corncobs, and bagasse) totaling about
790 million tons, with a corresponding energy content of about 11  (Gu and
Duan 1998). To put this in perspective, if half of this resource were to be used for
generating electricity at an efﬁciency of 25% (achievable at small scales today), the
resulting electricity generation would be about half of the total electricity gener
ated from coal in China in 1996.
What are potential environmental impacts
of modernized biomass energy production?

Modernizing biomass energy production raises environmental concerns, includ
ing concerns about intensive agricultural management practices that energy plan
tations might require and concerns about taking agricultural residues from the
land. Chemical contamination of groundwater, loss of soil quality, and loss of
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habitat diversity are the primary issues. Such concerns must be effectively
addressed if there is to be widespread grassroots public support for biomass mod
ernization efforts, which will be required for modernized biomass energy to play
signiﬁcant roles in the world’s energy systems.
There is no doubt that biomass can be grown for energy in ways that are envi
ronmentally destructive. However, it is also possible to improve land relative to
present use through the production of biomass for energy. The environmental
outcome depends sensitively on the state of the land before biomass production
is started and on how the biomass is produced (Kartha and Larson 2000; Larson
and Williams 1995). Environmental issues associated with biomass energy pro
duction are beginning to be widely addressed (Cook et al. 1991; Beyea et al. 1992;
Davidson 1987; Gustafsson 1994;  1993; Sawyer 1993; Shell and  1993; WEC
1994).
Consider the challenge of sustaining the productivity of the land. Harvesting
biomass removes nutrients that must be restored. With many modernized bio
mass conversion systems (detailed below), it is feasible to recover most mineral
nutrients as ash, which can be returned to the land. However, nitrogen is lost to
the atmosphere at the conversion facility and must be replenished. Environmen
tally sensitive measures can be taken to address this nutrient need. For example,
when trees are the harvested crop, the leaves, twigs, and small branches in which
nutrients are concentrated can be left at the site to reduce nitrogen loss; this also
helps maintain soil quality and reduce erosion. Also, biomass species that ﬁx nitro
gen in the soil can be selected as the energy crop or for interplanting with other
energy species to eliminate or reduce to low levels the need for artiﬁcial fertilizers.
Biomass production for energy allows much more ﬂexibility than agriculture in
meeting ﬁxed nitrogen requirements this way.
Energy crops also offer ﬂexibility in dealing with erosion and chemical pollu
tion from herbicides, problems associated largely with planting frequency. If the
energy crop is an annual crop, the erosion and herbicide pollution problems
would be similar to those for annual row-crop agriculture; cultivating such
crops—for energy or for agriculture—should be avoided on erosion-prone lands.
However, potential biomass energy crops also include fast-growing trees that are
harvested only every three to eight years and replanted perhaps every ﬁfteen to
twenty-four years and perennial grasses that are harvested annually, but replanted
only once in a decade or so. Both of these alternatives tend to sharply reduce ero
sion as well as the need for herbicides (Hohenstein and Wright 1994).
Dedicated biomass energy production will support a much narrower range of
biological species than productive, naturally vegetated land. However, if energy
production is established on degraded lands, it will generally support a more
diverse ecology than was possible before restoration. Similarly, if biomass energy
production replaces monoculture food crops, the effect on the local ecology will
depend on the energy crop species chosen, but in many cases the shift will be to a
more ecologically varied landscape.
What are potential socioeconomic impacts
of modernized biomass energy production?

Two key socioeconomic issues associated with modernizing biomass energy pro
duction are the potential for rural employment and income generation and the
possibility that local populations will be displaced from their lands.


Because it is an employment-intensive activity, the growing of biomass will gen
erate rural jobs. Carpentieri, et al. (1993) estimate that large industrial plantations
in Brazil today generate 1.9 to 3.6 direct jobs per square kilometer. Parikh and
Reddy (1997) indicate that 20 jobs per square kilometer were created at one smallscale fuelwood plantation site in India. While these employment levels may be rel
atively modest, they are important locally, and additional indirect jobs are also
likely to be created. Moreover, the income generation from biomass energy planta
tions would often compare favorably to income generation from food crops. For
example, in Brazil, where the selling price of purpose-grown biomass energy might
typically be $2/GJ (Carpentieri, et al. 1993), the gross annual revenues generated by
a plantation would be $400 to $600 per hectare, assuming biomass yields of 10-15
dry tons/ha/yr. Such revenues are comparable to the revenues that are generated
from soybean production in Brazil today. While gross annual revenues might be
comparable, the cost of inputs for biomass energy production (especially for
woody crops with 3 to 8 year rotations) are likely to be substantially lower than
those for an annual crop like soybeans. Moreover, unlike the situation with Brazil
ian soybeans, which are largely exported, biomass would be used locally for energy,
which in turn could be consumed in additional income-generating industries
within the region. (The comparison of soybeans with biomass production does
not imply that the two would compete for the same land. As discussed earlier, it
might be desirable to target degraded areas for multi-year rotation biomass energy
production. Such areas may not be suitable for an annual crop like soybeans.)
The prospect that low-cost energy from advanced biomass conversion systems
will attract energy-intensive industries (and associated high-paying jobs) to rural
areas is perhaps the single most important beneﬁt that biomass production could
offer to rural populations. This could provide the income needed in rural areas to
modernize agriculture, as noted earlier, and also help stem urban migration.
Concerns are sometimes raised about large biomass energy plantations dis
placing local populations engaged in land-use activities that they do not want to
abandon. This fear is based on the assumption that large plantations are required
to take advantage of economies of scale to make bioenergy competitive. However,
this supposition is not necessarily correct. Farm forestry in Brazil has been one
approach that has been especially effective in involving small farmers in the highyield production of biomass (Larson and Williams 1995). There is extensive expe
rience also in small-scale fuelwood production in India (Ravindranath and Hall
1995).
In a typical farm-forestry program in Brazil, a forestry company provides the
material inputs and technical know-how for establishing trees on a farmer’s land
(1 to 50 hectares of trees per farm) and contracts with the farmer to buy some or
all of the ﬁrst harvest for an agreed upon price that incorporates repayment for the
initial inputs and services. The inputs include saplings (usually some species of
eucalyptus), fertilizers (applied at planting), herbicides (applied at some point
after planting), and pesticides. The company samples the farmer’s soil and pro
vides fertilizers and tree species “tuned” to that farmer’s soil.
Because of the sophisticated material inputs and the careful tending provided
by the farmer, the biomass yields reported from small-farm plantings are not
much below those reported for large-scale industrial plantations that are owned
and operated by forestry companies. In addition, most programs in Brazil started
in earnest only in the mid-1980s. Yields are likely to increase as both farmers and
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their contracting companies learn improved methods and approaches. Limited
data suggest that even with present farm-forestry systems, the delivered costs for
biomass are not much different than from large-scale plantations.
Several hundred thousand hectares of farm forests have been established in
Brazil since the mid-1980s with support from the private sector; federal, state and
local governments; and farmers. The results of the small-farm forestry programs
include minimal changes in land ownership and use patterns, increased reason
ably priced local wood supplies, and a new revenue source for farmers—including
former subsistence farmers.
What does modernization of biomass conversion mean?

Modernized biomass conversion implies the use of technologies that offer, at the
scales appropriate for biomass energy conversion facilities, low unit capital costs
and high thermodynamic efﬁciencies for making modern energy carriers—mainly
electricity and high-quality liquid and gaseous fuels. High conversion efﬁciencies
are needed to maximize the useful services derived from the biomass and to enable
competitive use of relatively high cost biomass such as dedicated energy crops.
Also, because long-distance biomass transport is costly, conversion facilities must
be modest in scale, compared to fossil fuel conversion facilities, to be competitive.
A number of systems that meet the above criteria for modernized biomass con
version can be identiﬁed (Larson, 1993). Processes that begin with thermochemi
cal gasiﬁcation, which involves the conversion of solid biomass at 800-1000oC into
a fuel gas containing carbon monoxide and hydrogen as the primary com
bustibles, are especially promising. Such processes offer enormous ﬂexibility in
the choice of feedstock, because the only important feedstock properties are high
yield, low cost, and low environmental impact. Some possibilities for moderniz
ing biomass-based electricity production and biomass-based cooking fuels pro
duction are discussed here.
How can electricity production from biomass be modernized?

The coupling of biomass gasiﬁcation with gas turbine power generation is promis
ing for modernizing biomass-based electric power generation at a scale of 30 to 100
MWe (Williams and Larson 1996). Biomass-gasiﬁer/gas turbine (/) systems
have the potential to double the efﬁciency of electric power generation compared
to conventional (steam turbine) technology and decrease unit capital costs, result
ing in more competitive total costs per kWh (Table 1). / commercialization is
the focus of demonstration projects in Brazil, Sweden, the , the , and else
where (Waldheim and Carpentieri 1998; Sipila and Korhonen 1999). Potential
applications of / systems include various co-product systems, e.g., animal
feed and power (Salo and Horvath 1999) or cooking fuel and power [see below];
combined heat and power production in industries that generate biomass or bio
mass-derived fuels as process byproducts such as the forest products industry
(Larson and Raymond 1997; Weyerhaeuser et al. 1995); and stand-alone power gen
eration (Carpentieri, Larson, and Woods 1993; Rensfelt and Everard 1999).
The sugarcane processing industry serves to illustrate the potential impact that
/ technology could have on modernizing biomass electricity production.
Some 80 developing countries grow and process sugarcane. The production of
sugar or ethanol from sugarcane generates a ﬁbrous biomass byproduct (bagasse)
that amounts to 25-30% of the mass of the sugarcane stalks entering a mill. Bagasse


table 1

potential for ‘excess’ electricity generation
from sugarcane processing facilities in developed countries
1995 Cane
Production
(million tc)

Brazil
India
China
Caribbean
Indonesia
Other Latin Am.
Others
Totals
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2025 Cane
Prod. @ 2%/yr.
(million tc)

2025 ‘Excess’
Electricity
(TWh/year)

1995 Utility
Elec. Prod.
(TWh)

304
260
70
48
31
152
233

550
470
127
87
57
275
422

330
282
76
52
34
165
253

257
364
859
42
58
438
912

1098

1988

1192

2930

2025 Cane
Elec./1995
Utility Elec.
1.3
0.8
0.09
1.2
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.4

is typically used today as a fuel for combined heat and power generation at mills
to supply the mill’s process energy requirements.
Historically, there has been little electricity exported by sugar factories because
of the low efﬁciency of the conventional bagasse-ﬁred combined heat and power
systems. However, sugar factories have the potential to become major exporters of
electricity. Figure 6 shows the amount of excess electricity generation possible
(above and beyond process electricity needs) per ton of sugarcane (tc) processed.
Most existing sugar mills use low-pressure (~20 bar) boilers feeding inefﬁcient
steam turbines and generate no excess electricity from bagasse. A few mills in
developing countries now utilize higher-pressure boilers (40-60 bar) and more
efﬁcient steam turbines (condensing-extraction steam turbines, ), which
result in excess power generation of the order of 100 kWh/tc from bagasse. By
making cost-effective changes to the process to reduce steam consumption, a 
system can export an additional 20 or 30 kWh/tc (middle bar, Figure 6).
With bagasse as fuel, a sugarcane processing facility is limited in its potential to
generate electricity outside of the cane crushing season, which typically lasts six
months in many countries. By using a supplemental fuel during the off-season,
however, considerably more power could be exported. A potentially attractive
supplemental fuel is cane trash, the tops and leaves of the sugarcane plant. These
are generated in quantities comparable to the amount of bagasse generated
(Goldemberg et al. 1993). Today they are typically burned on the ﬁelds to facilitate
replanting or harvesting, though the resulting air
pollution has motivated some governments to ban
this practice. Using cane trash to enable year-round
power production, a sugar mill using  tech
nology could nearly triple exportable electricity
production compared to generating only during
the crushing season. Adopting / technology,
a sugar mill could nearly sextuple excess electricity
production (Figure 6).
Table 2 gives some perspective on the potential
contribution of / “cane power” to overall
electricity supply in developing countries. The
table demonstrates an estimate of the electricity
present process
generation potential at sugarcane processing facil
steam demands
ities in 2025 in developing countries, assuming the

figure 6
Electricity generated in excess
of on-site requirements per
tonne of sugarcane crushed at
a sugar or ethanol factory using
different cogeneration tech
nologies (Larson, 1994). Exist
ing technology is the back-pres
sure steam turbine with steam
pressure about 20 bar. CEST is a
condensing extraction steam
turbine with steam pressure
about 60 bar.

with reduced process
steam demands
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recent average annual rate of increase in sugarcane production. For some 80 devel
oping countries, “excess” electricity from cane residues in 2025 could amount to
40% of the amount of electricity generated by all utility generating plants in these
countries in 1995. For some countries-e.g., Brazil and some Caribbean nations-the
contribution of cane-derived power could be much greater.

table 2

comparison of electricity costs from biomass and
conventional (steam turbine) technology and
gasifier/gas turbine technology (elliot and booth 1993)

How can cooking with biomass
be modernized?

Fluid cooking fuels emit far fewer toxic
pollutants than solid fuels (Figure 7), and
Conventional
cooking with ﬂuid fuels is far more efﬁTechnology
cient (Figure 8). Thus, if biomass can be
Power plant capacity (MW electric)
25
25
converted efﬁciently into ﬂuid cooking
Biomass fuel cost at the plant ($/dry tonne)
40
40
Electric generating efficiency (lower heating value %)
20
45
fuels, it becomes possible to meet larger
Installed capital cost ($/kW)
1800
1300–1500
cooking energy demands than are being
Power plant capacity factor (%)
85
85
provided by biomass use today and to do so
Electricity generating costs (us$ per kWh)
with far fewer detrimental health impacts.
Capital recovery (8% real rate of return)
4.2
30.–3.5
One option is to use “producer gas,” the
Operating and maintenance
0.5
0.5
Biomass fuel
3.6
1.6
product of thermochemical biomass gasiTotal generating cost
8.3
5.1–5.6
ﬁcation (Dutt and Ravindranath 1993).
There is considerable experience world
wide in the use of “town gas,” the product of coal gasiﬁcation, which has the same
principal combustible components as producer gas (carbon monoxide and hydro
gen). Town gas was widely used in urban areas of industrialized countries in the
late 1800s through the mid-1900s as fuel for cooking and heating. Town gas con
tinues to be used in urban areas in China, India, and some other developing coun
tries. Producer gas from biomass is attractive because it can be generated using rel
atively simple, small (village-scale), low-cost devices that convert 60 to 70% of the
energy in the original biomass into fuel gas. Some provinces of China that are par
ticularly rich in agricultural residues (e.g., Jilin and Shandong) have recently
launched major programs to introduce producer gas from crop residues for cook
ing in villages (Dai et al. 1998; Cao 1998). With proper use, producer gas is a much
Gasifier/
Gas Turbine
Technology

figure 7
Measured emissions (to room
air) of products of incomplete
combustion (PIC) from flue-less
cook stoves in China (Zhang et
al., 1999).


more convenient, efﬁcient and clean cooking fuel
than direct burning of the biomass. However, its use
presents the possibility of accidental carbon monox
ide poisoning.
Liqueﬁed petroleum gas (, conventionally a
mixture of propane and butane) and dimethyl ether
(, with chemical formula CH3OCH3) are two
non-toxic fuels that can also be made from biomass
via gasiﬁcation, followed by catalytic synthesis of the
gas into liquid products, and then reﬁning of the raw
synthesis products (Larson and Jin 1999a,b; Andren
et al. 1999). Both are gases at atmospheric pressure,
but can be stored as liquids under moderate pres
sures. Fossil fuel derived  is already used for cooking in developing countries,
e.g., many urban Chinese households use , and an estimated 30 million rural
households also use some (Wang 1997). DME has received some attention as a pos
sible cooking fuel (Chen and Niu 1995), but is not being used for this purpose
today.
The production of  or  from biomass is now conceivable as a result of
recent technological developments, both in / for electricity generation (dis
cussed earlier) and in oil and gas industry technologies for synthesizing liquid
hydrocarbons from natural gas or gasiﬁed coal.“Gas-phase” hydrocarbon synthe
sis technologies were ﬁrst introduced commercially over 50 years ago, but the eco
nomics of these are prohibitive except at scales far larger than can be conceived of
with biomass. However, “liquid-phase” synthesis technologies, which improve
economically at a smaller scale, are emerging (Knott 1997; Tijm et al. 1997; Rentech
1999), driven by interests of the oil and gas industry in converting remote pockets
of natural gas into liquids that can then be transported signiﬁcant distances to
markets (Fouda 1998).
Liquid-phase processes provide for potentially attractive economics for “once
through” co-production of liquids and electricity (Choi, et al. 1997). In this case,
gas containing CO and H2 is passed once through the synthesis reactor. Any gas
not converted to liquids goes to a gas turbine to generate electricity. Liquid-phase
synthesis provides for much greater single-pass conversion of gas to liquids than
is possible with gas phase synthesis (Bechtel Group 1990; Lewnard et al. 1993). As
a result, liquid-phase synthesis gives efﬁciencies of liquids production in a oncethrough conﬁguration that cannot be achieved without additional reaction steps,
recycle loops, and process energy consumption with traditional gas-phase syn
thesis. The economics with once-through processing are better as well.
Illustrating the signiﬁcance of the liquid-phase once-through concept for
modernization of biomass-based cooking, Larson and Jin (1999) have estimated
the cost of co-producing synthetic  and electricity from corn stalks gathered
from a radius of 11 km in Jilin Province, China. They estimate that the cost of bio
mass-derived  would be competitive with current  prices in rural areas of
that province (Figure 9).
Jilin is home to 2% of China’s population and grows 14% of China’s corn, which
amounts to about 35 million tons of corn stalks annually. About half of these are
used for soil conditioning and fertilization, for livestock fodder, and for industrial
feedstock (Cao 1998). A large number of rural households burn stalks for domes-
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figure 8
End-use energy consumption
for cooking with alternative
cooking fuels and stoves (Dutt
and Ravindranath, 1993).

   

lpg production cost ($/gj)
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figure 9
Estimated production cost of
Fischer-Tropsh LPG from bio
mass in a "once-through" facil
ity as a function of sale price for
co-produced electricity (Larson
and Jin, 1999).

electricity sale price (c/kwh)

tic cooking and heating, contributing to poor indoor air quality in many homes.
However, now, with rising farm incomes, there is a shift away from the domestic
use of stalks and toward coal briquettes. The unused stalks are burned in open
ﬁelds to prevent buildup of undecomposed residues that can harbor insect infes
tations, which is creating new and serious outdoor air pollution problems.
Because of the high efﬁciency of converting biomass to LPG (and using it in
cooking), Larson and Jin estimate that less than 30% of the total Jilin corn stalk
supply converted to  and electricity would be sufﬁcient to meet all rural Jilin
cooking fuel demands. The co-produced electricity would be equivalent to more
than triple the present per household electricity demand in rural Jilin households.
For China as a whole, Li, et al. (1998) project that some 376 million tons of agri
cultural residues will be available for energy use in 2010 (from a total residue gen
eration of 726 million tons). Converting the available residues to LPG could meet
the cooking fuel demand of some 560 million people, about 40% of China’s pro
jected 2010 population. Electricity would be co-produced at about 2.5 times the
rate projected for the Three Gorges hydroelectric facility.
What are some key practical challenges to modernizing biomass?

Sound technology, with the potential for economic viability, is an essential ele
ment of strategies that seek to modernize biomass energy on a wide scale. Because
biomass conversion technologies are typically relatively small, however, establish
ing cost-competitiveness is challenging due to the well-known phenomenon of
unit costs rising as unit sizes fall. On the other hand, small unit size is a potential
advantage in that it facilitates achieving economies of scale in manufacturing and
economies of scale in learning through repeated applications. This advantage can
be exploited only if there is a sufﬁcient scale of demand for the technology. Criti
cal levels of demand needed to achieve cost reductions through scale economies
can be created through regulatory or other mechanisms.
For example, in Brazil the demand for ethanol fuel was created initially by sub
sidies that made it attractive for private producers to make ethanol instead of


sugar. Ethanol production grew at over 30% per year for the ﬁrst decade of the pro
gram, reaching some 12 billion liters per year by 1985. Considerable technology
learning took place and standard distillery designs were developed by equipment
manufacturers, both of which helped reduce the costs of ethanol production and
enabled the industry to continue producing ethanol at a high level of output even
as subsidies started to be reduced beginning in the mid-1980s (Moreira and
Goldemberg 1999). Even with the recent large drop in prices paid to producers in
mid-1999, ethanol production is expected to continue at a high level due to the cost
reductions that have been achieved since the inception of the program.
An approach to encouraging widespread replication of village-scale biomass
energy systems is the granting of rural concession areas, analogous to those
granted for oil and gas exploration and production (Shivakumar et al. 1998). The
key steps in developing a resource using a concession approach include:
•
•
•
•

a regional survey to identify prospective areas to be developed;
delineating the resource area into concession areas;
soliciting bidders under published terms and conditions; and
licensing successful bidders.

The key objectives in applying a concession approach to replicating bioenergy
systems are (i) to encourage the development of a large number of applications
and (ii) to enable successful bidders to take advantage of equipment and learning
cost reductions, as well as administrative and overhead cost reductions, arising
from multiple applications in their concession area.
A concession approach could be envisioned, for example, for the installation
and operation of village-scale biomass-based electricity generating systems
throughout a rural concession area. Any single village may generate a relatively
small amount of power, but many villages all generating power could make sig
niﬁcant contributions to electricity production from a national perspective. Con
cessionaires would be able to provide electricity to customers at competitive rates
as a result of reducing overhead costs associated with contract negotiations, with
marketing, manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance, etc. The
Global Environment Facility is currently supporting pilot projects involving con
cession approaches to rural electriﬁcation based on renewable energy in
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines.
In addition to scale, another important consideration in many projects where
biomass-based electricity generation is involved is access to the electric utility grid.
This is important because the economics of any power generating system depend
on how extensively the installed capacity is utilized, i.e. on the system capacity
factor. Often in rural areas, local demands for electricity will initially not be high
enough to give economically viable capacity factors for biomass generating sys
tems. To remedy this problem, power might be exported from the rural area to
urban demand centers via the utility transmission grid until the size and diversity
of local power demands grow. Even where grid extension has been judged uneco
nomical for electrifying a rural area, it may nevertheless be economical if the elec
tricity were transmitted from, rather than to, the rural area (Kartha, et al. 2000).
When electricity is sent to urban areas from rural areas, transmission lines can be
utilized at high capacity, making transmission more cost-effective than when elec
tricity ﬂows from urban to rural areas to meet sporadic and low levels of electric
ity demand. Indeed, rural-to-urban transmission is the conﬁguration under

285

286

   
which many remote hydroelectric installations and mine-mouth coal power
plants currently provide power to urban centers.
Utilities worldwide have historically been reluctant to purchase power from
independent generators, but regulatory measures have been used successfully to
overcome this reluctance. For example, in the United States, the 1978 Public Utili
ties Regulatory Policy Act () forced utilities to buy and pay fair prices for
purchased electricity.  led to the installation of several thousand megawatts
[C1]of biomass-derived electricity generating capacity in the  in the 1980s (and
ultimately to the ongoing deregulation of the electric power industry). Similar leg
islation is starting to be enacted in a few developing countries. A law in Brazil that
would mandate fair buy-back rates for biomass-generated electricity is currently
in the public hearing stage—bagasse-based electricity generation at sugarcane
processing facilities is expected to grow signiﬁcantly once the law is enacted. India
has in place a ﬁxed purchase price for biomass-generated electricity that has
encouraged expansion of biomass generating capacity there.
Who will make biomass energy modernization happen?

Strong institutions and leadership at international, national and local levels, as
well as the involvement of the private sector, are needed to help surmount practi
cal challenges to widely implementing modernized biomass energy systems
(Kartha and Larson 2000).
International institutions have important roles to play (Reddy et al. 1997;
 1999), including
• helping to launch initiatives that encourage South-North joint ventures aimed
at developing, adapting, or transferring technology for converting biomass to
modern energy carriers;
• facilitating investment and ﬁnancing for biomass energy modernization; and
• setting policies and programs that support strong national programs, e.g.,
those aimed at restoring productivity to degraded lands through biomass
energy production.
At the national level, coherent policies and regulation regarding biomass energy
development are essential to clarify rules and roles of participants. Also, rationaliz
ing electricity tariffs and fossil fuel prices, e.g., by lifting subsidies or otherwise
more fully reﬂecting costs (including social and environmental costs) will help to
level the playing ﬁeld for all energy sources. National-level land-use planning
(Kinzig et al. 1999) and promulgation of socioeconomic and environmental guide
lines for biomass energy projects is also important in order to provide investors
and project developers a uniform and consistent set of principles and speciﬁc rules
for developing biomass energy systems. Generating and providing information
and technical assistance relating to biomass resources and technologies are addi
tional important roles for national-level institutions, as is facilitating project
ﬁnancing. Strong national-level institutions supporting the development of bio
mass energy are needed to foster the establishment of strong local institutions.
Motivated local institutions engaged in the design, implementation and ongo
ing management of individual biomass energy modernization projects is essen
tial. Local coordinating institutions can provide forums for articulating local
needs and concerns, and for building political consensus. Not only does local par
ticipation make projects responsive to local needs, but experience has demon


strated that such participation generates a sense of ownership that is a critical
ingredient for the success of projects over the long term.
Finally, the private sector has essential roles to play in expanding biomass
energy modernization, with appropriate public-sector oversight and competitive
bidding for projects. Especially important capacities for the private sector relate to
technology, including manufacturing, marketing, installation, operation, and
maintenance (Jain 1995). Commercial enterprises can be effective entities for facil
itating repeated application of technology by applying accumulated experience
and knowledge to new projects. Also, the private sector’s inclination toward entre
preneurial risk-taking and its capability for international partnering can facilitate
ﬁnancing, development, and spread of improved technologies.
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Abstract
Increased energy efficiency at the point of end-use is a key strategy for addressing a
range of energy related problems, including greenhouse gas emissions. There are
energy efficiency alternatives that can be implemented at low cost,and perhaps with
some cost savings – these activities offer no-regrets opportunities for climate change
mitigation. In addition, high levels of end-use energy efficiency will be key for sus
tainable growth of energy systems, which will be required for economic growth and
the concurrent increased demands for energy services.
This paper briefly reviews the role of energy in development, and the main expe
riences and considerations associated with energy efficiency as a strategy for leastcost provision of energy services.A major challenge for society is accelerating the rate
of energy efficiency improvement to meet the increasing demand for energy services
and to ameliorate the negative impacts of increased energy supply at the same time.
Thus, the primary focus of this paper is the discussion of various policies and incen
tives that are conducive to energy efficiency, within the context of development.
Introduction

The overall objective of an energy system should be to provide energy services at
aﬀordable cost without socially unacceptable side eﬀects. Energy services, such as
illumination, refrigeration, torque, cooling and heating, and cooking, are what
satisfy people’s daily needs, not pure kilowatt-hours (kWhs) of electricity or liters
of gasoline. Energy services may also allow access to other forms of service
through, for example, transportation or internet use. Energy commodities are a
means to an end, not an end unto themselves. There are many alternative and
superior means of providing energy services with reduced external impacts from
energy supply.
If the present trends in energy demand and the energy supply mix persist, the
associated environmental, socioeconomic, developmental, and security problems
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will continue to worsen (Goldemberg et al. 1988). Improved eﬃciency in the
extraction, conversion, and distribution of energy, along with increased reliance
on renewable sources of fuels and electricity, are key strategies to substantially
improve the situation. It is clear that minor adjustments of the present energy
system, such as lower emissions of various pollutants or increased energy security,
will be insuﬃcient to meet objectives formulated by society ( 1997).
Placing stress on energy services rather than energy supply brings improved
energy eﬃciency into focus, especially at the point of end use. Historically, society
has neglected energy end-use eﬃciency improvements compared to eﬀorts to
expand and improve eﬃciency of conventional energy exploration, conversion,
and distribution. However, interest in end-use eﬃciency strategy as a means of
meeting the demand for cost-eﬀective energy services is growing. While there are
many historic examples of impressive increases in end-use eﬃciency, countries
around the world are still very far from reaching the ultimate limits of eﬃciency,
as deﬁned by the laws of physics.
The share of energy being consumed by developing countries will continue to
increase in the coming decades. At the same time, developing countries will also
be facing the task of accelerating socioeconomic development and increasing
standards of living, closing the gap between industrialized countries and develop
ing countries. The proportion of global primary energy supply consumed by
countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development () and transition economies is projected to decrease from 68%
in 1995 to 54% by 2020. Conversely, consumption by China and the rest of the
developing world are projected to increase from 32% to 46 % in this time period
( 1998).
Solutions to energy planning and policy will diﬀer between countries and
regions depending on available resources, technical skills, geography, culture, and
other conditions. Developing countries tend to have relatively abundant and inex
pensive labor, whereas capital may be scarce and expensive, which may lead to diﬀ
erent energy planning solutions than those employed in industrialized countries.
These solutions are reliant on national research and development to devise energy
strategies that are tailored to the nation’s speciﬁc needs, at times utilizing laborintensive, capital-frugal techniques. In this context, energy eﬃciency is an
approach, or strategy, that can help simultaneously meet multiple development
objectives.
In this article we brieﬂy review how energy is used and what factors inﬂuence
energy demand. We also discuss the potential for end-use energy eﬃciency
improvements and explain some barriers to capturing economically cost-eﬀective
solutions by the market. Diﬀerent policy instruments to overcome such barriers
are also discussed.
What are the trends in energy use?

1 See WEA 2000 for a recent
review of global energy issues.

Before the industrial revolution, plants and animals were the primary sources of
energy. Since then, energy use has grown exponentially. Today coal, oil, and gas
contribute 77% of global primary energy demand.1 Nuclear power and hydro
power account for about 6.3% and 2.3% respectively, and the remaining 14% is
wood fuel and other biomass-derived fuels. Developing countries use a much
larger share of biomass fuels than industrialized economies. They also tend to use
them ineﬃciently, resulting in high pollution levels for low energy service levels.

  
Globally, nearly 40% of all fuels and electricity are used in buildings for heat
ing, cooling, lighting, cooking, and for running equipment and appliances. A sim
ilar amount is used in industry in a large number of processes such as electrolysis,
distillation, melting, and drying, as well as lighting, ventilation, compressed air,
etc. The remaining 25% is used for transporting goods and people – although the
transportation share of total energy use is increasing in many countries.
Two-thirds of all total primary energy is used by the wealthiest 25% of the
global population. This is a reﬂection of the much higher levels of energy services
enjoyed by aﬄuent, industrialized countries. The economic elite in developing
countries also frequently have energy consumption patterns that are similar to the
aﬄuent in industrialized countries. In many developing countries, energy
demand doubles every six to ten years, while it remains stable or grows gradually
in industrialized countries.
National energy intensities, as expressed by energy use per unit of gross domes
tic product () are decreasing in several industrialized countries and some
developing countries (Nilsson 1993). These trends are a result of energy eﬃciency
The average eﬃciency of electricity generation in central station power plants
has increased by a factor of six since the turn of the century. However, even in
industrialized countries about 70% of the potential energy of primary fuel is
wasted in the process of delivering kWhs of electricity.
improvements and structural changes, i.e., a shift of economic activity to less
energy-intensive sectors of the economy. For example, in  countries the pro
portion of  earned by industry dropped from 37% to 32% between 1974 and
1989. In addition, there are structural changes towards less material and energy
intensive products within industry.
The basic materials industries account for most of industrial sector energy use.
Declining consumption intensity of many basic materials such as steel, cement,
ammonia, and chlorine in industrialized countries – as measured by kg per 
– is an indicator of structural change (Williams et al. 1987). This trend is driven by
market saturation of goods such as fertilizers and refrigerators, and improved and
lighter construction, which reduces the amount of material needed for a given
product. In addition to the slowing growth in demand for many basic materials,
the processes by which they are produced have become more energy-eﬃcient,
even during long periods with decreasing energy prices.
While maintaining a certain level of energy services, primary energy use can be
reduced and energy eﬃciency improved essentially in two ways: higher end-use
and conversion eﬃciencies. The eﬃciency by which energy services such as refrig
eration, light, and transportation are provided is increasing as a result of technol
ogy development. For example, the eﬃcacy in lumens per watt for a modern light
source is several times higher than for Thomas A. Edison’s original carbon ﬁla
ment lamp, which in turn was more eﬃcient than candles or wick-lamps.
Energy conversion and distribution losses have also been reduced. The average
eﬃciency of electricity generation in central station power plants has increased by
a factor of six since the turn of the century. However, even in industrialized coun
tries about 70% of the potential energy of primary fuel is wasted in the process of
delivering kWhs of electricity. Thus, in industrialized countries, for each unit of
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electricity saved at the point of end-use, three to four units of primary fuel are
saved. For many developing countries the leverage is even greater.
Increased use of modern energy carriers such as electricity and ﬂuid fuels has
contributed to lower energy intensities. In particular, the ﬂexibility of electricity
as an energy carrier has contributed to technological innovation and increased
industrial productivity. The advantages of electricity have led to increasing shares
of electricity in the energy balances of most countries. For example, Swedish
industry replaced nearly all direct hydropower and steam engines with electric
motors in the relatively short period between 1900 and 1955.
In developing countries, the demand for energy services is increasing as
economies grow. Higher incomes are leading to increased demand for energyintensive basic materials and energy-consuming products, such as televisions,
cars, air-conditioners, and refrigerators. Thus, during economic growth, developWhile most of the world’s iron-making is based on the use of coke, coal-poor, bio
mass-rich Brazil has developed a modern charcoal-based process based on the
eﬃcient use of eucalyptus grown on plantations; this iron is processed into a
high-quality steel that is competitive in world markets ( 1997).
ing countries may partially repeat the experience of industrialized countries by
undergoing a phase of increased energy use per unit of GDP while building infra
structure, expanding basic industries, and accommodating changing consumer
preferences.
Perspectives on energy planning and policy are quite diﬀerent between indus
trialized countries, developing countries, and economies in transition. Even
within each of these groups there is signiﬁcant variance; however, some common
trends are apparent. Industrialized countries generally have mature energy supply
systems, growth in supply is low, and in many areas there is an over-capacity of
supply. Access to electricity and other modern energy carriers is nearly universal.
Saturation eﬀects are evident in equipment for end-use services such as refrigera
tion, lighting, torque, and cooking. Capital for energy eﬃciency projects can, in
principle, be raised easily through the ﬁnancial markets.
By comparison, developing countries are experiencing tremendous growth in
demand for energy services. There is still substantial room for growth in services
and energy supply, since many people do not have access to any electricity or com
mercial energy and those who do face limitations and reliability problems. Resi
dential sectors are frequently without appliances that the industrialized world
tends to take for granted, such as refrigerators, electric lights, and televisions. Even
if such appliances were available at the residential level, the electricity to operate
them might not be available. Customers in all sectors also face constraints on the
quality and quantity of energy services due to the availability of economically fea
sible technologies. As a result, most developing country governments are currently
considering methods for providing energy services, often focusing on expanding
energy supply infrastructure.
The energy services in European economies in transition (EITs), economies
that were formerly centrally planned, are similar to those of other industrialized
countries in some respects, i.e. the level of service available. However, the oppor
tunities for energy eﬃciency improvements are typically much greater in EITs.

  
Energy supply infrastructures are adequate, yet they are often obsolete, polluting,
and oversized due to economic downturns and removal of energy subsidies.
Demand for more services and transportation fuels is also increasing rapidly,
especially in the road transportation sector.
What are the opportunities for energy e≤ciency?

A whole-system approach is required in order to provide energy services in the most
eﬃcient manner. This method begins with analyzing the types of services needed
and the most eﬃcient means of supplying those services using mainly locally avail
able resources. An example of this is designing an energy-eﬃcient building using
solar energy. Decisions are then based on the technologies and the type and quantity
of energy supplies that can help fulﬁll any remaining need for energy services at the
lowest cost – ideally also including social and environmental costs.
When energy eﬃciency measures result in saved units of energy, they can then
be used for other purposes. These surplus units, sometimes called ‘negawatts,’ can
provide the same services as generated units except they are generally cheaper,
cleaner, faster to obtain, safer, less interruptible, and less burdensome on national
security than generated units of energy. As a result, investing in energy eﬃciency
can provide higher returns of services to society for a given ﬁnancial investment
than investing in energy supply. This type of energy system design philosophy is
called end-use oriented, least-cost method, or a bottom-up approach.
Within the context of the least-cost method, developing countries might invest
in more energy eﬃcient and water eﬃcient irrigation systems to reduce the cost of
pumping. In situations such as villages that maintain a local power supply, energy
eﬃciency investments can help reduce capacity requirements or enable a given
capacity system to provide more energy services.
End-use oriented, least-cost energy strategies are aimed at achieving the great
est developmental gains for society, given the limits of available capital and tech
nology. End-use, least-cost development saves ﬁnancial resources, which can then
be devoted to other services such as health care, education, commercial develop
ment, and job creation. This strategy will help to get the most use from energy ser
vices out of the available resources. Energy services are vital for many important
areas of development, and having high quality energy services is indispensable for
keeping a nation’s citizens and businesses healthy.
What is the potential for modern technology transfer?

In some cases, technology transfer from industrialized countries to developing
countries has taken the form of shipping old, obsolete, ineﬃcient, and polluting
equipment to the developing country. This practice has helped to encourage rep
etition of the detrimental formative development patterns of the industrialized
world. The operation and maintenance of these ineﬃcient technologies can also
tie up the developing country’s economic resources. The transfer of state-of-the
art technologies will provide developing economies with many of the additional
beneﬁts of energy eﬃciency, including improved national energy security,
reduced trade imbalances from energy imports, greater demand for skilled labor,
and increased industrial competitiveness.
Developing countries have the opportunity to ‘leapfrog’ the steps taken by
industrialized countries and develop new technologies, or use the most eﬃcient
existing technologies, as their economies grow. Perhaps the clearest, and therefore
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most widely cited, example of leapfrogging is the direct application of modern
technology for telecommunications in developing countries, e.g., optical ﬁbers
and cellular phones. By jumping directly to the advanced technologies, many
countries have avoided wasting resources on labor and material-intensive copper
cables when expanding infrastructure.
In the context of energy eﬃciency, one historical example of leapfrogging is in
Mexico, where the world’s ﬁrst plants for producing iron by direct reduction
(without smelting) were built. This technology, used in conjunction with electric
arc furnaces for steel-making, is especially well suited to many developing coun
tries because favorable returns can be realized at scales of 100,000 tons of annual
capacity or less, compared to the 2.5 to 3.5 million ton per year needed for con
ventional blast furnaces plus oxygen-blown converters. Another example is in
Brazil. While most of the world’s iron-making is based on the use of coke, coalpoor, biomass-rich Brazil has developed a modern charcoal-based process based
on the eﬃcient use of eucalyptus grown on plantations; this iron is processed into
a high-quality steel that is competitive in world markets ( 1997).
New technologies for demand-side eﬃciency are becoming widely available,
with lower costs, increased eﬃciency, and improved service. In contrast, many of
the fuels needed for supply-side electricity generation are becoming more diﬃcult
and expensive to ﬁnd. In the residential sector, the available ‘state-of-the-shelf ’
technologies for lighting, heating and cooling for indoor air and water, cooking,
and appliances have dramatic improvements in eﬃciency and life-cycle cost of
operation over those currently in use or most frequently purchased. There are
technologies available to the commercial and industrial sectors, such as improved
lighting systems, drive-power and motor systems, industrial process heat and
chemical reactor systems, along with heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
systems that use up to 90% less energy to provide the desired services.
What is the potential for improved efficiency?

Research into various areas of energy end-use suggests that actually implement
ing the best designs and technologies available today could reduce energy use dra
figure 1
Electricity use in refrigerators in
Denmark. Technical develop
ment typically leads to
improved energy efficiency.
Based on data from Professor
Jorgen Norgard, Department of
Buildings and Energy, Technical
University of Denmark. Lyngby,
Denmark.
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figure 2
Di≠erent concepts of the
energy efficiency potential
(Nilsson 1998)

matically and improve energy eﬃciency several times relative to present levels
(von Weizäcker et al. 1997). For example, the best new refrigerators use less than
half as much energy as the present average refrigerator in use. Advanced technol
ogy, which is not yet commercially available, uses as little as one-ﬁfth of the pre
sent average.
The amount of potential for energy eﬃciency improvement is sometimes
debated, and confusion arises due to varying conceptions of ‘potential.’ Deﬁni
tions range from what may be technically possible to what may be perceived as
economic and achievable in practice. Estimates of the potential for saving energy
by improving end-use eﬃciency typically vary from 5%–15% up to 75%–95%,
depending on the end-use application and technical and economic assumptions
(see Figure 2). At the lower end, typically, are estimates of the overnight potential
for proﬁtable changes with short payback times in existing installations. Reported
payback requirements for investments in energy eﬃciency are typically one to
three years. An example of low-cost overnight measures is improved control or
time-scheduling of lighting and ventilation systems.
Over the longer term, energy eﬃciency opportunities arise when equipment is
replaced at the end of its lifetime, during new construction, or when a building is
renovated for reasons other than improving energy performance. Taking these
opportunities to apply energy-eﬃcient technology can reduce energy use by more
than 50% relative to the average technology used. The potential increases further
when requirements for short payback times are relaxed, and a more long-term
economic perspective is applied. Using best available ‘oﬀ-the-shelf,’ or advanced
technology, takes us even closer to the theoretical minimum energy use for any
given service.
Evaluating end-use technology investments based on life-cycle cost ()
analyses frequently shows a broad minimum in the  curve. In other words, the
net present value of capital plus energy costs does not change much when capital
is substituted for energy. For a given energy service, there are many alternative
choices with diﬀerent levels of energy eﬃciency and capital costs but with the
same . Examples include selecting air-handling unit sizes for a given task,
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In the context of energy efﬁciency, one historical example of leapfrogging is in
Mexico, where the world’s ﬁrst plants for producing iron by direct reduction (with
out smelting) were built. This technology, used in conjunction with electric arc
furnaces for steel-making, is especially well suited to many developing countries.
sizing pipes in a pumping system, adding extra insulation to a house, or diﬀerent
vehicle technology alternatives. Thus, there is little economic risk involved in
making an extra investment associated with a higher energy eﬃciency alternative.
Potential estimates and eﬀorts to improve eﬃciency sometimes concentrate on
reducing energy losses in individual components, such as air-conditioners or boil
ers. Greater opportunities for cost-eﬀective energy eﬃciency improvements are
typically identiﬁed when using a system-wide approach, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The cost of improving the eﬃciency of only a cooling or heating system of a house
may increase to a point where it becomes uneconomical to continue making fur
ther eﬃciency improvements. However, system-wide eﬃciency measures, for
example through improved insulation and building design, may bring cooling and
heating needs down to a level where the conventional cooling or heating system
can be replaced by a much less expensive system or eliminated altogether.

figure 3
A system-wide approach
may result in greater energy
efficiency improvements at
lower cost than when com
ponents are viewed in isola
tion. (Adapted from Nilsson
1995)

It is also worth noting that the energy eﬃciency potential is changing as higher
eﬃciency technologies are continuously being introduced into the market. A
common misconception about energy eﬃciency is the idea of ‘ever-rising costs’ to
achieve greater energy eﬃciency (H. Nilsson 1995). An example of this is the idea
that improved designs for energy-eﬃcient and -free refrigerators will auto
matically require more expensive insulation materials and compressors. However,
this perspective does not take into account the dynamics of real markets, where
factors such as technological breakthroughs and development, learning, produc
tion volume, and industrial retooling bring costs down. It also ignores the reality
that energy eﬃciency improvements often are introduced in conjunction with
other product or process improvements that have a value, e.g., improved quality
and productivity.
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The greatest opportunities for energy eﬃciency typically arise at the time of
new construction. The cost of retroﬁtting an existing building to a certain level of
performance is considerably higher than installing technologies during construc
tion. Failure to do so may result in lost opportunities, i.e., it may be prohibitively
expensive to improve an existing building or to replace a new but ineﬃcient
household appliance. In countries with high rates of economic growth and asso
ciated investments in industry, buildings, etc., it is particularly important to seize
these energy eﬃciency opportunities when they are available.
Energy scenarios can be used for exploring various development paths for the
global energy system. Such scenarios can demonstrate that solutions to current
energy problems are possible, and that sustainable energy futures, for example
with 60% to 70% reductions in carbon dioxide emissions relative to present levels,
Improving a work environment through installing energy eﬃcient lighting and
air-handling will save energy, but the value of a 5% to 10% oﬃce worker pro
ductivity increase that may potentially result from the change may be ten times
higher.
are compatible with the need for increased levels of energy services. A key element
in sustainable energy scenarios is an accelerated rate of energy eﬃciency improve
ments relative to historic rates. Best available technologies or advanced technolo
gies are assumed to reach high levels of market penetration in such scenarios. In
addition, sustainable energy future scenarios are based on a greater utilization of
renewable energy and other advanced technologies.2
What are the non-energy benefits?

End-use oriented, least-cost energy strategies do more than just save energy and
money for consumers and capital developers. There are many non-energy bene
ﬁts to this approach as well. As discussed earlier, energy-eﬃcient design of services
may help save capital, thereby allowing funds to be put toward providing energy
services to customers that might not previously have had access. In addition, this
saved capital can be used for improving other aspects of people’s lives such as
health care and education.
The improvements in productivity, quality, process control, etc. from energy
eﬃciency practices can help boost productivity and product output while creat
ing new jobs in industry. This productivity improvement can enable these indus
tries to compete internationally, which will, in turn, attract more capital invest
ment to the country. Many energy eﬃcient technologies, such as high-eﬃciency
motors and lights, allow increased operation control, resulting in large increases
in material, energy, and labor productivity. Increasing the competitiveness of a
business also facilitates attracting investment, gaining international market share,
and earning foreign currencies.
At the individual project level, the non-energy beneﬁts may dwarf the eco
nomic value of direct energy savings. This is often observed when implementing
day-lighting technologies or modern artiﬁcial lighting, which substantially reduce
maintenance costs in addition to energy costs. Improving a work environment
through installing energy eﬃcient lighting and air-handling will save energy, but
the value of a 5% to 10% oﬃce worker productivity increase that may potentially

2 For further information, see
Goldemberg et al. 1988 and
wea 2000.
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result from the change may be ten times higher. Other non-energy beneﬁts can be
more diﬃcult to quantify. For example, shifting from cooking on ineﬃcient
wood-stoves to eﬃcient stoves using electricity or a ﬂuid fuel such as biogas can
substantially improve indoor air-quality and reduce negative health impacts from
indoor air pollution.
An end-use, least-cost energy strategy will also help to make a nation’s energy
system more reliable on a local level, and more secure on a national scale. Energy
eﬃciency improvements reduce the need to invest in large power plants and large,
extensive transmission and distribution systems. It simpliﬁes the system by
moving the energy service, creating capacity (eﬃciency projects) closer to the enduser. This has a ﬁnancial value in terms of both risk reduction and reliability.
Nationally, energy eﬃciency improvements may help to keep resources within the
country rather than draining money from the economy to burn more oil, coal, and
natural gas imported from other countries. Energy eﬃciency improvements can
also help support current industry and develop new national industries in
eﬃciency technologies, as well as design strategies and distributed energy systems
utilizing alternative energy supply technologies.
Nations using energy eﬃciency and renewable energy strategies will suﬀer less
local and regional environmental pollution. Indoor and outdoor air quality will
be greatly improved by reducing or eliminating the use of ineﬃcient energy tech
nologies that send large amounts of pollution into the local air for cooking, indus
trial process heat, transportation, and electricity generation. This pollution takes
the form of particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds,
ozone, sulfur dioxide, etc., all of which adversely aﬀect human health.
What is to be done to implement energy efficiency?

3 See, for example, Fisher and
Rothkopf 1989; Jochem and
Gruber 1990; Golove and Eto
1996; and Reddy 1991.

Barriers to energy eﬃciency
There are many barriers to the successful implementation of an end-use, leastcost strategy for energy services. These barriers can help explain why a system may
require outside intervention in order to accomplish development goals. The out
side agent may be a government agency, a private sector company, a non-govern
mental organization (), or an international lending or aid institution.
Among the barriers to end-use, least-cost planning is the traditional ‘supply
side’ mentality of energy planners, international ﬁnancial institutions, and gov
ernment agencies. These organizations have traditionally pursued supply expan
sion as a ﬁrst step toward increasing energy services rather than focusing on
energy services. This approach is typiﬁed by an increased supply of raw energy
being deﬁned as an end unto itself, rather than as one of many possible means to
an end. It often fails to fully realize the true end-goal of improved access to qual
ity energy services. It is akin to the old adage of throwing money (or energy) at a
problem and hoping for the best solution.
There are several other reasons why energy eﬃciency improvements that are
apparently economically attractive are not implemented. There is an extensive lit
erature on this subject.3 A complete list of speciﬁc barriers would be very long.
However, there are three general categories of barriers that can be identiﬁed:
• low fuel and electricity prices;
• diﬀerences in economic criteria between energy users and suppliers; and
• energy and its cost being a relatively low priority to most users.

  
Such scenarios can demonstrate that solutions to current energy problems are
possible, and that sustainable energy futures, for example with 60% to 70%
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions relative to present levels, are compatible
with the need for increased levels of energy services. A key element in sustainable
energy scenarios is an accelerated rate of energy eﬃciency improvements rela
tive to historic rates.

The environmental, security, and other external costs associated with energy use
are generally not reﬂected in fuel and electricity prices. For example, it has been esti
mated that if the environmental costs associated with electricity production in coal
and oil-ﬁred power plants were included, the cost of electricity from such plants in
Europe would approximately double. Even though it is diﬃcult to quantify envi
ronmental externalities, such as the cost of future climate change, risks associated
with nuclear power, or the cost of keeping oil ﬂowing from the Middle East, the deci
sion not to consider them quantiﬁes them implicitly by setting their value at zero.
Direct or hidden energy supply subsidies are common in many countries. It is
estimated that between $250 and $300 billion is spent in subsidies globally
per year ( 1997). Prices are sometimes used as political instruments – fuels
and electricity may be subsidized or even given away for free to obtain public sup
port. Artiﬁcially low electricity rates may be sometimes oﬀered to attract indus
tries. Energy-intensive industries that compete on international markets are typi
cally exempt from energy taxes or receive a tax refund based on the amount they
export. The long-run marginal cost for new fuel or electricity production is high
in most areas, but prices to end-users are usually based on the lower average cost of
production.
Under-investment in end-use energy eﬃciency that results from low energy
prices is further compounded by the diﬀerence in economic criteria between energy
users and suppliers. This is caused in part by diﬀerences in the access to ﬁnancing.
Investments in new power plants are often evaluated using real discount rates of 4%
to 6%. In contrast, end-users often require one to three-year payback times on
investments in energy eﬃciency, implicitly assuming discount rates of 30% to 100%.
A primary reason for this is that end-users do not have the same access to capital as
large energy suppliers. Consequently, from a whole-system perspective, there is
over-investment in supply and under-investment in energy eﬃciency.
The diﬀerence in economic criteria is also related to the fact that energy is a low
priority to most end-users. As a result, information and awareness about the oppor
tunities to improve eﬃciency are limited. In many instances there are misplaced
incentives, e.g., when a landlord buys equipment for which a tenant must pay oper
ating costs. The high required rates of return are also in part a reﬂection of the trans
action costs involved in ﬁnding and evaluating investment options, and the risk that
the investor will not receive the expected beneﬁts. One important policy objective is
improving the market mechanisms by reducing transaction costs and thereby help
ing consumers, architects, engineers, and managers make better choices.
Getting there: Policies and implementation practices
A successful energy policy builds upon a vision of a nation’s development. This
vision should include the types of services needed, the kind of industrial invest
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ments to be made, the types of jobs created, and how to optimize the capital invest
ment under the constraints of competing demands for resources. Analyzing a
nation’s assets (including natural resources, skilled labor, and capital) and deﬁn
ing goals will help direct a coherent development strategy along with an intelligent
energy policy and a well thought out plan to implement it.
There are a variety of policy tools that can be used to stimulate increased energy
eﬃciency. It is critical to try to foresee the logical short- and long-term responses
to some of these policy measures to determine if they will have the intended eﬀect.
Consideration of the incentives that will be in place after a given policy is imple
mented will help to forecast responses to the policy in terms of natural resource
issues, technology development, and socioeconomic behavior. Policies may be
general in nature, e.g., energy or carbon taxes, or targeted to overcome or remove
barriers for speciﬁc sectors or technologies.
It is also important to develop a full understanding of the balance of incentives
and disincentives (motivators not to participate in an activity) needed to trans
form energy consumption patterns toward policy goals that address energy
eﬃciency both directly and indirectly. For example, electric utilities often have
incentives to generate and sell increasing amounts of electricity. They are
rewarded for selling electricity and penalized for reductions in its use. Incentive
systems or regulations need to be established to reward utilities for providing
energy services, rather than units of energy, as eﬃciently as possible. An impor
tant step toward that end is to allow utilities to collect proﬁts from implementing
energy eﬃciency measures.
There are many forms of policies and market mechanisms for promoting and
supporting energy eﬃciency programs in energy service markets. These include:
voluntary and compulsory standards and building codes;
energy labeling of equipment;
regulation of monopoly energy companies;
design guidelines and education for architects or industrial engineers;
Research Design and Development () eﬀorts;
energy service company () activities;
market transformation programs;
public-private initiatives and voluntary agreements;
government procurement policies, consortiums, and ﬁnancial incentive pro
grams; and
• other market mechanisms.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Each of these programs or policies has the potential to increase energy
eﬃciency. Each also has unique beneﬁts and drawbacks.
An eﬀective method of initiating energy eﬃciency strategies is the implementa
tion of policies that rely on market mechanisms. Energy eﬃciency potential is a
dynamic entity and it will continue to increase. Policies that rely on market mecha
nism are more likely to capture this potential and spark entrepreneurial activity. In
some areas market mechanism strategies may have a greater impact than, or be an
important complement to, the energy eﬃciency command and control structures
that are typically favored by governments, such as taxes, regulations, and standards.
Market approaches can go a long way toward achieving the goal of an energyeﬃcient and developed economy. However, regulations and energy taxes may still
be used for shaping energy demand. During the design of a manufacturing process

  
or building or when an appliance is being purchased, the cost of operation due to
energy prices is often not considered. Hence, policies that rely on manipulating
energy prices are only one strategy for encouraging energy eﬃciency and may not
be the most eﬀective for achieving policy goals.
The use of market mechanisms that push the performance of the products and
services in a more energy eﬃcient direction, in any given market, is sometimes
called market transformation. One technique for transforming markets is ‘fee
bates,’ where a certain standard is set for a product by a government agency or
other independent source. Products that perform above the standard receive a
rebate oﬀ of their sale price; products that perform below the standard are charged
a fee that is attached to their sale price. The program is revenue neutral; the fees
pay for the rebates. The eﬀect is to encourage manufacturers to produce eﬃcient
products, and for consumers to buy them. Consumers with more socially and
environmentally attuned buying habits are rewarded while those imposing
energy-related costs on society are penalized. This is a market approach that incor
porates the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
Market transformations are limited in their eﬀectiveness, however. Customers
still need individual attention because the existing stock of houses or electric
motors is much larger than the new capital equipment purchases. Transforming
markets may not remove ineﬃcient equipment if it has a long lifetime. There will
These surplus units, sometimes called ‘negawatts,’ can provide the same services
as generated units except they are generally cheaper, cleaner, faster to obtain,
safer, less interruptible, and less burdensome on national security than gener
ated units of energy. As a result, investing in energy eﬃciency can provide higher
returns of services to society for a given ﬁnancial investment than investing in
energy supply.
still be a need for programs designed to eradicate obsolete, ineﬃcient equipment
in homes and businesses. Market transformations only work at the point of pur
chase or design. They cannot address the abundance of less eﬃcient equipment
that is currently being used in all sectors.
On the opposite end of the policy spectrum, regulations and standards can be
an eﬀective way of ensuring a base-level of energy eﬃciency. Typically, product reg
ulation determines a minimum acceptable level of energy consumption or perfor
mance, and requires that it be met. This type of regulation succeeds in eliminating
the worst products or services from the market and can be very eﬀective in improv
ing the overall performance levels of new investments. However, manufacturers or
designers may view the regulation only as a requirement to meet, rather than as a
starting point. There is little incentive to increase energy performance beyond the
minimum set by the government.An often heard comment about regulation is that
when, for example, an architect exclaims proudly that the building he designed
‘meets code,’ he is really saying that if he built it any worse he would be ﬁned. The
result, from refrigerators to commercial buildings, is that energy performance
tends to clump around the government’s mandated standard with little variation
between companies. The government must then revise the code or standard every
few years, as technologies and design strategies improve, rather than having this
happen naturally, as it would if there were proper incentives in the market. As such,
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Thus, energy eﬃciency strategies oﬀer low or negative cost, and can be
approached as no-regrets opportunities for mitigating climate change.
regulatory and voluntary standards can be eﬀectively used in combination with
market-based approaches to stimulate improvement in energy eﬃciency.
The government can also help to coordinate voluntary programs that help to
encourage companies or consumers in a market to come together, and in so doing
receive beneﬁts for cooperation that might not otherwise been available to the
market. This approach has been successfully implemented in Sweden through a
number of technology procurement or market transformation projects to
improve the performance of appliances, buildings, and industrial equipment.
Similar approaches have been tried in North America, for example through the
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles program, the Super Eﬃcient Refrig
erator Program, and the Green Lights program.
In summary, energy eﬃciency should be an intrinsic part of energy policy, and
energy policy an intrinsic part of development policy. Thus, policy strategy should
include energy eﬃciency as an integral component of the development process.
Policy strategy should foster a comprehensive and coherent set of incentive sys
tems that encourage energy eﬃciency in all areas of development. The implication
of this is that energy eﬃciency will always be considered when a project or invest
ment is being planned.
Summary

Energy eﬃciency, like other productivity improvements, helps to enhance devel
opment by providing increasing levels and quality of service. There is no trade-oﬀ
between protecting the environment and providing critical development services.
Energy-eﬃciency strategies incidentally provide environmental protection to
those populations who need it most—those who are most likely to suﬀer from
environmental problems and who can least aﬀord to recover from them. Increased
energy eﬃciency is a key element in sustainable energy futures with low carbon
dioxide emissions.
There are several historical examples of impressive increases in energy
eﬃciency, and the potential for continued improvements is great. Theoretically,
the same level of energy services could be provided using only a fraction of the
energy supply used today. With the existing technology, it is cost-eﬀective to
reduce energy use by 50% or more in some applications. Bottom-up studies sug
gest that industrial countries can reduce their energy demand by 10% to 30% at
low or negative cost to society, even when external costs are not included. Thus,
energy eﬃciency strategies oﬀer low or negative cost, and can be approached as
no-regrets opportunities for mitigating climate change.
The major challenge for society is to accelerate the rate of energy eﬃciency
improvement in order to meet the need for energy services, particularly in devel
oping countries, and at the same time to ameliorate the negative economic, social,
and environmental impacts of increased energy supply. Various policies can and
should be used to promote energy eﬃciency, including codes and standards, pro
curement policies, , market transformation programs, ﬁnancial incentives,
etc. The preferred solutions, however, must be sensitive to a range of technology
and country-speciﬁc conditions.

  
It is unrealistic to think that developing countries can achieve their develop
ment objectives without increasing their energy consumption. A wide variety of
strategies will be needed to implement a coherent policy of providing energy ser
vices while establishing the most eﬃcient means of energy supply to provide the
raw inputs needed for those services. Energy eﬃciency is a cornerstone of sus
tainable development in industrial and developing countries alike.
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Most developing countries are neither prepared
to address nor interested in climate change
Luis Gómez-Echeverri
United Nations Development Programme

Abstract
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) has the
potential to become one the most important instruments to-date for addressing
urgent global and local environmental and developmental priorities. It is also one of
the most inclusive in that it incorporates important actors from government as well
as private sector and civil society. Because of the importance of their full participa
tion, the success of the Framework Convention rests greatly on the effectiveness of
the instruments established for international cooperation by its signatories. Also cru
cial to the success of the Framework Convention will be the engagement of all coun
tries, both rich as well as poor. But the engagement of developing countries will only
come through programs and actions that also address urgent development and
poverty eradication priorities. Thus, while it is obvious that the mechanisms of the
unfccc and Protocol will be essential in mitigating and adapting to climate change,
they will not be sufficient in-and-of-themselves. Other mechanisms such as a
strengthened and well-replenished Global Environmental Facility and Official Devel
opment Assistance (oda) will be needed to reinforce the Convention and its objec
tives. Without them, many developing countries will not have capacities required to
make the Framework Convention a success.
Introduction

Climate change is one of the most serious environmental problems that human
ity faces today. Unfortunately, most countries are lacking the basic tools, the insti
tutions and the capacities needed to cope with and mitigate its effects. Further
more, the dismal condition of poverty and deprivation under which a large
portion of the world’s population lives provides a poor platform on which to
embark on a major attack on climate change. Millions of people in the developing
world live in extreme poverty. Some two billion do not have access to the most
basic energy services. In the last few decades of the 20th century, and mostly due
to the precarious living that is often associated with poverty, a growing vulnera
bility to extreme weather events has resulted in a dramatic increase in death and
physical destruction. This combination of increasing levels of poverty, lack of
basic services, and increasing threat of weather events is what occupies the atten
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1 Greenhouse gases are those
that absorb infrared radiation
in the Earth’s atmosphere,
while allowing solar radiation
to pass through it. This process,
known as the greenhouse
effect, maintains the Earth’s
atmosphere at a much warmer
temperature than it would oth
erwise have - the Earth could
not sustain life without it. How
ever, since industrialization the
amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere has been
steadily increasing. The green
house gases include water
vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O), halogenated fluorocar
bons (hcfcs), ozone (O3), perfluorinated carbons (pfcs), and
hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs).

2 De Moor and Calami, Per
verse Incentives Subsidies and
Sustainable Development: Key
Issues and Reform Strategies.
San José, Costa Rica: Earth
Council: 1997.
http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/rio/
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tion of most policymakers around the world today. It is against this background,
therefore, that negotiators of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change
(), and more speciﬁcally its Kyoto Protocol, need to frame their debates
and agreements in order to engage the attention and the participation of the
majority of the world’s population.
Signiﬁcant resources are needed to strengthen institutions and capacities in
developing countries. Without these assets these countries will not be able to
adopt, adapt, and develop the technologies needed to eradicate poverty and
address the challenges of climate change. Some of the mechanisms emerging from
the negotiations of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and its
Kyoto Protocol will be helpful, but not sufﬁcient. Other mechanisms such as the
Global Environmental Facility () need to be revisited and retooled. Further,
Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (), which is currently undergoing one its
worst crises to date, needs to be revived so that it can become a real force of change
and support in the effort of many countries to escape marginalization while simul
taneously contributing effectively to the climate change agenda. However, building
institutions and capacities, particularly in developing countries, is a task that
requires time in addition to resources, while the dual threats of climate change and
poverty continue to grow. Both need to be addressed urgently and with equal force.
The good news is that, more often than not, projects to adapt to climate change
or to mitigate greenhouse gas () emissions1 can also be instrumental in
enhancing good governance and in addressing poverty reduction and the sustain
able development priorities of developing countries. Within the energy sector, for
example, climate change mitigation projects could stimulate the introduction of
new, cleaner, and in many cases less expensive technologies to cater to the energy
demands of developing countries and of the two billion people who are currently
without energy services. Alternatively, the same two billion people could continue
to rely on fuel wood, resulting in continued deforestation (as well as acute health
risks), or they could come to depend on energy produced with current fossil fuel
technologies, which are harmful to the atmosphere. Another, adaptation-ori
ented, example of the enhancement of good governance is in the area of land use
and watershed management. Improvements in natural resource management can
lower risks, reduce loss of human life, and thus facilitate adaptation to the heavy
rains, ﬂoods, and severe storms that are associated with climate change, while
simultaneously enabling populations to use their resources with minimal or no
impact.
The bad news is that countries have not been as effective in promoting sus
tainable development or supporting the development of the clean and benign
technologies needed for the reduction of  emissions. Worse, as revealed in a
recent study commissioned by the Earth Council, around the world subsidies
amounting to some $700 billion per year actually encourage ecologically destruc
tive and socially inequitable practices.2 Further, research and development in
renewable energy is rarely prioritized as it should be. Finally, there is an overall lack
of information regarding the linkages that exist between economic and environ
mental concerns. Speciﬁcally, there has been little effort to disseminate informa
tion regarding the probable impacts of climate change on human wellbeing in
developing countries, including issues of health, food security, and sustainable
development in general.

-
The unfccc, its Protocol, and the involvement of developing countries

The  is the most far-reaching environmental global treaty to date and,
given the actors involved, the one that most directly mirrors the dynamic processes
of today’s globalization. The signiﬁcance of these two characteristics is that the
Convention, through its Kyoto Protocol, has the potential either to become the
most important instrument to date for meditation between global and local sus
tainable development and environment priorities, or to irreparably exacerbate the
divide between these concerns. The primary reasons this treaty is so uniquely
powerful are:
• It is the ﬁrst time that countries have agreed to such a far-reaching environ
mental treaty.
[The] Kyoto Protocol has the potential either to become the most important
instrument to date for meditation between global and local sustainable devel
opment and environment priorities or to irreparably exacerbate the divide
between these concerns.
• It is the ﬁrst time that major investors and the business sector will be largely
responsible for the success or the failure of an environmental treaty.
• It is the ﬁrst time that the world’s ‘big players’ from the private sector, ﬁnancial
sector, governments, and non-governmental organizations are all participat
ing, which implies that each sector recognizes the imperative nature of the issue
and the signiﬁcance of the decisions that are likely to result.
• It is the ﬁrst time that the future of a Convention rests on the ability of countries
to address climate change problems through major technology and ﬁnancial
resource transfers in a combination of institutionalized and free market regimes.
This new context demands a major capacity building effort for developing
countries. Globalization and the liberalization of trade have drastically changed
the rules of global governance. One of the most signiﬁcant developments of recent
times, for example, has been the growing role of the private sector. From the per
spective of many developing countries, the increased participation of the private
sector has considerable implications for global governance: Where developing
country governments previously had some leverage to dictate the rules of engage
ment in the global economy, the rules are now often dictated by geographically
distant players and based on issues such as a country’s level of competitiveness,
political risk, and economic stability. Because of this, the key role to be played by
the private sector in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol needs to be assessed
within the context of its contribution—negative or positive—to global governance
and the governance of the climate change regime. Furthermore, developing coun
tries need to strengthen their capacities so that they can inﬂuence the decisions
being made in and for their countries, pushing them in truly beneﬁcial directions.
The group of countries that are considered ‘developing’ is far too politically,
economically, culturally, and geographically diverse to unanimously ascribe to a
speciﬁc set of concerns. However, it is reasonably safe to say that all developing
countries share the following broad concerns:
• The Ethical Concern: One of the primary aspects of equity is what is sometimes
referred to as ‘ecological space.’ Most developing countries maintain that they
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need ‘space’ to grow and develop, meaning that they do not consider it reason
able to sacriﬁce domestic growth for the global good, especially in light of their
minimal contribution to the climate change problem to date. Thus, at this
point, most developing countries will logically prioritize local environment
and development concerns over global ones. In order to strike a balance that
allows for sustainable economic advancement in developing countries while
enabling  emissions mitigation, industrialized countries will have to com
pensate at the global level by becoming less wasteful and restricting pollution
further. This is cited as a matter of equity, as industrialized countries have
already attained high levels of development, with signiﬁcant costs to the global
environment.
• The Economic Concern: Another primary concern to be addressed has to do
with the different ways to measure the costs and beneﬁts of  abatement.
 abatement may be evaluated either in terms of the cost to achieve some
global effect or in terms of the cost that it has at the local level. In the context
of the global effect of the reduction, there is a marginal cost associated with
 abatement.. In the context of the costs of local needs and effects, which is
the perspective that developing countries require,  abatement is charac
terized in terms of opportunity costs and beneﬁts. It would be ideal to ﬁnd
solutions that are equitable to both.
• The Financial Concern: Through the approval of mechanisms for emissions
trading, both among developed countries and between developed and devel
oping countries, the Kyoto Protocol is creating a new commodity—carbon off
sets. The current rules of ﬁnance that govern the trade of privately and publicly
produced goods are not adequate, as this new commodity will be a public good
that is produced privately. New rules will need to be created. How this new
product is marketed touches on the ethical, the political, and the economic.
How it will ultimately be traded will have a major effect on the ability of devel
oping countries to participate. In turn, how they are able to participate will
inﬂuence both future  emissions mitigation and current development
strategies for many developing countries.

3 ipcc, R.T. Watson, M.C. Ziny
owera, R.H. Moss (Eds), The
Regional Impacts of Climate
Change: An Assessment of Vul
nerability: A Special Report of
ipcc Working group II. Cam
bridge, U.K, Cambridge Univer
sity Press: 1997.
(http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sr97.h
tm)
4 World Bank, Entering the 21st
Century:World Development
Report 1999/2000. Washington,
D.C.:World Bank Group: 2000.

When the negotiations began, many developing countries argued that climate
change was the problem and the responsibility of industrialized countries. How
ever, recent data and information have demonstrated that developing countries
will be the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change, and that economic and
social costs will be immense. According to a report of a working group of the Inter
governmental Panel on Climate Change (), a doubling of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere may cost developing countries between 2% and 9 % of their gross
domestic products ().3 Further, as a recent World Bank World Development
Report points out, these estimates are based solely on those costs that are readily
quantiﬁable. They do not account for non-monetary resources such as life preser
vation, cultural stability, and sustainable livelihoods.4
Surprisingly, the potential costs and negative implications do not match the
frequent lack of interest or urgency given to climate change. Here again, capacity
building efforts are urgently required to clearly demonstrate the close linkages that
exist between climate change, poverty reduction, and development. Efforts are
also needed to resist the natural tendency to avoid addressing problems that
require solutions that have high immediate costs and uncertain beneﬁts in the
seemingly distant future.

-
Is climate change really a serious problem?

Climate change is a natural process that has been occurring for thousands of years.
Species have been ‘adapting’ by shifting to places where they can thrive despite
changing climate conditions. With the advent of the industrial revolution, the
anthropogenic emissions of  increased dramatically and, over the course of
the 20th century, exponentially. Emissions from human activities have also been
accumulating over the decades, and it is expected that as a result climate change
will happen faster in the coming decades than it has in the last ten thousand years.
Changes in land-use practices, mostly to accommodate increasing human popu
lations, have also fragmented ecosystems so drastically that the ability of species
to adapt is being impeded. Ecosystem resilience has further been compromised by
pollution and other stresses caused by present production processes as well as
heavy demands on natural resources. This degradation of natural systems is fairly
ubiquitous in industrialized countries, and to some degree, it is the foundation of
the economic success of these countries. However, it is becoming painfully appar
ent that the damage done by ignorant or irresponsible development will be egre
giously detrimental in the long-term, both globally and locally.
According to assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(), developing countries will suffer greatly as a result of climate change. Shifts
in regional temperatures due to climate change will have impacts on health, as the
ranges for disease vectors expand, bringing the threat of illnesses such as malaria,
dengue fever, and yellow fever to larger populations than ever before. Agriculture
around the world, especially in developing countries, will be threatened by ﬂoods,
droughts, and inordinately heavy rains. Close to 70% of the global population lives
in coastal areas, and will therefore feel the threat of even a slight rise in sea level
due to altered hydrological cycles and melting ice caps. Finally, natural water reser
voirs in mountainous regions stand to be depleted, and freshwater supplies on
islands are already threatened by salinization.
However, despite evidence pointing to the severe social, economic, and envi
ronmental costs of climate change, most people do not take the threat of climate
change seriously. Given that the beneﬁts of mitigation will not be apparent for
years to come, it is understandable that paying for mitigating it is unappealing. In
addition, the science of climate change is relatively new and imperfect, rendering
assessments of the impacts today and projections for the consequences tomorrow
controvertible. These two factors have given players on both sides of the climate
change debate the opportunity to manipulate data to push agendas that either
support or oppose serious climate change abatement measures. Unfortunately, the
ambiguity and ambivalence caused by these two factors have also given policy
makers reasons to hesitate on attacking the biggest problem of the climate change
regime—the global dependence on fossil fuels, which contributes about 80% of
the carbon dioxide being emitted into the atmosphere every year.
Despite the lack of consensus as to how it should be addressed, there has at
least been a remarkable increase of awareness and concern for climate change on
the part of policymakers since the mid-1990s. Particularly in the months prior to
the third meeting of the Committee of the Parties ( 3) in Kyoto in December
of 1997, the media focused the world’s attention, not on the complexities or the
tenuous nature of the science, but on a few important issues that would appeal to
the global population. The attention centered on the main causes of  emis
sions, a few of the most signiﬁcant impacts, and some important measures that
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needed to be taken if the international community was serious about addressing
the problem.
The much-publicized Kyoto Protocol to the Convention that emerged from
 3 was a modest but important step for the climate change regime. It was a
precedent-setting legal document in that, for the ﬁrst time since the advent of the
climate change discussion, a group of countries agreed to legally binding emis
sions reduction commitments. While the Parties to the  were able to hash
out the fundamental agreement at that time, it was also understood that there was
still much work to be done in future meetings. However, the advancement of the
Kyoto Protocol means different things to different people and countries. For some,
it means ﬁnalizing negotiations on the implementation and compliance mecha
nisms. For others it means obtaining commitments from developing countries.
For developing countries, it means negotiating a package that will enable them to
address poverty reduction and their urgent development priorities while helping
to address climate change.
Importantly, many players are not waiting for ultimate mandates to take action.
Some private corporations, such as BP Amoco, have taken bold and progressive
steps to reduce their emissions voluntarily and to develop new technologies in
anticipation of future regulations. Several countries and companies have partici
pated in ‘Activities Implemented Jointly,’ of which there are now over 150 ongoing
or being planned.5 More importantly, many countries are considering policies that
are ‘good-for-the-environment-anyway,’ which are those that are aimed at eradi
cating poverty and advancing sustainable development, but may simultaneously
address climate change mitigation, natural resource management, pollution
abatement, improvement of environmental quality, or basic development needs
such as adaptation to climate change. Approaches such as these promise to be
some of the most effective defenses against climate change. Unfortunately, they are
not necessarily the ones receiving the most attention or support from donor coun
… the primary challenge for negotiators is overcoming the uncertainty of the
information produced by the relatively young science of climate change. By
focusing less on the science and more on the positive impacts that climate change
activities will have on the quality of life, negotiators may be able neutralize those
who are ﬁghting against aggressive mitigation measures.

6 Reid, W.W. and Jose Goldenberg, “Developing Countries are
Combating Climate Change:
Actions in Developing Coun
tries that Slow Growth in
Carbon Emissions,” Energy
Policy, 1997, 26 (3): pp. 233 -237.

tries. Instead, Ofﬁcial Development Assistance () and other funding mecha
nisms that support developing country activities to promote clean and sustainable
development and the eradication of poverty are decreasing at a rapid pace.
Several countries have also adopted policies that promote better natural
resource management, increased energy efﬁciency, adoption of technologies that
use renewable sources of energy, and cleaner technologies for conventional energy
sources, independently of the negotiations. A recent study6 presents some inter
esting evidence that demonstrates that there have been some signiﬁcant 
reductions in several developing countries including China, India, Mexico, Brazil,
and South Africa, primarily due to the introduction of these measures. Many
countries have been adopting such regulations, not so much out of concern for cli
mate change, but because they are interested in promoting sustainable develop
ment, poverty reduction, and more sound national development practices. In gen

-
eral, these activities have been based on the principle that the best way to ensure a
better quality of life for future generations is by improving the current quality of
life. Evidence of these successes coupled with a campaign to explain and promote
the linkages between climate change and development could provide the best basis
for future information dissemination and progress on the implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol.
Having witnessed and experienced unprecedented weather-related catastro
phes such as Hurricane Mitch in Central America and the Caribbean in 1998, many
A true irony of the climate change negotiations is that those countries that are
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are also those with the weak
est, least consistent negotiating teams.
countries are also beginning to introduce measures to adapt to sudden and violent
changes in the weather. It is doubtful that these actions are based on the science of
climate change, or on a concern about whether the atmosphere is inﬂuenced by
human activities. Rather, these decisions are based on a more basic understanding
that better land use practices, reforestation, improved watershed and coastal man
agement, and better infrastructure will protect their lives, livelihoods, and prop
erty. The success of these countries in lowering and managing risk will provide the
best foundation for future endeavors on the adaptation side of the .
Is climate change a priority for most people around the world?

Globally, most people do not seem too anxious about climate change, and there is
a great deal of skepticism as to whether it actually warrants concern. Thus, it might
seem that the biggest challenge facing those charged with doing something about
climate change would be to convince this majority of the global population to
believe in the reality of climate change and its consequences. If this were the case,
if a global consensus on the urgency of the issue were a prerequisite to the success
of the implementation of the , negotiators would stop wasting their time.
Many in developing countries will not, at least not in the foreseeable future, pay
any attention to an issue that may cause a problem for the sustenance of life in the
distant future when their principal concern is the preservation of life today. It
would therefore be fruitless to spend resources simply trying to convince the
global population of the need for unity and action. Instead, the primary challenge
for negotiators is overcoming the uncertainty of the information produced by the
relatively young science of climate change. By focusing less on the science and
more on the positive impacts that climate change activities will have on the qual
ity of life, negotiators may be able neutralize those who are ﬁghting against aggres
sive mitigation measures. This tactic will also probably have the additional bene
ﬁt of effectively gaining the attention of developing country policymakers.
The revolutionary principles that were established at the United Nations Con
ference on Environment and Development () in 1992 made the Frame
work Convention on Climate Change possible. The most important principle of
this landmark event was the conﬁrmation of the inextricable link between envi
ronment and development. At the time,  created an unparalleled fervor,
and set the stage for environmental-political evolutions around the globe. How
ever, over time this enthusiasm has dwindled and been dampened. The review
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conference scheduled to take place in 2002, the  + 10, will provide an excel
lent opportunity not only to revive these commitments, but also to strengthen the
relationship between the  and poverty reduction and sustainable devel
opment. To reinforce the point,  + 10 should perhaps be called  +
10: A World without Poverty, with Nature’s Help.
It is fortunate that  + 10 will most likely coincide with the beginning of
the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (), which is one
of the Kyoto Protocol instruments designed to link climate change and develop
ment. This is an excellent opportunity to highlight climate change mitigation
measures that provide considerable development opportunities. A more power
ful, more equitable Kyoto Protocol and a more comprehensive Clean Develop
ment Mechanism will emerge from this stronger link. As the  evolves and
becomes a tool that can be adapted to the needs of developing countries regard
less of size or wealth, it will inevitably gain momentum while promoting capacity
building, technology transfer, and development. With the fortiﬁcation of the
, developing country Parties will strengthen their commitments to the Con
vention, as the link between the climate change and development activities
becomes more apparent. However, this stronger link will, by deﬁnition, also
require a readiness on the part of wealthier countries to do their part in address
ing the climate change problem, for which they are primarily culpable. It also
requires a readiness to transfer vast resources and the necessary technologies for
addressing and reducing  emissions in developing countries.
How are developing countries participating in the negotiations?

The fact that the majority of their populations either don’t understand or don’t
care about climate change has fortunately not hindered developing country gov
ernments from actively participating in the negotiations. However, developing
countries are doing so with different motivations than industrialized and transi
tion economies, and, by no fault of their own, with different capacities to inﬂu
ence events.
Small island populations are among those most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change. Impacts such as sea level rise, increased frequency and strength of
extreme weather events, and saltwater encroachment on limited island freshwater
supplies are already being felt by many island populations. However, most of the
developing countries comprised of small islands are not individually politically
powerful. In recognition of this, a group of these countries organized themselves
into the Association of Small Island States (). With 43 member states, 
is now a fairly effective political force and has been one of the strongest inﬂuences
throughout the climate change negotiations. Through , the leaders of these
island countries have been more consistent in their negotiating tenacity than any
other developing-country group. Their negotiating team and its bold proposals
have set examples of how even the smallest developing countries can inﬂuence the
events of such complex global negotiations (see Slade and Werksman, this
volume).
At the other end of the spectrum, large developing countries such as Brazil,
India, and China, with a cumulative population of over two billion, have also had
a major inﬂuence on the negotiating process. Through strong, well-prepared del
egations, these countries have developed some of the most important proposals
and platforms to be introduced into the negotiations. Brazil’s original proposal,

-
for example, led to the formulation of the Clean Development Mechanism.
As a unit, the Group of 77 and China have been extremely useful and effective
in providing analysis, synthesis, and political advice to a large group of develop
ing countries which, because of small and/or weak delegations, have had difﬁculty
keeping pace with the negotiations, and interpreting the implications. The Group
of 77 and China have been less effective, however, in uniting its developing coun
try members into an organized movement to counter the well-rehearsed and orga
nized positions often presented by wealthier Parties. Instead, Group of 77 coun
tries have formed subgroups independently, based on common interests. For
Between the provision of sound policies and regulatory frameworks on the part
of the governments, and the ﬁnancial and managerial efﬁciency of private sector
players, public-private partnerships could potentially provide a crucial formula
for the successful implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.
example, those that would like to see land use change and carbon sequestration
issues reﬂected and made possible through the  have pulled together to inﬂu
ence the negotiations on this issue. However, these same countries are not neces
sarily willing to work together for any other cause. Other groups have formed
based on regional afﬁliations, usually when there is a limited set of issues upon
which they can agree. Thus, in general, the most effective element of the Group of
77 subgroups seems to be information exchange and preparation for COPs, rather
than actual negotiation.
A true irony of the climate change negotiations is that those countries that are
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are also those with the weakest,
least consistent negotiating teams. Because of their lack of strength in the negoti
ating forum, this rather large group, which is mostly comprised of the poorest
states, has had little chance of inﬂuencing the negotiations, and as a result, does
not stand to beneﬁt much from the process. Often overlooked because of their
minimal contribution to current  emissions, these countries could truly ben
eﬁt from the new, cleaner technologies that are being discussed as methods of
emissions mitigation and from capacity building programs.
Should we leave it all to governments?

One of the most interesting features of the  and its Kyoto Protocol is
inclusiveness. Never before, with the exception perhaps of the World Trade Orga
nization negotiations, have global negotiations included so many sets of actors.
This is both good and bad. Good in that this all-encompassing approach has
undoubtedly led to a greater awareness of global environmental problems. It is
also good that there are more resources, both intellectual and ﬁnancial, con
tributing to the complex solutions required. At the same time, it is not good that
the variety of actors has introduced such a diverse set of motivations and interests.
Overall, however, one can hope that any process that is this comprehensive will
result in a treaty that has more sense of ownership and commitment.
The role of the private sector—both local and international—is another unique
component of the Kyoto Protocol. Given the large proportion of investments
comprised by private capital throughout the developing world, it is only natural
and positive to have the private sector fully engaged in the negotiations and imple
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mentation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. Around the world, private
companies are currently making investment decisions on production systems that
will need to be amortized over several years or decades. Each of these decisions,
therefore, is a potential vote for or against the environment, and has the promise
of pushing the production and consumption patterns in directions that could
either assist or damage the chances for  emission mitigation and poverty
reduction. In many countries, these decisions are currently being made with little
regard as to whether they support poverty reduction,  emissions reductions,
or sustainable development. Additionally, while many of the larger, more eco
nomically stable developing countries have policies and measures in place to reg
ulate private investment, the majority have weak or non-existent rules of engage
ment for orienting private activity. In the absence of regulation, investors will tend
to opt for projects that provide short-term beneﬁts, rather than those with long
term sustainability. As such, while it would be unthinkable to formulate a treaty of
this scope and magnitude without the full inclusion of the private sector, the Kyoto
Protocol will need to prioritize developing-country capacity building in this area
in order to improve the chances for successful relationships.
The design of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol are such that the public and
private sectors will be reliant on each other for success. This interdependence has the
potential to foster powerful relationships between the two sectors. Between the pro
vision of sound policies and regulatory frameworks on the part of the governments,
and the ﬁnancial and managerial efﬁciency of private sector players, public-private
partnerships could potentially provide a crucial formula for the successful imple
mentation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. These relationships will not
happen automatically or come easily, and capacity building and technology transfer
initiatives will need to be built into the Kyoto Protocol and play a major role.
Why is international cooperation so important in the Convention?

There are an increasing number of problems in today’s interdependent world that
can only be solved through the cooperation of groups of countries or with the
unity of the international community as a whole. Few examples of this are as obvi
ous as climate change, poverty eradication, and sustainable development. In the
area of climate change, global collaboration has been targeted as crucial to the suc
cess of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Clean Development Mecha
nism. In recognition of this, much of the  and Kyoto Protocol negotia
tions, particularly in the most recent , have been largely dedicated to securing
international cooperation.
In this context, it is unfortunate that Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (),
one of the most important instruments for promoting international cooperation,
is going through an extreme crisis.  levels are at an all-time low exactly when
there is the most need for it. Ironically, developed countries are wealthier and
better able to afford  than ever before. There are several theories as to the rea
sons behind the decrease in  resources and the decreased donor country inter
est. However, whatever the pretext, it is unjust and irresponsible to believe that the
world can progress without  and other mechanisms that facilitate the trans
fer of wealth between rich and poor countries. In fact, unless this trend is reversed,
it will seriously compromise the success of many international treaties including
the  and the Kyoto Protocol. Without assistance that reaches past climate
change concerns, the majority of developing countries will not have the capacity

-
to innovate, to establish the proper infrastructures, or to adopt the new technolo
gies required for  emissions mitigation. Given the inextricable link between
climate change and sustainable development, the lack of capacity, institutions,
instruments, and measures to promote development that will result from insufﬁ
cient  will eventually place insurmountable obstacles in the path of climate
change mitigation activities.
On the same token, it is also not reasonable to expect the private sector to
assume the ﬁnancial responsibility for developing countries. While it is undeniable
that private sector investment in developing countries has increased dramatically
in recent years, the bulk of this investment has been going to a select few sectors in
a select few countries—those with large, secure markets and highly developed
ﬁnancial systems. This automatically discounts the participation of the poorer
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, meaning that most of
these countries must continue to rely on  or concessionary lending in order to
attend to their most urgent development priorities. Further, in the private capital
ﬂow structure, there is no mechanism to mediate among and between govern
ments, civil society organizations, and the private sector on issues of development.
Conclusion

Meeting the challenge of climate change will provide one of the best opportuni
ties for renewed, stronger international cooperation and for a revived system of
. If designed properly, the , one of the principal instruments of the Kyoto
Protocol, could contribute intensely to a revitalization of  and vice-versa. The
 will be a means by which developed country private sector industries can ful
ﬁll their Kyoto Protocol commitments with sound investments that simultane
ously build capacities in and transfer technologies to developing countries. The
prerequisite of developing countries for these ventures should be that they
advance the agenda of poverty reduction and sustainable development priorities.
In this scenario, even with the structure of the Kyoto Protocol fortifying it, private
capital will only go so far. Without the added capacity-building support that can
be provided by  and other mechanisms such as the ,  projects may be
severely handicapped, and a large majority of countries—those that are techno
logically excluded—will never be able to contribute or beneﬁt.
Finally, the new era of revitalized international cooperation for climate change
and sustainable development initiatives will need to take into account the great
technological divide that currently exists between developing and developed
countries. If the Convention is truly to act as a global treaty, then there must be
serious efforts to build capacities and transfer technology with the concrete objec
tive of narrowing this divide.

Luis Gómez-Echeverri is a senior official at the United Nations Development Programme. He was formerly the director of the undp Environment Programs, and is
currently a doctoral candidate at Yale University.
e-mail: luis.gomez.echeverri@undp.org
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A Review of the Latin American
contribution to climate change mitigation
Carlos. E. Suárez 1
Bariloche Foundation, Argentina

Abstract
This article describes the past, present, and future contribution of the Latin America
and Caribbean Region (lac) to the control and reduction of greenhouse emissions,
with particular attention to carbon dioxide (CO2).
The first section contains an introduction to and an analysis of the evolution of
the Decarbonization Energy Index (dei) from 1970 to 1990,and from 1990 to 1997.The
main conclusion of this analysis is that, globally, lac has the lowest regional dei. lac
is also among the regions that have shown the greatest decline in the Index, espe
cially between 1970 and 1985. The second section is based on data produced by the
Energy Economic Information System (siee) of Latin American Energy Organization
(olade) and is essentially a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the dei at the
subregional/country level within lac.
Based on these physical values, the discussion turns to the development of a new
approach for determining economic/monetary values for the lac contribution to cli
mate change mitigation. The author’s conclusion is that at us$30 per ton of CO2, the
total value of the lac emissions mitigation activities from 1970 to 2017 could be worth
as much as $261.7 billion.This is equal to about 40% of the total lac foreign debt in 1997.
The final section discusses possible future mitigation contributions of the region,
even though no country in the region is legally bound by the United Nations Frame
work Convention on Climate Change (unfcc) to make absolute ghg emissions
reductions. This discussion focuses first on the general measures that are being
undertaken, and then moves on to the specific measures and policies that a sample
of lac countries have been examining and implementing to the extent that the insti
tutional, financial, technological, and human resources are available at the national,
regional, and international level.

How has the Latin American/Caribbean region
contributed to ghg emissions mitigation to date?

The global situation
The Latin American/Caribbean region has the lowest coefﬁcient of speciﬁc CO2
emissions per energy unit (sometimes also called “Decarbonization Energy

1 Acknowledgements: The
author would like to express
gratitude to Osvaldo Girardin
for studying and summarizing
the bibliography and comment
ing on the chapter. Additional
thanks go to Daniel Bouille, Luis
Gómez-Echeverri, Guillermo
Gallo Mendoza, and Michael
Gukovsky for their constructive
comments. However, the full
responsibility for the content of
this chapter remains with the
author.

2 The dei presented here was
calculated on the basis of the
energy data for Primary Energy
Consumption published yearly
by the BP Amoco Statistical
Review of the World Energy and
standard CO2 emissions coeffi
cients for each energy source. It
could be alternatively calculated
for most countries and regions
using the International Energy
Agency’s (iea) energy statistics
or other regional sources, such
as the “Energy and Economic
Information System” developed
by the Latin American Energy
Organization (laeo) for all Latin
American countries.
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figure 1

Source: Author’s calculations based on energy data from the BP Sta
tistical Review of World Energy, June 1998.5
figure 2

Index”—),2 and is among the regions that have
shown the greatest decline in this coefﬁcient, especially
between 1970 and 1985 (see Figures 1 and 2).3
Emissions from the total energy system in Latin
America and the Caribbean in 1997 were 0.597 tons of
CO2 Tn C/toe4—83% of the world average. The reason
for this comparatively low level is that the Energy Bal
ance in the region is heavily reliant on natural gas and
hydroelectricity, and very little coal is used. This index
has also been reduced by 18.4% between 1970 and 1997
compared to the world reduction average of 10.7%. The
average value for  is particularly important when
one takes into account that the value for natural gas, the
lowest among fossil fuels, is 0.608 Tn C/toe.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the  levels for develop
ing country regions tend to be above the global average.
Figure 2 also shows that industrialized countries and
economies in transition are all below the global aver
age, but higher than .
The lac Situation

Source: Author’s calculations based on energy data from the BP Sta
tistical Review of World Energy, June 1998.6
3 This analysis is focused on
CO2 because, of the green
house gases, CO2 is the best
single indicator of emissions
trends. In the absence of spe
cific data for each sector and
energy source in every country,
international emissions coeffi
cients have been kept constant
for the whole period.
4 Tons of carbon equivalent.
5 See
http://www.bpamoco.com/
worldenergy/ for 1999 report.
6 Ibid.

The regional information that is represented in Figures
3 and 4 is based on data produced by the Latin America
Energy Organization () and the Energy Eco
nomic Information System ().
For the purpose of this discussion, biomass is
included in the group of primary energy sources and
CO2 emissions are calculated in detail for each sector of
ﬁnal energy consumption. The latter calculation
includes the main transformation processes such as
power production and reﬁneries, as well as natural gas
ﬂaring. The  is represented here in terms of kilo
grams of CO2 per barrel of oil equivalent (
CO2/boe).

1970 to 1997
From 1970 to 1988 there was a steady decline of the  in the Latin American
Caribbean Region. A stabilization of the Index began in 1988, and continued
through 1997. Including the stabilization, there was a  total decline of 17%
between 1970 and 1990. During this time period, Brazil achieved the most signiﬁ
cant reduction (29%). Mexico and the Southern Cone saw reductions of 17% while
the Andean Zone, the Caribbean, and Central America experienced reductions of
only 5 to 7% (See Figure 4).
The continued decrease of the Index was essentially the result of the replace
ment of oil derivatives, coal, and biomass with hydroelectricity, natural gas, and
geothermal and nuclear energy. These substitutions were primarily made for
energy reasons and/or to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, rather than for climate
change reasons. A detailed analysis of energy balances in the countries and regions
of  reveals that the reduction of the Index occurred for reasons that include:


• A signiﬁcant increase in the use of primary electric
ity (hydroelectric, geothermal, and nuclear power)
in all regional energy services, particularly through
the mid-1980s (from 26.5% in 1970 to 41.3% in 1990,
and 43.9% in 1997).
• A decrease in the use of biomass in the residential,
commercial, and service sectors, as well as in the
industrial sector (total biomass used for primary
and secondary energy consumption went from
29.9% in 1970 to 20.5% in 1990, and 17.1% in 1997).
• Signiﬁcant reduction of natural gas ﬂaring, espe
cially in the Andean Zone, Mexico, and the South
ern Cone, as a result of the implementation of
national control measures (from 47.6% in 1970 to
12.3% in 1990, and only 10.1% in 1997).
• An increase in the use of natural gas, both for power
production and other sectors (from 13.7% of pri
mary and secondary energy consumption in 1970, to
19.0% in 1990, and 21.6% in 1997).
• An increase in the use of electricity in the ﬁnal con
sumption sectors, also contributing to a sustained
decrease of the sectoral Index of CO2-speciﬁc emis
sions.
• A widespread decrease of dependence on oil deriv
atives, especially heavier forms, as well as coal to
some extent.
• The use of the ethanol fuel from sugar cane as a sub
stitute for gasoline in Brazil.
• In Argentina, the development of natural gas vehi
cles. The Argentine ﬂeet of nearly 450,000 vehicles
in 1995 represented about 10% of the total cars on
the country’s streets, and was the largest ﬂeet of its
kind in the world.
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figure 3

Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998.
figure 4

Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998.
figure 5

The inﬂuence of the increased use of primary elec
tricity is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. The ﬁgures
clearly demonstrate that the Decarbonization Index
for Power Generation (TnCO2/GWh) also decreased
systematically during the 1970s and 1980s. This trend is
evident until it concludes in 1990 at a value that is 37.5%
lower than that of 1970.
In this case, the reduction of the Index corresponds
with the substitution trend and the increase in the
energy efﬁciency of power production in similar pro
portions.
From 1970 to 1990, there were signiﬁcant changes in
Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
the structure of power generation inputs in . The December 1998.
proportion of primary electricity, such as hydroelec
tric, geothermal, and nuclear power, increased from 26.5% to 41.3%, while natural
gas went from 13.8% to 15.1%. At the same time, there was a combined decrease of

326

figure 6

   
oil derivatives and biomass products from 51.4% to 32.0%. The only negative
change during this time was the increase of the proportion of coal from 8.3% to
11.6%.
Figure 6 illustrates that, at the regional level, the
average course of the Index for  was the result of
very different processes at the subregional level. In Cen
tral America, the Southern Cone, and Brazil, the reduc
tion was signiﬁcant—between 70 and 80%—and basi
cally continued through 1985. In the Andean Zone, the
reduction did not begin until 1983, but continued up
through 1991. The total Andean Zone reduction
between 1970 and 1990 was 40%. The Caribbean saw a
reduction of 12.2%, but the trend ﬂuctuated and the
Index began to rise again. Finally, in Mexico the Index
increased almost 100.0% between 1970 and 1990.
1990 to 1997
In recent years the evolution of the  for the total
energy system (kg CO2/boe7) has remained stable at
values similar to those of the late 1980s. At the subregional level there has also been
some stabilization, but with more variability, and overall, a Brazilian increase has
compensated for the decreases in other subregions.
With regard to fuel source substitution, even if the proportionate number of
primary electricity sources continues to increase, the pace in the 1990s was slower
than that of the previous period of time. This trend is also evident in the evolution
of CO2-speciﬁc emissions from power production (Tn CO2/GWh 8), where a sta
bilization began in the 1990s (see Figure 5). The index reduction during this time
was mainly due to an increase in average efﬁciency of power production, rather
than the substitution process, which had slowed.
At the subregional level, it appears that in all cases in the last few years of the
series there is a trend of speciﬁc emissions increases that could indicate the begin
ning of a full reversal of the past decrease of the Index (see Figure 6). An exami
nation of these trends in order to identify the underlying reasons reveals two key
instigating factors:
First, there has been signiﬁcant advancement in power production technologyspeciﬁcally, the development of the natural gas turbine (both open cycle and com
bined cycle). This has increased energy efﬁciency considerably, while simultane
ously lowering the necessary amount of capital and the total cost of producing
electricity. Strictly from the climate change perspective, this advancement will be
extremely beneﬁcial, as natural gas technology replaces other fuels such as oil or
coal, or even old steam turbines functioning with natural gas but at lower efﬁ
ciencies. However, when the new technology replaces primary electricity sources
like hydroelectric, geothermal, nuclear, or other renewable resources that have
zero CO2 emission levels, the total and speciﬁc emissions of CO2 and other 
will increase. This is the situation in several  countries.
On the other hand, beginning in the mid-1980s, a series of profound institu
tional and regulatory changes began in the  regional energy system, leading to
partial or total privatization of energy systems that had previously, for the most
part, been managed by state enterprises. This process accelerated during the 1990s,

Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998.
7 Kilogram of carbon dioxide
per barrel of oil equivalent.

8 Ton of carbon dioxide per
giga watt hour.


and is presently progressing at various speeds and with varying characteristics in
the different countries of the region.
These changes have been ﬁnancially beneﬁcial for the enterprises concerned,
and for the microeconomic and/or energy efﬁciency of the regional system. How
ever, from the climate change perspective, this new trend may be negative, due to
the replacement of an energy development strategy that was based on the use of
local resources (especially renewables with zero emissions), with a strategy that is
based on private sector behavior—prioritizing the minimization of direct cost in
the short term, reduced capital costs, and various economic and/or ﬁnancial risks.
The impact of the move toward privatization is already apparent in several 
countries. Post-privatization power stations are typically strictly thermal and
largely based on open cycle and/or combine cycle gas turbines. The relatively few
new hydroelectric projects are those that were designated within the framework of
the previous strategy.
Both technological advancement and privatization are processes that reinforce
themselves. If one also takes into account the variability of oil prices at the inter
national level and the increasing availability of natural gas in different  coun
tries, the possibility of maintaining the previous regional  trend becomes
questionable for both power production and for the total energy system.
What are the economic implications of the lac contributions?

From the climate change perspective, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change () has established the need to reduce  emissions
at the global level. In 1997, at the third Conference of the Parties (-) in Kyoto,
some concrete and obligatory emissions reduction commitments were agreed to,
for industrialized (Annex I) countries in particular. In order to achieve these reduc
tions, a series of actions have been proposed with different cost levels. Recent stud
ies undertaken by United Nations Environment Programme’s () Collaborat
ing Centre on Energy and Environment () at Risø National Laboratory in
Denmark (Risø) indicate that the cost of the various alternatives for CO2 emissions
mitigation vary depending on the country where the mitigation occurs, the tech
nologies used, and the type of project. In the European countries surveyed, the esti
mated cost ranged from ..$20 to ..$100 per ton of CO2,9 while in developing
countries the values ranged between ..$2 and ..$80 per ton of CO2.10
When calculating the potential value of the  mitigation efforts between
1970 and 1997, even using the conservative ﬁgure of ..$30 per ton of CO2, the
region’s contribution has signiﬁcant economic value. The CO2 emissions that have
been avoided in the regional energy systems as a result of energy source substitu
tion and the use of primary electricity sources with zero  emissions can be
estimated using a comparison of the real values between 1970 and 1997 with a pro
jection of what would have occurred based on the 1970 CO2-speciﬁc emissions. In
this case, the difference amounts to 3.57 billion tons of CO2.11 The projects and
developments that have engendered these ‘non-emissions’ will also continue to
function for at least another 20 years on average, avoiding an additional 5.15 bil
lion tons of CO2.12
The combined total of the previously avoided CO2 emissions and those pro
jected over the next 20 years is 8.72 billion tons. Using the value estimate of ..$30
per ton of CO2, again, the total value of the  contribution is about ..$261.7
billion, which equals about 40% of the total  foreign debt.13 However, accord
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9 In Table IV of the UNEP
Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Costing Studies Phase One
Report, Denmark, August 1992,
values range from 15 to 75 Euro
pean Currency Units per ton of
CO2 for various European coun
tries. This equals about U.S.$20
100 per ton of CO2.
10 See note 2. Studies on sev
eral developing countries in
previous drafts of this report
yielded data ranging from
U.S.$2 to U.S.$80 per ton of CO2.
In the case of Brazil values vary
from U.S.$45 to U.S.$80 per ton
of CO2. Options with negative
costs were not considered.
11 When comparing real emis
sions for the 1970-1997 period
with those that would result
from applying the CO2-specific
emissions for 1970 of 363 kg
CO2/boe to the total Energy
supply, there is a difference of
about 3.57 billion tons of CO2,
valued at U.S.$30 per ton, which
amounts to U.S.$107.1 billion.
12 If the savings for 1997, the
last year of this timeframe, are
considered in relation to the
1970 DEI, to remain constant for
an additional 20 years, the total
is 5.15 billion tons of CO2 which,
valued at U.S.$30 per ton, would
total U.S.$154.5 billion. The sum
of the figure from this note and
note 5 is U.S.$261.6 billion.
13 This has been estimated on
the basis of data from
siee/olade, December 1998
for the total lac foreign debt.
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ing to the present international rules and conventions, the economic value of CO2
emissions reduction resulting from these 27 years of concrete action in  coun
tries cannot be recovered.
Up until now, the climate change negotiations have not considered the contri
butions already made by Non-Annex I countries, which are under no obligation
to cut down their  emissions. Thus, past efforts have no “emissions credit”
value on the international market and, according to the guidelines currently under
discussion, may not be capitalized by  in order to ﬁnance other development
needs, such as health or education or partial repayment of the regional foreign
debt.
However, recent debates in Kyoto and Buenos Aires have focused on determin
ing both a mechanism for future trading of saved emissions, and the possibility of
banking surplus emissions from one commitment period to the next. It seems
only just that within the framework of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action the rele
vant international organizations and both industrialized and developing coun
tries might analyze how past Non-Annex I emissions reduction efforts, especially
those with beneﬁcial effects that continue into the future, might be valued and/or
rewarded.
The  region may be able to continue contributing to  emissions con
trol in the future as part of the essential and ongoing process of socioeconomic
sustainable development. However, such contributions will not occur based
strictly on market forces. Speciﬁc policy measures will be required to optimize
socioeconomic aspects of  emissions control, consistent with the microeco
nomic behavior of the private sector. In addition to national policy measures, new
international procedures will be necessary for the transfer of economic resources
to developing countries in general, and  in particular, as a counterpart of their
contributions, past and future, towards a more efﬁcient solution of the global cli
mate change problem.
How will the lac region contribute to climate change mitigation in the future?

General outlook
After the long economic crisis of the 1980s, the  region began a new process of
growth during the 1990s. There have been some small slumps, however. For
instance, the region experienced a ﬁnancial slip due to circumstances in Mexico in
1995. But today, World Bank studies indicate that the  growth will accelerate.
Projected growth rates over the 10-year period starting in 1998 are as follows:
1998
1999
2000
2001-2007

2.5 % annually
0.6% annually
3.0% annually
4.4% annually

This means a total regional  increase of 43.6% through 2007. The future
growth of  emissions in general, and of CO2 in particular, will depend on the
one hand on the evolution of efﬁciency in energy use (energy intensity of )
and on the other hand, on the evolution of the Decarbonization Energy Index. As
previously discussed, the  has been regionally stable for the last 10 years, fol
lowing an 18 year period of decrease. In some  subregions, such as Brazil and
Mexico, and through some activities such as power production, the regional Index
has begun to increase, which is a rather worrisome trend.


For the Index to decrease again, it will be necessary to develop a strategy that
utilizes natural gas, the least atmospherically detrimental of the fossil fuels, in
capacities beyond power generation. In effect, this approach would essentially
replace oil derivatives in the transportation, industrial, and/or residential sectors
in all countries where natural gas (or Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas—) might be
available. To this end, there are primary electricity sources, such as water, wind,
geothermal resources, and nuclear resources, that are comparatively advantageous
from the climate change perspective. Sustainably produced biomass presents
another possibility,14 and has the added beneﬁt of potential net absorption so long
as the carbon sequestration during growth outweighs the release during use. How
ever, there is a complication with this substitution methodology, as these systems
are often more capital intensive than the alternatives, and their beneﬁts are evident
only in the long term.
The most recent global ﬁnancial crisis, which began in the late-1990s in Asia,
moved through Russia, and then hit , tightened the ﬁnancial and economic
markets. The result was not only a short-term economic crisis, which is clearly
indicated in the World Bank statistics for 1999 mentioned earlier, but also a
scarcity in ﬁnancial resources and an increase of their cost. This situation, comThe combined total of the previously avoided CO2 emissions and those projected
over the next 20 years is 8.72 billion tons. Using the value estimate of ..$30 per
ton of CO2, again, the total value of the  contribution is about ..$261.7 bil
lion, which equals about 40% of the total  foreign debt. However, according
to the present international rules and conventions, the economic value of CO2
emissions reduction resulting from these 27 years of concrete action in  coun
tries cannot be recovered.
bined with the normal behavior of the private sector, which is now responsible for
a signiﬁcant share of the energy system in several  countries, makes the devel
opment of the long term primary electricity solutions proposed here very difﬁcult.
It is therefore necessary for both national governments and international organi
zations to determine a way to internalize the costs of the alternative primary
energy options, and in so doing, create climate change mitigation opportunities
within the present institutional framework.
As previously mentioned, improving energy efﬁciency is also important for the
reduction of  emissions reductions in general, and CO2 in particular. But
again, in general, measures for rational use of energy imply a long-term strategy
with initial investments that will eventually be recovered through energy savings.
The international community and the national governments somehow need to
develop policies and measures for a concrete application of the “polluter pays”
principle in relation to the  emissions which are at the heart of the climate
change issue.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that all of the  countries have signed
and ratiﬁed the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change
() and have recently undertaken the tabulation of National Greenhouse
Inventories in response to  requirements with the ﬁnancial and technical
support of the  through the  and the U.S. Country Study Program. The
results of the Inventories will provide a better picture of the situation in the region.
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge that all of the  countries have signed
and ratiﬁed the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change
() and have recently undertaken the tabulation of National Greenhouse
Inventories in response to  requirements with the ﬁnancial and techni
cal support of the  through the  and the U.S. Country Study Program.
Some of the country activities also include the analysis of future mitigation
options, even if they have no obligation to reduce their absolute emissions.
Country level analyses

Based on the National Greenhouse Inventories and the related analyses, the fol
lowing is a synthesized description of the policies and/or measures that have been
proposed in some  countries as examples of the present and future efforts
being made in the region (see Reference section for all citations).
Argentina
In the Argentine Government’s presentation to the ﬁfth Conference of Parties
(-) in Bonn, Germany, the following mitigation options were listed:
• Development of afforestation projects through an active policy that distributes
the ﬁscal and private costs at both the national and provincial level;
• Control of emissions related to solid waste management;
• Control of emissions from livestock production through better diets and
enhanced production methods;
• Use of no-till methods in agriculture, which will result in lower fuel consump
tion and better soil conservation;
• Control of fugitive emissions, including speciﬁc government standards for
maximum ﬂaring in oil and gas production;
• Development of wind resources through subsidies at the national and provin
cial levels, with the corresponding ﬁscal costs;
• Development of hydroelectric projects as alternatives to thermal power pro
duction, with ﬁscal and other environmental costs;
• Increase of co-generation projects in the industrial and services sectors;
• Increase of the volume of natural gas vehicles, especially for public transporta
tion, such as buses, and for light duty trucks.
It is important to stress that all of these mitigation options were proposed
against a baseline scenario that already incorporated better performing technolo
gies following historical trends.
At - the Argentine government proposed a voluntary commitment for
the reduction of Argentine  emissions for the period 2008-2012. Taking into
account the normal uncertainty about the rate and structure of socioeconomic
development, the proposal was submitted with the assumption of a dynamic
target related to  as follows:

with E in tons of carbon equivalent and I constantly equal to 151.5 and
the  in 1993 Argentine Pesos at market prices
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This implies a  emissions reduction of between 2% and 10%, relative to the
baseline scenario for the period 2008 to 2012, following different assumptions on
the  rate of growth and on agricultural and livestock production strategies.
Bolivia
The energy sector is not responsible for the largest proportion of  emissions
in Bolivia; it is second to land-use changes. Nonetheless, most of the proposed
mitigation measures are energy-related.
Importantly, Bolivia has initiated a policy for the sustainable use of natural gas
resources as a clean fuel not only for the country’s needs, but also for export. Brazil
is the primary importer of Bolivian natural gas. The Bolivian policy has allowed
Brazil to signiﬁcantly increase the portion of its energy balance fulﬁlled by this
comparatively clean fuel. This policy is especially beneﬁcial when natural gas
replaces or avoids the use of coal and/or oil derivatives.
In order to avoid the increase of CO2 and methane (CH4) emissions associated
with natural gas production through ﬂaring, starting in 1994 the Yacimientos
Petroliﬁeros Fiscales Bolivianos ()15 initiated measures to reduce ﬂaring to
the minimum technical level by increasing the processing and re-injection of nat
ural gas. At the national level, programs for the expansion of the power system
have been adapted in order to reduce  speciﬁc emissions.
In this mitigation scenario, in addition to the proportionally increased use of
natural gas in the transportation and residential sectors, there are proposals
related to conservative use of energy in lighting, refrigeration, water heating, and
for the use of biomass in rural areas. One important consideration for this type of
policy is that it requires an initial investment in order to enable the increase in
energy use efﬁciency.
Costa Rica
The Costa Rican  emissions inventory has already been done, but there has
been no formal mitigation proposal. Nevertheless, Costa Rica, through the Costa
Rica Joint Implementation Ofﬁce, has been one of the most engaged countries in
the Joint Implementation () Pilot Phase since 1994. As a result, there is now a
series of speciﬁc projects related to wind farms, hydroelectric plants, park and nat
ural reserve management programs, and forest development, all of which should
result in signiﬁcant  emissions reductions, or the increase of carbon seques
tration from the atmosphere. At the same time, these projects are indicative of
important foreign investments and a national increase in labor demand through
projects related to sustainable development. Costa Rica has also proven itself to be
a leader in the climate change regime through the development of new ﬁnancial
tools like Certiﬁed Tradable Offsets (), which represent speciﬁc amounts of
sequestered carbon and can be exchanged with investors.
Colombia
Colombia has completed a preliminary inventory of  emissions for 1990, and
a study of the options for reducing  emissions through 2010. The study pro
poses twenty-four mitigation options, all of which are related to forestry or energy.
The mitigation potential for the proposed reforestation measures is estimated at
about 24 billion tons of CO2 per year. The energy sector initiatives have a poten
tial of about 12.5 billion tons of CO2 per year. Together, the efforts in these two sec

15 Bolivian Fiscal Controller for
Petroleum Deposits.
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tors could reduce the baseline scenario emissions for Colombia in 2010 by about
21%. There are varied approaches to reforestation. The energy sector strategy is
based on an important development in the use of natural gas, for both power pro
duction and ﬁnal use, to replace oil or carbon alternatives. This approach involves
co-generation projects and rational use of energy measures in the industrial and
residential sectors.
As with other  countries, it is important to stress that the use of natural gas
for power production is a mitigation tool only when it is supplanting oil or coal, not
when it replaces hydroelectric development. This is becoming a difﬁcult procedure
to maintain due to institutional, ﬁnancial, and local environmental problems.
Ecuador
The studies conducted in Ecuador of potential mitigation scenarios thus far have
examined the traditional Rational Use of Energy () measures for lighting,
cooking, water heating, and refrigeration in the residential and service sectors,
combining price policies and technological developments. There are also  and
fuel substitution options for the industry and transportation sectors. Because
Ecuador is an oil and natural gas producing country, there are also suggestions for
speciﬁc measures that will reduce natural gas ﬂaring. In addition, there are pro
posals for the development of afforestation projects in order to reduce the defor
estation process and increase carbon sequestration.
These measures can produce important reductions in  emissions against
the baseline scenario. It should be noted that there is a problem in Ecuador that is
an issue in other Latin American countries, but is not typically expressed explic
itly. Most of the measures proposed, even those that are cost effective in the long
term, require signiﬁcant initial investments that call for ﬁnancial resources within
a socioeconomic context that has other investment requirements, both for eco
nomic and social reasons. The means of securing those ﬁnancial resources is one
of the main obstacles to executing these policies and projects.
Mexico
In addition to the issue of global climate change, Mexico is also facing a signiﬁcant
domestic atmospheric pollution problem, especially in metropolitan areas. The
country is therefore taking important steps related to both.
Even though Mexico’s emissions account for less than 2% of the total global
emissions, it is ranked among the most important emitters, and within the top 20
in terms of emission per capita.
The mitigation measures in the energy sector are -oriented, with speciﬁc
programs for lighting, co-generation, fuel, and electricity use following Mexican
Ofﬁcial Standards that are controlled by the National Commission for Energy
Saving (), with the ﬁnancial support of Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de
Energía Eléctrica ().16 There is also a concrete energy policy that provides for
the substitution of coal and oil products by natural gas from both local and U.S.
sources. This natural gas strategy signiﬁes the development of the transportation
network and the power production based on combined cycle technology. The efﬁ
cient lighting program (Illumex) has already been very successful and will be con
tinued and expanded both in the residential and services sectors.
In addition to the energy sector measures and policies, there are also programs
related to environmental and natural resources management, such as the Natural


Protected Areas, Commercial Forest Plantations, and Forest Development Pro
grams, all of which have had positive results with respect to CO2 sequestration.
Some of the projects in the forest and energy areas are related to Joint Implemen
tation proposals.
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16 the Trust for the Conserva
tion of Electrical Energy.

Andean Pact
The Andean study, promoted by the Risø/ Center on Energy and Environ
ment through the “Economics of  Limitations Project,” analyzes the addi
tional mitigation options that are possible through an integration process at the
regional level, in addition to the measures considered at the country level. In this
case, mitigation options were identiﬁed through the integration of power systems
in the border area between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru with hydrological projects
instead of thermal power options, in addition to the replacement of petroleum
products with natural gas for power production. There are also similar possibili
ties along the border between Ecuador and Peru, as well as between Colombia and
Ecuador. In the latter case, this would involve an expansion of the Colombian nat
ural gas transport network into Ecuador in order to substitute for oil products
with natural gas for power production.
It would be a very positive step to develop this type of regional integration
analysis in other areas, such as  17 or Central America, in order to iden
tify additional mitigation options.
Uruguay
Even though the absolute net emissions of   from Uruguay are comparatively
small globally (5 billion tons of CO2), it is important to highlight the current mit
igation efforts there.
Uruguay is a highly agricultural country, and it has excellent conditions for
forest activities. Accordingly, there are several programs in place that involve direct
seeding and efﬁcient use of fertilizers. In 1987, a law was enacted to support these
activities, with an important increase in newforested areas that should mean the
absorption of the equivalent of about 28% of the country’s total CO2 emissions.
These land-use trends will increase in the future. In addition, there are several
studies and concrete projects aimed at developing the use of natural gas (imported
from Argentina), as well as the integration of power networks at the 
level in order to reduce the regional  emissions. The  strategy is a
concrete example of the advantages of the regional integration process.
Venezuela
Venezuela’s economy is based on oil and natural gas production, as well as mining
activities and the production of steel and aluminum, all of which are energyintensive activities, basically oriented toward foreign markets.
This situation raises a question regarding the “export and import” of 
emissions. Unfortunately, at this point, there is no accounting system for this type
of “international trade” and the emissions are accounted for in the producing
countries. This is disadvantageous for developing countries, which are the main
providers of energy-intensive commodities to industrialized countries.
The baseline scenario calculated for Venezuela does not take into account any
mitigation policy except the normal improvement in efﬁciency and new technol
ogy. In the mitigation scenario, the options being considered include the control

17 mercosur is the Southern
Common Market in Latin Amer
ica. Its members are Argentina,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil.
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of fugitive emissions at the natural gas production and transport level, taking into
account the importance of the natural gas industry in the country. At the end-use
level, there is a mix of classical  measures, as well as substitution strategies, in
order to increase the use of natural gas in all sectors, including transportation. The
tactic for power production is to continue with hydroelectric development as far
as possible.
Forest activities are also very important in Venezuela, considering 60% of the
country is forested and 70% of the total land area is in the Amazon Basin. In this
case, there are contradictory trends. On the one hand, there are pressures to exploit
the forest resources, despite government controls through annual permits and
long term concessions. The annual deforestation rate is signiﬁcant. It is estimated
that between 300,000 and 600,000 hectares are lost per year, although this infor
mation is not well documented. On the other hand, there are several programs for
reforestation for industrial purposes and for protected area management. There
are calculations that indicate that for the year 2025 the total potential stock of
sequesteredcarbon in forest areas could be nearly 1.5 billion tons of carbon, with a
unit cost between $4 and $20 per ton. It is therefore very important for
Venezuela to support in-depth forest studies and institution building at the coun
try and regional level in this particular area.
This small sample of mitigation options under consideration in the Latin
American/ Caribbean region demonstrates that the region has signiﬁcant poten
tial to continue its historic trend of decreasing speciﬁc ghg emissions without
arresting the progress of urgently needed socioeconomic development. However,
it will be very important to secure international support, regional cooperation,
and action at the national level so as to overcome ﬁnancial, institutional, techno
logical, social, and cultural barriers, which would otherwise threaten the viability
of the proposed measures and programs.
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Abstract
This paper is an examination of carbon dioxide emission mitigation scenarios within
the forestry and energy sectors in Mexico. It is primarily intended to illustrate how,
using a proper strategy, it is possible to identify development options that result in
significant CO2 emission reductions while simultaneously advancing national sus
tainable development priorities. 1
Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change () was
agreed to in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel
opment in Rio de Janeiro. The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention was developed
and agreed to ﬁve years later at the third Conference of Parties ( 3). Using 1990
emissions levels as a baseline, the Protocol instituted mandatory reductions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) for industrialized (Annex I) countries. It also estab
lished the possibility of trading ‘units’ of emissions reduction between Annex I and
developing (non-Annex I) countries through the Clean Development Mecha
nism, which is expected to begin operating by the end of the year 2000.
Both the Convention and the Protocol state that the different actions and poli
cies directed at the mitigation and/or reduction of the impacts of potential change
in the Earth’s climate should be framed within the context of sustainable devel
opment. In order for Non-Annex I countries to participate in emissions reduction
activities, the identiﬁcation of mitigation options and future emissions reduction
paths that simultaneously advance sustainable development priorities within the
participating countries will be critical. Another crucial element will be the inclu
sion of mitigation options that not only involve both the forestry and energy sec
tors, but also encompass integrated scenarios that enable full examination of alter
native emissions paths in each country.

1 This article is based on Shein
baum and Masera,“Mitigating
Carbon Emissions while
Advancing National Develop
ment Priorities: The Case of
Mexico” in Climatic Change
(November 2000 issue). Some
of the text and graphics
throughout this paper have
been re-published here with
the kind permission of Kluwer
Academic Press. Please refer to
this article for a more complete
discussion of the approach, the
model, scenarios, and results.
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The case of climate change mitigation in Mexico is particularly pertinent for
several reasons. First, Mexico is among the 20 countries with the highest levels of
greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Second, Mexico has been a member of
both the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ()
and the North American Free Trade Agreement () since 1994, and has there
fore been subject to pressures to cap future  emissions or emissions growth.
Third, Mexico is an oil exporting country and relies heavily on fossil fuels for its
domestic energy needs. At the same time, however, Mexico is clearly a developing
country in terms of its average income per capita, unavailability of basic services
for a signiﬁcant portion of its population, and its per capita emissions rate. In
addition, the government does not have sufﬁcient capital to make incremental
investments in emissions mitigation options.
The current situation

About 96% of Mexico’s primary energy comes from fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide
emissions related to energy use grew from 297 TgCO2 2 in 1990 to 331 in 1994
(Sheinbaum and Rodríguez 1997). This has been compounded by severe defor
estation and forest degradation, which has been estimated at a loss of 670,000 ha
per year (Masera et al. 1997). Approximately 136 TgCO2 are emitted each year as a
result of land use changes, 185 TgCO2 if forest regrowth on abandoned land is not
taken into account. Total carbon dioxide
figure 1
emissions reached 434 TgCO2 per year (118
1990 carbon dioxide emissions in mexico
TgC/yr) in 1990, 27% of which came from
land use changes (Government of Mexico
1997) (see Figure 1).
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sions. Within the energy sector these
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activities include improvements in energy
efﬁciency in the industrial, transportation,
commercial, and residential sectors; switching to less carbon intensive fuels; and the
total 444 million tons co 2
establishment of standards for new equip
ment. Forestry sector projects that focus on conservation and management of
native forests as alternatives to deforestation, afforestation of degraded and defor
ested lands, and promoting agroforestry systems also have the potential to miti
gate net  emissions. These measures are summarized in Table 1.

2 One TgCO2 is equivalent to
one million tons of carbon diox
ide; one ton of CO2 is equiva
lent to 3.67 tons of carbon (tC).

Energy Sector

Starting in 1989, several institutions were created in Mexico with the purpose of
promoting energy efﬁciency. These include the Comisión Nacional para el Ahorro
de Energía (—The National Commission for Energy Savings), Programa
de Ahorro de Energía del Sector Eléctrico (—The Electricity Sector’s Energy
Saving Program) and the Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de Energía Eléctrica (—
The Trust for the Conservation of Energy), which is a revolving-loan trust fund to
save electricity. These organizations have developed the following energy efﬁ
ciency programs.

  
table 1
table 1

summary of current measures in mexico
with climate change mitigation impacts

sector

measures and policies

Energy

Institutions: Comisión Nacional para el Ahorro de Energía (conae—The
National Commission for Energy Savings), Programa de Ahorro de Energía del
Sector Eléctrico (paese—The Electricity Sector’s Energy Saving Program) and the
Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de Energía Eléctrica (fide—The Trust for the Conser
vation of Energy).
Energy Efficiency Standards: Several standards are in place including policies for
domestic refrigerators and coolers, room and central air conditioners, three phase
electric motors, and non-residential lighting.
Demand-Side Management Programs: There are specific programs for residential
lighting, commercial lighting, industrial motors and compressors, and municipal
pumping. Other programs include a roof insulation initiative and daylight savings.
Energy Efficiency Demonstration Projects: These include installation of high-effi
ciency burners and heat recovery systems in industry, and several projects in build
ings.
Cogeneration: Promotion of more than 20 large projects with more than 600 mw
of installed capacity.
Renewable Energy: There are programs for rural electrification with photovoltaic
systems, water heating with solar thermal systems and large scale wind power
generation.
Fuel Switching: Planning for future power expansion is based on natural gas fired
(combined cycle) power plants instead of the traditional thermal (fuel-oil fired)
power plants.

Forestry

Natural Protected Areas (npa): There are currently 111 npas covering 12 million ha.
Seven million additional hectares are under special management for protecting
wildlife.
Sustainable Forest Management: Approximately us$13 million per year of subsi
dies are provided through prodefor to improve harvesting systems in native
forests.
Afforestation: Approximately 200,000 ha of degraded lands are afforested for
restoration purposes each year (for a net of 70,000 ha per year) through pronare.
Commercial Plantations: Subsidies of us$30 million per year are being provided to
establish fast-growing plantations in degraded forest and on agricultural lands.

Energy efﬁciency standard
There are several standards already in effect, including criteria for domestic refrig
erators and coolers, room and central air conditioners, three phase electric
motors, and non-residential lighting. According to , energy standards save
2000 GWh of electricity per year ( 1996).
Demand-side management programs
Residential lighting: In the residential sector, the primary state-owned national util
ity, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (—The Federal Electricity Commission),
implemented 12 projects between 1989 and 1996 to promote the use of compact ﬂu
orescent lamps () in Mexican households. By September 1996 these projects
were responsible for the adoption of about 1.2 million  in Mexican homes,
resulting in energy savings of 160  per year (Friedman et al. 1993 and 1995).
Incentives: The incentive program, which started in early 1998, is intended to
achieve energy savings of 3,250 MWh in the year 2000 by promoting the intro
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duction of efﬁcient technologies for residential lighting, commercial lighting,
industrial motors and compressors, and municipal pumping ( 1996).
Roof insulation: Since 1991  has been promoting domestic roof insulation in
northern Mexico by providing ﬁnancing to homes using more than one MWh per
month of electricity during the summer. Over 75,000 homes in northern Mexico,
mostly in Mexicali, have been insulated to reduce cooling loads, with reported
electric savings of up to 35 % (DeBuen 1993).
Daylight savings: Summer daylight savings time was implemented in 1996. Eval
uations of its success claim a national savings of 0.7% of national electric consump
tion (1.3 billion KWh TWh) and reduction of peak load by 500  ( 1997).
Industry
Speciﬁc work in the industrial sector has included promoting the use of new, highefﬁciency burners; improving current systems; and encouraging fuel switching.
Additional activities include the instrumentation and control of boilers and burn
ers and the promotion of energy management systems. Work in the public sector
includes strengthening the relationship with Petroleos Mexicanos (), the
national oil company, as well as studies of recovery in rigs and platforms and the
use of turbo compressors at terminal stations. Energy savings related to these pro
grams are estimated to be around 480 GWh/yr ( 1995;  1995a).
Buildings
Efﬁciency demonstration projects have been carried out in ofﬁce buildings, edu
cational facilities, commercial malls, department stores, restaurants, hotels, super
markets, hospitals, and other establishments. The resulting energy savings have
varied between 20 and 37%, with a maximum payback of three years on invest
ments, and a total energy savings of 24 GWh per year ( 1995b).
Cogeneration
As of 1994, Mexico had installed industrial cogeneration facilities with a combined
capacity of nearly 3 , mostly in  reﬁneries and petrochemical facilities.
More recently, the Regulatory Energy Commission authorized close to 20 permits
for cogeneration, which represents an installed capacity of around 600 . How
ever, most of this installed cogeneration capacity has been used exclusively for onsite demand due to barriers related to electricity costs that have to be paid by the
electric utilities (Sheinbaum et al. 1997-1998).
Renewable energy
Rural electriﬁcation: In 1994 a rural photovoltaic electriﬁcation program enabled
35,000 small household systems to be installed for communities that did not have
access to the electricity grid (Mexican Secretary of Energy 1997).
Solar thermal systems: Water heating solar systems are being applied in a vari
ety of capacities, both at the household level and in the commercial sector, includ
ing at one of the principal hospitals in Mexico City.
Wind power generation: The main wind power generation system in Mexico is in
the southeast region of the country (La Venta to Oaxaca). It is connected to the
national and interconnected grid system. It has a power capacity of 1575 kw (equiva
lent to 15,750 bulbs of 100 watts) and a capacity of nearly 40%. There are plans to
expand wind projects to reach a power capacity of 56  by the year 2005 ( 1997).
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Fuel switching
Most of the expansion in the electric power sector through the year 2005 will take
place by adding natural gas ﬁred (combined cycle) power plants (9500  from
1996 to 2005) instead of the traditional thermal (fuel-oil ﬁred) power plants. In
addition, the majority of the industries in the regions with the highest local pol
lution indexes, especially those in the larger cities, have switched from fuel oil to
natural gas.
Forest sector

Mexico has 49 million ha of native forests, half of which are temperate and half
tropical (Masera et al. 1997). There are an additional 21 million ha classiﬁed as
degraded forestlands. About 80% of total forestland is communally owned by
rural communities. Approximately 95% of all timber harvesting in Mexico is con
ducted in native, mainly temperate, forests ( 1996). There are several
programs in place to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in the country.
The main forestry activities that will result in  emissions reductions are:
Promotion of sustainable forest management in native forests
By the end of the year 2000, the Mexican government plans to support the estab
lishment of sustainable forest harvesting systems on more than 3 million ha of
native tropical and temperate forests. Most of these forests are collectively owned
by rural communities and are either unmanaged or have been managed using
inadequate methods that have favored degradation and conversion to other land
uses. Several incentives are in place that will help achieve the stated objectives,
including a government program, el Programma para el Desarrollo Forestal
(—The Program for Forest Development), which allocates between
$9 million and $13 million per year toward these initiatives (
1996). Through , forest owners, mostly rural communities and ejidos,3
receive subsidies that enable them to prepare integrated forest management plans
for timber and non-timber forest products, to conduct forest inventories, and to
improve the current management of timber and non-timber resources.
Commercial plantations
Approximately 25,000 ha will be established as commercial plantations by the end of
2000. Most of these plantations are sown with fast growth species that are intended
to be used for cellulose production. A newly approved law places several constraints
on the establishment of these plantations to insure that they will not cause major
environmental or social problems (Alvarez-Icaza and Viveros 1996). Since 1997 a
subsidy of $30 million per year, as well as several ﬁscal incentives, have been pro
vided to encourage the establishment of plantations ( 1996).
Agroforestry systems
Agroforestry systems combine the production of crops and trees in the same area
for the purpose of obtaining both agricultural and forest products. As of 1997 there
were 0.86 million ha dedicated to agroforesty systems in Mexico—about 0.8 mil
lion ha of this is producing shade coffee and 0.06 million ha is sown with cacao
(Masera and Ordonez 1997). There is a large area of fallow lands, the exact size of
which is currently unknown, that are also managed as agroforestry systems. Agro
forestry systems offer a promising economic alternative to conversion of forests to

3 Ejidos are a form of collective
land ownership. In the case of
forestlands, members of the
ejido are allowed to use the
land but not to sell it.
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pasture and agriculture, especially for tropical deciduous and tropical evergreen
forests. There are currently several large governmental programs planned for
implementation in different tropical regions of Mexico. Speciﬁcally, in the humid
tropics, the program Desarrollo Sustentable del Tropico Humedo (Sustainable
Development of the Humid Tropics) plans to reduce the extent of slash and burn
agriculture by intensifying corn production, establishing soil conservation prac
tices, and promoting different types of agroforestry systems.
Restoration plantations (afforestation)
Afforestation involves planting trees in both deforested and degraded lands. The
objective is to enable the regeneration of vegetation in order to recover degraded
areas, protect water basins, and reduce soil erosion. The afforested area has
increased substantially over the last few years, but the national results of these pro
grams are still modest (0.2 million ha). The government reforested 200,000 ha
every year from 1995 to 2000, for a total of 1 million ha in the period (
1996). However this area should be adjusted by the trees’ survival rate, which is
currently 34%, leaving a net of 0.46 million ha by the end of 2000.
Other programs
Mexico has currently 111 Natural Protected Areas (NPAs), covering 11.9 million ha
of tropical, temperate, and semi-arid forests. Financial resources are not sufﬁcient
to adequately protect all of these areas, so the government has decided to give pri
ority to the 10 NPAs deemed most important. Two programs directed at slowing
the rate of conversion of forest to other land uses are the Unidad de Manejo de
Vida Silvestre (—Wildlife Management Units) and the Programa para la
Defensa de la Frontera de la Selva (—The Program for the Defense of the
Forest Frontier). The former provides incentives to individuals and organizations
for the management of fauna and vegetation for conservation purposes. It is cur
rently being applied to 7 million ha of semi-arid, temperate, and tropical forests
(Government of Mexico 1999). It is a voluntary agreement between landowners
and government. The  provides incentives to owners of land with marginal
crop and pasture productivity to reconvert them to forests. The program currently
covers 20,000 ha per year. A recently approved program, Programa Nacional de
Leña (—The National Fuelwood Management Program), will devote
funds to encouraging the sustainable use of fuelwood in the countryside, which
currently accounts for 78% of total wood demand in Mexico (Government of
Mexico 1999).
Building future carbon emission and sequestration scenarios

4 The study was funded by the
U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). Portions
of the original text, para
phrased or verbatim, may
appear in this document.

There are several crucial steps that will be necessary in order to effectively link mit
igation strategies with sustainable development priorities at the country level. The
authors conducted a study of the options within the energy and forestry sectors
that would address both the global responsibility of  emissions reductions
and the national priority of sustainable development. A 15-year time period from
1995 to 2010 was used for this study.4
Development and adaptation of country-specific analytical tools

There are several existing tools for carbon emission mitigation analysis. However,
the current pre-programmed packages for carbon mitigation present some disad

  
vantages: a) there is little control over the actual computational procedures; b) the
users depend on the package programmers for any modiﬁcations; c) the form in
which the data must be entered may not coincide with that in which information
is available, so that a certain amount of exogenous data-processing must be com
pleted before the package can be used; and d) most packages impose major con
straints on the planning process (Reddy 1995).
For these reasons, the ﬁrst step in this analysis was to develop and adapt exist
ing tools to Mexico’s particular priorities. Speciﬁcally, the authors chose to create
an integrated analysis of energy and forestry options, and developed a bottom-up
accounting simulation model for Mexico that simulates energy consumption by
end uses. The model has three basic submodels, which enabled the authors to con
duct estimates for both the base year and projected scenarios. The submodels
included: a) an end-use-based simulation of the Mexican energy system and its
associated  emissions; b) a simulation of forest sector options, based on the
demand for forest products and other services from the forest sector, accounting
for both emissions and carbon sequestration; and c) a ﬁnancial module comprised
of an estimation of CO2 mitigation costs and an incremental cost curve.5
Identification of Mexico’s future sustainable development priorities

Through the end-use analysis of energy needs and a demand-based analysis of
forest products, the authors identiﬁed a set of key activities that address national
development priorities while simultaneously helping to reduce the current rate of
 emissions growth. Within the energy sector, these activities include increases
in energy efﬁciency in the industrial, transportation, commercial, and residential
sectors; switching to less carbon intensive fuels; and the establishment of stan
dards for new equipment. Within the forest sector, the authors recommendations
included the adequate conservation and management of native forests, the sup
port of afforestation of degraded and deforested lands, and the promotion of
agroforestry systems.
Building reference scenarios and mitigation scenarios

The study examined two scenarios for the year 2010: a reference scenario and a
mitigation scenario. In the energy sector, the reference scenario was based on an
assumption of intensity frozen at 1994 levels. In the forest sector, the assumption
was a constant rate of deforestation based on a percentage of the remaining forest
area. The economic and population growth rates that were used to determine the
demand for energy and forestry products were based on ofﬁcial projections.
The mitigation scenario focused on speciﬁc rates of penetration of mitigation
technologies by sector. Only a limited set of options were analyzed; thus, the results
presented should not be viewed as the total or maximum potential carbon mitiga
tion for Mexico. This is particularly true for the energy sector, where data availabil
ity restrictions hindered a truly in-depth analysis of the transportation sector.
Transformation of sustainable development priorities
into greenhouse gas emissions mitigation

The ﬁnal step of the analysis was to demonstrate the implications of the scenarios
in terms of  emissions and sequestration, and the associated costs. For this
purpose, the authors used appropriate emission factors and methods to transform
the identiﬁed targets in each scenario. For example, the number of compact ﬂuo
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rescent bulbs to be installed or the area to be restored through reforestation would
be expressed in terms of  emissions and sequestration ﬁgures.
The costs calculated in the model included the investment, operation, and
maintenance costs needed to achieve the energy and forest services for targeted
years. The model combined the different options in order to determine the least
cost “path” of the carbon mitigation scenarios.
Results

Baseline scenario
Without any mitigation activities, the total Mexican CO2 emissions would reach
879 Tg per annum by 2010. Energy emissions can be expected to grow 149% in the
15-year timeframe used for this analysis (see Figures 2 and 3). A net loss of 10.4 mil
lion ha of forests, 20% of the existing area, is predicted by the baseline scenario.
Because the net deforestation rate is propor
figure 2
tionate to the remaining forested area, the area
co 2 emissions from energy use:
deforested annually would decline in the
mexico 1965 –2010 baseline scenario
future. As a result, annual carbon emissions
from deforestation will decline 33% between
1995 and 2010.
Mitigation scenario

Energy sector
For the purposes of this study, the mitigation
options related to energy use included com
bined cycle plants, efﬁcient industrial electric
motors, efﬁcient industrial boilers, industrial
cogeneration, efﬁcient commercial and resi
dential lighting systems, efﬁcient potable
water pumping, inter-modal substitution of
passenger transportation methods in the
Mexico City Metropolitan Area (), and
figure 3
wind
power generation. The assumptions used
mexico 1995 –2005 – 2010
for the mitigation scenario analysis were as
follows:6
Combined cycle plants: The assumption was
that rising demands for electricity could be sat
isﬁed by installing systems based on natural gas
combined cycle plants, rather than fuel oil
thermoelectric plants. By the year 2010, it is
projected that the required installed capacity
will have reached 51,464 , 43% of which
could be produced by combined cycle plants.
Efﬁcient industrial motors: It was assumed
that all the motors sold from 1999 to 2010
would be high efﬁciency units. Substitution
was considered for motors between 5 and 125
horsepower (hp), with energy savings of 15%
6 For a detailed description of
per motor. This substitution would create a cumulative energy savings of 754 GWh
the methodology, see Shein
by the year 2010 (Rodriguez 1997).
baum and Masera 2000.

  
Industrial cogeneration: The models used the assumption that all new industrial
plants would implement cogeneration in their processing. Energy needs were cal
culated assuming that the exhaust heat of a gas turbine would satisfy the thermal
necessities of industrial processes. Under these conditions, the cogeneration
system would supply more than enough power for the industrial process, with the
cogeneration potential for new plants reaching 8664.3  by the year 2010 (Shein
baum 1997).
Industrial boilers: According to Selmec (1994), 10,000 boilers with capacities of
between 10 and 2000 hp are currently installed in the Mexican industrial sector.
The mitigation scenarios assumed fuel switching (from diesel and fuel oil to nat
ural gas), insulation, and burner substitution for 20% of all industrial boilers by
2010 (Aguillon 1997).
Efﬁcient lighting in commercial sector: It was assumed that 5 million efﬁcient
lighting systems would be installed by 2010 due to the expected increases in elec
tricity prices and decreases in the costs of efﬁcient lighting technology (Shein
baum and Vazquez 1997).
Compact ﬂuorescent lamps (cfls) in the Residential Sector: ’ incentive
program estimates that 9.6 million lamps (out of a stock of more than 150 million
lamps) will be replaced by  by the year 2010. The mitigation scenario used the
assumption that for each lamp considered within the incentive program, another
one would be installed, resulting in energy savings of 500 GWh by the year 2010
(Sheinbaum and Vazquez 1997).
Efﬁcient water pumping: It is estimated that corrective and maintenance mea
sures could save approximately 35% of the national water pumping electricity con
sumption (Carmona 1997). This assumption was applied in the mitigation models.
Inter-modal transportation substitution in the mcma: Replacement of small
gasoline-powered buses with large diesel buses and increased use of electric mass
metro and light train lines are considered the most viable emissions mitigation
technology options for the . The mitigation scenario assumed the substitu
tion of 60,000 microbuses with 30,000 diesel buses, as well as increased service
from the metro and light electric trains (Dartois 1997).
Large scale wind electricity generation: Based on different studies of the poten
tial for wind power generation in Mexico, the model used the assumption that
5000 MW of large wind power plants would be installed in the country by the year
2010, which equals about 14% of the total installed capacity in 2000. Using a capac
ity factor of 0.3, the generation capacity of these plants would be 1314 GWh
(Caldera 1997).
Forest sector
The analysis covered three forestry mitigation strategies in detail: management of
native forests, afforestation for forest restoration, and agroforestry systems.
Management of native forests: Sustainable management of native forests is one
of the best options available to Mexico for avoiding carbon dioxide emissions from
forest degradation and deforestation. At the same time, this scenario also offers
important development beneﬁts, such as local employment opportunities,
increased wood and non-wood forest product outputs, and soil and biodiversity
conservation. Currently, about 95% of all timber harvesting in Mexico occurs in
native forests, which are mostly communally owned by 10 million people grouped
in several thousand communities and ejidos. This means that encouraging sus
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table 2
sector
General

Energy

basic assumptions for the reference and mitigation scenarios
reference scenario

mitigation scenario (year 2010)

Medium gdp growth scenario (nearly 4%/yr);
Reduction of population growth from 1.6% in 1995 to 1.1% in 2010
Energy intensity levels frozen
at 1994 values
Fuel oil thermoelectric plants
as the dominant additional
installed capacity within the
power sector
Conventional technology

Combined cycle plants: The required installed
capacity will reach 51,464 mw, of which 43%
will be combined cycle plants.
Efficient industrial motors: Cumulative
energy savings of 754 GWh by the year 2010.
Cogeneration: 8,664 mw for the year 2010.
Industrial boilers: Fuel switching (from diesel
and fuel oil to natural gas), insulation, and
substitution of burners for 20% of all indus
trial boilers by 2010.
Efficient Lighting in Commercial Sector: 5 mil
lion lighting systems will be installed by 2010.
CFLs in the Residential Sector: 15 million cfls
will be installed by 2010 (double the incentive
program estimate).
Efficient Water Pumping: Corrective and
maintenance measures used to save approxi
mately 35% of the national water pumping
electricity consumption.
Transportation in the Metropolitan Area: The
substitution of 60,000 gasoline microbuses
by 30,000 diesel buses and increased service
from the metro and electric light trains.
Wind Electricity Generation: 5000 mw of
large wind power plants.

Forestry

Net deforestation rate
(deforestation minus
afforestation) at 1.5% per year
(based on early 1990s) from
1995 to 2010

Forest Management: 361 thousand ha per
year of deforestation avoided by sustainable
management of native forests.

Total deforested area will
reach 10.4 million ha by 2010

Agroforestry: Additional 200,000 ha being
used for agroforestry systems by 2010.

Afforestation: Additional 1.3 million ha desig
nated as restoration plantations by 2010.

Source: Adapted from Sheinbaum and Masera 2000.

tainable management of native forests will be particularly beneﬁcial socially as
well as environmentally.
In the mitigation scenario, the area of native forest under management was
estimated at 4.4 million ha. This was determined using the expected rates of defor
estation, offset by the area to be converted to improved management systems.
Based on projected population and economic growth, the mitigation scenario also
factored in the demand for wood products up through 2010. Long-term unit
carbon sequestration ranges between 618 t of CO2/ha for temperate forest and 763
t of CO2/ha for tropical forest.
Afforestation: The scenario was based on the planting of trees in both defor
ested and degraded lands. The afforestation penetration estimation for this part
of the scenario was based on governmental policies and goals for the year 2010,
which were offset by relevant variables to determine that there would be 1.3 mil

  

347

lion ha of afforested land within the analysis period. In this case, the annual carbon
balance for the period from 2000 to 2010
figure 4
shows a steady increase from 2.8 to 12.1 TgCO2.
avoided
emissions
of
co
Agroforestry: The model examined several
2 mitigation scenario (2010)
different systems of combining trees and crops
for the purpose of producing both agricultural
and forest products. It used a conservative esti
mate of an additional 0.2 million ha under
these systems by the year 2010. The rate of
carbon sequestration varies greatly depending
on the particular system, but usually ranges
between 73 and 440 t of CO2 per year in 2000,
and up to 2.0 TgCO2 per year by 2010.
Figure 4 illustrates the avoided CO2 emis
sions for different energy and forestry options
for the year 2010. The total mitigation poten
tial for the options examined reaches 45 Tg of
CO2 in the energy sector and 262 Tg of CO2 in
the forest sector by 2010.
Mitigation costs

Within the energy sector, annual costs per unit range from $45.90 per ton of
CO2 for residential lighting to $106.40 for
figure 5
industrial motors. The average costs for
costs
for
different
mitigation
forestry options range from $3.50 per ton
alternatives in mexico
of CO2 to $5.40 depending on the option
(see Figure 5). The mitigation options that
resulted in higher costs than the baseline sce
nario are forest management in tropical areas,
restoration plantations, agroforestry systems,
increased used of the metro and light trains in
the , and integration of efﬁcient indus
trial motors. It should be noted that even costeffective options, such as efﬁcient lighting or,
very speciﬁcally, the sustainable management
of native temperate forests, usually require
substantially higher investment costs than
conventional technologies. Also, speciﬁcally
in the case of forestry options, costs are
extremely site-dependent; thus, the average
values presented here may be much higher or lower for speciﬁc projects. However,
the analysis showed that if mitigation scenario options were added one-by-one,
they could be achieved at almost no additional net cost compared to the baseline
scenario (Sheinbaum and Masera 2000).
Discussion

The analysis identiﬁed a mitigation potential of 393 Tg of CO2 for Mexico by the
year 2010. If this potential were realized, Mexico would reduce its total emissions
by 7% from 1990 levels rather than increasing them by 69%, which is what the
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purchase “proto-carbon credits”
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sequestering carbon dioxide in
sustainable forest and agricul
tural systems. For more infor
mation, please refer to the
Scolel Té website:
http://www.ed.ac.uk/~ebfr11/

   
baseline scenario predicts. This means that the per capita emissions rate would
drop by 30% in the same period of time (from 6.2 to 4.3 tons of CO2 per capita),
instead of increasing by 26% (See Figure 3). Thus, by properly implementing a
series of promising mitigation options in the energy and forest sectors, Mexico has
the opportunity to signiﬁcantly advance national development priorities for the
period from 1995 to 2010, while keeping its per capita carbon emissions low and
experiencing a very modest increase in total emissions. Therefore, in principle,
there should be no contradiction between the national and global interests.
Forestry options, particularly sustainable management of native forests, show
the largest carbon mitigation potential for Mexico in the short term. Forestry and
energy projects speciﬁcally aimed at carbon mitigation are already operating suc
cessfully7 (Scolel Té 1997; Montoya et al. 1995; De Buen and Masera 1994) or are
waiting only for approval of ﬁnancial resources (- 1998). It should
be noted, however, that forestry options are ultimately limited by the amount of
available area, and unless effective actions are taken in the energy sector, emissions
will eventually continue growing at a rapid pace (see Figure 3). While resulting in
a lower short-term carbon emissions reduction rate, there are several energy
options, such as , that would be extremely cost effective given Mexico’s strong
dependence on relatively cheap oil resources. In this case, it will be necessary to
employ a consistent and strategy, starting immediately, to insure that efﬁcient
technologies and renewable resources are integrated into policymaking over the
next decade, and continue to be essential elements of development thereafter. At
the same time, the large amount of carbon that could be potentially captured via
forestry projects could provide Mexico with additional time for the development
of a renewable energy path.
Conclusions

While it has been determined that Annex I countries are primarily accountable for
the rising GHG emissions levels, Non-Annex I countries such as Mexico also have
minor responsibilities both historically and in the present. The participation of
these countries is very important to climate change mitigation. It is therefore crit
ical that strategies be developed to support projects that will abate the future
growth of  emissions in these countries while addressing their sustainable
development priorities.
As demonstrated in this paper, Mexico is not a passive spectator in the climate
change regime. Several actions have already been taken that, without explicitly
addressing climate change, have a deﬁnite impact on emissions reductions. This
paper also illustrates that future emissions paths can be identiﬁed in which there
is no contradiction between sustainable development and climate change mitiga
tion. The authors have shown that emissions of  gases can be cut by replacing
conventional technologies with efﬁcient ones, by introducing renewable energy
technologies, and by implementing sustainable forest management, afforestation,
and agroforestry systems. Many of these mitigation alternatives are “no regret”
options for Mexico, not just because most of them are cost-effective, but because
they simultaneously address sustainable development goals. Energy efﬁciency and
increased use of renewable resources will lead to improved economic productiv
ity, less investment to satisfy the increasing energy demand, and the possibility of
raising the quality of life for those who do not currently have access to electricity.
In the forest sector, in addition to carbon sequestration, the alternatives presented

  
in this paper are likely to have tangible beneﬁts at the local level, such as genera
tion of income opportunities, conservation of biodiversity, and the preservation
of soils and watersheds.
However, the mitigation potential identiﬁed will not be reached automatically.
Strong and consistent efforts are needed at the local, national, and global levels.
Locally, one of the main barriers to overcome is the increase in investment costs
associated with carbon mitigation options. This is true for both energy and
forestry options—even for those alternatives that will be cost-effective on a lifecycle scale, because they may require higher initial investment. This is true of
options such as cogeneration and sustainable management of native temperate
Forestry options, particularly sustainable management of native forests, show
the largest carbon mitigation potential for Mexico in the short term … It should
be noted, however, that forestry options are ultimately limited by the amount of
available area, and unless eﬀective actions are taken in the energy sector, emis
sions will eventually continue growing at a rapid pace.
forests. As such, innovative schemes are needed to reduce up-front costs so users
can afford to invest in  mitigation alternatives.
At the national level, energy and land-use policies should be established to
address long-term concerns, as opposed to the six-year planning cycle that is cur
rently employed by the government of Mexico. Internationally, industrialized
countries need to signiﬁcantly increase the transfer of funds and technology to the
Non-Annex I countries. These funds, channeled through mechanisms such as the
, could play a critical role in removing the investment barriers associated with
several energy and forestry mitigation options. Appropriately managed, new
funds and better access to technology could also catalyze the “leap-frog” from
obsolete technology to state of the art systems (Goldemberg 1998).
Speciﬁc actions that can help in the design of appropriate  mitigation
options and scenarios in Non-Annex I countries include:
• Supporting the development of locally-adapted tools and methods that allow
an integrated assessment of future mitigation scenarios in terms of the coun
tries’ own deﬁned sustainable development needs.
• Promoting an integrated approach to scenario building, where energy and
forestry options can be examined and combined.
• Increasing and strengthening local capacity and institutions for the identiﬁca
tion of mitigation options, project formulation, implementation, and moni
toring (cooperation between developing countries is very important in this
respect).
• Encouraging technology adaptation, and building on indigenous knowledge
when possible and appropriate.
• Insuring and encouraging the effective participation of local communities,
from the identiﬁcation of options to the implementation of alternatives (e.g.,
Scolel Té Project, Mexico).
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Abstract
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the countries
of the world have been debating climate change mitigation strategies for the past
decade. In 1997, the strategy discussion was still ongoing. However, that year, at the
Third Conference of Parties (cop-3) in Kyoto, a Protocol was agreed to (still in the rat
ification process at the time of this writing) that included provisions to allow coun
tries to meet their reduction commitments by buying credits from other countries.
Costa Rica has been a pioneer in developing and selling emission reduction cred
its. Deforestation is the second largest source of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere
and forest growth absorbs carbon dioxide gases (CO2), which contribute to global
warming. Costa Rica’s carbon credits come primarily from the conversion of culti
vated fields and pastures into forests, as well as from the reduction of deforesta
tion. In 1996 the country sold its first 200,000 tons of carbon emission reduction
credits to Norway for us$10 per ton. However, in late 1997 when it tried to auction
an additional 1,000,000 tons of carbon credits with a floor price of us$20 per ton,
it received no bids. The country is currently evaluating its strategy. Preliminary
results show that, depending on the final rules, regulations, and carbon prices,
carbon trading is likely to promote the expansion of national park areas and to
induce some farmers to switch from traditional agricultural to forest plantations
and private forest conservation.
These conclusions are very important for two reasons. First, more than 75% of the
projects with CO2 mitigation potential from Latin American and African countries are
forest-related. Second, forest projects constitute the least cost option of the emerg
ing us$9 billion per annum carbon market between industrialized and developing
countries. However, if the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) does
not clearly recommend including forest projects in the overall climate change miti
gation strategy, these projects are likely to be rejected by the Convention or remain
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in limbo. Moreover, if forest projects are excluded, then fuel-switching projects in
large developing countries like China and India will become the least cost options
and will capture the bulk of the market, effectively limiting the participation of Latin
American and African countries in climate change mitigation activities.

Some background on global warming

1 Estimates of annual global
emissions from deforestation
range from 0.6 to 2.8 billion
tons, compared to around 6.0
billion tons from fossil fuel
combustion (Houghton 1991;
Smith et al. 1993).

During the last decade, many scientists and policymakers became convinced that
increased emissions of carbon dioxide or other “greenhouse gases” (methane,
nitrous oxide, and related synthetic compounds) were contributing to the warm
ing of the planet. These emissions had grown with industrialization, particularly
from the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal and petroleum, to power industry; to
heat, cool, and light homes and ofﬁces; and to transport goods and passengers.
Deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions to the
atmosphere after fossil fuel combustion.1
Several factors have made it difﬁcult to reach an agreement on a global warm
ing mitigation strategy.
First, there is still substantial scientiﬁc uncertainty about the link between
global warming and the so-called greenhouse gases. To many it seems obvious that
the planet is warming. Proof comes in the form of receding polar ice caps and the
14 warmest years in recorded history all happening within the last two decades
(temperatures have been recorded since 1866). However, it is still unclear whether
warming is a long-term trend and to what extent the build up of greenhouse gases
is contributing to it. The scientiﬁc models of climate change are so complex and
sensitive that small and plausible differences in assumptions could signiﬁcantly
alter predictions about future temperatures.
Second, the beneﬁts of preventing global warming are in dispute. Concerned
scientists forecast that rising temperatures will lead to massive coastal ﬂooding,
dramatic changes in crop yields, more violent storms, the extinction of species due
to habitat loss, and other terrible results. Yet others argue that the world may adapt
to rising temperatures without enormous suffering or cost, particularly if the tem
perature increase is not too extreme. Some models also indicate that global warm
ing might help many parts of the world by increasing rainfall and extending grow
ing seasons.
Third, there is disagreement about how the burden of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions should be shared among the countries of the world. Historically, indus
trialized countries have emitted the lion’s share of greenhouse gases; the United
States alone has accounted for nearly 25%. However, the “business-as-usual” fore
casts show that the proportion of emissions from developing countries will rise
rapidly as they industrialize (see Table 1). Developing countries argue that they
should not have to reduce their emissions below their current modest levels, and
should be allowed some margin for growth. Industrialized nations are reluctant to
bear the burden alone, however, or to make sacriﬁces that might encourage prof
ligate emissions by others.
The strategy debate has been further complicated by uncertainty as to how
much it will cost to reduce emissions. Pessimists point out that sources of energy
with low or no greenhouse gas emissions tend to be either fairly expensive (such
as solar or wind power) or to present other environmental risks (such as nuclear
power). Optimists argue that the costs of alternative energy sources and cleaner
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table 1

total carbon emissions by region, 1995 and 2000 (millions of metric tons)

Regions
North America
Western Europe
Industrialized Asia
Eastern Europe and
former Soviet Union
Developing Asia
Middle East
Africa
Central and
South America
World total
Selected countries
United States
Canada
Japan
Mexico
China
India
Brazil

actual
1995

projected
2020

annual % change
1995-2000

1,629
925
379

3,313
1,239
415

1.4 %
1.2
1.2%

866
1,427
229
192

1,223
3,835
409
341

1.4%
4.0%
2.3%
2.3%

194
5,841

574
10,447

4.4%
2.4%

1,411
135
82
281
792
222
64

1,956
198
159
385
2.340
523
208

1.3%
1.5%
2.7%
1.3%
4.4%
3.5%
4.9%

Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 1998

technologies would decline rapidly once businesses and households were given
incentives.
The potentially high costs of reducing emissions make tradable emissions cred
its more attractive. The basic idea is that every country will agree to reduce emis
sions by a certain amount and if countries that can reduce emissions at a relatively
low cost are able to exceed their reduction commitments, they would be allowed
to sell “credits” for the excess to countries where emissions reduction is more
expensive. The United States successfully established a domestic market for emis
sions credits to help reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants in the
1990s. The hope is that a similar market for greenhouse gas emission credits could
reduce the cost of slowing global warming.
International conventions on climate change

The countries of the world took a key step toward a global agreement on climate
change in 1988 when they established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change () to assess the scientiﬁc, technical, and socioeconomic research on
climate change. The ’ work helped convince many in the world community
that the risk of global warming was serious enough to warrant action. This led to
the United Nations’ Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Parties to the Rio
summit approved the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, which
called for the rollback of greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels and was later rat
iﬁed by 165 countries. The Convention set no speciﬁc targets for individual coun
tries, however, so its effect was more symbolic than practical. A subsequent
summit in Berlin in 1994 also saw only limited progress.
By 1997, however, concern about global warming had increased to the point
that at the third Conference of Parties in Kyoto more speciﬁc measures were
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2 Argentina actually com
mitted to a specific target,
Kazakhstan has only
promised to do so.

3 The two that can be used
among Annex I countries are
“international permit trad
ing” (under Article 17) and
“joint implementation”
(under Article 6). The Clean
Development Mechanism is
described in Article 12.

   
approved. In Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol the industrialized nations and many
of the transition-economy countries of Eastern Europe committed to speciﬁc
emissions reduction targets that averaged a 5.2% rollback from 1990 emissions
levels. These targets were to be achieved by the year 2008 and sustained through
2012. The developing countries did not commit to speciﬁc reduction targets at
Kyoto because they were reluctant to incur expenses and they wanted to see
whether technological progress would reduce the costs of cleaner technologies
and development. Because of this, the Annex I countries hedged their commit
ments by specifying that the Protocol would not be binding until it was ratiﬁed by
at least 55 Annex I countries that were responsible for at least 55% of the Annex I
greenhouse gas emissions. Since Kyoto, only two developing countries—
Argentina and Kazakhstan—have agreed to emissions reduction targets.2 The
process of ratiﬁcation among the Annex I countries is also proceeding slowly, and
many observers are of the opinion that the major emitters, such as the United
States, are unlikely to ratify the Protocol until the rest of the developing countries
have also committed to speciﬁc reduction targets.
The Kyoto Protocol includes three provisions for trading emissions credits.
Two apply only to trades between Annex I countries, but the third, the Clean
Development Mechanism (), may be used for trades between Annex I coun
tries and developing countries.3 To qualify for a  trade, a developing country
must demonstrate that the emissions credits it intends to sell are “additional” to
emissions reductions it might be expected to achieve under a business-as-usual
scenario. Through the , Annex I countries can offset their commitments by
ﬁnancing projects in developing countries.
Costa Rica’s economy and its forests

Costa Rica is a Central American country with a population of 3.7 million and a
landmass of 5.2 million hectares. It is one of the most stable democracies in Latin
America, and has not suffered from the civil wars or unrest that have plagued many
of its neighbors in recent decades. Perhaps as a result, Costa Rica has the highest per
capita income in Central America and one of the highest in Latin America.
Throughout most of the 1980s, Costa Rica’s economy was largely dependent on
exports of coffee, bananas, and cattle and its domestic industry and farmers were
protected by high tariffs. These policies led to slow economic growth, however,
and the government began to run ﬁscal deﬁcits in an effort to meet the popular
demand for improved standards of living. By 1988, the ﬁnancial situation had
become so precarious that the government had to appeal to the International
Monetary Fund () for loans. As a condition of the loans, the IMF required that
Costa Rica reduce its import barriers and open its economy to foreign investment.
These reforms helped to transform the Costa Rican economy over the next decade.
Tourism to Costa Rica’s beautiful beaches and tropical forests increased and soon
overtook agriculture as the leading source of foreign exchange. Foreign companies
invested so much in local assembly plants that in 1998 electronics overtook
tourism as the number one foreign exchange earner. With the opening of a new
Intel computer chip plant, electronics is expected to be the primary foreign
exchange source for the next decade.
The 1990s also brought increased efforts by the Costa Rican government to pro
tect its forests and wildlife (see Table 2). During the decades when agriculture was
the primary export earner, thousands of hectares of forest were chopped down for
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plantations and ranches. This destruction prompted the government to expand its
system of national parks and to create a national network of Wildlife Conserva
tion Areas (WCAs) which covered 15% of the
country’s land area. The WCAs were intended
table 2 land use in costa rica, 1998
to preserve habitats for sensitive forest species
and consisted either of publicly owned lands
hectares
(millions)
percentage
or private lands where, for a fee, the owner
and forestry
had agreed to limit logging to levels that Agriculture
Coffee, banana, and other export crops
0.2
4
would not harm wildlife. The national parks
Beef cattle
1.0
19
Dairy and mixed use
1.0
20
and WCAs helped to establish Costa Rica as
Private forest
0.8
15
one of the premier destinations for ecoAbandoned cropland
0.5
10
tourism in the 1980s and 1990s.
Subtotal for agriculture and forest
3.5
68
1.3
25
In 1994, however, ecologists from various Parks and Wildlife Conservation Areas
governmental and non-governmental con- Other
Urban
0.3
5
servation agencies determined that the WCAs
Miscellaneous other
0.1
2
Subtotal for ‘other’
0.4
7
should be expanded to cover an additional
5.2
100
10% of the country’s land area in order to Total
adequately protect Costa Rica’s wildlife.4
Source: René Castro Salazar,“Valuing the Environmental Service
of Permanent Forest Stands to the Global Climate:The Case of Costa Rica,”
Costa Rica has several different types of tropunpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, June 1999.
ical forest and, as a result, is home to an
unusually large number of species. Some of
4 The expanded area is
these species are rare and endangered, including many that are thought to be
called the Protected Areas
unique to the forests of Costa Rica, and not as yet studied by scientists. In arguing
Project. For the sake of sim
for expansion of the protected areas, Costa Rican environmentalists stressed that
plicity, it is referred to here as
the WCAs expansion.
the nation had an obligation to the world to preserve this biodiversity. Moreover,
many of the sylvan species had potential economic value as the source of new
medicines, food, and cosmetics. In the early 1990s, for example, Costa Rica signed
contracts with two international pharmaceutical companies to share in the prof
its from medicines that might be developed from rare Costa Rican species.
Expanding the WCAs would also protect the quality of Costa Rica’s drinking
water.
The desire to expand the  stimulated Costa Rica’s effort to develop carbon
emissions reduction credits. Without the revenue from selling credits, the govern
ment would have been hard pressed to ﬁnd the funds either to purchase land out
right or to pay landowners not to develop all the additional hectares that it wanted
to add to the . Reforesting neighboring plantations and cattle ranches had
the added beneﬁt of carbon dioxide sequestration, however, and thus offset green
house gas emissions. This meant that if the government could sell the credits for
sequestering the carbon to Annex I countries, it could use the proceeds to buy or
protect the hectares it wanted.
The reforestation scheme was politically advantageous as well because it helped
rural residents. The rural areas had been fairly much excluded from the country’s
growing prosperity because most of the factories and other new economic activi
ties were located around San José, the nation’s capital. Traditional rural agricul
ture was declining because world prices for coffee, bananas, and beef remained low
and because young people were ﬁnding better jobs in San José. Expanding the
WCAs provided new sources of income for rural communities.
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table 3
table 3

estimates of the marginal cost of abatement with and without trading
(in 1995 dollars per ton of carbon)
trading

model or
researcher

united
states

sgm
merege
G-cubed
poles
gtem
WorldScan
green
aim

163
274
63
82
375
38
149
166

Average

164

no trading
japan

annex i
countries

167
130-140
773
78
196
214

252
249
751
87
77
253

76
114
37
112
123
20
67
65

27
80
13
33

260

277

80

28

europe

global

25
43

Source: Table 1 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility do they Provide?" in Richard
Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism:
Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives, report by the International Energy Agency for the
Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October-November 1999.

table 4
table 4

aggregate economic cost of kyoto commitments with and without trading
(in 2020 as a percentage reduction in gross national or domestic product)
trading among

model or
researcher
sgm
merge
G-cubed

gtem
green
aim

country

no trading

United States
United States
United States
Japan
Other OECD
All industrialized
All industrialized
United States
Japan
European Union

0.4%
1%
0.3%
0.8%
1.4%
1.2%
0.5%
0.45%
0.25%
0.3%

trading among
annex i countries

global
trading

0.28%

0.12%
0.25%

0.2%
0.2%
0.5%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.15%
0.17%

0.2%
0%
0.07%

Source:Table 2 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility do They Provide?" in Richard
Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism:
Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives, report by the International Energy Agency for
the Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October-November 1999.
5 The information and
tables in this section are
drawn from Richard Baron,
“The Kyoto Mechanisms:
How Much Flexibility do They
Provide?” in Richard Baron,
Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading
and the Clean Development
Mechanism: Resource Trans
fers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives, report by
the International Energy
Agency for the Fifth Confer
ence of the Parties, Bonn,
October-November 1999.

The potential for emissions trading 5

Research suggests that, at least in theory, emissions trading could substantially
reduce the cost of rolling back greenhouse gas emissions. Table 3 summarizes cost
estimates for achieving Kyoto Protocol commitments based on eight economic
models produced by researchers who were selected by the International Energy
Agency from several countries. The results vary somewhat because of differing
model assumptions about, for example, the rates at which the costs of cleaner
technologies will decline. Nevertheless, the eight models are fairly consistent in
predicting that trading can signiﬁcantly reduce costs. For example, using the average results from the eight models, without trading, the marginal cost of a ton of
carbon emissions reductions would be us$164 in the United States, $260 in
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Europe, and $277 in Japan. If table 5 emissions reduction commitments and share potentially acquired
trading were allowed among the table 5 through trading among industrialized and transition economies
Annex I countries, the marginal
emissions
emissions
emissions
cost could drop to us$80 per ton.
reduction
reduction
reduction
If trading were allowed with the
(millions
from trading
from trading
developing countries as well, the
of tons
(millions
as a percentage
of carbon)
of tons
of total
marginal cost would drop even
of carbon)
reduction
further, to $28 per ton.6
Table 4 translates the results of Europe
338
213
63%
83
66%
these forecasts into effects on Japan (or oecd Pacific) 126
America
567
221
39%
Gross National Product (). North
Total
1,031
517
50%
The “G-cubed” model is a fairly
typical analysis. It predicts that
without emissions trading, con- Source: Adapted from Table 3 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility do
They Provide?" in Richard Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the
trol measures would absorb the Clean Development Mechanism: Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives,
equivalent of 0.3% of the  , report by the International Energy Agency for the Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October0.8% of the  in Japan, and November 1999.
1.4% in the other industrialized
6 The simulations assumed
countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developthat developing countries
ment ().7 With trading, emissions control would only absorb between 0.2 and
would be able to sell credits for
0.5% of the  in those same countries (see Table 5).
any emissions reductions
beyond their business-as-usual
Some researchers suspect, however, that the cost estimates represented in the
forecasts.
models are optimistic, for two reasons. First, the models all assume that each coun
try will choose the most cost-effective domestic emissions control strategy. If pol7 The members of the oecd
include Australia, Austria, Bel
icymakers chose to protect politically sensitive domestic industries and regions
gium, Canada, Czech Republic,
from adopting even low-cost measures, however, then the costs of abatement
Denmark, Finland, France, Gerwithout trading might be much higher than estimated.
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lux
Second, the models assume fully ﬂuid markets for emissions credits with no
embourg, Mexico, the Nethersigniﬁcant barriers or transaction costs. In practice, however, the fact that the
lands, New Zealand, Norway,
developing countries have not committed to speciﬁc emissions targets is a source
Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
of concern among Annex I countries. In particular, they are concerned about leakUnited Kingdom, and the
age and slippage. The Convention uses these terms to refer to the possibility that
United States.
the net beneﬁts of a carbon sequestration project will be reduced if, for instance,
landowners take the money earned from forest conservation and use it to convert
forest to cropland in another area (leakage); or if they increase their CO2 emissions
by, for example, buying more vehicles (slippage). These potential situations might
prove to be major impediments to carbon reduction trading. At the very least it
would mean that some neutral party would have to ensure that the additionality
requirement was met—i.e., that the emissions reduction would not have occurred
anyway in the absence of the project. Germany has emerged as the spokesperson
for a number of industrialized countries that are opposed to allowing signiﬁcant
trading with developing countries until they commit to emissions reduction tar
gets. Germany has argued that without emissions commitments, additionality
would be difﬁcult to determine and could be easily evaded.
Even if developing countries do commit to speciﬁc emissions targets, some
observers wonder whether the trade ﬂows involved are realistic. Trading among
the Annex I countries would involve payments of roughly $42 billion per year
to the transition economies of Eastern Europe from Europe, Japan, and North
America. If global trading were allowed, it is projected that industrialized coun
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If global trading were allowed, it is projected that industrialized countries would
pay developing countries roughly us$9 billion per year for emissions credits. The
amounts involved would be substantially larger than the foreign aid payments
that many developing and transition-economy countries are currently receiving.
Understandably, some developing and transition economies want assurances
that industrialized countries will not simply cut their foreign aid budgets to
compensate.

8 Now British-Amoco.

tries would pay developing countries roughly $9 billion per year for emissions
credits. The amounts involved would be substantially larger than the foreign aid
payments that many developing and transition-economy countries are currently
receiving. Understandably, some developing and transition economies want
assurances that industrialized countries will not simply cut their foreign aid bud
gets to compensate. Skeptics also wonder whether or not the emissions reductions
implied for the transition and developing countries are realistic. If trade occurs at
the scale predicted by the models, transition economies would be emitting
roughly 50% less than under the business-as-usual scenario, while developing
countries would be emitting only 20% to 30% less.
Despite these concerns, trading emissions credits with developing countries is
proceeding on a limited basis. The 1992 Rio Convention encouraged experimen
tal trading in order to determine how such a system might work. The 1997 Kyoto
Protocol approved the Clean Development Mechanism (), although it never
deﬁned how the additionality test would be met. This ambiguity exists, in part, due
to differences between developing countries and the German-led critics. Some
countries and large multinational businesses with high emissions control costs
were interested in buying credits, however, even though the credits’ ultimate legal
status was ambiguous. British Petroleum,8 a major international energy company,
set up an experimental system to trade emissions credits among its plants in
industrialized and developing countries. Through this trial the company discov
ered that even with inter-plant trading, its marginal costs of abatement were likely
to be close to $70 per ton. As such, buying some low-cost credits from other
sources might be worthwhile as a method for BP to hedge its bets for future com
mitments. It also does not hurt that purchasing credits generates favorable corpo
rate publicity.
Most of the proposed emission credit trades are for electric power generating
projects. For example, a credit might be issued for installing wind turbines that
generate electricity with no greenhouse gas emissions, or for converting a coalﬁred generating station to using cleaner-burning natural gas. However, there is
also growing interest in credits for other types of emission reduction measures,
including reforestation. Reforestation credits are typically offered for a limited
period of time, say 20 years, with the idea that at the end the forest might be logged
and replanted. This causes some environmental groups to oppose reforestation
credits. Greenpeace, the international environmental group, has labeled credits for
reforestation a “time bomb” that will cause serious problems when they expire.
Environmentalists are also wary because the reforestation credits would have to be
replaced when the forest was logged. Yet advocates of reforestation have pointed
out that other credits are for limited periods also- a wind turbine, for example, can
be expected to last just 20 years. Moreover, after 20 years technological progress
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may have reduced the costs of emissions abatement signiﬁcantly.
Many models have been used to estimate an order of magnitude for sequestra
tion and mitigation potentials. Early models calculated that around 500 million
hectares were necessary (Sedjo and Solomon 1989) or available (Nordhaus 1991b)
at the global level for carbon sequestration. All of the early models for Latin Amer
ican and African countries consistently showed that they could provide at least
50% of the needed land, with low preparation costs and high forest growth rates.
These combined factors offered, especially to tropical countries, a highly compet
itive position in any carbon market that includes forest projects. More recent stud
ies, such as the Harvard University study for Central America and the National
Autonomous University of Mexico () study for Mexico, compared carbon
and fossil fuel options.9 The Harvard study calculated the carbon reduction from
forests in Central America (via conservation, forest management, and reforesta
tion) to be 54 million tons per year, compared to 6 million coming from potential
fossil fuel emissions reduction. The  study estimated that the forest repre
sents 87% of the 40 million tons of carbon available in Mexico for the year 2000.
In economic terms, carbon sequestration through forestry or reduced defor
estation may be a cost-effective approach to reducing global atmospheric concen
trations of CO2.10 However, the countries participating in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change () are still debating whether
reducing carbon emission through projects that reduce deforestation will be an
acceptable option for emissions reduction and trade under the treaty. This unre
solved legality is likely to affect the carbon trade more than scientiﬁc concerns. If
the  excludes the preservation of natural forests, it would encourage forest
plantations, which do not constitute very rich ecosystems. A second effect is a bias
toward options in countries that use CO2-intensive energy sources. For example,
big developing countries like China and India that mainly use fossil fuels will ben
eﬁt because they will be able to provide cheaper and larger volumes of carbon
emission reductions as a result of fuel switching or using cleaner energy sources.
At the same time, countries like Costa Rica and Brazil, which are currently using
mainly renewable energy sources, will not be able to participate as fully in the
emerging carbon market.
Costa Rica’s emissions credit program

Costa Rica’s emissions credit program has gone through three stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, which lasted from 1994 to 1995, the government tried to facilitate trades
between individual Costa Rican landowners and businesses and foreign govern
ments or corporations. Although one trade was almost consummated, the gov
ernment soon realized that individual emissions reduction projects would have to
be consolidated if trading was to be viable. Negotiating a deal for a small refor
estation project was almost as costly—in terms of translators, lawyers, and air
fare—as negotiating a deal for a large one.
During the second stage, from 1995 to 1997, the Ministry of Environment and
Energy assumed responsibility for consolidating small projects and offering cred
its for sale. This effort resulted in the ﬁrst-ever sale of an emission credit based on
reforestation. Two hundred and thirty eight individual reforestation projects,
many bordering the existing WCAs, were consolidated to provide a credit for
200,000 tons of carbon for 20 years. This credit was sold to the Norwegian gov
ernment in 1996 for $10 per ton, a price the Ministry had calculated would
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9 The Harvard study was
financed by the Central
American Bank and is forth
coming; the UNAM study
was partially financed by the
Inter-American Development
Bank and was presented at
the Bank’s annual governor’s
meeting in March 2000.
10 This is the conclusion for
Costa Rica in the Costa Rican
Dilemma (Castro and Cordero
1999). Omar Masera reached
the same conclusion for Mexico
in his presentation at the InterAmerican Development Bank
meeting, held in New Orleans,
March 2000. A similar conclu
sion was reached for the United
States in an article called “Cli
mate Change and Forest Sinks:
Factors Affecting the Costs of
Carbon Sequestration,” (Har
vard University, November
1998) prepared by Professors
Robert Stavins and Richard
Newell. This article stated,
“...even for highly industrialized
countries such as the United
States, carbon sequestration
through land-use changes
could arguably be part of a
cost-effective portfolio of short
term strategies” (p.24).
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Surveillance Group, has estab
lished a special Forestry Offset
Carbon Verification Service.

   
recover the payments that it expected to make to cattle ranchers to induce them to
convert their ranches into plantation forests. Despite its success, however, the
Ministry was criticized by the Inspector General, a government watchdog agency,
for having sold the credits at cost. The Inspector General argued that the Ministry
could have gotten a much higher price.
In the third stage, from 1997 to 1998, the Ministry of Environment and Energy
decided to address the Inspector General’s concerns by auctioning credits to the
highest bidder. This time it assembled enough projects to sequester 1,000,000 tons
of carbon and offered them at a ﬂoor price of $20 per ton. Although a number
of governments and multinational ﬁrms expressed interest in the auction, in the
end there were no bidders. The Ministry was told privately by some bidders that
the ﬂoor price had been too high. The Ministry also suspected that uncertainty
about the new additionality requirements that had just been established under the
Kyoto Protocol might have been a factor. To help address the additionality ques
tion, in March 1998 the Ministry hired a well known French technical certiﬁcation
ﬁrm to audit the project and attest that the reforestation would take place as
promised.11 However, following this, the Ministry opted to delay offering the cred
its for auction again until after the national elections later that year.
The new government

The left-of-center Social Democrats lost the presidency to the right-of-center
Christian Democrats in the 1998 elections. In his inauguration speech, incoming
President Miguel Angel Rodriguez singled out emission credits as one of the few
of his predecessor’s programs that he intended to retain. President Rodriguez has
a doctorate in economics, which may have made him sympathetic to the rationale
for the program. In addition, environmental protection has always been popular
in Costa Rica, and part of the reason the Christian Democrats won the election
was because of appeals to voters in the disaffected rural areas.
When the new government assumed responsibility for the emissions credit
program, it faced two decisions: (1) whether to offer the 1,000,000 tons for sale
again soon or to wait; and (2) if they were to sell, what minimum price to set.
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figure 2

estimate of the marginal cost of forest carbon sequestration
and energy carbon emissions reduction projects in the united states
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note: The carbon squestration lines are estimates of marginal costs for reforestation
in the United States. The carbon abatement points are estimates of the marginal costs
for emissions reductions from U.S. power plants.
Source: Robert N. Stavins,“The Cost of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed Preference Approach,”
American Economic Review, vol. 89, no. 4 (September 1999), p. 1004

It was tempting for the new government to delay the offering until the next
major international conference on global warming, in hopes of some clariﬁcation
of some of the uncertainties regarding emissions commitments and trading.
However, the conference in Bonn in November 1999 saw little progress on these
issues, and the next conference in The Hague in November 2000 is not expected
to make much advancement either—partly due to the unlikelihood that the U.S.
political ambivalence towards the Protocol will be resolved during its presidential
elections. Should the Costa Rican government choose to wait, however, it might
lose its position as a reforestation credit pioneer. Bolivia recently offered approx
imately 4,000,000 tons of credits from reforestation projects, and Brazil and sev
eral other countries are expected to follow suit.
With regard to pricing, the Costa Rican Ministry of the Environment had new
estimates of how much it would have to pay farmers to switch to forests. The new
ﬁgures conﬁrmed that the cost would be about $10 per ton for the ﬁrst ﬁve mil
lion tons, but would rise steadily thereafter due to increasing marginal cost when
more expensive land was planted (see Figure 1) Bolivia was rumored to have
potential buyers at $15 to $20 per ton for its new credits. New studies also sug
gested that forest projects might be feasible in the United States at $20 per ton,
only slightly more than the cost of emissions abatement from some U.S. powergenerating projects (see Figure 2). In July 1999, the World Bank Prototype Carbon
Fund announced a price range of $20 to $30 per ton.
To contribute to the ongoing Costa Rican evaluation, a study was developed to
analyze the implications of different price scenarios on forest conservation and
agriculture.
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The impact of the emerging CO2 market on forested and agricultural areas

12 René Castro Salazar,“Valuing the Environment Service of
Permanent Forest Stands to the
Global Climate: The Case of
Costa Rica,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Uni
versity, June 1999.

During 1998 and 1999 René Castro, the former Costa Rican Minister of Environ
ment and Energy, conducted a study (partially ﬁnanced by the ) of the value
of forest stands to the global climate. The focus of the study was Costa Rica’s
forested areas.12 The results strongly suggest that including forest options for trop
ical countries like Costa Rica would further reduce mitigation costs. For example,
Castro calculated the amount of carbon generated on 260,000 hectares in Costa
Rica. To compare this with the amounts for other countries and regions, he esti
mated the total amount of carbon produced at different prices. The results illus
trate the importance of trade. If the carbon price is set at us$10 per ton, the Costa
Rican  would be willing to sell 15% of their annual tons of carbon, the state
of Wisconsin 9%, the Delta region 8%, and the United States as a whole 22%.When
The study also suggests that considering carbon sequestration beneﬁts will lead
to larger areas of forest being protected than if only the need to protect biodiver
sity or fragile ecosystems were considered. … Additionally, the study demon
strated that if Costa Rican landowners were paid for carbon sequestration, many
of them might switch from crops to planting forests.
the carbon price increases to us$50 per ton, the Costa Rican  would sell 88%,
while the landowners surveyed in the Delta study would sell only 42%, and those
in the U.S. study 74%. As the price increases, each supplier would be willing to offer
a larger percentage of its carbon, with the Costa Rican  offering propor
tionally more carbon than all the domestic U.S. options at any given price because
Costa Rica usually has a lower marginal cost.
The study also suggests that considering carbon sequestration beneﬁts will lead
to larger areas of forest being protected than if only the need to protect biodiver
sity or fragile ecosystems were considered. For example, at prices between $50
and $100 per ton the Costa Rican protected areas of La Amistad, Barbilla, and
Palo Verde might expand further than proposed. Moreover, with prices closer to
$100, the objective of consolidating and expanding protected areas to up to 25%
of the national territory seems feasible.
Additionally, the study demonstrated that if Costa Rican landowners were paid
for carbon sequestration, many of them might switch from crops to planting
forests. For example, if the carbon price was at least $83 per ton, a farmer pro
ducing, or with potential to produce, the average agricultural mix for Costa Rica,
might switch to a pine plantation (Pinus patula). Forest projects would probably
ﬁrst replace traditional activities, such as raising cattle and rice, which require con
siderable land. Forests are less likely to replace the more proﬁtable export-oriented
crops such as coffee, bananas, and pineapples.
Finally, carbon sequestration payments would also induce landowners to pro
tect their natural forests outside the protected areas. For example, if a private
owner of natural forest were considering whether to preserve a natural forest or to
use it to raise beef cattle or rice, he would ﬁnd that preserving the natural forest
was the more proﬁtable option if the price were set at $20 per ton (see Table 6).
On the other hand, if that same owner had natural forestland that was suitable for
growing export-oriented crops, he might well use it for those crops unless the
carbon price were to exceed $100 per ton.

-,    -
table 6
table 6

carbon indifference price between private natural
forest protection and competing agricultural activities

crops or
activity

region or private natural forest (cost estimates in $/ton)
La Rincón de
Palo
Piedras
Barra
GuanaCarara
Amistad
la Vieja

Coffee
Pineapples
Watermelons
Yams
Avocados
Plantains
Tiquisque*
Passion Fruit
Tomatoes
Forest plantations
Bananas
Hearts of palm
Yucca*
Coconuts
Dairy cattle
African palms
Oranges
Sugar cane
Beef and dairy cattle
Lemons
Beans
Melons
Potatoes
Rice
Beef cattle
Mangoes
Managed forestry

386
372
309
251
245
244
198
189
170
124
102
98
91
73
66
63
63
61
51
35
27
23
22
12
11
3
3

219
458
378
305
298
297
240
228
204
35
118
114
106
82
74
70
71
68
55
35
25
20
19
6
6
<0
<0

275
522
432
350
342
341
277
263
236
71
140
135
126
99
90
85
86
83
68
46
35
30
29
14
13
1
2

168
524
431
346
338
337
270
256
228
14
129
124
114
87
77
72
74
70
55
32
20
15
14
<0
<0
<0
<0

228
502
415
335
327
326
263
250
224
51
130
125
116
91
81
77
78
75
61
39
28
23
22
8
7
<0
<0

226
469
389
314
307
306
248
235
211
50
124
119
111
87
79
74
76
73
59
39
29
24
23
10
9
<0
<0

211
549
455
368
360
359
291
276
248
54
147
142
132
104
94
89
90
87
71
48
36
31
30
14
13
<0
1

Barbilla
227
487
403
327
320
319
258
245
221
62
131
126
118
93
84
80
81
78
64
44
33
28
27
14
13
1
2

* Tiquisque and yucca are roots similar to cassava.
Source: René Castro Salazar, "Valuing the Environment Service of Permanent Forest Stands to the Global Cli
mate:The Case of Costa Rica," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, June 1999.

Conclusions

Most researchers and policymakers agree that the overall cost of mitigating CO2
and other greenhouse gases could be reduced if the carbon trading options pro
posed in the Kyoto Protocol were implemented. For example, in the short run, the
cost of carbon abatement could easily exceed us$100 per ton for energy projects in
industrialized countries. However, if the forestry sector is included, the cost of
reducing carbon emissions and sequestering carbon could be reduced to a range
between us$10 and us$100 per ton of carbon.
The ﬁndings for Costa Rica might also be relevant for other tropical countries
in Latin America and Africa. For example, the World Bank and the United Nations
Development Programme are ﬁnancing the development of a network of pro
tected areas called the Mesoamerican Corridor that will encompass 8 million
hectares in Central America and 2 million in southern Mexico. This project is
based on the idea that the eight participating countries share between 60% and
80% of the same living species, which will be more likely to survive within large
interconnected protected areas. It is reasonable to expect that the ﬁgures projected
in the Castro study, both in terms of carbon productivity and land opportunity
cost, are relevant to the much larger Mesoamerican protected areas network. The
study’s estimates for the marginal cost of carbon might also apply to this larger
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region. A second example is that cattle ranchers in many tropical African countries
are currently earning less than $50 per hectare per year. If the carbon price were
to reach at least $10 per ton, these ranchers would ﬁnd it economically advan
tageous to switch to forest-friendly activities. At the same time, the environment
would be used in a more sustainable way.
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Biomass: Energy and carbon emissions
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Abstract
Biomass was the primary source of energy for humankind until developed countries
began the shift toward fossil fuels about 200 years ago. More recently, developing
countries have been following in their footsteps. Today, biomass energy accounts for
just 11% of total global energy. However, in recent years, developed countries have
started to explore biomass fuel options as a cleaner alternative to fossil fuels.
This paper is an overview of a model that breaks biomass down into four compo
nents and calculates biomass energy in 122 countries, which are responsible for 95%
of global energy consumption. The study shows that despite a significant shift to
fossil fuels over the past century, biomass has been and will remain an important
source of energy for decades to come. The study also examines carbon emissions
from energy biomass sources and from all forest activities, and finds that biomass is
responsible for a total global emissions of 300 to 400 million tons of carbon a year.
At the same time, however, the carbon sequestration capacity of all forest activities
is around 550 million tons per year, resulting in a net carbon sequestration effect,
even when balanced with energy biomass.
This article is not a discussion of policy tools or technological advancements. It is
intended to serve as a methodological primer for non-scientists grappling with the
science that is at the core of the policy debates that surround the issue of climate
change.
Introduction

When used in its simplest form, the production of energy from biomass1 does not
require sophisticated technology. Because of this, throughout the history of
mankind biomass has played an important role as a basic source of energy. It was
not until the beginning of the 19th century that a shift began to occur toward fossil
fuels, eventually reducing the use of biomass energy to just 11% of the global total.
Importantly, it has become evident that the shift away from biomass to fossil fuels
generally occurs with economic growth. For the most part, developed countries
made the transition to fossil fuels some time ago and developing countries have
been following more recently.
Biomass has developed a reputation as being ineﬃcient, dirty, and unhealthy.
Burning wood that is collected from community forests, for example, is time con
suming, produces a low energy value, and tends to generate particulates which are

1 Biomass is any plant matter
or animal waste that is used for
fuel.
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Andrade and Bodinaud Modela
mento de Cana-de-açúcar
Brasileira, 2000 (both in Por
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3 For a discussion of energy
policy, see Nilsson and Bailey,
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4 A quad is a unit of energy
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average heating values,
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then breathed in by household members, frequently causing severe respiratory ill
nesses. When biomass is used in its simplest form these characteristics are
unavoidable. However, an interesting new trend has been developing in the past
few years: Developed countries have begun exploring new uses for biomass energy.
The research is concentrating on the development of low-emission technologies
that use renewable and sustainable energy sources. The result of these new devel
opments is that in recent years, despite the continued shift toward fossil fuels, the
percentage of biomass energy has not decreased as rapidly as expected. These
developments are especially signiﬁcant in light of the international goal of arrest
ing climate change.
This article is based primarily on studies conducted by the author.2 The dis
cussion is intended to be a scientiﬁc foundation for non-scientists, as well as a
guide for science and policy professionals to the functioning of the modeling pro
cedures used in this ﬁeld. It is not intended to be a correlation of policy and sci
ence, but rather an unadulterated look at the science and statistics of biomass
energy production.3
The model

Categorization of biomass
Of the 421 quads4 of global energy consumed in 1998, 376 were derived from fossil
fuels and 45 from biomass. Thus, the contribution of biomass energy is still sig
niﬁcant and will remain so throughout the ﬁrst few decades of the 21st century,
especially for ‘less developed’ countries.
For the purposes of this study, the 45 quads of global biomass energy consump
tion were divided into four categories, which are then applied to three biomass
energy-use scenarios in 122 countries. Despite the diverse energy biomass applica
tions today, these four components embody all global biomass consumption:
• Non-Forest Biomass (BNF): farm waste, animal waste, urban waste, and nonforest wood;
• Biomass from Collected Wood (BFC): manually collected native forest wood for
domestic purposes;
• Commercial Biomass from Forest Exploitation Activities (BLC): commercially
produced ﬁrewood and charcoal;
• Technological Biomass (BT): use of liquid fuels (biofuels) and cogeneration
technologies.

5 United States Census
Bureau,‘World Population Pro
file: 1998’, source:
http://www.census.gov.
6 Food and Agriculture Organi
zation of the United Nations,
‘State of the World’s Forests’,
1999.
7 INFOENER, Instituto de
Eletrotécnica e Energia,
Universidade de São Paulo,
Database published in
http://infoener.iee.usp.br.

Data
Unfortunately, the actual data available for biomass energy is scarce. However, it
is possible to estimate energy consumption values with a certain degree of error
using a combination of social and economic parameters and natural resource
data. The basic data that were used for this study were:
• Population: based on information from the United States Census Bureau.5
• Percentage of rural population: extracted from the Food and Agriculture Orga
nization () report, State of the World’s Forests.6
• Rural population biomass: based on averages of data and energy indices from
a number of sources that support the Instituto de Electrotácnica e Energia of
the University of São Paolo (—the Institute of Electricity and
Energy).7
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• Forest data by country: based on information culled from State of the World’s
Forests, including:
•
•
•
•
•

country area
total forest area
total forestation area
annual deforestation area
annual reforestation area

• Commercial deforestation area (Ac): derived from annual commercial wood
production information in the  publication, State of the World’s Forests.
The actual calculation was based on the average rate of 120 t/ha of ﬁrewood
produced.8
• Non-commercial deforestation area (ADNC): based on the di›erence between
the total annual deforestation and commercial deforestation.

8 Morato de Andrade, Carlos
Américo,‘Florestas, Madeira e
susa Aplicacoes,’ in-house pub
lication IEE/USP, February 2000.

Structuring the model
The foundation of the model is the premise that total biomass use is equal to the
sum of non-forest biomass, non-commercial biomass from native forests, com
mercial biomass from forest exploitation, and technological biomass. Thus, the
basic equation used for this study is:
B = BT + BNF + BFC + BLC
The model was used to determine the individual values of the four components
of biomass energy use in 122 countries, which are cumulatively responsible for
95% of global energy consumption. The values of the four components are
depicted for all 122 countries in Table 1 (page xx). These ﬁgures were determined
using the methodology described below.
Technological biomass (BT)
Many developed countries and a few developing countries have well-established
biomass energy production programs. A primary component of these programs
is cogeneration of electricity.9 The category BT includes the entire output of liquid
fuels (biofuels), including ethyl alcohol.10 Relatively accurate BT values can be
obtained from the United States Department of Energy,11 from the International
Energy Agency12 databases, and from information supplied by individual coun
tries. Cumulatively, approximately seven quads of BT energy are currently being
generated in eight countries:
United States
Brazil
Sweden
Germany
Norway
Japan
Canada
France

1.86 quads
1.00 quads
0.82 quads
0.72 quads
0.70 quads
0.48 quads
0.46 quads
0.41 quads

9 Cogeneration is a process by
which industrial waste is used
to produce heat or electricity.
10 Also known as ethanol. In
addition to being a fairly
common ingredient in indus
trial chemicals and medicines,
ethyl alcohol may be used both
as an additive to gasoline and
as a fuel by itself.
11 EIA, Department of Energy,
USA,‘Country Analysis Brief’,
http:/www.eia.doc.gov/emeu/
world/country.
12 IEA, International Energy
Agency,‘Key World Energy Sta
tistics, 1998’, Paris 1999.
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Commercial biomass from forest exploitation activities (BLC)
BLC includes all biomass derived from commercial wood (MLC) used for ﬁrewood
and charcoal production. Values for BLC are relatively easy to determine, since
there are accurate data on MLC values for each country.
figure 1

world biomass energy (quads) – minimum values (b=42.69)

Non-forest biomass (BNF) and biomass from collected wood (BFC)
Because of insuﬃcient accurate data, BNF and BFC are more diﬃcult to determine
than the other two biomass categories. In order to establish a value with a safe
margin of error for these biomass energy components, the model used additional
data on population, forest, and economics for the various countries. The follow
ing data was established for each country:

13 LPG is typically a mixture of
propane and butane.

Rural Population Biomass (BR), measured in quads per year. The model used
an estimated value for the basic needs of rural inhabitants, with the assump
tion that they had no access to electrical power. This factor varied with avail
ability of alternative fuel sources such as liqueﬁed petroleum gas ().13
Energy Obtained from Burning Entire Non-Commercial Deforested Areas
(0.00157ADNC). Only countries with large forest areas and a high rate of
deforestation have a free ADNC area from which to obtain fuel wood.
The variables that were determined and applied using this data included: Bio
mass Lost in Burned Areas (BQ) and A Portion of the Commercial Biomass
Energy, Firewood and Charcoal Produced (BCP).
Two basic equations were proposed in the model:
BFC + BQ = 0.00157ADNC: Collected wood biomass plus biomass lost in burned
areas must be equal to biomass from non-commercial deforested areas.
BR = BFC + BNF + BCP: Rural population biomass energy must be equal to col
lected wood biomass energy plus non-forest biomass energy plus part of the com
mercial biomass energy, ﬁrewood, and charcoal produced in the country.
Firewood and charcoal biomass (BLC) are used in part for manufacturing and
in part by rural populations. In most of the countries where there is no rural power

  
supply, BLC biomass is the sole source of energy for the rural population (BCP =
BLC). For the purposes of this model, industrial use of BLC can be ignored.
There are three basic scenarios that can occur in BNF and BFC-consuming
countries:
Scenario 1: BLC >BR
In this case, there is enough commercially produced charcoal and ﬁrewood to
supply the rural population. The most probable situation will be: BNF = BFC = 0.
Excess BLC will be used by the urban population or by local manufacturing plants.
Scenario 2: BLC <BR and 0.00157ADNC <BR –BLC
In this case, the rural population is supplied by BLC + BFC + BNF, the values for
which would be as follows:
BFC = 0.00157ADNC
BLC, determined for each country based on the  forest report
BR – 0.00157ADNC > BNF > BR – BLC – 0.00157ADNC
BNF is usually close to BR – BLC – 0.00157ADNC and only approaches the other
limit, BR – 0.000157ADNC, when there is a signiﬁcant manufacturing activity that
uses ﬁrewood and/or charcoal.
Scenario 3: BLC <BR and 0.00157ADNC =BR –BLC
In this case, non-commercial forest is enough to supply BR – BLC, and there is
no need for non-forest biomass BNF. Therefore:
BNF = 0
BR > BFC> BR – BLC
In this case, BFC should approximate BR – BLC and will approximate BR only
when there is signiﬁcant industrial activity that relies on ﬁrewood and/or char
coal.
These three scenarios provide the energy components in the various countries,
since BT and BLC have already been calculated.
If biomass from collected wood is less than the energy obtained from burning
entire non-commercial deforested areas (BFC < 0.00157ADNC) there will be biomass
burning and the di›erence between these energy outputs will be the energy lost.
When BFC = 0.00157ADNC, there will be no burning biomass, meaning that this is a
better use of forest energy. Table 1 (see page xx) and Figures 1 and 2 show BT and
BBLC values for all countries, as well as possible variations of BFC and BNF. The
results obtained worldwide are the following:
14.55 <
4.89 ≤
42.69 quads/year ≤

BT
BNF
BFC
BLC
B

= 7.36
≤ 18.82
≤ 5.48
= 15.89
≤ 47.55

quads/year
quads/year
quads/year
quads/year
quads/year

The unexpected result for non-forest biomass, which averaged about 16 quads,
or 36% of the total, is closely related to activities in China and India, which
together boast 37% of the global population. China and India use 6.43 quads and
4.15 quads of non-forest biomass respectively. The high percentage of global nonforest biomass is further explained by the cumulative total of China, India,
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Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The BNF values for these last three are 0.83
quads in Bangladesh, 0.40 quads in Indonesia, and 0.71 quads in Pakistan.
The projected trend for the foreseeable future is a quick growth of technologi
cal biomass (BT) and a reduction of collected fuelwood (BFC) due to systematic
worldwide campaigns to reduce deforestation of native forests. It should be
expected that commercial biomass (BLC) will remain constant or decrease slightly
, but activities of this nature are also expected to shift gradually from native forests
to reforested plantations. Charcoal production has been shifting toward depen
dence on reforested plantations to such an extent that in a few years no charcoal
will be created from native forest wood. Substitution of natural gas or  for
cooking ﬁrewood should further reduce BLC. Many governments have intensiﬁed
e›orts to reduce domestic use of ﬁrewood because of the health hazards associ
ated with it, which should result in faster substitution in some areas. However, for
many rural populations, collected wood is still the only energy solution.
Despite insuﬃcient and inaccurate date, the model allows for a relative degree
of certainty in the calculation of energy biomass and its four components for the
122 countries selected. As new information on rural energy use becomes available
for more developing countries, the accuracy of the model will obviously be
improved.
It will be extremely important to monitor the possible growth of BT and the
reduction of BFC, which is expected to become negligible in approximately 20
years.
figure 2

world biomass energy (quads) – maximum values (b=47.55)

Carbon emissions
The energy sector is the primary anthropogenic source of air pollution at the
global level. It releases about 6.3 billion tons of carbon per year. These tons are gen
erated during the production of about 376 quads of energy. Carbon is generated
at the rate of 16.8 x 106 tons of carbon per quad of energy.
Energy biomass produces 31.5 x 106 tons of carbon per quad of energy. There
fore, in principle, this means that there will be 1.4 billion tons of carbon in the
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figure 3

carbon emissions from forest activity
(millions of tons per year), minimum values

atmosphere as a result of energy biomass use. It is important, however, to identify
the origins of the various biomass sources that might be emitting this consider
able amount of carbon. Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5 show probable biomass carbon
emission values.
The calculation of total carbon
table 2
emissions, including all biomass
carbon released
source
energy applications, is now as fol biomass energy
(quads/year)
(10 6 t/year)
lows:
CT = 232
Reforestation/Farming
BT does not produce a net carbon BBT = 7.36
14.55 ≤ BNF ≤ 18.82
458 ≤ CNF ≤ 593
Farming and Cattle Raising
emission, because it depends on 4.89 ≤ BFC ≤ 5.48
154 ≤ CFC ≤ 173
Native Forest
BLC = 15.89
CLC = 501
Native Forest (partial)
reforestation/farming;
BNF does not produce a net Burned Areas
193 ≤ CQ ≤ 212
Native Forest
carbon emission, since it is also 6.13 ≤ BQ ≤ 6.72
CS = -1.106(4)
Carbon sequestration by reforestation
Reforestation (177x106ha)
derived from farms;
BFC comes from native forests
and produces between 154 and 173 million tons of carbon per year
BLC is comprised of BLCN and BLCR, which are derived from ﬁrewood and char14 Morato de Andrade, Carlos
coal,14 and typically produced with techniques that necessitate the destruction
Américo, 2000.
and reforestation of native forest areas. In a previous study, the following set of
15
values were established for these two components:
15 Morato de Andrade, Carlos
Américo, 2000.
5.84 < BLCN < 7.17 (quads)
10.05 > BLCR > 8.72.
Carbon emissions associated with these biomass components will be as follows:
184 < CLCN < 226 (106t/year)
CLCR = 0 (reforestation)
BQ: burned areas cause emissions of 193 to 212 x 106 t of carbon.
The conclusion of this study is that the total carbon released by forest activity
is actually made up of just three components derived from BFC, BQ, and BLCN.
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figure 4

carbon emissions from forest activity
(millions of tons per year), maximum values

According to this model, the total carbon released varies from 550 to 592 million
tons per year.
Given the limitations previously mentioned, energy activity is responsible for
only BFC and BLCN, which adds up to between 338 and 399 x 106 tons of carbon. This
value is much lower than the total 1.4 billion tons that might be attributable to the
energy sector if all of the 45 quads of energy biomass were emitting carbon. As
shown, only 25% of energy biomass energy production generates net carbon emis
sions. Further, world reforestation, which is happening at a rate of 17 million
hectares per year and spreads over 177 million hectares, also has the capacity to
sequester some 1.106 million tons of carbon per year. Based on this information,
an equation that accounts for all forest activities, including manufacturing, burn
ing biomass, forest burning, and reforestation, ultimately reveals a net sequestra
tion of 550 million tons of carbon per year. Thus, it should be concluded that the
tactic for combating carbon emissions should concentrate on diminishing fossil
fuel use, rather than decreasing forest activities.
Latin America

Table 3 depicts the biomass energy balance in Latin America. Latin America con
tains several large tracts of forest, including the Amazon, which is the largest
humid tropical forest in the world. Of the 45 quads of global biomass energy, Latin
America is responsible for the following amounts shown on Table 3.
What conclusions can we draw from this data?
The primary implication of these ﬁgures is that the most signiﬁcant technological
biomass energy activity in the region is the Brazilian sugar cane and ethanol pro
gram, which is responsible for 14% of technological biomass (BT) worldwide.16 As
deﬁned previously, BT includes biomass and biofuel activities. Another trend that
is demonstrated by Table 3 is that, unlike Asian countries, which tend to use their
agricultural residues to the fullest extent possible, use of non-forest biomass, BNF,
for energy production is virtually unheard of in Latin America.

  
table 3

biomass in south america

bt

b nf

b fc

b lc

q

Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

0.06
0.01
0.04
1.93
0.11
0.18
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.13
0.06
0.31
0.03
0.02
0.06
0.08
0.03
0.04

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0.02 - 0.02
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0
0–0

0.01 – 0.01
0 - 0.01
0.02 – 0.03
0.14 – 0.14
0–0
0–0
0–0
0 - 0.01
0.02 – 0.03
0–0
0.01 – 0.01
0–0
0–0
0.11 – 0.20
0.02 – 0.04
0.01 – 0.03
0–0
0.01 – 0.03
0–0
0.02 – 0.03

0.05
0
0.01
0.79
0.11
0.18
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.06
0
0.13
0.06
0.15
0
0
0.06
0.06
0.03
0.01

0-0
0 - 0.01
0.86 - 0.87
0.16 - 0.16
0-0
0.21 - 0.21
0.02 - 0.02
0 - 0.01
0 - 0.01
0.19 - 0.19
0-0
0-0
0.09 - 0.09
0.38 - 0.47
0.20 - 0.22
0.07 - 0.09
0.41 - 0.41
0.24 - 0.26
0-0
0.74 - 0.75

Total

3.3

1.02

0.02 - 0.02

0.37 – 0.57

1.76

3.57 - 3.77

It is also important to note that Latin America is experiencing substantial prob
lems with urban migration, resulting in massive depletion of rural populations in
almost every country. This has limited the region’s biomass energy requirements
almost entirely to commercial or manually collected ﬁrewood without any other
type of energy generation.
The ﬁgures for commercial ﬁrewood (BLC) indicate that 11% of the total global
activity in this area is concentrated in Latin America, which is home to 8% of the
global population. Considering the size of the forest in the region, and its tropical
forest resources, one might expect far more intense forestry activities. The primary
reason for this low activity level is most likely insuﬃcient economic and ﬁnancial
resources.While the current extraction methods being used in the Amazon forest are
far from sustainable, with the implementation of sustainable forestry management,
countries like Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia could produce several
times current BLC amounts in the long run. Some Central American countries, such
as Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras have already shown begun signiﬁcant com
mercial timber harvesting. Unfortunately this production is not always sustainable,
and which will require international ﬁnancial support and ecological education.
The amount of energy produced with non-commercially collected wood from
native forests (BFC) is approximately 0.37 to 0.57 quads per year, which is approx
imately 10% of the international total. It is estimated that of the 481 million people
living in Latin America, between 40 and 60 million still use manually collected
ﬁrewood as a primary source of energy. This means that this relatively ineﬃcient,
generally environmentally detrimental activity is still strong in the region, espe
cially in Brazil and Mexico, the two most populous countries in the region.
Together, the rural populations of these two countries are responsible for over half
of the burning of manually collected ﬁrewood. Considering that BFC is undeniably
non-sustainable, and that the amount of collected wood in Latin America is com
paratively high, this activity must decrease signiﬁcantly in the next decade.
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With regard to energy biomass and forestry activities, the primary issue that
must be addressed is extensive burned areas that stem, primarily, from the expan
17 For a more detailed discus
sion of farming and cattle-raising areas. Approximately 60% of the burned areas
sion, see Morato de Andrade,
all over the world are located on the Latin American continent, mirroring the
'Florestas, Madeira e suas Aplicações,' 2000 (in Portuguese).
urgent need for measures to reduce deforestation.17
Due to its economic strength, the size of
table 4
its population, and the fact that it is home
to the largest tracts of forest in the region,
Total Average Biomass
3.30 quads
7% of the total worldwide
BT
1.02 quads
14% of the total worldwide
Brazil’s activities will be critical in addressBNF
practically zero
ing current energy and forestry problems.
BFC
0.37 - 0.57 quads
10% of the total worldwide
For this reason, the following section
BLC
1.76 quads
11% of the total worldwide
Q
approximately 3.7 quads
60 % of the total worldwide
focuses speciﬁcally on Brazil.
Brazil

18 Official Brazilian Statistical
Institute (IBGE).
19 Official Energy Balance for
Brazil, BEM 1998, Ministry of
Mines and Energy.
20 Bagasse is the crushed fiber
that is left over after the juice
has been extracted from sugar
cane.
21 The complete production
model and the Brazilian use of
sugar cane are described in
Morato de Andrade, and Bodin
aud,‘Modelamento de Cana-de
açúcar Brasileira,’ 2000 (in Por
tuguese). The same publication
also contains comprehensive
technical indexes regarding
sugar cane processing in Brazil.

As the largest, most populous nation in Latin America, Brazil will play an impor
tant role in addressing the current energy and forestry problems. With approxi
mately 5.5 million km2 of forest area, Brazil has the largest tract of tropical forests
in the region. The population of Brazil is 166 million,18 33 million of whom live in
rural areas. The country consumes approximately 10 quads19 of energy per year, of
which 20% is produced with biomass. The two quads of biomass energy being
consumed annually in Brazil are divided more or less evenly between forest and
sugar cane activities. This latter is especially signiﬁcant because the Pro-Alcool
Program, established almost 30 years ago, is the biggest biomass transportation
fuel experiment ever conducted. Approximately 4 million hectares in Brazil cur
rently produce about 300 million tons of sugar cane per year. According to 1997
data, 9.7 billion liters of hydrated alcohol, 5.6 billion liters of anhydrous alcohol,
87 million tons of wet bagasse,20 and 14.8 million tons of sugar are obtained from
sugar cane.21
Over the past 30 years, due to agricultural advances, the sucrose content of
Brazilian sugar cane went from 8% to 15%. This practically doubled the ethyl alco
hol and sugar production. The amount of revenue-producing sugar cane products
increased from 40 liters to 80 liters of alcohol/ton of sugar cane and from 80kg to
140kg sugar/ton of sugar cane between 1970 and 1999. This is attributable to sig
niﬁcant improvements in sugar cane production and byproduct processing.
Brazilian sugar cane generates approximately 0.3 quads of energy in the form
of alcohol (equal to 7.5 million tons of oil), and approximately 0.7 quads of energy
as sugar cane bagasse, which is partially used in alcohol and sugar production.
There is enormous potential for electricity cogeneration, which is beginning to
make some headway at the national level. Estimates indicate that the available
bagasse could produce more than 2 of energy using cogeneration.
Deforestation
The portion of Brazil that is forested is approximately 549x106ha. The area of
reforestation is 4.9x106ha. Deforestation has varied signiﬁcantly from year to year,
but is currently about 1.5x106ha per year. According to State of the World’s Forests
( 1999), Brazilian ﬁrewood and charcoal production uses 85x106m3 and indus
trial wood uses 135x106m3, resulting in a deforestation rate of 1.31x106ha. Added to
that is approximately 0.19x106ha in which non-commercial activities like slash and
burn agriculture and hand collection of ﬁrewood are conducted, resulting in a

  
total average deforestation rate of about
1.5x106 ha.
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table 5
Reforestation industrial timber
Native forest industrial timber
Native forest firewood and charcoal
Reforestation firewood and charcoal
Hand collected firewood
Burned areas

up to 150x103ha
between 653 x103ha and 803x103ha
between 356 x103ha and 506x103ha
up to 150x103ha
89x103ha
102x103ha

Reforestation
Table 5 shows an annual 0.25% decrease of
Brazilian forest area, due mainly to deforestation in the Amazon region. Reforestation in
1.500x103ha
Brazil is still very limited, and a good portion Deforestation Total
of the commercial timber activities are still
carried out in native forests. Commercial activities clear about 150x103 reforested
hectares per year, compared to 1,150x103ha in native forests. Non-commercial
activities in Brazil are conducted on 191x103ha per year. The total area where ﬁre
wood is manually collected is 89 x103ha/year, and slash-and-burn agriculture
destroys about 102x103ha/year. These last two activities are conducted only in
native forests.
There has been some progress, however. An important pulp and paper indus
try sector, and a steel mill industrial area that produces approximately 50 million
tons of iron and steel per year, have both begun stimulating reforestation and
charcoal production almost exclusively from
table 6 balance of carbon emissions and sequestration in brazil
reforestation ﬁrewood. It is also predicted
annual carbon balance
that the consumption of ﬁrewood will origin
decrease in the future.
506 x 103ha for native forest firewood
and charcoal production
191 x 103ha for hand collected firewood and
Carbon emissions from forest activities
burned areas
Despite poor management of forestry activi- 4.9 x 103ha total reforestation area
ties in the Amazon, forestry and associated 4 x 103ha sugar cane
energy activities in Brazil are fairly balanced Global Result
with regard to carbon emissions. Table 6
depicts a rough estimation of the current balance between carbon emissions and
sequestration in Brazil.22

Brazil and the Clean Development Mechanism
Fundamentally, the Clean Development Mechanism () is a component of the
Kyoto Protocol that allows industrialized countries to meet their emissions reduc
tion commitments by investing in projects in developing countries. The goal of the
 is to reduce CO2 emissions while engendering sustainable economic growth
in the host country. Brazil is especially qualiﬁed for such ventures, due to its size,
its unique forest environment, and the stability of its agricultural sector. Several
proposals that will fulﬁll the emissions abatement and development requirements
of the  clause have already been put forth regarding the Amazon forest, the
plains, and the Atlantic forest in Brazil.
The ethanol program will also probably be a candidate  project, since there
is considerable room for further development and expansion of this initiative.
This program is very compatible with climate change mitigation goals, as it has
already replaced the equivalent of 200,000 barrels fossil fuel per day with ethanol.
No CO2 is emitted during the complete cycle of production and use of ethanol for
transportation. It is even possible to demonstrate that sugarcane production and
its transformation into alcohol may have sequestration beneﬁts.

Emission of 25 x 106t
Emission of 9.4 x 106t
Capture of 30.6 x 106t
Capture of 8 x 106t
Capture of 4.2 x 106t

22 For further information, see
Morato de Andrade, Florestas,
‘Madeira e suas Aplicações,’
2000, and Morato de Andrade
and Bodinaud ‘Modelamento
de Cana-de-açúcar Brasileira,’
2000 (both in Portuguese).
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Conclusion

With the development of advanced biomass technologies, this previously
frowned-upon form of energy has the potential to be a key component of climate
change mitigation. However, there is a dearth of precise information on current
biomass uses, which could easily impede its advancement as an integral part of
emissions abatement strategies. The model discussed in this paper was speciﬁcally
designed to determine the values for the four di›erent types of biomass energy by
extrapolating information from various related, but often non-speciﬁc, sources.
The values that were determined using this procedure are compatible with the
overall energy consumption patterns and the social and economic status of the 122
countries examined in the study.
Even considering the uncertainties of the available data, the model established
value ranges for the non-commercial uses of biomass. It also demonstrated that
between 43 and 48 quads of biomass energy are consumed globally each year. Of
this, 7.4 quads per year are attributable to technological biomass (BT) and 15.9
quads per year are composed of biomass from commercial forest exploitation
activities (BLC). The model also targeted ranges for two important components of
biomass, which have been very diﬃcult to determine accurately due to insuﬃcient
data: non-forest biomass (BNF), which produces 15 to 19 quads of energy per year,
and collected wood (BFC), which generates between 4.9 and 5.5 quads per year.
Overall, the model indicates that non-commercial biomass constitutes around
50% of the global biomass total. This category includes non-forest biomass, which
is responsible for about 37% of the global total, and collected wood, which
accounts for about 13% of the global total.
The implication of the discussion and ﬁgures presented in the Latin America
case is that most biomass activities in the region are not sustainable. At this point,
this is primarily attributable to insuﬃcient funding for environmentally positive
projects or initiatives such as reforestation and improved natural resources man
agement.
Due to its geopolitical, ecological, and agricultural attributes, Brazil is likely to
play an important role in the areas of both forest and non-forest biomass activi
ties. Several reforestation projects are already being conducted and the ethanol
program has been an extraordinary success, with excellent potential as a vehicle
for the .
It can be expected that  activities will help the region expand sustainable
energy availability, while improving natural resource management. Brazil has the
potential to be a trailblazer on this front, and the projects that have already been
developed for and within Brazil may even be considered pilots for other technol
ogy development projects in the region and around the world.

Energy consumption
without biomass
(Quads/yr) (E)

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

Percentage rural
population

Population
(millions)

0.02
0.04
1.36
0.09
2.60
0.10
4.50
1.29
0.71
0.31
0.37
1.03
2.58
0.01
0.13
7.44
0.06
1.22
0.08
12.20
0.05
0.89
37.00
1.30
0.12
0.02
0.09
0.40
0.63
1.90
0.97
0.20
0.37
1.64
0.09
0.04
0.05
1.19
9.73
0.05
0.11
14.18

Biomass energy
B=(Bmin+Bmax)/2

0.20
0.02
0.13
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.00
1.04
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.33
0.00
0.03
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.02
8.48
0.10
0.36
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.37
0.03
0.00
0.50
0.02
0.15
0.01
0.02
0.11

0.24
0.03
0.14
0.10
0.06
0.01
0.25
0.27
0.02
0.00
1.19
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.04
1.93
0.00
0.03
0.13
0.55
0.07
0.11
9.93
0.18
0.47
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.04
0.06
0.28
0.03
0.01
0.53
0.36
0.50
0.02
0.01
0.75

Total energy
(Quads/yr)

0.79
0.62
0.43
0.68
0.11
0.31
0.15
0.35
0.44
0.09
0.81
0.28
0.03
0.54
0.38
0.20
0.30
0.31
0.54
0.23
0.77
0.16
0.68
0.26
0.71
0.40
0.50
0.43
0.23
0.34
0.15
0.37
0.40
0.55
0.54
0.56
0.84
0.36
0.25
0.48
0.41
0.13

0.26
0.07
1.50
0.19
2.66
0.11
4.75
1.56
0.73
0.31
1.56
1.04
2.68
0.02
0.17
9.37
0.06
1.25
0.21
12.75
0.12
1.00
46.93
1.48
0.59
0.04
0.12
0.41
0.68
1.95
1.08
0.24
0.43
1.92
0.12
0.05
0.58
1.55
10.23
0.07
0.12
14.93

BT
(Quads/yr)

AFGHANISTAN
25.80
ALBANIA
3.33
ALGERIA
31.10
ANGOLA
10.60
ARGENTINA
36.70
ARMENIA
3.47
AUSTRALIA
18.40
AUSTRIA
8.05
AZERBAIJAN
7.74
BAHRAIN
0.62
BANGLADESH
128.00
BELARUS
10.41
BELGIUM
10.20
BELIZE
0.23
BOLIVIA
7.83
BRAZIL
164.30
BRUNEI
0.32
BULGARIA
8.24
CAMEROON
15.00
CANADA
30.70
CHAD
7.20
CHILE
14.80
CHINA
1,247.00
COLOMBIA
39.30
CONGO DEM. REP.
50.50
CONGO REP.
2.58
COSTA RICA
3.60
CROATIA
4.67
CUBA
11.04
CZECH REPUBLIC
10.32
DENMARK
5.33
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
8.00
ECUADOR
12.30
EGYPT
67.20
EL SALVADOR
5.84
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
0.48
ETHIOPIA
59.70
FINLAND
5.11
FRANCE
59.00
GABON
1.40
GEORGIA
5.17
GERMANY
82.00

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.220
0.230
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.460
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.110
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.310
0.410
0.000
0.000
0.720

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

0.02
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.68
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00

0.09
0.02
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.98
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.85
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.02
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00

18.82

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (min)
(Quads/yr)

14.55
0.11
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
1.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

4.89

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (max)
(Quads/yr)

7.360
0.11
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
1.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

5.48

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(min) (Quads/yr)

421.12
0.07
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.05
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.79
0.00
0.01
0.13
0.09
0.01
0.11
1.87
0.18
0.47
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.06
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.45
0.05
0.09
0.02
0.00
0.03

15.89

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(max) (Quads/yr)

45.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.86
0.16
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.65
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00

6.13

Commercial firewood
and charcoal energy
(BLC) (min) (Quads/yr)

376.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.87
0.16
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.65
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00

6.72

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmin
(Quads/yr)

32.54
0.20
0.02
0.13
0.07
0.06
0.01
0.25
0.27
0.01
0.00
1.04
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.03
1.93
0.00
0.02
0.13
0.55
0.06
0.11
9.50
0.18
0.47
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.11
0.03
0.06
0.23
0.03
0.01
0.50
0.36
0.50
0.02
0.01
0.75

42.69

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmax
(Quads/yr)

0.53

0.27
0.03
0.15
0.13
0.06
0.01
0.25
0.27
0.03
0.00
1.34
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.04
1.93
0.00
0.03
0.13
0.55
0.07
0.11
10.35
0.18
0.47
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.04
0.06
0.33
0.03
0.01
0.55
0.36
0.50
0.02
0.01
0.75

47.55

Biomass energy
B (max)
(Quads/yr)

6,014.00

table 1

WORLD
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biomass energy (world, countries afghanistan–germany)

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

BT
(Quads/yr)

Total energy
(Quads/yr)

Biomass energy
B=(Bmin+Bmax)/2

Energy consumption
without biomass
(Quads/yr) (E)

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

Percentage rural
population

Population
(millions)

0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
4.50
0.50
0.20
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.06
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.84
0.00
0.00
0.00

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (min)
(Quads/yr)

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
3.80
0.30
0.17
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.57
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.38
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.11
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.00

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (max)
(Quads/yr)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.150
0.000
0.480
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.070
0.000

0.18
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.38
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.03
0.00
0.00

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(min) (Quads/yr)

0.21
1.21
0.23
0.18
0.62
1.17
0.05
20.15
5.65
4.25
1.24
0.49
0.69
7.84
0.26
21.80
0.20
2.13
0.88
0.70
0.23
0.04
0.58
0.35
0.18
1.84
6.11
0.49
0.51
0.30
3.88
0.95
0.09
1.89
2.24
1.81
0.23
2.78
0.16
0.09
0.16

0.00
0.01
0.13
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.00
2.62
1.49
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.09
0.15
0.01
0.19
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.03
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.27
0.00
0.05
0.06

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(max) (Quads/yr)

0.15
0.03
0.13
0.06
0.01
0.03
0.00
8.15
2.15
0.22
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.19
0.10
0.50
0.00
0.06
0.37
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.15
0.31
0.13
0.40
0.27
0.00
0.07
0.03
1.03
0.09
0.07
0.00
1.04
0.02
0.05
0.06

0.06
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.38
0.00
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.12
0.41

Commercial firewood
and charcoal energy
(BLC) (min) (Quads/yr)

0.06
1.18
0.10
0.12
0.61
1.14
0.05
12.00
3.50
4.03
1.19
0.48
0.69
7.65
0.16
21.30
0.20
2.07
0.51
0.70
0.20
0.03
0.57
0.34
0.18
1.69
5.80
0.36
0.11
0.03
3.88
0.88
0.06
0.86
2.15
1.74
0.23
1.74
0.14
0.04
0.10

0.06
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.47
0.00
0.23
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.12
0.41

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmin
(Quads/yr)

0.12
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.00
0.04
0.00
7.31
1.36
0.26
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.19
0.08
0.28
0.01
0.07
0.20
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.26
0.14
0.35
0.22
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.67
0.08
0.01
0.00
0.90
0.01
0.04
0.02

0.12
0.02
0.13
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.00
7.80
2.05
0.20
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.10
0.50
0.00
0.05
0.37
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.26
0.12
0.35
0.22
0.00
0.07
0.02
1.03
0.08
0.07
0.00
0.90
0.01
0.05
0.06

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmax
(Quads/yr)

0.63
0.40
0.60
0.55
0.05
0.35
0.08
0.73
0.63
0.40
0.25
0.42
0.09
0.33
0.55
0.22
0.27
0.40
0.70
0.03
0.61
0.27
0.14
0.27
0.03
0.45
0.26
0.47
0.73
0.89
0.11
0.14
0.37
0.59
0.38
0.26
0.21
0.65
0.43
0.83
0.46

0.18
0.04
0.13
0.06
0.01
0.04
0.00
8.50
2.25
0.23
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.20
0.10
0.50
0.00
0.07
0.37
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.19
0.35
0.13
0.45
0.32
0.00
0.07
0.04
1.03
0.10
0.07
0.00
1.17
0.03
0.05
0.06

Biomass energy
B (max)
(Quads/yr)

18.50
10.58
12.00
5.92
6.70
10.20
0.27
1,001.00
216.10
65.20
22.40
3.56
5.64
56.80
15.40
125.72
4.43
16.90
28.80
1.91
4.53
2.50
5.65
3.60
0.42
21.40
100.00
29.70
48.00
24.30
15.65
3.59
4.72
114.00
21.20
4.40
2.26
138.00
2.78
4.60
5.29

table 1

GHANA
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
HUNGARY
ICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN
IRAQ
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
IVORY COAST
JAPAN
JORDAN
KAZAKSTAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
KYRGYZSTAN
LATVIA
LIBYA
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MYANMAR
NEPAL
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGERIA
NORTH KOREA
NORWAY
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
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biomass energy (countries ghana–paraguay)

Energy consumption
without biomass
(Quads/yr) (E)

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

Percentage rural
population

Population
(millions)

374.52
1.48

Biomass energy
B=(Bmin+Bmax)/2

30.74
1.80

43.09
2.03

Total energy
(Quads/yr)

0.53
0.67

417.61
3.51

BT
(Quads/yr)

5,746.18
267.82

7.360
0.00

rural population
biomass (Quads/yr)
BR

TOTAL (122 Countries)
Other Countries

13.43
1.12

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (min)
(Quads/yr)

17.62
1.20

0.00
0.26
0.07
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.20
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.17
0.06
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.07
0.04
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.02
0.10
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.58
0.09
4.64
0.25

0.01
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.00

Non-forest biomass
energy (BNF) (max)
(Quads/yr)

0.00
0.08
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.29
0.06
5.13
0.35

0.03
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.06
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.00

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(min) (Quads/yr)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.020
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.820
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.250
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.860
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
15.32
0.57

0.06
0.35
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.04
0.09
0.13
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.35
0.35
0.00
0.03
0.08
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.84
0.00
0.01
0.29
0.00

Collected wood bio
mass energy (BFC)
(max) (Quads/yr)

0.58
1.55
4.27
0.93
0.31
0.58
1.99
27.21
4.03
0.75
1.21
0.79
0.24
4.51
7.21
4.53
0.40
0.30
3.03
1.23
0.71
3.17
0.12
0.85
2.95
0.28
0.21
3.01
0.28
0.25
10.33
6.68
1.79
0.17
94.40
1.96
2.72
1.26
0.23
5.50
0.63

0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.74
0.00
0.00

Commercial firewood
and charcoal energy
(BLC) (min) (Quads/yr)

0.08
0.57
0.07
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.41
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.21
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.24
0.87
0.01
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.35
0.62
0.00
0.03
0.21
0.02
0.22
0.25
0.08
0.00
0.03
2.70
0.10
0.04
0.77
0.08
5.99
0.73

0.26
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.75
0.00
0.00

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmin
(Quads/yr)

0.50
0.98
4.20
0.91
0.31
0.58
1.90
26.80
4.03
0.73
1.21
0.76
0.23
4.30
7.16
4.48
0.24
0.06
2.16
1.22
0.66
3.11
0.09
0.50
2.33
0.28
0.18
2.80
0.26
0.03
10.08
6.60
1.79
0.14
91.70
1.86
2.68
0.49
0.15
40.75
1.94

0.07
0.48
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.34
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.17
0.03
0.05
0.15
0.23
0.87
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.35
0.54
0.00
0.03
0.18
0.01
0.20
0.25
0.06
0.00
0.03
2.70
0.08
0.03
0.62
0.06

Burning biomass
energy (min) BQmax
(Quads/yr)

0.07
0.35
0.14
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.34
0.03
0.05
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.22
0.08
0.09
0.15
0.23
0.02
0.03
0.08
0.11
0.04
0.23
0.47
0.00
0.03
0.18
0.02
0.20
0.07
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.63
0.14
0.03
0.62
0.11

45.43
2.12

0.09
0.66
0.08
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.48
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.24
0.07
0.05
0.17
0.25
0.87
0.01
0.06
0.07
0.04
0.35
0.69
0.00
0.03
0.23
0.02
0.24
0.25
0.10
0.00
0.03
2.70
0.11
0.04
0.91
0.09

Biomass energy
B (max)
(Quads/yr)

0.28
0.44
0.36
0.63
0.26
0.08
0.43
0.23
0.16
0.42
0.00
0.40
0.48
0.50
0.17
0.23
0.77
0.67
0.17
0.38
0.47
0.50
0.67
0.74
0.79
0.27
0.37
0.28
0.55
0.87
0.11
0.29
0.15
0.09
0.23
0.58
0.14
0.80
0.65

table 1

PERU
26.60
PHILIPPINES
79.00
POLAND
38.70
PORTUGAL
9.87
PUERTO RICO
3.86
QATAR
0.70
ROMANIA
22.40
RUSSIAN F,
147.00
SAUDI ARABIA
21.50
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO
11.20
SINGAPORE
3.46
SLOVAKIA
5.39
SLOVENIA
1.97
SOUTH AFRICA
43.40
SOUTH KOREA
46.90
SPAIN
39.24
SRI LANKA
19.10
SUDAN
34.50
SWEDEN
8.95
SWITZERLAND
7.25
SYRIA
16.70
TAIWAN
22.10
TAJIKISTAN
6.01
TANZANIA
31.30
THAILAND
60.00
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
1.12
TUNISIA
9.40
TURKEY
65.60
TURKMENISTAN
4.30
UGANDA
22.80
UK
59.10
UKRAINE
49.80
U. ARAB EMIRATES
2.26
URUGUAY
3.20
USA
272.60
UZBEKISTAN
24.10
VENEZUELA
23.20
VIETNAN
77.00
YEMEN
16.40
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Parties to this Convention,
Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse e›ects are a
common concern of humankind,
Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmos
pheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the nat
ural greenhouse e›ect, and that this will result on average in an additional warm
ing of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely a›ect natural
ecosystems and humankind,
Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions
in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emis
sions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and devel
opment needs,
Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,
Noting that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, par
ticularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof,
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an e›ective and
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but
di›erentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and eco
nomic conditions,
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972,
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction,
Reaﬃrming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation
to address climate change,
Recognizing that States should enact e›ective environmental legislation, that
environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reﬂect the
environmental and developmental context to which they apply, and that standards
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic
and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries,
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Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 Decem
ber 1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
and resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 December 1989, 45/212 of
21 December 1990 and 46/169 of 19 December 1991 on protection of global climate
for present and future generations of mankind,
Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22
December 1989 on the possible adverse e›ects of sea-level rise on islands and
coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of
General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation
of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertiﬁcation,
Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987,
as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990,
Noting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference
adopted on 7 November 1990,
Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many States on
climate change and of the important contributions of the World Meteorological
Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and other organs,
organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as other interna
tional and intergovernmental bodies, to the exchange of results of scientiﬁc
research and the coordination of research,
Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate change will
be environmentally, socially and economically most e›ective if they are based on
relevant scientiﬁc, technical and economic considerations and continually re
evaluated in the light of new ﬁndings in these areas,
Recognizing that various actions to address climate change can be justiﬁed eco
nomically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental
problems,
Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate action in
a ﬂexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a ﬁrst step towards compre
hensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional
levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their
relative contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse e›ect,
Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries
with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to ﬂoods, drought
and desertiﬁcation, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosys
tems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate change,
Recognizing the special diﬃculties of those countries, especially developing
countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production,
use and exportation, as a consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas
emissions,
Aﬃrming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social
and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding
adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs
of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and
the eradication of poverty,
Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to
resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and
that, in order for developing countries to progress towards that goal, their energy

 
consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for achieving
greater energy eﬃciency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general,
including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such
an application economically and socially beneﬁcial,
Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1

Deﬁnitions*
For the purposes of this Convention:
1 “Adverse e›ects of climate change” means changes in the physical environment
or biota resulting from climate change which have signiﬁcant deleterious
e›ects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed
ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health
and welfare.
2 “Climate change” means a change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmos
phere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods.
3 “Climate system” means the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere
and geosphere and their interactions.
4 “Emissions” means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into
the atmosphere over a speciﬁed area and period of time.
5 “Greenhouse gases” means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.
6 “Regional economic integration organization” means an organization consti
tuted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of
matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly autho
rized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve
or accede to the instruments concerned.
7 “Reservoir” means a component or components of the climate system where a
greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.
8 “Sink” means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.
9 “Source” means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.
* Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.
Article 2

Objective
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the rel
evant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
time-frame suﬃcient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic develop
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner.
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Article 3

Principles
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its
provisions, the Parties shall be guided, INTER ALIA, by the following:
1 The Parties should protect the climate system for the beneﬁt of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but di›erentiated responsibilities and respective capabili
ties. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in com
bating climate change and the adverse e›ects thereof.
2 The speciﬁc needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties,
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would
have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention,
should be given full consideration.
3 The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or min
imize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse e›ects. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be coste›ective so as to ensure global beneﬁts at the lowest possible cost. To achieve
this, such policies and measures should take into account di›erent socio-eco
nomic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reser
voirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors.
E›orts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by inter
ested Parties.
4 The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Poli
cies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change
should be appropriate for the speciﬁc conditions of each Party and should be
integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that
economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate
change.
5 The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and devel
opment in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling
them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.
Article 4

Commitments
1 All Parties, taking into account their common but di›erentiated responsibili
ties and their speciﬁc national and regional development priorities, objectives
and circumstances, shall:
(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Confer
ence of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all green
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable
methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties;

 
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate cli
mate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate
change;
(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and di›usion,
including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control,
reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not con
trolled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the
energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management
sectors;
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the con
servation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including bio
mass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine
ecosystems;
(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change;
develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone
management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and
rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, a›ected by drought and
desertiﬁcation, as well as ﬂoods;
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in
their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions,
and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, for
mulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse
e›ects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the envi
ronment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt
to climate change;
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientiﬁc, technological, technical, socio-eco
nomic and other research, systematic observation and development of
data archives related to the climate system and intended to further the
understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties
regarding the causes, e›ects, magnitude and timing of climate change and
the economic and social consequences of various response strategies;
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant
scientiﬁc, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information
related to the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and
social consequences of various response strategies;
(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness
related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this
process, including that of non- governmental organizations; and
(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to
implementation, in accordance with Article 12.
2 The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit
themselves speciﬁcally as provided for in the following:
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national1 policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthro
pogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its
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(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying
longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objec
tive of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the pre
sent decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
would contribute to such modiﬁcation, and taking into account the
di›erences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic
structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable
economic growth, available technologies and other individual circum
stances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by
each of these Parties to the global e›ort regarding that objective. These
Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Par
ties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the
objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall com
municate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for
it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed
information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a)
above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthro
pogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not con
trolled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the
Conference of the Parties, at its ﬁrst session and periodically thereafter, in
accordance with Article 7;
Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases for the purposes of subparagraph (b) above should take into account
the best available scientiﬁc knowledge, including of the e›ective capacity of
sinks and the respective contributions of such gases to climate change. The
Conference of the Parties shall consider and agree on methodologies for
these calculations at its ﬁrst session and review them regularly thereafter;
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its ﬁrst session, review the adequacy
of subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the
light of the best available scientiﬁc information and assessment on climate
change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic
information. Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take
appropriate action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the
commitments in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Conference of the
Parties, at its ﬁrst session, shall also take decisions regarding criteria for
joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A second
review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31
December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Con
ference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met;
Each of these Parties shall :
(i) Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic
and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of
the Convention; and
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(ii) Identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which
encourage activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emis
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
than would otherwise occur;
(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December
1998, available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such
amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with
the approval of the Party concerned;
(g) Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratiﬁcation,
acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the
Depositary that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b)
above. The Depositary shall inform the other signatories and Parties of any
such notiﬁcation.
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex
II shall provide new and additional ﬁnancial resources to meet the agreed full
costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obliga
tions under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also provide such ﬁnancial
resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing mea
sures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between
a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to
in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these com
mitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in
the ﬂow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the
developed country Parties.
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex
II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnera
ble to the adverse e›ects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to
those adverse e›ects.
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex
II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and ﬁnance, as appropri
ate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and
know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable
them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the devel
oped country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other
Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the
transfer of such technologies.
In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a cer
tain degree of ﬂexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties to the
Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market
economy, in order to enhance the ability of these Parties to address climate
change, including with regard to the historical level of anthropogenic emis
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol chosen as a
reference.
The extent to which developing country Parties will e›ectively implement their
commitments under the Convention will depend on the e›ective implementa
tion by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention
related to ﬁnancial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into
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account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the
ﬁrst and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.
8 In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give
full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, includ
ing actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to
meet the speciﬁc needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising
from the adverse e›ects of climate change and/or the impact of the implemen
tation of response measures, especially on:
(a) Small island countries;
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to
forest decay;
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertiﬁcation;
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous
ecosystems;
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated
from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of
fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with
respect to this paragraph.
9 The Parties shall take full account of the speciﬁc needs and special situations of
the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and trans
fer of technology.
10 The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the
implementation of the commitments of the Convention the situation of Par
ties, particularly developing country Parties, with economies that are vulnera
ble to the adverse e›ects of the implementation of measures to respond to cli
mate change. This applies notably to Parties with economies that are highly
dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export,
and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products
and/or the use of fossil fuels for which such Parties have serious diﬃculties in
switching to alternatives.
Article 5

Research and systematic observation
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(g), the Parties
shall:
(a) Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and intergovern
mental programmes and networks or organizations aimed at deﬁning, con
ducting, assessing and ﬁnancing research, data collection and systematic
observation, taking into account the need to minimize duplication of e›ort;
(b) Support international and intergovernmental e›orts to strengthen sys
tematic observation and national scientiﬁc and technical research capaci
ties and capabilities, particularly in developing countries, and to promote
access to, and the exchange of, data and analyses thereof obtained from
areas beyond national jurisdiction; and

 
(c) Take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing coun
tries and cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capa
bilities to participate in the e›orts referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
above.
Article 6

Education, training and public awareness
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(i), the Parties
shall:
(a) Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and
regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and
within their respective capacities:
(i) The development and implementation of educational and public
awareness programmes on climate change and its e›ects;
(ii) Public access to information on climate change and its e›ects;
(iii) Public participation in addressing climate change and its e›ects and
developing adequate responses; and
(iv) Training of scientiﬁc, technical and managerial personnel.
(b) Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where appro
priate, using existing bodies:
(i) The development and exchange of educational and public awareness
material on climate change and its e›ects; and
(ii) The development and implementation of education and training
programmes, including the strengthening of national institutions and
the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this ﬁeld,
in particular for developing countries.
Article 7

Conference of the Parties
1 A Conference of the Parties is hereby established.
2 The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall
keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any
related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the e›ective
implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:
(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional
arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the
Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolu
tion of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge;
(b) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted
by the Parties to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into account
the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties
and their respective commitments under the Convention;
(c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of mea
sures adopted by them to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into
account the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the
Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention;
(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the
Convention, the development and periodic reﬁnement of comparable
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methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties, inter alia,
for preparing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and
removals by sinks, and for evaluating the e›ectiveness of measures to limit
the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases;
(e) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of the Con
vention by the Parties, the overall e›ects of the measures taken pursuant
to the Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social
e›ects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress
towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved;
(f) Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the Con
vention and ensure their publication;
(g) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation
of the Convention;
(h) Seek to mobilize ﬁnancial resources in accordance with Article 4, para
graphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11;
(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the imple
mentation of the Convention;
(j) Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to
them;
(k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and ﬁnancial
rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies;
(l) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and
information provided by, competent international organizations and
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and
(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the
objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it
under the Convention.
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its ﬁrst session, adopt its own rules of pro
cedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention,
which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered
by decision- making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures
may include speciﬁed majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.
The ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the
interim secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than
one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordi
nary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless
otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties.
Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such
other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written
request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one
third of the Parties.
The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not
Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of
the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international,
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualiﬁed in matters covered by
the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be rep

 
resented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so
admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission
and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure
adopted by the Conference of the Parties.
Article 8

Secretariat
1 A secretariat is hereby established.
2 The functions of the secretariat shall be:
(a) To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the Parties and its
subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to provide them
with services as required;
(b) To compile and transmit reports submitted to it;
(c) To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Par
ties, on request, in the compilation and communication of information
required in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;
(d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the Conference of
the Parties;
(e) To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other rele
vant international bodies;
(f) To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the Parties, into
such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for
the e›ective discharge of its functions; and
(g) To perform the other secretariat functions speciﬁed in the Convention and
in any of its protocols and such other functions as may be determined by
the Conference of the Parties.
3 The Conference of the Parties, at its ﬁrst session, shall designate a permanent
secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning.
Article 9

Subsidiary body for scientiﬁc and technological advice
1 A subsidiary body for scientiﬁc and technological advice is hereby established
to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other sub
sidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientiﬁc and technolog
ical matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be open to participa
tion by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise government
representatives competent in the relevant ﬁeld of expertise. It shall report reg
ularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work.
2 Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing upon exist
ing competent international bodies, this body shall:
(a) Provide assessments of the state of scientiﬁc knowledge relating to climate
change and its e›ects;
(b) Prepare scientiﬁc assessments on the e›ects of measures taken in the
implementation of the Convention;
(c) Identify innovative, eﬃcient and state-of-the-art technologies and know
how and advise on the ways and means of promoting development and/or
transferring such technologies;
(d) Provide advice on scientiﬁc programmes, international cooperation in
research and development related to climate change, as well as on ways and
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means of supporting endogenous capacity-building in developing coun
tries; and
(e) Respond to scientiﬁc, technological and methodological questions that
the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put to the
body.
3 The functions and terms of reference of this body may be further elaborated by
the Conference of the Parties.
Article 10

Subsidiary body for implementation
1 A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the Con
ference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the e›ective implemen
tation of the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Par
ties and comprise government representatives who are experts on matters
related to climate change. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Par
ties on all aspects of its work.
2 Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body shall:
(a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12,
paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated e›ect of the steps taken by the
Parties in the light of the latest scientiﬁc assessments concerning climate
change;
(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12,
paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out
the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and
(c) Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and
implementation of its decisions.
Article 11

Financial mechanism
1 A mechanism for the provision of ﬁnancial resources on a grant or conces
sional basis, including for the transfer of technology, is hereby deﬁned. It shall
function under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the
Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility
criteria related to this Convention. Its operation shall be entrusted to one or
more existing international entities.
2 The ﬁnancial mechanism shall have an equitable and balanced representation
of all Parties within a transparent system of governance.
3 The Conference of the Parties and the entity or entities entrusted with the oper
ation of the ﬁnancial mechanism shall agree upon arrangements to give e›ect
to the above paragraphs, which shall include the following:
(a) Modalities to ensure that the funded projects to address climate change are
in conformity with the policies, programme priorities and eligibility crite
ria established by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) Modalities by which a particular funding decision may be reconsidered in
light of these policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria;
(c) Provision by the entity or entities of regular reports to the Conference of
the Parties on its funding operations, which is consistent with the require
ment for accountability set out in paragraph 1 above; and
(d) Determination in a predictable and identiﬁable manner of the amount of

 
funding necessary and available for the implementation of this Conven
tion and the conditions under which that amount shall be periodically
reviewed.
4 The Conference of the Parties shall make arrangements to implement the
above-mentioned provisions at its ﬁrst session, reviewing and taking into
account the interim arrangements referred to in Article 21, paragraph 3, and
shall decide whether these interim arrangements shall be maintained. Within
four years thereafter, the Conference of the Parties shall review the ﬁnancial
mechanism and take appropriate measures.
5 The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Par
ties avail themselves of, ﬁnancial resources related to the implementation of the
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.
Article 12

Communication of information related to implementation
1 In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the
Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements of
information:
(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
to the extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be
promoted and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to imple
ment the Convention; and
(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achieve
ment of the objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its
communication, including, if feasible, material relevant for calculations of
global emission trends.
2 Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall
incorporate in its communication the following elements of information:
(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to
implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and
(b) A speciﬁc estimate of the e›ects that the policies and measures referred to
in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emis
sions by its sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during
the period referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2(a).
3 In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party
included in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance
with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
4 Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose projects for
ﬁnancing, including speciﬁc technologies, materials, equipment, techniques or
practices that would be needed to implement such projects, along with, if pos
sible, an estimate of all incremental costs, of the reductions of emissions and
increments of removals of greenhouse gases, as well as an estimate of the con
sequent beneﬁts.
5 Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall
make its initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the
Convention for that Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial com
munication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention for that
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Party, or of the availability of ﬁnancial resources in accordance with Article 4,
paragraph 3. Parties that are least developed countries may make their initial
communication at their discretion. The frequency of subsequent communica
tions by all Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties, taking
into account the di›erentiated timetable set by this paragraph.
Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be transmitted by
the secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the Parties and to any
subsidiary bodies concerned. If necessary, the procedures for the communica
tion of information may be further considered by the Conference of the Parties.
From its ﬁrst session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the provi
sion to developing country Parties of technical and ﬁnancial support, on
request, in compiling and communicating information under this Article, as
well as in identifying the technical and ﬁnancial needs associated with pro
posed projects and response measures under Article 4. Such support may be
provided by other Parties, by competent international organizations and by the
secretariat, as appropriate.
Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of
the Parties, and to prior notiﬁcation to the Conference of the Parties, make a
joint communication in fulﬁlment of their obligations under this Article, pro
vided that such a communication includes information on the fulﬁlment by
each of these Parties of its individual obligations under the Convention.
Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as conﬁ
dential, in accordance with criteria to be established by the Conference of the
Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect its conﬁdentiality
before being made available to any of the bodies involved in the communica
tion and review of information.
Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party
to make public its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make com
munications by Parties under this Article publicly available at the time they are
submitted to the Conference of the Parties.

Article 13

Resolution of questions regarding implementation
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its ﬁrst session, consider the establishment
of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the
resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention.
Article 14

Settlement of disputes
1 In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the inter
pretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of
their own choice.
2 When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any
time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organiza
tion may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in
respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Con
vention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation:
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(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or
(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Confer
ence of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a dec
laration with like e›ect in relation to arbitration in accordance with the proce
dures referred to in subparagraph (b) above.
A declaration made under paragraph 2 above shall remain in force until it
expires in accordance with its terms or until three months after written notice
of its revocation has been deposited with the Depositary.
A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration shall not
in any way a›ect proceedings pending before the International Court of Justice
or the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following
notiﬁcation by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Par
ties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request
of any of the parties to the dispute, to conciliation.
A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the par
ties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of
members appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by
the members appointed by each party. The commission shall render a recom
mendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith.
Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by the Confer
ence of the Parties, as soon as practicable, in an annex on conciliation.
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any related legal instrument which
the Conference of the Parties may adopt, unless the instrument provides oth
erwise.

Article 15

Amendments to the Convention
1 Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.
2 Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the
Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed amendment to the Con
vention shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six
months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat
shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Con
vention and, for information, to the Depositary.
3 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed amend
ment to the Convention by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the
meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to
the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
4 Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with
the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above
shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day
after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at
least three fourths of the Parties to the Convention.
5 The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day
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after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument
of acceptance of the said amendment.
6 For the purposes of this Article,“Parties present and voting” means Parties pre
sent and casting an aﬃrmative or negative vote.
Article 16

Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention
1 Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, unless oth
erwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention constitutes at the same
time a reference to any annexes thereto. Without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 14, paragraphs 2(b) and 7, such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms
and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientiﬁc, technical,
procedural or administrative character.
2 Annexes to the Convention shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with
the procedure set forth in Article 15, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
3 An annex that has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall
enter into force for all Parties to the Convention six months after the date of the
communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex,
except for those Parties that have notiﬁed the Depositary, in writing, within
that period of their non-acceptance of the annex. The annex shall enter into
force for Parties which withdraw their notiﬁcation of non-acceptance on the
ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notiﬁcation has been
received by the Depositary.
4 The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to the
Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as that for the proposal,
adoption and entry into force of annexes to the Convention in accordance with
paragraphs 2 and 3 above.
5 If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amend
ment to the Convention, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter
into force until such time as the amendment to the Convention enters into
force.
Article 17

Protocols
1 The Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt protocols to
the Convention.
2 The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the
secretariat at least six months before such a session.
3 The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be established
by that instrument.
4 Only Parties to the Convention may be Parties to a protocol.
5 Decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to the protocol
concerned.
Article 18

Right to vote
1 Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except as provided for in
paragraph 2 below.
2 Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their compe

 
tence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the
number of their member States that are Parties to the Convention. Such an
organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exer
cises its right, and vice versa.
Article 19

Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of the Con
vention and of protocols adopted in accordance with Article 17.
Article 20

Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United
Nations or of any of its specialized agencies or that are Parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice and by regional economic integration organizations
at Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York from
20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993.
Article 21

Interim arrangements
1 The secretariat functions referred to in Article 8 will be carried out on an
interim basis by the secretariat established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990, until the comple
tion of the ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties.
2 The head of the interim secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above will coop
erate closely with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to ensure
that the Panel can respond to the need for objective scientiﬁc and technical
advice. Other relevant scientiﬁc bodies could also be consulted.
3 The Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be the international entity
entrusted with the operation of the ﬁnancial mechanism referred to in Article
11 on an interim basis. In this connection, the Global Environment Facility
should be appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to
enable it to fulﬁl the requirements of Article 11.
Article 22

Ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession
1 The Convention shall be subject to ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or acces
sion by States and by regional economic integration organizations. It shall be
open for accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is
closed for signature. Instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or acces
sion shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2 Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the
Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by
all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one
or more of whose member States is a Party to the Convention, the organization
and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the
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performance of their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights
under the Convention concurrently.
3 In their instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession, regional
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their compe
tence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These organiza
tions shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of
any substantial modiﬁcation in the extent of their competence.
Article 23

Entry into force
1 The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of
deposit of the ﬁftieth instrument of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or acces
sion.
2 For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratiﬁes,
accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the
ﬁftieth instrument of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession, the Con
vention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by
such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of
ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession.
3 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional
to those deposited by States members of the organization.
Article 24

Reservations
No reservations may be made to the Convention.
Article 25

Withdrawal
1 At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has
entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by
giving written notiﬁcation to the Depositary.
2 Any such withdrawal shall take e›ect upon expiry of one year from the date of
receipt by the Depositary of the notiﬁcation of withdrawal, or on such later
date as may be speciﬁed in the notiﬁcation of withdrawal.
3 Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also
having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party.
Article 26

Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secre
tary-General of the United Nations.
   the undersigned, being duly authorized to that e›ect,
have signed this Convention.
 at New York this ninth day of May one thousand nine hundred and
ninety- two.

 
Annex I and Annex II countries

Annex I
Australia
Austria
Belarus *
Belgium
Bulgaria *
Canada
Czechoslovakia *
Denmark
European Economic Community
Estonia *
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary *
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia *
Lithuania *
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland *
Portugal
Romania *
Russian Federation *
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine *

United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United States of America
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.

Annex II
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Economic Community
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United States of America
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Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Parties to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,
Recalling the provisions of the Convention,
Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention,
Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/.1 of the Conference
of the Parties to the Convention at its ﬁrst session,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol, the deﬁnitions contained in Article 1 of the
Convention shall apply. In addition:
1 “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Con
vention.
2 “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.
3 “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” means the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorolog
ical Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.
4 “Montreal Protocol” means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subse
quently adjusted and amended.
5 “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an aﬃrmative
or negative vote.
6 “Party” means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.
7 “Party included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the Conven
tion, as may be amended, or a Party which has made a notiﬁcation under Arti
cle 4, paragraph 2(g), of the Convention.
Article 2

1 Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantiﬁed emission limitation
and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable
development, shall:
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance
with its national circumstances, such as:
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(i) Enhancement of energy eﬃciency in relevant sectors of the
national economy;
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of green
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking
into account its commitments under relevant international
environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest
management practices, a›orestation and reforestation;
(iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of cli
mate change considerations;
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use
of, new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide
sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative
environmentally sound technologies;
(v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections,
ﬁscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all
greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objec
tive of the Convention and application of market instruments;
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors
aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol;
(vii)Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector;
(viii)Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through
recovery and use in waste management, as well as in the pro
duction, transport and distribution of energy;
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined
e›ectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article,
pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2(e)(i), of the Convention. To this end,
these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and exchange infor
mation on such policies and measures, including developing ways of
improving their comparability, transparency and e›ectiveness. The Con
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, at its ﬁrst session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways
to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant informa
tion.
2 The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emis
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from avia
tion and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Avia
tion Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.
3 The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures
under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse e›ects, including the
adverse e›ects of climate change, e›ects on international trade, and social,
environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing
country Parties and in particular those identiﬁed in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and
9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Con
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may
take further action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the pro
visions of this paragraph.

 
4 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol, if it decides that it would be beneﬁcial to coordinate any of the policies
and measures in paragraph 1(a) above, taking into account di›erent national
circumstances and potential e›ects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate
the coordination of such policies and measures.
Article 3

1 The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the green
house gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated
pursuant to their quantiﬁed emission limitation and reduction commitments
inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with
a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.
2 Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable
progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.
3 The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities,
limited to a›orestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured
as veriﬁable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used
to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I.
The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with
those activities shall be reported in a transparent and veriﬁable manner and
reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8.
4 Prior to the ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for
consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice,
data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to
be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its
ﬁrst session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules
and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities
related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories
shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties
included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in report
ing, veriﬁability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and
Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Con
ference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent
commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these
additional human-induced activities for its ﬁrst commitment period, provided
that these activities have taken place since 1990.
5 The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a
market economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to deci
sion 9/.2 of the Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that
base year or period for the implementation of their commitments under this
Article. Any other Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of transi
tion to a market economy which has not yet submitted its ﬁrst national com
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munication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it
intends to use an historical base year or period other than 1990 for the imple
mentation of its commitments under this Article. The Conference of the Par
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the
acceptance of such notiﬁcation.
Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the imple
mentation of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under
this Article, a certain degree of ﬂexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol to the Parties
included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
In the ﬁrst quantiﬁed emission limitation and reduction commitment period,
from 2008 to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall
be equal to the percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthro
pogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in
Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in accordance with
paragraph 5 above, multiplied by ﬁve. Those Parties included in Annex I for
whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas
emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources
minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for the purposes of cal
culating their assigned amount.
Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydroﬂuoro
carbons, perﬂuorocarbons and sulphur hexaﬂuoride, for the purposes of the
calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above.
Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be
established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted
in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the
consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the
ﬁrst commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.
Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or
of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.
Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of
Article 17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring
Party.
Any certiﬁed emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned
amount for the acquiring Party.
If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less
than its assigned amount under this Article, this di›erence shall, on request of
that Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent com
mitment periods.
Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments
mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social,
environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particu
larly those identiﬁed in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention. In line

 
with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the implementation
of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its ﬁrst session, consider what actions are nec
essary to minimize the adverse e›ects of climate change and/or the impacts of
response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues
to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer
of technology.
Article 4

1 Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulﬁl their
commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those com
mitments provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not
exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantiﬁed emission
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accor
dance with the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated
to each of the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement.
2 The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the
agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratiﬁcation, accep
tance or approval of this Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in
turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of the
agreement.
3 Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commit
ment period speciﬁed in Article 3, paragraph 7.
4 If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional
economic integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the
organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not a›ect existing commit
ments under this Protocol. Any alteration in the composition of the organiza
tion shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under Article 3
that are adopted subsequent to that alteration.
5 In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total
combined level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be
responsible for its own level of emissions set out in the agreement.
6 If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional
economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each
member State of that regional economic integration organization individually,
and together with the regional economic integration organization acting in
accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to achieve the total com
bined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions as
notiﬁed in accordance with this Article.
Article 5

1 Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior
to the start of the ﬁrst commitment period, a national system for the estima
tion of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all green
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such
national systems, which shall incorporate the methodologies speciﬁed in para
graph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its ﬁrst session.
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2 Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Pro
tocol shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session.
Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be
applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Par
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its ﬁrst session.
Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Techno
logical Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par
ties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such
methodologies and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant deci
sions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to methodologies or
adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining compliance
with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period
adopted subsequent to that revision.
3 The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equiva
lence of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of green
house gases listed in Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmen
tal Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties
at its third session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc
and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise
the global warming potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into
account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision
to a global warming potential shall apply only to commitments under Article 3
in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.
Article 6

1 For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party
included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party
emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthro
pogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that:
(a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved;
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an
enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would
otherwise occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance
with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.
2 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
may, at its ﬁrst session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guide
lines for the implementation of this Article,including for veriﬁcation and reporting.
3 A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under
its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition
under this Article of emission reduction units.

 
4 If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the require
ments referred to in this Article is identiﬁed in accordance with the relevant
provisions of Article 8, transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units
may continue to be made after the question has been identiﬁed, provided that
any such units may not be used by a Party to meet its commitments under Arti
cle 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved.
Article 7

1 Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the rel
evant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary
information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be
determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.
2 Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communica
tion, submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary infor
mation necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this
Protocol, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.
3 Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the ﬁrst inventory due under the
Convention for the ﬁrst year of the commitment period after this Protocol has
entered into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information
required under paragraph 2 above as part of the ﬁrst national communication
due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and
after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The fre
quency of subsequent submission of information required under this Article
shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for the submission
of national communications decided upon by the Conference of the Parties.
4 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall adopt at its ﬁrst session, and review periodically thereafter, guide
lines for the preparation of the information required under this Article, taking
into account guidelines for the preparation of national communications by
Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. The Con
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall
also, prior to the ﬁrst commitment period, decide upon modalities for the
accounting of assigned amounts.
Article 8

1 The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I
shall be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of
the Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for
this purpose by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par
ties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. The information submitted
under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be
reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inven
tories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under
Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as
part of the review of communications.
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2 Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be com
posed of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention
and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with
guidance provided for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties.
3 The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The
expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serv
ing as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation
of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential problems in,
and factors inﬂuencing, the fulﬁlment of commitments. Such reports shall be
circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat
shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such reports for fur
ther consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol.
4 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall adopt at its ﬁrst session, and review periodically thereafter, guide
lines for the review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams
taking into account the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.
5 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and,
as appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice,
consider:
(a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of
the expert reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and
(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under para
graph 3 above, as well as any questions raised by Parties.
6 Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5
above, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall take decisions on any matter required for the implementation of
this Protocol.
Article 9

1 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available sci
entiﬁc information and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well
as relevant technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be
coordinated with pertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular those
required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Con
vention. Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action.
2 The ﬁrst review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews
shall take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner.
Article 10

All Parties, taking into account their common but di›erentiated responsibilities
and their speciﬁc national and regional development priorities, objectives and cir
cumstances, without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included
in Annex I, but reaﬃrming existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of

 
the Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these com
mitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Arti
cle 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall:
(a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-e›ective national
and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of
local emission factors, activity data and/or models which reﬂect the socio
economic conditions of each Party for the preparation and periodic updat
ing of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Con
ference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for the preparation
of national communications adopted by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate cli
mate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate
change:
(i) Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, trans
port and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and
waste management. Furthermore, adaptation technologies and
methods for improving spatial planning would improve adap
tation to climate change; and
(ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action
under this Protocol, including national programmes, in accor
dance with Article 7; and other Parties shall seek to include in
their national communications, as appropriate, information on
programmes which contain measures that the Party believes
contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse
impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse
gas emissions, and enhancement of and removals by sinks,
capacity building and adaptation measures;
(c) Cooperate in the promotion of e›ective modalities for the development,
application and di›usion of, and take all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and ﬁnance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environ
mentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes perti
nent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including
the formulation of policies and programmes for the e›ective transfer of
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the
public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the pri
vate sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, envi
ronmentally sound technologies;
(d) Cooperate in scientiﬁc and technical research and promote the mainte
nance and the development of systematic observation systems and devel
opment of data archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate
system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the economic and social
consequences of various response strategies, and promote the develop
ment and strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to par
ticipate in international and intergovernmental e›orts, programmes and
networks on research and systematic observation, taking into account
Article 5 of the Convention;
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(e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropri
ate, using existing bodies, the development and implementation of educa
tion and training programmes, including the strengthening of national
capacity building, in particular human and institutional capacities and the
exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this ﬁeld, in par
ticular for developing countries, and facilitate at the national level public
awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change. Suit
able modalities should be developed to implement these activities through
the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the
Convention;
(f) Include in their national communications information on programmes
and activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with rele
vant decisions of the Conference of the Parties; and
(g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this
Article, to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention.
Article 11

1 In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provi
sions of Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention.
2 In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Conven
tion, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11
of the Convention, and through the entity or entities entrusted with the oper
ation of the ﬁnancial mechanism of the Convention, the developed country
Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention
shall:
(a) Provide new and additional ﬁnancial resources to meet the agreed full
costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implemen
tation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(a), of the
Convention that are covered in Article 10, subparagraph (a); and
(b) Also provide such ﬁnancial resources, including for the transfer of tech
nology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full
incremental costs of advancing the implementation of existing commit
ments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that are covered by
Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the
international entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention,
in accordance with that Article.
The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the
need for adequacy and predictability in the ﬂow of funds and the importance
of appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties. The guidance
to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the ﬁnancial mecha
nism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties,
including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the provisions of this paragraph.
3 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the
Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves
of, ﬁnancial resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral,
regional and other multilateral channels.

 
Article 12

1 A clean development mechanism is hereby deﬁned.
2 The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing
to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in
Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantiﬁed emission limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3.
3 Under the clean development mechanism:
(a) Parties not included in Annex I will beneﬁt from project activities result
ing in certiﬁed emission reductions; and
(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certiﬁed emission reductions
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part
of their quantiﬁed emission limitation and reduction commitments under
Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
4 The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guid
ance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to
this Protocol and be supervised by an executive board of the clean development
mechanism.
5 Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certiﬁed by
operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of:
(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;
(b) Real, measurable, and long-term beneﬁts related to the mitigation of cli
mate change; and
(c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the
absence of the certiﬁed project activity.
6 The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certi
ﬁed project activities as necessary.
7 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall, at its ﬁrst session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the
objective of ensuring transparency, eﬃciency and accountability through inde
pendent auditing and veriﬁcation of project activities.
8 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certiﬁed project activities is
used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate change
to meet the costs of adaptation.
9 Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities
mentioned in paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certiﬁed emission
reductions, may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to
whatever guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean devel
opment mechanism.
10 Certiﬁed emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000
up to the beginning of the ﬁrst commitment period can be used to assist in
achieving compliance in the ﬁrst commitment period.
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Article 13

1 The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
2 Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate
as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of
the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under
this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.
3 When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties repre
senting a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol,
shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst
the Parties to this Protocol.
4 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro
tocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its e›ective
implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol
and shall:
(a) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance
with the provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol
by the Parties, the overall e›ects of the measures taken pursuant to this
Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social e›ects as well
as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the
objective of the Convention is being achieved;
(b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol,
giving due consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph
2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in the light of the
objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation
and the evolution of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge, and in this
respect consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this
Protocol;
(c) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted
by the Parties to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into account
the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties
and their respective commitments under this Protocol;
(d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of mea
sures adopted by them to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into
account the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the
Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol;
(e) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention
and the provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the rele
vant decisions by the Conference of the Parties, the development and peri
odic reﬁnement of comparable methodologies for the e›ective imple
mentation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol;
(f) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation
of this Protocol;
(g) Seek to mobilize additional ﬁnancial resources in accordance with Article
11, paragraph 2;
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(h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the imple
mentation of this Protocol;
(i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and
information provided by, competent international organizations and
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and
(j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation
of this Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by
the Conference of the Parties.
The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and ﬁnancial proce
dures applied under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under
this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Confer
ence of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
The ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with
the ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date
of the entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Con
ference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Par
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be
deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that,
within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the sec
retariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not
party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as observers.
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non
governmental, which is qualiﬁed in matters covered by this Protocol and which
has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties pre
sent object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the
rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above.

Article 14

1 The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the sec
retariat of this Protocol.
2 Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the func
tioning of the secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. The sec
retariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol.
Article 15

1 The Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice and the Sub
sidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Con
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vention shall serve as, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Tech
nological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol.
The provisions relating to the functioning of these two bodies under the Con
vention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice and the Sub
sidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction
with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Tech
nological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Conven
tion.
2 Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as
observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the
subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions
under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.
3 When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention
exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any
member of the Bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the
Convention but, at that time, not a party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by
an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this
Protocol.
Article 16

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Proto
col shall, as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and
modify as appropriate, the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article
13 of the Convention, in the light of any relevant decisions that may be taken by
the Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consultative process that may be
applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the procedures and
mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18.
Article 17

The Conference of the Parties shall deﬁne the relevant principles, modalities, rules
and guidelines, in particular for veriﬁcation, reporting and accountability for
emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions
trading for the purposes of fulﬁlling their commitments under Article 3. Any such
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting
quantiﬁed emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.
Article 18

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Proto
col shall, at its ﬁrst session, approve appropriate and e›ective procedures and
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the pro
visions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of
consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non
compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.
Article 19

The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall
apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol.

 
Article 20

1 Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.
2 Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
The text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated
to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which
it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of
any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention
and, for information, to the Depositary.
3 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed
amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at
the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secre
tariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
4 Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with
the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above
shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day
after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at
least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.
5 The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day
after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument
of acceptance of the said amendment.
Article 21

1 Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise
expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a ref
erence to any annexes thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of
this Protocol shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descrip
tive nature that is of a scientiﬁc, technical, procedural or administrative character.
2 Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose
amendments to annexes to this Protocol.
3 Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be
adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or
amendment to an annex shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat
at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The
secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amend
ment to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for
information, to the Depositary.
4 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed annex
or amendment to an annex by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex
shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties
present and voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment to an
annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall
circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
5 An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been
adopted in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for
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all Parties to this Protocol six months after the date of the communication by
the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex or adoption of the
amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have notiﬁed the
Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex
or amendment to the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter
into force for Parties which withdraw their notiﬁcation of non-acceptance on
the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notiﬁcation has
been received by the Depositary.
6 If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amend
ment to this Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter
into force until such time as the amendment to this Protocol enters into force.
7 Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter
into force in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that
any amendment to Annex B shall be adopted only with the written consent of
the Party concerned.
Article 22

1 Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below.
2 Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their compe
tence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the
number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an orga
nization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises
its right, and vice versa.
Article 23

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Pro
tocol.
Article 24

1 This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratiﬁcation, acceptance
or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which
are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at United Nations
Headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol
shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which it is closed for
signature. Instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession shall
be deposited with the Depositary.
2 Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this
Protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all
the obligations under this Protocol. In the case of such organizations, one or
more of whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and
its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the per
formance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organiza
tion and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this
Protocol concurrently.
3 In their instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession, regional
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their compe
tence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organiza
tions shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of
any substantial modiﬁcation in the extent of their competence.

 
Article 25

1 This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in
Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon
dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited
their instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession.
2 For the purposes of this Article, “the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of
the Parties included in Annex I” means the amount communicated on or
before the date of adoption of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I
in their ﬁrst national communications submitted in accordance with Article 12
of the Convention.
3 For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratiﬁes,
accepts or approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out
in paragraph 1 above for entry into force have been fulﬁlled, this Protocol shall
enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instru
ment of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or accession.
4 For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional eco
nomic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those
deposited by States members of the organization.
Article 26

No reservations may be made to this Protocol.
Article 27

1 At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered
into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving
written notiﬁcation to the Depositary.
2 Any such withdrawal shall take e›ect upon expiry of one year from the date of
receipt by the Depositary of the notiﬁcation of withdrawal, or on such later
date as may be speciﬁed in the notiﬁcation of withdrawal.
3 Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also
having withdrawn from this Protocol.
Article 28

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russ
ian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
 at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-seven.
   the undersigned, being duly authorized to that e›ect,
have aﬃxed their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated.
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Annex A

Greenhouse gases
Carbon dioxide (CO2)
Methane (CH4)
Nitrous oxide (N2O)
Hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs)
Perﬂuorocarbons (PFCs)
Sulphur hexaﬂuoride (SF6)
Sectors/source categories
Energy
Fuel combustion
Energy industries
Manufacturing industries and construction
Transport
Other sectors
Other
Fugitive emissions from fuels
Solid fuels
Oil and natural gas
Other
Industrial processes
Mineral products
Chemical industry
Metal production
Other production
Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexaﬂuoride
Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexaﬂuoride
Other
Solvent and other product use
Agriculture
Enteric fermentation
Manure management
Rice cultivation
Agricultural soils
Prescribed burning of savannas
Field burning of agricultural residues
Other
Waste
Solid waste disposal on land
Wastewater handling
Waste incineration
Other

 
Annex B

Party

Quantiﬁed emission
limitation or reduction
commitment (percentage
of base year or period)

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Canada
Croatia*
Czech Republic*
Denmark
Estonia*
European Community
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary*
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia*
Liechtenstein
Lithuania*
Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland*
Portugal
Romania*
Russian Federation*
Slovakia*
Slovenia*
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine*
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

108
92
92
92
94
95
92
92
92
92
92
92
92
92
94
110
92
92
94
92
92
92
92
92
92
100
101
94
92
92
100
92
92
92
92
92
100
92
93

* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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Glossary 1
Absorption of Radiation: The uptake of radiation by a solid body, liquid or gas. The
absorbed energy may be transferred or re-emitted.
Activities implemented jointly (aij): Under a pilot phase that ends by 2000, AIJ activ
ities can be carried out through partnerships between an investor from a devel
oped country and a counterpart in a host country. The purpose is to involve pri
vate-sector money in the transfer of technology and know-how. See also Joint
Implementation.
Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (agbm): A subsidiary body created by cop-1 to
conduct the talks that led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol; the agbm con
cluded its final meeting on 30 November 1997.
Aerosols: Particles of matter, solid or liquid, larger than a molecule but small enough
to remain suspended in the atmosphere. Natural sources include salt particles
from sea spray and clay particles as a result of weathering of rocks, both of which
are carried upward by the wind. Aerosols can also originate as a result of human
activities and in this case are often considered pollutants. See also Sulfate
Aerosols.
Albedo: The ratio of reflected to incident light; albedo can be expressed as either a
percentage or a fraction of 1. Snow covered areas have a high albedo (up to about
0.9 or 90%) due to their white color, while vegetation has a low albedo (generally
about 0.1 or 10%) due to the dark color and light absorbed for photosynthesis.
Clouds have an intermediate albedo and are the most important contributor to
the Earth’s albedo. The Earth’s aggregate albedo is approximately 0.3.
Alliance of Small Island States (aosis): The Alliance of Small Island States is an ad
hoc coalition of low-lying and island countries. These countries are particularly
vulnerable to sea-level rise and share common positions on climate change. The
42 members and observers are American Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Fed
erated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Grenada, Guam, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica,
Kiribati,Maldives,Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru,Netherlands Antilles,
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Singa
pore, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, US Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu.
Annex I Parties: Industrialized countries that, as parties to the Framework Conven
tion on Climate Change, have pledged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
by the year 2000 to 1990 levels. Annex I Parties consist of countries belonging to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) and coun
tries designated as Economies-in-Transition.

1 This glossary was compiled
from the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s Global
Warming Glossary,
http://www.epa.gov/oppeoee1/
globalwarming/glossary.html,
and the UN Framework Con
vention on Climate Change
Glossary, http://www.unfccc.de/
siteinfo/glossary.html.
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Annex II Parties: The rich countries listed in this annex to the Convention have a spe
cial obligation to help developing countries with financial and technological
resources. They include the 24 original OECD members plus the European Union.
Anthropogenic: Derived from human activities.
Atmosphere: The mixture of gases surrounding the Earth. The Earth’s atmosphere
consists of about 79.1% nitrogen (by volume), 20.9% oxygen, 0.036% carbon diox
ide and trace amounts of other gases. The atmosphere can be divided into a
number of layers according to its mixing or chemical characteristics, generally
determined by its thermal properties (temperature). The layer nearest the Earth
is the troposphere, which reaches up to an altitude of about 8 km (about 5 miles)
in the polar regions and up to 17 km (nearly 11 miles) above the equator. The
stratosphere, which reaches to an altitude of about 50 km (31 miles) lies atop the
troposphere. The mesosphere which extends up to 80-90 km is atop the stratos
phere, and finally, the thermosphere, or ionosphere, gradually diminishes and
forms a fuzzy border with outer space. There is relatively little mixing of gases
between layers.
Article 4.1: This Convention article contains general commitments for all Parties 
developing and developed.
Article 4.2: This Convention article contains specific commitments for developed
country (Annex I) Parties only, notably to take measures aimed at returning
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
Baseline Emissions: The emissions that would occur without policy intervention (in
a business-as-usual scenario). Baseline estimates are needed to determine the
e≠ectiveness of emissions reduction programs (often called mitigation strate
gies).
Berlin Mandate: Adopted at cop-1, the Berlin Mandate launched the talks that led to
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
Biogeochemical Cycle: The chemical interactions that take place among the atmos
phere, biosphere , hydrosphere, and geosphere.
Biomass: Organic nonfossil material of biological origin. For example, trees and
plants are biomass.
Biomass Energy:Energy produced by combusting renewable biomass materials such
as wood. The carbon dioxide emitted from burning biomass will not increase
total atmospheric carbon dioxide if this consumption is done on a sustainable
basis (i.e., if in a given period of time, regrowth of biomass takes up as much
carbon dioxide as is released from biomass combustion). Biomass energy is often
suggested as a replacement for fossil fuel combustion which has large green
house gas emissions.
Biosphere: The region on land, in the oceans, and in the atmosphere inhabited by
living organisms.
Carbon Cycle: The global scale exchange of carbon among its reservoirs, namely the
atmosphere, oceans, vegetation, soils, and geologic deposits and minerals. This
involves components in food chains, in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, in the
hydrosphere and in the geosphere.
Carbon Dioxide (CO2): The greenhouse gas whose concentration is being most
a≠ected directly by human activities. CO2 also serves as the reference to compare
all other greenhouse gases (see carbon dioxide equivalents). The major source of
CO2 emissions is fossil fuel combustion. CO2 emissions are also a product of forest
clearing, biomass burning, and non-energy production processes such as cement

 
production. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have been increasing at a rate of
about 0.5% per year and are now about 30% above preindustrial levels.
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (cde): A metric measure used to compare the emissions
from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential
(gwp). Carbon dioxide equivalents are commonly expressed as “million metric
tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (mmtcde)” or “million short tons of carbon
dioxide equivalents (mstcde)”The carbon dioxide equivalent for a gas is derived
by multiplying the tons of the gas by the associated gwp.
Carbon Dioxide Fertilization: An expression (sometimes reduced to ‘fertilization’)
used to denote increased plant growth due to a higher carbon dioxide concen
tration.
Carbon Equivalent (ce). A metric measure used to compare the emissions of the
di≠erent greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential (gwp).
Greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. are most commonly expressed as “million
metric tons of carbon equivalents”(mmtce). Global warming potentials are used
to convert greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide equivalents. Carbon dioxide
equivalents can then be converted to carbon equivalents by multiplying the
carbon dioxide equivalents by 12/44 (the ratio of the molecular weight of carbon
to carbon dioxide). Thus, the formula to derive carbon equivalents is:
Carbon Sequestration. The uptake and storage of carbon. Trees and plants, for exam
ple, absorb carbon dioxide, release the oxygen and store the carbon. Fossil fuels
were at one time biomass and continue to store the carbon until burned.
Carbon Sinks: Carbon reservoirs and conditions that take in and store more carbon
(carbon sequestration) than they release. Carbon sinks can serve to partially
o≠set greenhouse gas emissions. Forests and oceans are common carbon sinks.
Chlorofluorocarbons and Related Compounds: This family of anthropogenic com
pounds includes chlorofluorcarbons (cfcs), bromofluorcarbons (halons), methyl
chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, methyl bromide, and hydrochlorofluorcarbons
(hcfcs). These compounds have been shown to deplete stratospheric ozone, and
therefore are typically referred to as ozone depleting substances.The most ozonedepleting of these compounds are being phased out under the Montreal Protocol.
Clean Development Mechanism (cdm): The Kyoto Protocol establishes the cdm to
enable industrialized countries to finance emissions-avoiding projects in devel
oping countries and receive credit for doing so.
Climate: The average weather (usually taken over a 30-year time period) for a partic
ular region and time period. Climate is not the same as weather, but rather, it is
the average pattern of weather for a particular region. Weather describes the
short-term state of the atmosphere. Climatic elements include precipitation,
temperature, humidity, sunshine, wind velocity, phenomena such as fog, frost,
and hail storms, and other measures of the weather.
Climate Change (also referred to as ‘global climate change’): The term ‘climate
change’ is sometimes used to refer to all forms of climatic inconsistency, but
because the Earth’s climate is never static, the term is more properly used to
imply a significant change from one climatic condition to another. In some cases,
‘climate change’ has been used synonymously with the term, ‘global warming’;
scientists however, tend to use the term in the wider sense to also include nat
ural changes in climate. See also Enhanced Greenhouse E≠ect.
Climate Change Action Plan. Unveiled in October, 1993 by President Clinton, the ccap
is the U.S. plan for meeting its pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under
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the terms of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc). The goal of
the ccap is to reduce U.S. emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases to 1990
levels by the year 2000. The ccap, which consists of some 50 voluntary federal
programs that span all sectors of the economy, uses a win-win approach by help
ing program partners save energy, save money, and gain access to clean technol
ogy while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate Feedback: An atmospheric, oceanic, terrestrial, or other process that is acti
vated by the direct climate change induced by changes in radiative forcing. Cli
mate feedbacks may increase (positive feedback) or diminish (negative feedback)
the magnitude of the direct climate change.
Climate Model: A quantitative way of representing the interactions of the atmos
phere, oceans, land surface, and ice. Models can range from relatively simple to
quite comprehensive. Also see General Circulation Model.
Climate Modeling:The simulation of the climate using computer-based models. Also
see General Circulation Model.
Climate System (or Earth System): The atmosphere, the oceans, the biosphere, the
cryosphere, and the geosphere, together make up the climate system.
Cogeneration: The process by which two di≠erent and useful forms of energy are
produced at the same time. For example, while boiling water to generate elec
tricity, the leftover steam can be sold for industrial processes or space heating.
Conference of the Parties (cop): The cop is the collection of nations that have ratified
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc), currently over 150 strong,
and about 50 Observer States. The primary role of the cop is to keep the imple
mentation of the Convention under review and to take the decisions necessary for
the e≠ective implementation of the Convention.The first cop (cop 1) took place in
Berlin,Germany from March 28th to April 7th,1995,and was attended by over 1000
observers and 2000 media representatives; cop-2 was in Geneva from 8 to 19 July
1996, cop-3 was in Kyoto, Japan from 1 to 11 December 1997, cop-4 was in Buenos
Aires, Argentina from 2–13 November 1998, cop-5 was from 25 October to 5
November 1999, and cop -6 will be in the Hague from 13 to 14 November 2000.
cop/mop: The Kyoto Protocol’s supreme body will be the cop, which will serve as
the Protocol’s meeting of the Parties. The sessions of the cop and the cop/mop
will be held during the same period.This will improve cost-e≠ectiveness and coor
dination with the Convention.
Deforestation: Those practices or processes that result in the change of forested
lands to non-forest uses. This is often cited as one of the major causes of the
enhanced greenhouse e≠ect for two reasons: 1) the burning or decomposition of
the wood releases carbon dioxide; and 2) trees that once removed carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere in the process of photosynthesis are no longer present and
contributing to carbon storage.
Desertification: The progressive destruction or degradation of existing vegetative
cover to form desert. This can occur due to overgrazing, deforestation, drought,
and the burning of extensive areas. Once formed, deserts can only support a
sparse range of vegetation. Climatic e≠ects associated with this phenomenon
include increased albedo, reduced atmospheric humidity, and greater atmos
pheric dust (aerosol) loading.
Economies in Transition (eit): Those Central and East European countries and former
republics of the Soviet Union that are in transition to a market economy.
El Niño: A climatic phenomenon occurring irregularly, but generally every 3 to 5 years.

 
El Niños often first become evident during the Christmas season (El Niño means
Christ child) in the surface oceans of the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The phe
nomenon involves seasonal changes in the direction of the tropical winds over
the Pacific and abnormally warm surface ocean temperatures.The changes in the
tropics are most intense in the Pacific region, these changes can disrupt weather
patterns throughout the tropics and can extend to higher latitudes, especially in
Central and North America. The relationship between these events and global
weather patterns are currently the subject of much research in order to enhance
prediction of seasonal to interannual fluctuations in the climate.
Emissions: The release of a substance (usually a gas when referring to the subject of
climate change) into the atmosphere.
Emissions Trading: The Kyoto Protocol establishes a mechanism whereby Parties
with emissions commitments may trade their emission allowances with other
Parties. The aim is to improve the overall flexibility and economic e≤ciency of
making emissions cuts.
Enhanced Greenhouse Effect: The natural greenhouse e≠ect has been enhanced by
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Increased concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, cfcs, hfcs, pfcs, SF6, NF3, and other
photochemically important gases caused by human activities such as fossil fuel
consumption and adding waste to landfills, trap more infra-red radiation,
thereby exerting a warming influence on the climate. See Climate Change and
Global Warming.
Entry into Force: Intergovernmental agreements, including protocols and amend
ments, are not legally binding until they have been ratified by a certain number
of countries; the Climate Change Convention required 50 and enters into force for
each new Party 90 days after it ratifies.
Evapotranspiration: The sum of evaporation and plant transpiration. Potential evap
otranspiration is the amount of water that could be evaporated or transpired at
a given temperature and humidity, if there was plenty of water available. Actual
evapotranspiration can not be any greater than precipitation, and will usually be
less because some water will run o≠ in rivers and flow to the oceans. If potential
evapotranspiration is greater than actual precipitation, then soils are extremely
dry during at least a major part of the year.
Financial Mechanism: As defined by the Convention, its role is to transfer funds and
technologies to developing countries on a grant or consessional basis, under the
guidance of the cop. The Global Environment Facility is “operating” the mecha
nism on an interim basis.
Fluorocarbons: Carbon-fluorine compounds that often contain other elements such
as hydrogen, chlorine, or bromine. Common fluorocarbons include chlorofluoro
carbons and related compounds (also know as ozone depleting substances),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorcarbons (pfcs).
Forcing Mechanism: A process that alters the energy balance of the climate system,
i.e. changes the relative balance between incoming solar radiation and outgoing
infrared radiation from Earth. Such mechanisms include changes in solar irradi
ance, volcanic eruptions, and enhancement of the natural greenhouse e≠ect by
emission of carbon dioxide.
Fossil Fuel: A general term for combustible geologic deposits of carbon in reduced
(organic) form and of biological origin, including coal, oil, natural gas, oil shales,
and tar sands. A major concern is that they emit carbon dioxide into the atmos
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phere when burnt, thus significantly contributing to the enhanced greenhouse
e≠ect.
Fossil Fuel Combustion: Burning of coal, oil (including gasoline), or natural gas. This
burning, usually to generate energy, releases carbon dioxide, as well as combus
tion by products that can include unburned hydrocarbons, methane, and carbon
monoxide. Carbon monoxide, methane, and many of the unburned hydrocarbons
slowly oxidize into carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Common sources of fossil
fuel combustion include cars and electric utilities.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc): The landmark international
treaty unveiled at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop
ment (unced, also known as the “Rio Summit”), in June 1992. The fccc commits
signatory countries to stabilize anthropogenic (i.e., human-induced) greenhouse
gas emissions to ‘levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer
ence with the climate system’. The fccc also requires that all signatory parties
develop and update national inventories of anthropogenic emissions of all green
house gases not otherwise controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Out of 155 coun
tries that have ratified this accord, the U.S. was the first industrialized nation to
do so.
General Circulation Model (GCM): A global, three-dimensional computer model of
the climate system which can be used to simulate human-induced climate
change. GCMs are highly complex and they represent the e≠ects of such factors
as reflective and absorptive properties of atmospheric water vapor, greenhouse
gas concentrations, clouds, annual and daily solar heating, ocean temperatures
and ice boundaries. The most recent GCMs include global representations of the
atmosphere, oceans, and land surface.
Geosphere: The soils, sediments, and rock layers of the Earth’s crust, both continen
tal and beneath the ocean floors.
Global Environment Facility (gef): The multi-billion-dollar gef was established by
the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment Programme in 1990. It operates the Convention’s “financial mechanism” on an
interim basis and funds developing country projects that have global climate
change benefits.
Global Warming: An increase in the near surface temperature of the Earth. Global
warming has occurred in the distant past as the result of natural influences, but
the term is most often used to refer to the warming predicted to occur as a result
of increased emissions of greenhouse gases. Scientists generally agree that the
Earth’s surface has warmed by about 1 degree Fahrenheit in the past 140 years.The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) recently concluded that
increased concentrations of greenhouse gases are causing an increase in the
Earth’s surface temperature and that increased concentrations of sulfate aerosols
have led to relative cooling in some regions, generally over and downwind of heav
ily industrialized areas. Also see Climate Change and Enhanced Greenhouse E≠ect.
Global Warming Potential (gwp): The index used to translate the level of emissions
of various gases into a common measure in order to compare the relative radia
tive forcing of di≠erent gases without directly calculating the changes in atmos
pheric concentrations. gwps are calculated as the ratio of the radiative forcing
that would result from the emissions of one kilogram of a greenhouse gas to that
from emission of one kilogram of carbon dioxide over a period of time (usually
100 years). Gases involved in complex atmospheric chemical processes have not
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been assigned gwps due to complications that
gwps for greenhouse gases
arise. Greenhouse gases are expressed in terms of
gas
gwp 1990
gwp 1996
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. The International
Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) has presented
Carbon Dioxide
1
1
Methane
22
21
these gwps and regularly updates them in new
Nitrous Oxide
270
310
assessments. The chart at right shows the origi
HFC-134a
1,200
1,300
nal gwps (assigned in 1990) and the most recent
HFC-23
10,000
11,700
HFC-152a
150
140
gwps (assigned in 1996) for the most important
HCF-125
NA*
2,800
greenhouse gases.
PFCs**
5,400
7,850
Greenhouse Effect: The e≠ect produced as greenSF6
NA*
23,900
house gases allow incoming solar radiation to
*Not Applicable. GWP was not yet estimated for this gas.
pass through the Earth’s atmosphere, but prevent **This figure is an average GWP for the two PFCs, CF4 and C2F6.
most of the outgoing infra-red radiation from the
surface and lower atmosphere from escaping
into outer space. This process occurs naturally and has kept the Earth’s tempera
ture about 59 degrees F warmer than it would otherwise be. Current life on Earth
could not be sustained without the natural greenhouse e≠ect.
Greenhouse Gas (ghg). Any gas that absorbs infra-red radiation in the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), halogenated fluorocarbons (hcfcs) , ozone (O3), perfluori
nated carbons (pfcs), and hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs).
Group of 77 and China: The g-77 was founded in 1967 under the auspices of the
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (unctad). It seeks to har
monize the negotiating positions of its 132 developing-country members.
Hot Air: Refers to the concern that some governments will be able to meet their com
mitment targets with minimal e≠ort and could then flood the market for emis
sions credits, reducing the incentive for other countries to cut their own domes
tic emissions.
Hydrocarbons: Substances containing only hydrogen and carbon. Fossil fuels are
made up of hydrocarbons. Some hydrocarbon compounds are major air pollu
tants.
Hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs). These chemicals (along with perfluorocarbons) were
introduced as alternatives to ozone depleting substances in serving many indus
trial, commercial, and personal needs. HFCs are emitted as by-products of indus
trial processes and are also used in manufacturing. They do not significantly
deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, but they are powerful greenhouse gases
with global warming potentials ranging from 140 (hfc-152a) to 12,100 (hfc-23).
Hydrosphere: The part of the Earth composed of water including clouds, oceans,
seas, ice caps, glaciers, lakes, rivers, underground water supplies, and atmospheric
water vapor.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc): The ipcc was established jointly
by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological
Organization in 1988. The purpose of the ipcc is to assess information in the sci
entific and technical literature related to all significant components of the issue of
climate change. The ipcc draws upon hundreds of the world’s expert scientists as
authors and thousands as expert reviewers. Leading experts on climate change
and environmental, social, and economic sciences from some 60 nations have
helped the ipcc to prepare periodic assessments of the scientific underpinnings
for understanding global climate change and its consequences. With its capacity
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for reporting on climate change, its consequences, and the viability of adaptation
and mitigation measures, the ipcc is also looked to as the o≤cial advisory body to
the world’s governments on the state of the science of the climate change issue.
For example, the ipcc organized the development of internationally accepted
methods for conducting national greenhouse gas emission inventories.
Joint Implementation: Agreements made between two or more nations under the
auspices of the Framework Convention on Climate Change to help reduce green
house gas emissions.
Lifetime (Atmospheric): The lifetime of a greenhouse gas refers to the approximate
amount of time it would take for the anthropogenic increment to an atmos
pheric pollutant concentration to return to its natural level (assuming emissions
cease) as a result of either being converted to another chemical compound or
being taken out of the atmosphere via a sink. This time depends on the pollu
tant’s sources and sinks as well as its reactivity.The lifetime of a pollutant is often
considered in conjunction with the mixing of pollutants in the atmosphere; a
long lifetime will allow the pollutant to mix throughout the atmosphere. Aver
age lifetimes can vary from about a week (sulfate aerosols) to more than a cen
tury (CFCs, carbon dioxide).
Mechanisms: The Kyoto Protocol establishes three mechanisms to increase the flex
ibility and reduce the costs of making emissions cuts; these are the Clean Devel
opment Mechanism, emissions trading, and joint implementation.
Methane (CH4): A hydrocarbon that is a greenhouse gas with a global warming
potential most recently estimated at 24.5. Methane is produced through anaero
bic (without oxygen) decomposition of waste in landfills, animal digestion,
decomposition of animal wastes, production and distribution of natural gas and
oil, coal production , and incomplete fossil fuel combustion.The atmospheric con
centration of methane has been shown to be increasing at a rate of about 0.6%
per year and the concentration of about 1.7 parts per million by volume (ppmv) is
more than twice its preindustrial value. However, the rate of increase of methane
in the atmosphere may be stabilizing.
Metric Ton:Common international measurement for the quantity of greenhouse gas
emissions. A metric ton is equal to 2205 lbs or 1.1 short tons.
National communications: A central requirement of the Convention (and the Proto
col) is that each Party must inform the others about its national climate change
activities. Many developed countries have submitted their second reports and
developing countries have started to submit their first.
National Delegation: One or more o≤cials who are empowered to represent and
negotiate on behalf of their government.
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx): Gases consisting of one molecule of nitrogen and varying
numbers of oxygen molecules. Nitrogen oxides are produced in the emissions of
vehicle exhausts and from power stations. In the atmosphere, nitrogen oxides
can contribute to formation of photochemical ozone (smog), can impair visibility,
and have health consequences; they are thus considered pollutants.
Non-Governmental Organizations (ngos): Many relevant ngos attend the climate
talks as observers in order to interact with delegates and the press and provide infor
mation. ngos must be non-profit and can include environmental groups, research
institutions, business groups, and associations of urban and local governments.
Non-Party: A state that has not ratified the Convention may attend talks as an
observer.

 
Observer: The cop and its subsidiary bodies normally permit observers to attend
their sessions. Observers may include the United Nations and its specialized
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, non-Party states, and other rel
evant governmental or non-governmental organizations.
oecd: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development consists of
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Japan, Luxem
bourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the uk, and the us.
Ozone (O3): Ozone consists of three atoms of oxygen bonded together in contrast to
normal atmospheric oxygen which consists of two atoms of oxygen. Ozone is an
important greenhouse gas found in both the stratosphere (about 90% of the
total atmospheric loading) and the troposphere (about 10%). Ozone has other
e≠ects beyond acting as a greenhouse gas. In the stratosphere, ozone provides a
protective layer shielding the Earth from ultraviolet radiation and subsequent
harmful health e≠ect on humans and the environment. In the troposphere,
oxygen molecules in ozone combine with other chemicals and gases (oxidiza
tion) to cause smog.
Particulates: Tiny pieces of solid or liquid matter, such as soot, dust, fumes, or mist.
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organization such as the eu) that
agrees to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has entered into force.
Perfluorocarbons (pfcs). A group of human-made chemicals composed of carbon
and fluorine only: CF4 and C2F6. These chemicals, specifically CF4 and C2F6, (along
with hydrofluorocarbons) were introduced as alternatives to the ozone depleting
substances. In addition, they are emitted as by-products of industrial processes
and are also used in manufacturing. pfcs do not harm the stratospheric ozone
layer, but they are powerful greenhouse gases: CF4 has a global warming poten
tial (gwp) of 6,300 and C2F6 has a gwp of 12,500.
Photosynthesis: The process by which green plants use light to synthesize organic
compounds from carbon dioxide and water. In the process oxygen and water are
released. Increased levels of carbon dioxide can increase net photosynthesis in
some plants. Plants create a very important reservoir for carbon dioxide.
Policies and Measures: Countries must decide what policies and measures to adopt
in order to achieve their emissions targets. Some possible policies and measures
which Parties could implement are listed in the Kyoto Protocol and could o≠er
opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation.
Precautionary Approach: The approach promoted under the Framework Convention
of Climate Change to help achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference
with the climate system.
Protocol: A protocol is linked to an existing convention, but it is a separate and addi
tional agreement that must be signed and ratified by the Parties to the conven
tion. Protocols typically strengthen a convention by adding new, more detailed
commitments.
Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Commitments: Legally-binding tar
gets and timetables under the Kyoto Protocol for the limitation or reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions for developed countries.
Radiation. Energy emitted in the form of electromagnetic waves. Radiation has
di≠ering characteristics depending upon the wavelength. Because the radiation
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from the Sun is relatively energetic, it has a short wavelength (ultra-violet, visible,
and near infra-red) while energy re-radiated from the Earth’s surface and the
atmosphere has a longer wavelength (infra-red radiation) because the Earth is
cooler than the Sun.
Radiative Forcing: A change in the balance between incoming solar radiation and
outgoing infra-red radiation. Without any radiative forcing, solar radiation
coming to the Earth would continue to be approximately equal to the infra-red
radiation emitted from the Earth. The addition of greenhouse gases traps and
increased fraction of the infra-red radiation, reradiating it back toward the sur
face and creating a warming influence (i.e., positive radiative forcing because
incoming solar radiation will exceed outgoing infra-red radiation).
Ratification: After signing the Convention or the Protocol, a country must ratify it,
often with the approval of its parliament or other legislature. The instrument of
ratification must be deposited with the depositary (in this case the UN SecretaryGeneral) to start the 90-day countdown to becoming a Party.
Regional Groups: The five regional groups meet privately to discuss issues and nom
inate bureau members and other o≤cials. They are Africa, Asia, Central and East
ern Europe (cee), Latin America and the Caribbean (grulac), and the Western
Europe and Others Group (weog).
Residence Time: The average time spent in a reservoir by an individual atom or mol
ecule. Also, the age of a molecule when it leaves the reservoir. With respect to
greenhouse gases, residence time usually refers to how long a particular mole
cule remains in the atmosphere.
Second Assessment Report (sar): Also known as Climate Change 1995, the ipcc’s
sar was written and reviewed by some 2,000 scientists and experts world-wide.
It concluded that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible
human influence on global climate” and confirmed the availability of “no-regrets”
options and other cost-e≠ective strategies for combating climate change.
Secretariat: Sta≠ed by international civil servants and responsible for servicing the
cop and ensuring its smooth operation, the secretariat makes arrangements for
meetings, compiles and prepares reports, and coordinates with other relevant
international bodies. The Climate Change secretariat is institutionally linked to
the United Nations.
Signature: The head of state or government, the foreign minister, or another desig
nated o≤cial indicates his or her country’s agreement with the adopted text of
the Convention or the Protocol and its intention to become a Party by signing.
Sink: A reservoir that uptakes a pollutant from another part of its cycle. Soil and trees
tend to act as natural sinks for carbon.
Short Ton. Common measurement for a ton in the United States. A short ton is equal
to 2,000 lbs or 0.907 metric tons.
Solar Radiation. Energy from the Sun. Also referred to as short-wave radiation. Of
importance to the climate system, solar radiation includes ultra-violet radiation,
visible radiation, and infra-red radiation.
Stratosphere: The part of the atmosphere directly above the troposphere. See
Atmosphere.
Subsidiary Body: A committee that assists the Conference of the Parties. Two per
manent ones are defined by the Convention: the Subsidiary Body for Implemen
tation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. COP-1 also
established two other temporary bodies: the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Man

 
date, which concluded its work on 30 November 1997, and the Ad hoc Group on
Article 13. Additional subsidiary bodies may be established as needed.
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2): A compound composed of one sulfur and two oxygen mole
cules. Sulfur dioxide emitted into the atmosphere through natural and anthro
pogenic processes is changed in a complex series of chemical reactions in the
atmosphere to sulfate aerosols.These aerosols result in negative radiative forcing
(i.e., tending to cool the Earth’s surface).
Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6). A very powerful greenhouse gas used primarily in electri
cal transmission and distribution systems. SF6 has a global warming potential of
24,900.
Sulfate Aerosol: Particulate matter that consists of compounds of sulfur formed by
the interaction of sulfur dioxide and sulfur trioxide with other compounds in the
atmosphere. Sulfate aerosols are injected into the atmosphere from the com
bustion of fossil fuels and the eruption of volcanoes like Mt. Pinatubo. Recent
theory suggests that sulfate aerosols may lower the earth’s temperature by
reflecting away solar radiation (negative radiative forcing). Global Climate
Models which incorporate the e≠ects of sulfate aerosols more accurately predict
global temperature variations.
Third Assessment Report (tar): The ipcc’s Third Assessment Report is expected to
be finalized in late 2000 and published in early 2001.
Trace Gas: Any one of the less common gases found in the Earth’s atmosphere. Nitro
gen, oxygen, and argon make up more than 99 percent of the Earth’s atmosphere.
Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, oxides of nitrogen,
ozone, and ammonia, are considered trace gases. Although relatively unimpor
tant in terms of their absolute volume, they have significant e≠ects on the Earth’s
weather and climate.
Troposphere: The lowest layer of the atmosphere.The troposphere extends from the
Earth’s surface up to about 10-15 km. See also Atmosphere.
Tropospheric Ozone (O3). Ozone that is located in the troposphere and plays a signifi
cant role in the greenhouse gas e≠ect and urban smog. See Ozone for more details.
Tropospheric Ozone Precursor: Gases that influence the rate at which ozone is cre
ated and destroyed in the atmosphere. Such gases include: carbon monoxide
(CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and nonmethane volatile organic compounds
(NMVOCs).
Voluntary Commitments: During the Kyoto negotiations, a draft article that would
have permitted developing countries to voluntary adhere to legally binding emis
sions targets was dropped in the final hours. This issue remains important for
some negotiators and may be discussed in Buenos Aires.
Water Vapor: The most abundant greenhouse gas, it is the water present in the
atmosphere in gaseous form. Water vapor is an important part of the natural
greenhouse e≠ect. While humans are not significantly increasing its concentra
tion, it contributes to the enhanced greenhouse e≠ect because the warming
influence of greenhouse gases leads to a positive water vapor feedback. In addi
tion to its role as a natural greenhouse gas, water vapor plays an important role
in regulating the temperature of the planet because clouds form when excess
water vapor in the atmosphere condenses to form ice and water droplets and pre
cipitation.
Weather: Weather is the specific condition of the atmosphere at a particular place
and time. It is measured in terms of such things as wind, temperature, humidity,
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atmospheric pressure, cloudiness, and precipitation. In most places, weather can
change from hour-to-hour, day-to-day, and season-to-season. Climate is the aver
age of weather over time and space. A simple way of remembering the di≠erence
is that ‘climate’ is what you expect (e.g., cold winters) and ‘weather’ is what you
get (e.g., a blizzard).

